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The purpose of this thesis is to rationalise the law on contractual joint ventures, in the sense of 
rendering it consistent with its own fundamental tenets and declared objectives. The declared 
objective of contract law is to give effect to the intentions of reasonable persons, whom the law 
presumes to be self-interested by default. To this end, this thesis argues for a new legal model 
to govern the contractual (project-specific) joint venture, which centres on the joint venture 
contract but is fundamentally augmented through the application of default, mutually binding, 
fiduciary duties. By applying David Gauthier’s take on rational choice theory in the context of 
cooperation, the thesis demonstrates that submitting to default duties of this type is the long-
term utility maximising strategy for self-interested commercial parties who have chosen to 
cooperate. For this reason, it argues that English law should imply fiduciary duties into the joint 
venture contract by default on the basis that this is what the co-venturers would have intended 
had they properly reflected on what their long-term self-interest requires.  
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1 INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1 Joint ventures and the law 
Let us imagine a common commercial scenario. Two companies of equal bargaining 
power and means decide to pool resources to jointly exploit a capital-intensive 
opportunity. For the purposes of our example, the nature of the opportunity is 
immaterial. It could be a project to research, develop and market a new technology, the 
exploration for and development of an oil field offshore Brazil, or the development of 
a screenplay into a movie for worldwide release. The key feature is that the opportunity 
at issue is capital-intensive, and therefore risky, and for this reason our companies have 
decided to cooperate. In doing so they have dedicated time and finance to determine 
the details of their relationship, in both legal and financial terms. Thus, they form a 
‘joint venture’. 
In the eyes of the law, a joint venture is a curious beast. The relationship between the 
parties is founded on the exchange of promises and therefore, in law, invariably 
involves a contract. Whether express or implied, this contract sets out the parameters 
of the relationship in terms of legally enforceable rights and duties. But the legal 
framework applicable to the relationship can be much wider than what the contract 
suggests and, in some cases, antagonistic to the parties’ intentions. What then is the 
appropriate legal response to our companies when, in the course of their joint venture, 
they each come across opportunities for profit at the expense of the other? The joint 
venture does not have a distinct status in law, so the applicable legal framework will be 
determined by the form attributed to the relationship by the parties themselves. Where 
that form is expressly recognised in law (such as a corporation or a partnership), the 
attached framework allows the parties to predict the consequences of their decisions in 
the context of the joint venture. But vagueness abounds where the parties simply rely 
on the contract between them to encapsulate their relationship, which they are wont to 
do (see 2.5.2). In this case, the co-venturers are faced with three possibilities: (a) they 
are deemed to be in an ‘arm’s length relationship’ with any dispute addressed with sole 
reference to their contract; (b) they are deemed to be, in fact, partners in law; or (c) they 
are not partners but are deemed to be in a relationship closer than what ‘the arm’s 
length’ characterisation entails. 
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The consequences in each case vary and their impact can be legally and financially 
devastating for the co-venturers, both collectively and individually. For instance, 
should they be identified as partners, partnership law will apply by default, the contract 
itself coming second to the overall partnership regime. In and of itself, this eventuality 
should not be as devastating an issue for the co-venturers, who may well take measures 
to mitigate the consequences of partnership law from the outset, e.g. by laying out a 
detailed dispute resolution mechanism in the contract, avoiding court involvement. The 
trouble here is with the operation of the partnership regime itself. As I argue in chapter 
3, with the meteoric rise of the joint venture model, the law has not caught up with the 
needs of the parties to the venture, which is evident from the regime’s reliance on the 
ancient tenets of partnership law to tackle any disputes between co-venturers. 
Consequently, the current law is geared towards parties whose relationship has broken 
down, rather than those who simply wish to resolve a dispute and move on with their 
collaboration. This makes partnership law an inappropriate regime to apply to joint 
ventures 
Having said that, even if their relationship does not satisfy the broad criteria for a 
partnership, co-venturers may still face outside interference on the basis that their 
relationship is not in fact an arm’s length one, i.e. one where the only connection 
between the parties is the contract pertaining to the joint venture. In this case, the 
problem lies not in the concept of the law’s interfering in the contractual relationship 
of private parties, but rather in the manner in which this jurisdiction is implemented. 
As chapter 4 demonstrates, the court has interfered on several occasions with 
commercial relationships that have been classically defined as arm’s length (either 
because they involve a one-off exchange or even no bargain at all), on the ground that 
such interference was warranted in the interests of equity and justice. The court did this 
by implying equitable duties into the relationship, inferring breach of those duties from 
the facts and, consequently, awarding significant equitable remedies. Naturally, there 
is no set definition of what is just and equitable so as not to unnecessarily restrict the 
equitable jurisdiction. 1  The same holds for the courts’ interference with on-going 
collaborative relationships, where the parties have expressly dismissed attributes of 
their respective roles that would suggest the basis of a fiduciary relationship. Even in 
																																																													
1 This is not say that there are no delimiting parameters applying to the equitable jurisdiction itself, for 
there are strict rules as to when the equitable jurisdiction of the court can arise. 
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those cases, the court may well find that the joint venture relationship gives rise to 
equitable duties, known as fiduciary duties, discussed in chapter 6. The obvious 
downside of this is that in both cases the implication of additional duties into an existing 
contractual relationship is not determined according to a set formula. In turn, this 
renders the judicial treatment of contractual joint ventures unpredictable and 
undermines their usefulness as a viable business vehicle. 
For these reasons, I argue that English law must re-evaluate its approach to joint 
ventures, taking into account the realities that make the contractual joint venture such 
an attractive business vehicle. I argue that the foundation of this new approach must be 
the joint venture contract, which, express or implied, is both the legal expression and 
operational nexus of the collaborative relationship. It is also the outsider’s primer to the 
co-venturers’ intentions. The interpretation and implementation of these intentions is 
the cornerstone of contract law and must also be the focus of a new contract-based legal 
model applicable to joint ventures. The challenge here is determining those intentions 
with replicability and, therefore, with predictability. 
1.2 Economic theory and moral theory: relevance and application 
Therein lies my central thesis: if the law purports to construe contracts so as to give 
effect to the intentions of the parties, then the rules of construction themselves must 
respect the purpose of all commercial contracts, which is the pursuit of financial gain. 
However, in order to ascertain the intentions of commercial parties with any hope of 
reflecting reality we must rely on principles from outside of the law of contract, whose 
purpose is merely the enforcement of promises as understood by the parties at the time 
of the agreement. We must examine the economic basis of those promises so as to gain 
an understanding of the driving forces behind the contract itself. The study of the 
mainspring and mechanics of economic activity is the remit of economics. Therefore, I 
propose that an economic theoretical methodology is essential in ascertaining the 
intentions of parties to a commercial contract.  
However, I do not propose to undertake an economic analysis of the law. That is, I do 
not propose that the legal rules of contract construction must be implemented so as to 
achieve the most efficient economic outcome (‘efficiency’ itself being defined as the 
net benefit, financial and social, gained from an exchange). My thesis is that a new legal 
model addressing joint ventures must determine the intentions of the parties by taking 
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into consideration the economic basis of the contract itself. To be sure, ‘economic basis’ 
does not refer to the specific accounting benefits accruing to each party due to their 
bargain. These are neither replicable nor transferable. Rather, my focus will be the 
economic rationale, which the parties must have implemented or, if acting prudently, 
would implement in order to establish and sustain a successful collaborative 
relationship. 
1.2.1 Economic theory and rational behaviour 
1.2.1.1 Rationality and self-interest 
My contention is that by employing an economic theoretical approach to the 
examination of the co-venturers’ relationship, I will be able to establish an objective 
standard for ascertaining their intentions for the purposes of contractual monitoring and 
enforcement. An objective standard of conduct is one that can be uniformly applied to 
commercial collaborative relationships and therefore it squarely serves the interests of 
legal certainty, by allowing for reproducibility of results and predictability. Economic 
theory itself purports to observe and explain economic behaviour, namely behaviour 
pertaining to the distribution of resources deemed desirable or necessary for human 
welfare.  On this basis, its aim is ‘to provide a system of generalizations that can be 
used to make correct predictions about the consequences of any change in 
circumstances’2 that befalls the economic agent(s) under observation. Therefore, an 
economic theoretical methodology involves the examination of the actions of an 
economic agent – which is what entities involved in commercial collaborative 
relationships invariably are – acting rationally. 
The concept of rationality is much debated in economic literature, because of its key 
role in the development and application of economic theory. This is because 
‘rationality’ is the criterion the economist attributes a priori to the agent(s) under 
consideration, and is what allows the economist to make generalised projections. Thus, 
rational conduct in economic theory is understood in its instrumental sense, that is, a 
course of action taken in pursuit of achieving a given goal following careful 
																																																													
2 M. Friedman ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’, in M. Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics 
(University of Chicago Press, 1953), 4.  
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consideration of surrounding circumstances and past experience.3 In the case of an 
economic agent, this all-important goal is the maximisation of a desired resource – itself 
variously described by the language of ‘welfare’, ‘utility’ or ‘ophelimity’. In other 
words:  
‘Maximization provides the moving force of economics. It asserts that any unit 
of the system will move toward an equilibrium position as a consequence of 
universal efforts to maximize utility or returns.’4 
Maximisation, therefore, lies at the heart of rational behaviour as understood by 
economists. This is because, in its study of resource distribution, economic theory 
presumes that several of the resources necessary for human welfare are scarce by 
nature.5 Being aware of this empirical fact, when humans interact for the purpose of 
distributing such resources amongst themselves, they each first and foremost seek to 
secure their respective self-interest. They do this by ensuring that they obtain the 
maximum possible units of the resource under consideration. The language of self-
interest is neatly summarised in the following excerpt from Adam Smith: 
‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of 
our own necessities but of their advantages.’ 6 
In other words, according to dominant economic theory, rational behaviour is 
synonymous with pursuing one’s own interest by maximising the resources regarded as 
necessary for one’s own welfare. 
																																																													
3 The ability to learn from past experience through trial and error is the key characteristic of a rational 
economic agent, according to Pareto, who was the first to identify the possibility that the same economic 
agent is capable of both rational (i.e. logical) and irrational (i.e. illogical) economic conduct; V. Pareto 
‘Manual of Political Economy’ ch.III.3; and see V. Pareto, ‘The New Theories of Economics’ (1897) 
5(4) J. Political Econ. 485, 496, on the necessity of putting economic theory deductions through the test 
of practical experience to ensure their validity. 
4 S.R. Krupp, ‘Equilibrium Theory in Economics and in Functional Analysis as Types of Explanation’ 
in D. Martindale, Functionalism in the Social Sciences (American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 1965), 69. 
5 For a critique of some key presumptions of the economic method, see R.L. Heilbroner, ‘Is Economic 
Theory Possible?’ (1966) 33(2) Social Research 272. 
6 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (MetaLibri Digital, 2007), 
16. 
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1.2.1.2 Collaborative relationships and the pursuit of self-interest 
Against this background, how do we go from one-off economic exchanges between 
self-interested maximisers to the collaborative commercial relationship envisaged in 
this thesis? The answer lies somewhere in the study of rational behaviour in the event 
that one’s own interest becomes intertwined with the interests of others. This is the 
remit of game or rational choice theory. In very general terms, game theory examines 
the rational response in situations where an agent’s range of preferred outcomes 
depends on the decisions of other agents, who are themselves rational and seek to 
achieve their own preferred outcomes. Assuming absolute rationality, game theory 
seeks to predict the choices that the agents under consideration would make when given 
a range of possible outcomes. It does this by assigning a numerical value – called a 
‘utility function’ – to the preferences of each agent, on the presumption that (a) the 
agent accepts the possibility that the alternative outcomes they are presented with may 
depend on chance alone (and are therefore described as ‘lotteries’) and (b) that their 
preferences are consistent.7 Given that the agents under consideration are assumed to 
be unfailingly rational, the all-important utility function itself is determined on the basis 
that an agent will choose one lottery over another, only if its utility function is higher 
than the utility function of the other. Therefore, predicting the choice of a rational agent, 
when faced with a range of outcomes dependent on the choices of other rational agents, 
is a matter of establishing the outcome with highest expected utility.8 
The mechanics, as well as the limitations, of game theory are illustrated by the famous 
Prisoner’s Dilemma paradox. The classic version of the paradox 9  involves two 
individuals arrested by the police on suspicion of a serious crime. They are interrogated 
in separate rooms so that each cannot know what the other is saying. At the beginning 
of the interrogation, the prosecutor tells each suspect that the first one to confess will 
serve a nominal prison term of three months for turning Queen’s evidence, while the 
other, at the prosecutor’s recommendation, will serve the maximum term of 10 years. 
If both confess, then the prosecutor will recommend a more lenient sentence of 8 years 
for both. If neither confesses, the suspects are told that they will be prosecuted on a 
																																																													
7 See R.D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey (Wiley, 1957), 
4. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid, 94. 
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lesser charge, for which the prosecutor is confident they can secure a conviction. The 
sentence in this case will be one year’s imprisonment. As the game is presented to them, 
each suspect has now two strategies: confess (thus implicating both themselves and the 
other) or stay silent. The following matrix illustrates the suspects’ strategies with their 
associated payoffs (the first numerical entry refers to Suspect 2’s payoff and the second 
to Suspect 1’s):  
 
Suspect 2: 
Suspect 1: 
 Confess Stay silent 
Confess 8 yrs, 8 yrs 3 mths, 10 yrs 
Stay silent 10 yrs, 3 mths 1 yrs, 1 yrs 
For each suspect, the outcomes of the ‘confess’ strategy dominate those of ‘stay silent’ 
– for one, bearing the highest payoff of just 3 months in prison – and is therefore said 
to be in ‘equilibrium’. Specifically, a strategy is in equilibrium if it is the best strategy 
that either player can choose in the circumstances knowing the strategies available to 
the other. Here, this means that even if one suspect knew that the other was going to 
confess, neither could do better by choosing another strategy, i.e. ‘stay silent’. 
Therefore, confessing is the ‘dominant’ strategy in this game.10 Notably, the effect of 
the dominant or equilibrium strategy for each player is to achieve the highest ‘security 
level’ and is therefore naturally risk averse. 11  Therein lies the paradox: if acting 
rationally, both suspects must choose the dominant strategy and confess, so as to 
receive the minimum sentence and, in any event, avoid the maximum sentence. Yet, if 
they both act ‘irrationally’ by staying silent, their payoff is much better than that of both 
following the dominant strategy. In other words, the collective interest of the suspects 
lies in their both defecting from the dominant, risk-averse strategy, and, therefore, it 
																																																													
10 For a more detailed explanation of the mechanics of a non-cooperative, no zero-sum game (i.e. a game 
where if one player gains something the other must correspondingly lose), see ibid, 60-63. 
11 See the analysis ibid, 67. 
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conflicts with their individual self-interest, which is determined by the dominant 
strategy.12 
How does the prisoner’s dilemma reflect the mechanics of joint ventures? The suspects 
in the prisoner’s dilemma are self-interested individuals, much like the rational 
economic agents who stereotypically take part in joint ventures. They do not necessarily 
compete but, when they interact, they are theoretically expected to pursue their self-
interest and be indifferent to the interests of others. However, unlike the two suspects 
in the prisoner’s dilemma, prospective co-venturers have extensive communication 
before they agree to the joint undertaking. Given their nature as self-interested agents, 
that decision is based on the initial acceptance that at least for the time being their 
individual self-interest13 lies in cooperating rather than competing with the other. Pre-
play communication, therefore, is key to a possible cooperative outcome.  
Let us consider then, how the dominant strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma game would 
be affected if the suspects had the opportunity to communicate before their 
interrogation. In this case, it is plain that they would agree to both stay silent. The 
outcome of this agreement is cooperation on the one hand, but, on the other, it is a 
conscious forfeiture of the best strategy in the game, which is to choose ‘confess’ if the 
other chooses ‘stay silent’. In other words, the ‘stay silent’ strategy pair is not in 
equilibrium, which means that each suspect has a strong incentive to defect from the 
agreement so as to obtain the highest possible payoff (a mere three months in prison) 
as opposed to the second highest (one year), as per the payoff matrix above. In the joint 
venture context, this translates to one of the parties defecting from the agreement with 
the other, in pursuit of the highest payoff once the opportunity arises. For the purposes 
of joint ventures, the prisoner’s dilemma illustrates that sustained cooperation between 
self-interested agents (post pre-play communication) is always a second-best option. 
This is because collaboration requires a minimum sacrifice from each participant, 
which in joint ventures means sharing the outputs of the joint undertaking, rather than 
keeping its fruits entirely for oneself.  
																																																													
12  The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been described as a ‘martyrdom game’, because adherence to the 
dominant strategy ultimately involves sacrificing one’s self-interest for the other’s benefit; see A. Kelly, 
Decision Making using Game Theory (CUP, 2003), 99.  
13 This does not necessarily translate into the maximum possible gain out of the situation – e.g. in joint 
ventures, the advantage lies mostly in risk mitigation: see 2.3. 
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In light of the fact that, theoretically, sustained cooperation is a second-best option in 
the context of economic activity, the question arises: why would a rational (i.e. self-
interest maximising) economic agent choose to sustain a cooperative relationship with 
another equally rational agent? Game theory does not have, nor does it purport to 
provide, an answer to this conundrum.14 If anything, its purpose is to examine and 
formalise the options available to the classically defined rational agents under 
consideration given specified strategies reached according to given data. Therefore, to 
address this question, I will turn to the work of David Gauthier. In his book Morals by 
Agreement, Gauthier responds to the practical rationality problem in the prisoner’s 
dilemma by developing a theory of morals, which holds that, in certain circumstances, 
a rational agent reasoning from non-moral premises must behave morally, i.e. submit 
to an impartial (namely, other-regarding) constraint on his pursuit of self-interest, in 
order to behave rationally.15 
1.3 Morals by Agreement 
Gauthier’s starting premise is that of a maximising conception of rationality;16  he 
assumes, like Hobbes before him, that the driving force behind human behaviour is the 
need to maximise the satisfaction of one’s desires. This ‘straightforward (utility) 
maximiser’ 17  initially has no concept of morality, i.e. is not burdened by the 
consideration of what he may or may not do in the interests of others, simply what he 
can do in order to maximise his utility or self-interest. If such an individual were 
operating in a world resembling a perfectly competitive market, there would be no need 
for a concept of morality to constrain his behaviour. This is because in a perfectly 
competitive market, the supply of resources necessary for the human welfare matches 
demand for them perfectly,18 no external factors can affect this process, or vice versa, 
and therefore there is no need for individuals to compete for resources. The perfect 
market is, in other words, a state of ‘moral anarchy, a human society that neither has 
																																																													
14 See Luce and Raiffa, n.7, ch.1. 
15 D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (OUP, 1986). 
16 Ibid, 34. 
17 Ibid, 167. 
18 This is possible in a perfect market because it ‘presupposes private ownership of all products and 
factors of production’ so that each person is endowed from the start with all the means necessary to 
pursue their welfare: ibid, 86. 
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nor needs internal constraints – a society of peaceable, productive and companionable 
persons who nevertheless are without conscience’.19 
The world does not reflect a perfectly competitive market. Market interaction is always 
affected by externalities, rendering resources scarce.20 Consequently, as individuals we 
are driven to compete for them while striving to maximise the satisfaction of our 
desires. Without suitable adjustment of human behaviour, such adversity would lead to 
a frightening reality where no society would be possible. Humans would be at constant 
war with each other, living in ‘continual fear and danger of violent death’ 21  and 
ultimately leading a life ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’.22 In light of such 
prospect, each person, inclined by nature to safeguard their interest before pursuing the 
satisfaction of their desires, must agree to give up some of their liberty to do so, 
provided others agree to do so as well.23 The forfeited portion of one’s liberty refers to 
their liberty to prevent others from pursuing the satisfaction of their own desires. This 
all-round agreement to constrain one’s pursuit of their self-interest, so as not to interfere 
with each other’s ability to pursue their respective well-being, can also be described as 
an implied contract among social actors. Accordingly, human society is a ‘cooperative 
venture for mutual advantage’ among persons ‘conceived as not taking an interest in 
one another’s interests’.24  
Adopting this contractarian view of society, Gauthier holds that market failure, i.e. the 
absence of perfect competition due to the existence of externalities, necessitates a new 
mode of interaction between agents. If, when interacting with others, economic agents 
only consider the costs and benefits of their independent choices and ignore the 
operation of externalities, the outcome of their independent choices in many situations 
will be sub-optimal.25 Thus,  
																																																													
19 Ibid, 84. 
20 Ibid, 87. 
21 T. Hobbes, Leviathan (Andrew Crooke, 1651), 78. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid, 80. 
24 Gauthier, n.15, 10. 
25 Ibid, 116-117. 
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‘In order to take effective account of externalities, each person must choose her 
strategy to bring about a particular outcome determined by prior agreement 
among those interacting. This agreement, if rational, will ensure optimality’.26 
He identifies this new mode of interaction as cooperation. 27  In the context of 
cooperation, Gauthier explains, the content of ‘rationality’ is different from that in the 
context of an agent acting independently of others, i.e. in the context of natural or 
market interaction. In the latter case, rational economic behaviour is determined by the 
equilibrium (i.e. utility-maximising) strategy, namely the best strategy in the 
circumstances when considered in light of the strategies available to others. By contrast, 
in the context of cooperation, the basis for action is a prior agreement among the 
interacting agents, culminating in a joint strategy and, ultimately, a joint payoff. The 
individual payoffs for each interacting agent are naturally determined by the agreement 
between them. 
Therein lies the difference between pursuing one’s self-interest in a cooperative context 
rather than independently: interacting agents must voluntarily constrain their naturally 
utility-maximising behaviour by adhering to the terms of a prior agreement. Complying 
with the agreement entails that the interacting agents must share the joint payoff, thus, 
by definition, eschewing the prospect of payoff/utility maximisation (i.e. keeping the 
entire output of the collaboration for oneself). This contradicts the traditional 
understanding of rational economic behaviour. Gauthier’s response to this is that such 
compromise is perfectly compliant with the classic conception of rationality, if we 
accept that, in cases where the risk of externalities prevails, cooperation, rather than 
individual action, will yield a higher payoff for each interacting agent. This is what 
Gauthier refers to as the ‘co-operative surplus’, namely the collective gain arising from 
co-operation between interacting agents, which is above the utility they would obtain 
in their ‘initial bargaining position’. The latter term refers to the base point from which 
the bargaining proceeds. It is, in essence, each agent’s factor endowment (i.e. ‘what 
[each] brings to the bargaining table’)28 and the utility it affords is what the agent would 
achieve outside the bargain.29 This understanding lies at the heart of the agreement to 
cooperate and the ensuing constraint on the parties’ economic behaviour. Accordingly, 																																																													
26 Ibid, 117. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, 130 
29 Ibid. 
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assuming everyone involved complies with the pre-agreed terms, individual payoff 
maximisation within the cooperative framework is not possible. Therefore, rather than 
pursuing equilibrium, the interacting agents must be concerned with achieving the 
second-best option in the circumstances: optimality. Ultimately, in cooperation, 
obtaining the optimal benefit out of the circumstances must be the focus of rational 
economic behaviour.  
Crucially, for the bargaining agents to be able to optimise their utility, the mechanics 
of the bargain itself must be rational, in the sense that the bargain is founded on the 
pursuit of optimality rather than maximisation. The foundational premise of a rational 
agreement is that each agent bargains from a position, which complies with the 
‘Lockean Proviso’. In his Two Treatises for Government, John Locke stated that it is 
legitimate for humans to appropriate, for their own use, goods, which they find in a 
state of nature, if they mix their labour in with them. However, this concession is subject 
to the proviso that ‘there is enough, and as good left in common for others’. 30 
Gauthier’s interpretation of Locke’s proviso is that it ‘prohibits bettering one’s situation 
through interaction that worsens the situation of another’.31 He continues: 
‘The proviso is intended to apply to interaction under the assumptions of 
individual utility maximizing rationality and mutual unconcern. Each person is 
supposed to choose a strategy that maximizes his expected utility, unless 
specifically forbidden by the proviso to do so. Each then is free to better his own 
situation as he chooses, provided that he does not thereby worsen the situation 
of another’.32 
When applied to self-interest maximising agents who must reach an accord so as to 
efficiently deal with externalities, the Lockean proviso ensures that, ceteris paribus, no 
party to the agreement becomes worse off as a result of the agreement than they would 
have been had there been no agreement at all.33 In other words, choosing to cooperate 
with other self-interested utility maximisers is only ever rational where every 
prospective collaborator has agreed to constrain their behaviour at least to the extent 
required by the Lockean Proviso. 
																																																													
30 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690), second treatise, Ch.V, [27]-[33]. 
31 Gauthier, n.15, 205. Note that the proviso is to be taken to apply to the manner in which the parties 
have each obtained their initial factor endowments.  
32 Ibid, 205-206. 
33 See the discussion, ibid, 204-205. 
	 13	
On this foundation Gauthier builds his vision of a rational bargaining process. The 
process begins with the interacting agents making their respective claims. Gauthier 
defines a claim as ‘a demand by a prospective co-operator for a particular co-operative 
surplus’.34 The ensuing bargaining process will be rational, if the following four factors 
are met: 
(a) the parties make rational claims off the co-operative surplus, i.e. those that 
afford them maximum utility, subject to the Lockean Proviso;  
(b) the parties presume the existence of at least one ‘feasible concession point’ 
for each rational agent involved in the bargaining process;  
(c) each party is in fact willing to concede in relation to one such concession 
point; and  
(d) all concession is limited to the extent that it is required by conditions (b) and 
(c).35 
Provided these conditions are satisfied, the interacting agents will have succeeded in 
constraining their behaviour only to the extent required to obtain an optimal outcome 
out of the bargain and no further. Gauthier refers to this optimal level of constraint as 
the ‘minimax relative concession’.36 The minimax relative concession refers to the 
maximum extent to which an agent would be required to constrain the pursuit of their 
self-interest that would afford them the least deviation from their claim on the 
cooperative surplus.37 Gauthier refers to that deviation as the ‘relative magnitude’ of an 
agent’s concession and he calculates it as the proportion that the absolute magnitude of 
that concession38 bears to the difference between the utility afforded by the claim and 
the utility of that agent’s initial bargaining position:39 
A concession’s relative 
magnitude: = 
Utility of claim - utility of concession 
Utility of claim - utility at initial bargaining position 
																																																													
34 Ibid, 142. 
35 Ibid, 143. 
36 For a formal proof see, ibid, 141ff. 
37 Ibid, 142.  
38 That is, the utility afforded by that agent’s claim minus the utility of the concession; ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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In sum, according to Gauthier, rational economic behaviour in cooperation is the pursuit 
of utility optimisation rather than utility maximisation. Such optimality is achieved 
when the interacting agents agree beforehand to constrain their otherwise maximising 
behaviour, thus becoming ‘constrained maximisers’. Only through such agreement is 
the prospect of cooperation between straightforward maximisers rational. This 
constraint is other-regarding and requires that all parties in the agreement pursue their 
self-interest only to the extent that they do not end up making the other participants in 
the bargain worse off than they would have been, had there been no bargain at all. The 
optimal level of constraint, which bargaining agents must undertake, is determined by 
calculating their respective minimax relative concessions. Ultimately, constrained 
maximisation emulates a system of morality, to which rational agents must submit in 
order to successfully secure their own interest. 
 
1.3.1 Gauthier’s prudential view of rational choice: Long-term welfare and the 
freeloader problem 
A crucial tenet of Gauthier’s theory of rational choice in interaction is that: 
‘rational choice must be directed to the maximal fulfilment of our present 
considered preferences, where consideration extends to all future effects in so far 
as we may now foresee them’.40 
In other words, rational choice must be informed by an agent’s desire to secure their 
long-term interest. To understand why this emphasis is necessary we need to go back 
to the classic definition of rationality as utility maximisation, the pursuit of which is the 
raison d’etre of the archetypal economic agent featured in the majority of economic 
models. In fact, so peculiar to economics is this singularly clear-headed being, 
(considered briefly in 1.2.1.1) that it has also been described as ‘homo economicus’.41 
As the quintessential rational agent, homo economicus always looks for the best 
possible bargain and is presumed to have the necessary information to achieve this. 
They do not get bored, tired, distracted or forgetful in their constant pursuit to maximise 
their utility out of any given situation. They pursue their self-interest first and foremost 
																																																													
40 Ibid, 37 (my emphasis). 
41 See J. Persky, ‘The Ethology of Homo Economicus’ (1995) 9(2) J. Econ. Perspect. 221. 
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and they expect every other agent they interact with to do the same.42 This basis for 
conscious action is in game theory known as the ‘common knowledge of rationality’ 
and informs the economist’s efforts to predict the actions of rational agents given 
specific data.  
Let us then consider how a rational agent (Gauthier’s straightforward maximiser) would 
approach the prospect of cooperation with others when acting on the common 
knowledge of rationality. The short answer is that the common knowledge of rationality 
renders the very concept of cooperation between economic agents nonsensical. The 
issue is amply illustrated in the ‘centipede game’, a repeated version of a no zero-sum, 
non-cooperative game.43 The centipede problem involves two players, A and B, and 
100 gold coins.44 The players are told that they can take turns taking and keeping coins 
from the pile, a maximum of two every time. The game stops the moment one coin is 
left in the pile. A and B are also told that they may take three coins rather than two, but 
the moment one of them does so the game stops and the rest of the coins in the pile 
disappear. In that case, the players are left with however many coins they have each 
managed to acquire up to that point. Both A and B are straightforward maximisers and 
operate under a common knowledge of rationality, meaning that they each know the 
other to be a straightforward maximiser as well. The ensuing game takes its name from 
the linear diagram below45 depicting the players’ moves pursuant to each of the two 
strategies in the game, i.e. Continue or Stop. Thus, ‘C’ indicates the moves that continue 
the game (i.e. taking 2 coins from the pile) and ‘S’ indicates the moves that stop the 
game (i.e. taking 3 coins from the pile). The first numerical value in each pair reflects 
A’s payoff and the second value reflects B’s. 
A: C1 (2,0) B: C2 (2,2) A: C3 (4,2) B: C4 (4,4) A: C5 (6,4) B: C6 (6,6) 
																																																													
42  Cf. M. Hollis and E. Nell, Rational Economic Man (CUP, 1975); A.K. Sen, ‘A Critique of the 
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory (1977) 6(4) Philos. Public Aff. 317 (discussing inter alia 
the realism and consequences of the widespread assumption that rational action must be self-interested); 
H. Gintis, ‘Beyond Homo Economicus: evidence from Experimental Economics’ (2000) 35 Ecol. Econ. 
311, 313ff (demonstrating that in experiments involving decisions with long-term pay-offs, agents’ 
actual behaviour contradicts the expectations of classical economics); H. Simon, ‘Theories of Decision-
Making and Behavioral Science’ (1959) 49(3) AER 253, 260-261 (on utility theory and maximisation 
contradicted in experiments with agents). 
43 See R.W. Rosenthal ‘Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-store Paradox’ 
(1981) 25 J. Econ. Theory 92. 
44 Example from M. Hollis and R. Sugden, ‘Rationality in Action’ (1993) 102 Mind 1, 21. 
45 Ibid.  
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 S1 S2  S3  S4 S5  S6 
 
(3,0)  (2,3)  (5,2)  (4,5)  (7,4)  (6, 7) 
 
From the diagram it is evident that A is always in the lead in terms of number of coins 
acquired from the pile because A started the game. B is aware of this, as well as of the 
fact that her very participation in the game is always dependent on A’s decision to 
continue or stop the game. Consequently, the moment that A decides to continue the 
game by choosing C1, B being rational will likely seek to maximise her payoff by 
taking three coins as soon as she is able to, thus stopping the game before A gets the 
chance to stop it herself. On the diagram, this reasoning manifests in B’s picking S2 
rather than C2. For her part, A apprehends all this from the very beginning because A 
is aware that B is rational. Therefore, in order to avoid losing out to B’s maximising 
choices by picking C1, A will more likely pick S1 thus ensuring that she will obtain the 
maximum number of coins on any one move. The result is that the game will end after 
the first move, despite the plain fact that, if the game were to continue, both players 
would be significantly better off.  
The centipede paradox demonstrates two important flaws with regard to the classic 
conception of rational conduct. First, when theoretically applied to its own terms, the 
immediate effect of the common knowledge of rationality is to stall collaboration 
between economic agents, however guaranteed the payoff for all involved. More 
importantly, the maximising conception of rational conduct operates so as to preclude 
the pursuit of one’s long-term interest (in this case continuing the game until the pile 
of coins is depleted) in favour of short-term gain (here, the maximum number of coins 
obtainable on any one move). This conclusion is simply incongruous with the very 
reality of joint ventures, whose whole premise is the joint pursuit of necessarily long-
term payoffs. Indeed, even if we accept for the sake of argument that homo economicus 
is capable of forming a joint venture, they will be unable to sustain it. This is because 
the dominant strategy, even in a scenario that involves cooperation pursuant to a pre-
play agreement (i.e. a classic joint venture), will be one of defection from the agreement 
so as to favour maximum short-term gain on any given move. 
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Thus, given common knowledge of rationality, Gauthier acknowledges that every 
collaboration between straightforward maximisers has the potential to devolve into a 
prisoner’s dilemma, despite any pre-agreed set of terms that should, in principle, 
guarantee optimal payoffs for all interacting agents.46 This is because, a straightforward 
maximiser concerned only with the satisfaction of their preferences in the short-term 
(e.g. Player A in the centipede game) would renege on the agreement whenever the 
opportunity arose to maximise their benefit in the present. In the prisoner’s dilemma 
this would amount to one suspect choosing ‘confess’ aiming for the minimum possible 
sentence, having first secured the other suspect’s agreement to choose ‘stay silent’. This 
type of opportunistic behaviour, Gauthier refers to as ‘parasitic’, where it directly 
causes the other party in the interaction to become worse off, or ‘free-riding’, where the 
opportunist obtains a benefit without paying all or part of its cost (but without 
displacing that cost directly onto the other parties in the interaction).47 With regard to 
free-riding, Gauthier uses the example of a number of ship-owners who pool together 
to build a lighthouse so as to improve the navigation of their vessels. A free-rider will 
be a ship-owner who receives the navigational benefit of the lighthouse without 
contributing to the cost of its building or maintenance. From here on, I will refer to both 
types of opportunistic agents as ‘freeloaders’. 
Consider the following scenario. The Council of a popular seaside resort town opens 
up a large beachfront area to residential and commercial development. Accordingly, it 
divides the area into ten plots and invites land developers to tender their bids. Ten 
developer companies of varying sizes and resources come forward. However, due to 
the popular location of the area on offer, the developers predict that an all-out bidding 
war over the plots would drive their prices too high for a decent profit to be made out 
of their development. Thus, they agree amongst themselves that every developer will 
bid for only one plot each, offering no more than the minimum bid set by the Council 
in every case. As with the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the best payoff for each developer 
clearly lies in defecting from the agreement when every other developer keeps to it. 
The defector would thereby bid for multiple plots and acquire them by offering only a 
																																																													
46 Gauthier himself uses the arms race as an example of a mutually suboptimal outcome for rational 
agents acting on the common knowledge of rationality. 
47 Gauthier, n.15, 96. 
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fraction over the minimum-set bid, having secured the others’ agreement not to drive 
the prices up by over-bidding themselves. 
Gauthier responds to the problem of defection or freeloading by adopting a prudential 
approach to rationality, to the effect that the freeloader’s reneging on the agreement to 
cooperate is both counterproductive and counter intuitive in the long run. It will be 
remembered that Gauthier relies on the (purportedly) empirically established premise 
that the driving force behind all human action is the pursuit of one’s self-interest and 
this is naturally underpinned, he claims, by a disposition to ensure one’s own survival 
first and foremost. According to Gauthier, it follows that all efforts toward survival and 
maximisation of one’s considered preferences would be meaningless, were they not 
aimed at securing one’s long-term – as opposed to their immediate – wellbeing. 
Therefore, in my land developer example, a developer who acts as a straightforward 
maximiser and reneges on the agreement will eventually become known as a freeloader, 
be shunned by others in the future and thus become unable to reap the benefits of 
cooperation again. Therefore, while constrained maximisation does not guarantee the 
highest payoff from cooperation in every case, it is an agent’s best strategy overall, for 
it ensures that agent’s continued participation in fruitful collaborations with others. In 
other words, it is in one’s best interest in the long run, to constrain their pursuit of their 
short-term interest when others have agreed to do the same. Ultimately, Gauthier 
argues, by habitually adopting the minimax relative concession (and the corresponding 
principle of maximin relative benefit) 48  in constraining their conduct during 
cooperation, agents will become conditioned into moral beings, whose natural 
disposition is to keep to their agreements. 
1.3.2 Limitations of Gauthier’s contractarian morality 
Gauthier’s contractarian project flows from his presumption that constraining human 
conduct is legitimate only in two cases. First, if the rational (utility-maximising) agents 
under consideration have expressly consented to the proposed constraint. Secondly, if 
the rational agents under consideration are required by their self-interest to consent to 
the constraint, in which case Gauthier implies that, had the agents under consideration 
reflected on the prospect of constraint rationally, they would have consented to it 																																																													
48 This becomes relevant in the calculation of one’s share of the cooperative surplus, where the latter 
does not consist of a single, transferable good. Essentially, in cooperation one maximises their relative 
benefit by minimising their relative concession; Gauthier, n.15, 154-155. 
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anyway. Thus, by utilising a hypothetical contract between interacting agents, Gauthier 
assumes that the agents under consideration will only consent to a mutual constraint on 
their conduct if it is to their mutual benefit. What follows is that agents will only consent 
to their conduct being constrained if there is a benefit to be derived from it. 
Consequently, those who cannot consent or have little or nothing to offer in a bargain, 
such as ‘animals, the unborn, the congenitally handicapped and defective’ 49  – in 
Gauthier’s words – ‘fall beyond the pale of a morality tied to mutuality. The disposition 
to comply with moral constraints, … may be rationally defended only within the scope 
of expected benefit’.50 Clearly, a rational defence in this case is one that perceives the 
primary driver of human action as the pursuit of self-interest.  
It will be remembered that according to Gauthier, moral constraint is required merely 
as a response to market failure and the presence of externalities, for – in a perfect market 
– agents are in a state of mutual unconcern, 51  reasoning only from self-centred 
imperatives. Accordingly, Gauthier avoids using the language of categorical 
imperatives and adopts that of rationality as self-interest hoping to establish a rational, 
non-moral justification for moral constraint on human conduct, where ‘moral’ is 
understood to refer to ‘other-directed concerns’.52 However, I submit that his strategy 
cannot reach a universal justification for moral constraint. Certainly, in the narrow 
context of two or more straightforward maximisers contemplating a bargain and 
calculating their respective payoffs in light of their considered preferences, constrained 
maximisation may well be the best strategy for these agents overall. But, as Moore 
observed, it is one thing to calculate one’s benefit from a prospective collaboration and, 
as a constrained maximiser, to honour the resulting agreement, but quite another to 
become disposed to keeping one’s agreements.53  
What this comes down to is that if the primary criterion of rational conduct is the pursuit 
of self-interest, why is it rational to become disposed to keeping one’s agreements, 
when the payoff from breaking just one may be so large as to make it worthwhile for 
the freeloader to accept being shunned by others with respect to future collaborations? 																																																													
49 Ibid, 268. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, 103-104. 
53 M. Moore ‘Gauthier’s Contractarian Morality’ in D. Boucher and P. Kelly (eds), The Social Contract 
from Hobbes to Rawls (Routledge, 1994), 212, 215-216. 
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Gauthier’s response is that, by virtue of the social contract (through which humans 
escape the dystopia of their existence in a state of nature), more agents are naturally 
disposed to being constrained maximisers than not. Therefore, while adopting morals 
by agreement will not work in everyone’s favour always, it will work most of the time. 
Thus, adopting such as a disposition is in the interest of rational agents in the long run.  
This claim, of course, presupposes that constrained maximisers are able to identify and 
avoid freeloaders most of the time or that constrained maximisers operate within a 
system where freeloaders face a significant risk of being caught out. It also presupposes 
that freeloaders are not able to deceive the constrained maximisers or are likely to be 
caught if they do deceive. In Moore’s words: 
‘In Gauthier’s world, it seems, there are no good poker players; there are no 
people who find it rational to cultivate their considerable powers of deception 
rather than simply accept Gauthier’s argument that the threat of being 
recognized will result in fewer opportunities for beneficial cooperation’.54 
Indeed, Gauthier accepts that parasitic behaviour will ultimately be inevitable in some 
contexts and that clever freeloaders could gain more than constrained maximisers. But 
given the future consequences of being caught out as a freeloader, it is easier and less 
risky, and therefore far more efficient overall, to be a constrained maximiser. 
But, does Gauthier have a response to a freeloader whose initial factor endowment and 
resulting bargaining power are so large that they can afford to openly renege on their 
agreements apparently fearing no consequences? Gauthier insists that adopting the lens 
of the free market in understanding and guiding human actions provides the impartiality 
necessary to achieve an objective foundation for morality. He claims that it is not the 
fault of the market (as a concept) that the distribution of public goods is inefficient and 
unfair, but that of externalities. Rather remarkably, Gauthier expressly does not take 
the inequalities in the factor endowments owned by interacting agents into account.55 
In fact, he assumes that all interacting agents are of equal rationality, the market itself 
acting as an equalising force ensuring that all interactions amongst agents are governed 
by the Lockean proviso.56 In this context any inequalities in their respective factor 
endowments will be immaterial, for the market, imperfect though it is, will ensure that 																																																													
54 Ibid, 216. 
55 Gauthier, n.15, 270. 
56 Ibid. 
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the agent with the larger endowment has access to more goods (as their endowment will 
allow) without this being at the expense of less-endowed parties. The Lockean proviso 
(and the twin principles of minimax relative concession and maximin relative benefit) 
will ensure that cooperation between straightforward-turned-constrained maximisers 
makes up for the failures of the market. 
The Lockean proviso may be effective in mediating the bargain between agents of more 
or less equal endowments, but how effective is it as a voluntary constraint when the 
disparity is large? Therein lies the flaw in Gauthier’s core reasoning; his strategy 
requires agents to accept that overall it is easier and less risky, and thus more efficient, 
to become generally disposed towards constrained rather than straightforward 
maximisation. But this is incongruous with his core premise that rational agents must 
always reason from self-centred imperatives. According to this premise, if the agent 
were faced with the prospect of a payoff so large that it could render the consequences 
of reneging on an agreement irrelevant, it would be irrational for them not to renege on 
their promise. At worst, Gauthier’s choosing to ignore the often-immense inequalities 
in the bargaining power of interacting agents renders his view of the market, even with 
the acknowledged externalities, nothing more than an irrelevant utopia and naturally 
falls prey to the criticisms that many classical economic theories and their underlying 
assumptions tend to face. At best, this fundamental contradiction means that Gauthier’s 
strategy cannot provide a universally applicable rational justification for moral 
constraint, but it does provide a well-reasoned methodology by which to calculate when 
a straightforward maximiser would be better off submitting to moral constraints on a 
case-by-case basis. 
 
1.3.3 The role of ‘Morals by Agreement’ in this thesis: instrumental but not 
justificatory 
Given its limitations, can Gauthier’s strategy for rationally justifiable moral constraint 
form the basis for a new joint venture model? My contention is that it can, so long as it 
is understood that its role will be instrumental (and explanatory) rather than 
justificatory. Indeed, if ‘morals by agreement’ were to be used on a justificatory basis 
then the implementation of the new model would be challenged by the freeloader 
problem near-constantly. This is because the proposed model’s primary purpose is to 
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provide an objective methodology for ascertaining the default intentions of parties to 
contractual joint ventures and implement rules which will give effect to those intentions 
on a predictable and replicable basis. My proposed methodology is based on Gauthier’s 
conception of rationality, in the context of cooperation, as self-interest through utility-
optimisation rather than utility-maximisation. In practice, utility optimisation translates 
into constrained maximisation of one’s self-interest in the collaborative venture, the 
extent of constraint being determined by the Lockean proviso and the minimax relative 
concession. My contention is that, in terms of a new joint venture model, Gauthier’s 
constrained maximisation translates into default legal rules implied into the contract 
between the commercial parties under consideration, whether that contract is express 
or implied (e.g. from past dealings). Following Gauthier’s line of reasoning, the 
conceptual basis for these default rules is as follows: the commercial parties under 
consideration are rational (i.e. self-interested) agents, who, having chosen to cooperate, 
are required by their self-interest overall to constrain maximisation of their considered 
preferences in the short-term by submitting to the constraints represented by the implied 
default rules. On a means-end application of Gauthier’s strategy, the content and extent 
of the default rules will be itself determined by the Lockean proviso, so the rules cannot 
cause a party to become worse off overall than they would have been had they defected 
from the joint venture agreement. 
Let us now consider the case, where Gauthier’s strategy is used to justify the imposition 
of default rules on rational contractual parties, where rationality is conceived as ‘self-
interest’. The default rules to be implied into the parties’ agreement, as per the proposed 
model, would have to be justified on Gauthier’s own starting premise of rationality as 
self-interest. Therefore, the justificatory claim would be that the default rules must be 
implied into the agreement, because the parties are required by their self-interest to 
submit to the default rules. At first blush, and given Gauthier’s own view of the world 
as populated mostly by constrained maximisers, justifying default rules on what the 
contractual parties would want, if they behaved rationally, is not necessarily a problem. 
This is illustrated in my earlier example of the prospective resort developers and their 
agreement. If all the land developers were of more or less equal resources and 
bargaining power it would, on Gauthier’s reasoning, certainly be in their self-interest 
overall to keep to the agreement, even though on a utility maximising basis the best 
strategy would be to defect so as to acquire multiple plots at once (but only if all the 
others kept their end of the bargain). Legally, this translates into a framework, which 
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attributes Gauthier’s line of reasoning to the contractual parties by default and, 
accordingly, subjects them to implied rules preventing defection, because this is what 
the parties would have intended, if they had reflected on what their self-interest 
requires. This line of justification does not hold up, however, when the legal framework 
is faced with the conundrum of the powerful freeloader.  
For the sake of simplicity, say that one of the land developers in the agreement, whom 
I will name Colossus, is a significantly larger concern than all the rest and in fact has 
the financing and resources in place to bid for most of the plots on offer, at several 
times the minimum bid for each. The only benefit Colossus would get from an 
agreement with the others is to ensure that the rest refrain from bidding over the 
minimum, so as not to drive the prices of the plots further up. Therefore, upon defection, 
Colossus would be able to acquire as many plots as its resources allowed at a 
significantly lower price. In this case, a default rule implied into the agreement between 
Colossus and the rest, simply cannot be justified on the basis that all the parties would 
submit to it because their respective self-interest requires it. Rationality as self-interest 
would make it irrational for Colossus to submit to any conduct-constraining rule; given 
its resources Colossus could well absorb the risk of being shunned from future 
agreements with other land developers and still prosper. Therefore, a justification for a 
conduct-constraining rule based on what Colossus would have intended, if it had 
reflected on what its self-interest requires, cannot hold up. Consequently, rationality as 
self-interest cannot be the justificatory basis for a universally applied default rule that 
requires rational commercial parties to become constrained maximisers. 
 
1.3.4 A justificatory basis for the long-term conception of self-interest 
The previous section established that a legal model, which purports to give effect to the 
(attributed) intentions of rational commercial agents, cannot rely on the concept of 
rationality as self-interest so as to justify conduct-constraining rules, 57  without 
eventually being stymied by the freeloader problem. This section argues that the 
justificatory basis of conduct-constraining defaults is to be found instead in the 
operation of English law itself. In particular, I will demonstrate that many of the legal 																																																													
57 The justification being that the parties would voluntarily submit to the conduct-constraining rules, if 
they had reflected on what their self-interest requires. 
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rules pertaining to commercial parties already map onto Gauthier’s prudential 
conception of self-interest as long-term wellbeing. It will be remembered that a major 
limitation of Gauthier’s moral theory is that Gauthier takes for granted that prospective 
collaborators are driven by the need to secure their long-term interest, which in turn 
dictates that they become constrained maximisers so as to ensure that they can reap the 
benefits of cooperation in the future by cultivating their reputation as trustworthy 
collaborators. This contrasts sharply with straightforward maximisers and freeloaders, 
who are by definition motivated by the pursuit of their short-term interest and therefore 
the prospect of future collaborations is irrelevant to their reasoning and strategic 
choices. My contention here is that if English law already adopts a definition of rational 
action as the pursuit of one’s long-term self-interest, then the powerful or cunning 
freeloader conundrum is no longer an obstacle to my proposed legal framework, which 
imposes default rules effecting constrained maximisation among collaborators based 
on what they would have intended if reasoning rationally. In other words, mapping onto 
existing presumptions of English commercial law, my proposed model amounts to an 
objective standard of conduct.58 This standard of conduct assumes that a reasonable 
person would adopt Gauthier’s utility optimisation strategy as the best strategy for 
maximising their considered preferences overall. 
Having said that, what evidence is there that English law does in fact presume 
rationality to mean the pursuit of long-term welfare? And even if it does, would English 
law intervene into a commercial relationship by imposing default rules onto co-
venturers in the first place? Consider this in light of the fact that English law is generally 
perceived as fundamentally respectful of commercial agreements and sceptical of legal 
intervention into commercial matters. The soundness of this point will be discussed in 
chapter 3. For the purposes of this section and demonstrating the long-termism 
advocated by English law, I contend that English commercial law is peppered with 
principles founded on other-regarding imperatives,59 whose purpose can only be to 
establish and preserve social harmony in the long-term. This is not to say that economic 
agents are in any way required to forego pursuing their self-interest or that they must 
																																																													
58 i.e. the standard of how a reasonable person having all the relevant background knowledge would 
reason, along the lines of the Supreme Court’s decisions and reasoning in Arnold v. Britton [2015] UKSC 
36 and Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, in the context of interpreting contractual 
language, where the Court held that evidence of the parties subjective intentions with respect to the use 
of certain language had to be disregarded. 
59 E.g. the concept of a fiduciary duty, see Ch.6. 
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do so subject to a positive duty of safeguarding the interests of others. Rather, I contend 
that English commercial law takes a view similar to that of Gauthier’s core 
methodology, i.e. that one’s self-interest is best served in a system, which supports and 
protects reliable market exchange, competition and constructive collaboration.60  
A case in point is the UK’s relatively recent reform of the law regulating corporations, 
which culminated in the much-debated Companies Act 2006 (hereafter ‘CA(2006)’). 
This legal development is pertinent to my argument for two reasons. First, because it is 
representative of English law’s wider approach to commercial parties. The corporation 
is undeniably the archetypal vehicle for commercial activity. Therefore, the regulatory 
approach that English law takes with regard to the corporation will inevitably inform 
its approach to commercial parties in general. Secondly, the UK company law reform 
is pertinent here because it explicitly addressed the conflict between short-termism and 
long-termism with regard to pursuing one’s commercial interests. By way of 
background, the reform involved detailed consultations with the professions and 
industry as to where the priorities of the new legal framework ought to lie, essentially 
looking for the answer to the short-term versus long-term conundrum. This manifested 
inter alia in the question of who is the proper beneficiary of the duties of company 
directors, which rather conveniently also represents one of the most debated issues in 
company theory. The possible beneficiaries are the company, its shareholders and, 
rather controversially, third parties with whom the company interacts on a regular basis, 
generally identified as ‘stakeholders’. The arguments for and against the inclusion of 
one constituent over others in the pool of beneficiaries unfold in two major schools of 
thought: the shareholder value model and the stakeholder value model. I regard the first 
as representative of short-termism and the latter of long-termism. 
Briefly, the shareholder value or shareholder primacy model requires companies to be 
managed with the sole purpose of maximising the wealth of the company’s 
shareholders.61 Accordingly, this model measures the success of the company by how 
much value it creates for its shareholders. In general, this value is reflected in the 
amount of profits available to be distributed as dividends, and if a public-listed 
company, either in the price of the company’s shares, or the ratio of the value of the 
																																																													
60 E.g. see the aims of the UK’s company law reform in DTI, Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: The Strategic Framework (HMSO, 1999), [2.4]-[2.9]. 
61 A.A. Berle, ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931) 44 Harv.L.Rev.1049. 
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company’s assets to its stock market value (known as the ‘Tobin’s Q’ ratio).62 The 
company director under the shareholder primacy model is nothing more than an agent 
for the shareholders,63 with the company being the shareholder’s private property.64 
Therefore, when the director exercises their discretion in conducting the company’s 
business, they must do so with the best interests of the shareholders in mind.65 At the 
other end of the spectrum lies the stakeholder value model,66 which acknowledges that 
throughout its lifetime a company must interact with other constituencies, such as 
customers, employees and creditors, putting the company in a unique position – it is 
not a natural person with the ability to reflect, make decisions and act accordingly, yet 
it can impact the wider economy and society. On this interpretation it is a matter of 
public interest67 to ensure that the management of a company is conscious of the 
company’s ‘social responsibility’68 and the interests of the constituents it affects and is 
affected by.69 
For the sake of simplicity, I have reduced this most crucial theoretical debate to its bare 
bones. Its relevance to my argument, here, lies in my interpretation of it as, 
																																																													
62 See generally J.E. Fisch, ‘Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy’ 
(2006) 31 J. Corp. Law 637, arguing that it is not the function of corporation law to be ‘efficient’, which 
is an ill-defined concept to begin with. 
63 Cf. S.M. Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 97(2) 
Nw.U.L.Rev. 547, arguing for managerialism (i.e. the idea that corporations are governed entirely by 
their managers, who alone choose the interests they will serve, the existence of shareholders being 
immaterial) with respect to the means of corporate governance, combined with shareholder primacy, 
with respect to the ends of corporate governance. Thus, the company is to be ultimately managed for the 
sole benefit of the shareholders, the rationale being that directors should not be exposed to more liability 
than necessary by expanding the class of beneficiaries to other stakeholders (as most stakeholder models 
propose). 
64 Cf. J. Heath, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Agency Theory’ (2009) 19(4) Bus. Ethics Q. 497, arguing that 
the application of agency theory here merely denotes how vulnerable the shareholders are with respect 
to the company’s management and therefore an agent-principal relationship becomes necessary for the 
protection of the shareholders’ interests. Agency theory, however, does not by itself justify the denial of 
a company’s moral duties toward other constituencies. 
65 But see D.G. Smith, ‘The Shareholder Primacy Norm’ (1998) 23 J. Corp. Law 277, demonstrating 
that, in practice, shareholder primacy is more relevant to closely held, private companies rather than to 
public trading corporations, where the norm appears to be the maximisation of corporate rather than 
shareholder wealth. 
66 M. Dodd. ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45 Harv.L.Rev. 1145. 
67 Ibid, 1148-1149, referencing W.H. Hamilton, ‘Affectation with Public Interest’ (1930) 39 Yale L.J. 
1089 who discusses the test of ‘public interest’ in the context of the US legislatures’ constitutional power 
to fix prices with regard to certain products/services.  
68 Dodd, ibid, 1161. 
69 Which is not to say that identifying which of these and other constituents can legitimately be identified 
as stakeholders for the purposes of the stakeholder value model is a simple matter; see R.E. Freeman, 
‘The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions’ (1994) 4(4) Bus. Ethics Q. 409. 
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fundamentally, a conflict between the short-term and the long-term pursuit of self-
interest. Specifically, a company model focused solely on the maximisation of 
shareholder wealth as per the shareholder primacy model has a short-term outlook. In 
other words, the company’s directors will, theoretically, be concerned only with 
strategies that boost the company’s share price or its profits, so as to secure a return on 
the shareholders’ investment as soon as possible. On the other hand, a model that 
requires a company to conduct its business in the manner of a ‘good citizen’70 has a 
long-term strategy, for it builds on its relationships with the various constituents with 
whom it interacts. In Gauthier’s parlance, the former approach is adopted by 
straightforward maximisers and provides ample opportunity for freeloading because of 
its short-termist outlook. The latter approach is one adopted by constrained maximisers, 
for they must apply other-regarding considerations and thus optimise their utility in the 
short-term, so as to ensure its maximisation overall.  
In its reform of UK company law, Parliament addressed this conflict by expressly 
embracing the long-term conception of a company’s interest. It did so by reformulating 
the duties of company directors. The most unambiguous example of Parliament’s 
response to the short-term versus long-term conundrum is s.172 of CA(2006). S.172 is 
the second of seven provisions in CA(2006) that collectively codify the duties of 
company directors,71 which had previously been set out only in common law. Imposing 
on company directors a general duty to promote the success of the company, s.172 is 
special, because it introduces – for the first time in statute – a non-exhaustive list of 
considerations that directors must have regard to in the exercise of this duty. Before 
this, company directors were perceived as being responsible for serving the interests of 
the company (and those of its shareholders) exclusively.72 Consequently, the duties of 																																																													
70 Dodd, n.66, 1154. 
71 Set out in CA(2006), ss.171-177. 
72 E.g. gratuitous payments by the company are invalid, if not made with the intention to benefit the 
company or its members (see esp. Parke, below): Hutton v. West Cork Railway Company [1883] 23 ChD 
654 (payment to theretofore unpaid company directors for past services, following the company’s 
winding up and discharge of all liabilities), In re Lee, Behrens and Co Ltd. [1932] 2 Ch 46 (payments 
made to a former managing director’s widow), Parke v. Daily News Ltd. [1962] Ch 927 (payment of 
balance of purchase price, having discharged all other liabilities, to former employees who were 
dismissed following the sale and closure of a newspaper); Cf. MSL Group Holdings Ltd. v. Clearwell 
International Ltd. [2012] EWHC 3707 (payment made to minority shareholder director following an oral 
agreement pertaining to the distribution of a licence fee on technology patented by the company was 
valid as it was ‘for the benefit of and to promote the prosperity of the company because it provided for 
the remuneration of its directors’, per Sir Raymond Jack, [41]-[42]); But note: on insolvency, payments 
by the company must benefit the creditors first: MacPherson v. European Strategic Bureau Ltd. [2002] 
BCC 39. 
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company directors were generally interpreted with ‘an undue focus on the short-term 
and the narrow interest of members at the expense of what is in a broader and a longer 
term sense the best interest of the enterprise’.73 Thus, the fundamental purpose of s.172 
(along with s.171, which pertains to the proper exercise of the directors’ powers) was 
to re-state the directors’ duty of loyalty74 to the company, which defines the scope of 
the directors’ duties on the whole, so as to ensure the inclusion of broader interests into 
the conduct of the company’s business,75 on the express condition that this is in the best 
interests of the company overall. 
First among the considerations listed in s.172 are the likely consequences for the 
company in the long-term of any decision the director makes (s.172(a)). At the outset, 
this demonstrates that Parliament’s conception of a rational commercial actor is akin to 
that of Gauthier in that decisions are understood as made in the service of one’s long-
term interest.76 But even more importantly, the rest of the considerations listed in s.172 
reveal a marked shift in the law’s expectations of companies, and, arguably, of 
commercial parties in general: the instrumental adoption of other-regarding 
imperatives.  Thus, the provision goes on to require that directors also have regard to: 
‘the interests of the company’s employees’ (s.127(b)), ‘the need to foster the company’s 
business relationships with suppliers, customers and others’ (s.172(c)); ‘the desirability 
of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct’ 
(s.172(e)); ‘the impact of the company's operations on the community and the 
environment’ (s.172(d); and ‘the need to act fairly as between members of the 
company’ (s.172(f)). 
																																																													
73 DTI, n.60, [5.1.17].  
74 The duty of loyalty was itself regarded as a collective expression of the directors’ individual duties to: 
(a) act within the company’s constitution; (b) exercise their directors’ powers for their proper purpose 
and (c) act in good faith for the benefit of the company as a whole; DTI, Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework (HMSO, 2000), 32. 
75 Cf. L.S. Sealy ‘Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities – Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural’ 
(1987) 13 Monash Univ. Law Rev.  164, arguing that directors’ duties jurisprudence is not an appropriate 
vehicle through which to protect the interests of wider constituents, with the exception of the interests of 
creditors in the event of expected insolvency; See also A. Alcock ‘An Accidental Change to Directors’ 
Duties?’ (2009) Co. Law. 362. 
76  This long-term minded outlook is also endorsed by the UK’s Financial Reporting Council, an 
independent body responsible for promoting standards of corporate governance and reporting, and it is 
heavily reflected in its ‘The UK Corporate Governance Code’, September 2014 
(https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-
Code-2014.pdf, accessed 14.8.18). 
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What is the place of these third-party interests in the director’s pursuit of the company’s 
own interests? Is the director required to pursue the company’s interests subject to the 
interests of these constituents? It would appear not; the director is expected to promote 
the success of the company ‘for the benefit of its members as a whole’ (s.172), but this 
duty along with all others in ss.171-177 of CA(2006) is expressly owed to the company 
alone (s.170). Indeed, it is trite law that, if and until it is wound up, the company is its 
own legal person,77 who acts through its directors (and, sometimes, its members passing 
resolutions in general meeting).  For their part, should a (solvent) company be wound 
up, its members are entitled to the residual value in its assets. It is in this light that the 
statute’s reference to ‘the benefit of the members as a whole’ should be read. 
Accordingly, I submit that the correct interpretation of s.172 is that the interests of the 
company – rather than those of the shareholders/members – are to be the director’s 
foremost consideration. This is supported by the fact that s.170 makes the director liable 
as an agent to the company alone, which in turn makes the company the director’s sole 
principal. Therefore, the interests of the members must be understood as springing from 
– rather than being identified with – the interests of the company. In other words, if the 
company benefits from its directors’ management then its members should expect to 
benefit as well, e.g. in the form of receiving dividends distributed on the 
recommendation of the directors from the company’s profits.78 This is in line with the 
fact that despite their rights as residual owners of the company’s assets, shareholders 
are not automatically entitled to dividends. Whether dividends are declared from the 
company’s distributable profits rests entirely on the discretion and business judgment 
of its directors.79 
Considering the directors’ priorities in this light, it follows that the stakeholder interests 
listed in s.172 should be interpreted as guidance on the factors that can contribute to 
the company’s success and, ultimately, its preservation. Admittedly, by making the 
director legally accountable to the company alone 80  but, essentially, equating the 
																																																													
77 Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co Ltd. [1897] AC 22. 
78 S.829 CA(2006) provides that dividends may only be distributed from profits (rather than e.g. capital: 
see In re Exchange Banking Company, Flitcroft's Case [1882] ChD 519, which established that directors 
are personally liable for unlawfully paid dividends in the same vein as trustees being liable for restoring 
a trust-fund which they have unlawfully – i.e. dishonestly–  reduced). 
79 Burland v. Earle [1902] AC 83; see also Worthington’s assessment of the shareholders’ entitlement in 
‘Reforming Directors’ Duties’ (2001) 64 MLR 439, 447. 
80 See, e.g., s.170; furthermore, s.260(3) –which gives shareholders the power to bring an action in the 
name of the company for the company’s benefit (assuming that a majority of the shareholders has not in 
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company’s interests with those of the ‘members as a whole’, s.172 clouds perhaps the 
most debated issue in company theory: whose interests ought the directors pursue, 
given that the interests of the shareholders are not necessarily those of the company, 
which is a separate entity altogether. This raises two questions. First, does my 
interpretation of the considerations in s.172 conflict with the provision’s stated purpose 
to be the statutory expression of the principle of ‘enlightened shareholder value’,81 
which, however ‘enlightened’, by definition appears to shift focus onto the interests of 
the shareholders? Secondly, does the specific reference to ‘the benefit of [the 
Company’s] members as a whole’ ultimately undermine the long-termism advocated in 
CA(2006)? This question should be considered in light of the fact that shareholders can 
be members of a company (especially in the case of a public company) for a very short 
time and therefore their primary concern will be the price of the company stock rather 
than how sustainable the company is in the future.  
On the first question, I submit that, if s.172 is read in light of Gauthier’s own conception 
of rational self-interest, there is no conflict between a list of factors that can be 
conducive to the success of the company (i.e. an entity entirely separate from its 
members) and a principle that seeks to ultimately increase shareholder value. After all, 
‘Enlightened Shareholder Value’ is a principle which ‘recognises that directors will be 
more likely to achieve long-term sustainable success for the benefit of their 
shareholders, if their companies pay attention to a wider range of matters’82 than merely 
the maximisation of the company’s profits in the short-term (thus boosting the share 
price for public companies and/or making the declaration of dividends that much more 
																																																													
fact ratified the alleged wrong) – clearly indicates that only the company is the proper claimant in an 
action against a director.  
81 CA(2006), Explanatory Note, [7.325]-[7.327]; It is also a product of a global shift in corporate law 
toward the protection of the long-term interests of shareholders, including those of minorities, which are 
ultimately identified with those of the company: see H. Hansmann & R. Kraakman ‘The End of History 
for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Geo.L.J. 439. Cf. P. Ireland ‘Company Law and the Myth of Corporate 
Ownership’ (1999) 62 MLR 32 - who points out that the shareholder-centric view of the role and function 
of directors and of corporate law disregards the essence of the company, as a separate legal personality. 
See also P. Ireland ‘Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory’ (2003) 23 LS 453, 
specifically doubting the view of the company as a nexus of contracts and emphasising its separate legal 
personality as the proper foundation of all discourse regarding its management. Cf. C. Riley 
‘Understanding and Regulating the Corporation’ (1995) 58 MLR 595 – essentially defending the 
contractarian view, but alluding to the same concerns as to whether a company can be ‘owned’, 609. 
82 A. Darling, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Hansard, 6 June 2006, n 125. 
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likely).83 Notably, by formulating the issue in light of Gauthier’s approach to rational 
self-interest and its pursuit, I do not equate the interests of the shareholders to those of 
the company, but regard the former as stemming from the latter. Furthermore, for 
Gauthier’s theory to work, a hypothetical contract must be capable of being implied. 
However, the structure of the company provides an answer in this regard: the company 
is created as a result of a (hypothetical) contract between its shareholders and the State, 
which allows for the creation of a separate legal entity, with or without limited liability, 
in the first place. Once formed, the new entity is then manifest in a contract between it 
and the shareholders, as well as a contract between the shareholders inter se (s.33 
CA(2006)). It is also manifest in contracts between it and its directors, employees, 
suppliers, customers, etc., as well as in implied contracts with the wider community in 
which it operates. 84  Accordingly, Gauthier would hold that the company, acting 
through its directors must constrain the maximisation of its utility/preferences in the 
short-term by conceding the interests of relevant stakeholders, as partly indicated in 
s.172, on the understanding that this will ensure the maximisation of the company’s 
self-interest overall. At the same time, the shareholders’ interests are inextricably linked 
to those of the company and therefore as the director secures the company’s maximum 
utility overall, so the shareholders’ own utility is secured. 
On the second question, I submit that given the statute’s insistence on the company’s 
long-term sustainability, irrespective of the enlightened shareholder value principle, it 
is highly unlikely that a court would ever expect a director to prefer the shareholders’ 
interests over those of the company.85 But would it be possible for a shareholder to sue 
(either for unfairly prejudicial conduct, under s.994 CA(2006), or through derivative 
action, under s.260 CA(2006)) on the ground that a director has failed to take into 
account the factors listed in s.172? On the one hand, it is not for Parliament or the courts 
to substitute their judgment for the business judgment of company directors,86 so long 																																																													
83 See a more detailed discussion on the merits of short-term versus long-term pursuit of shareholders’ 
interests in A. Keay ‘Getting to Grips with the Shareholder Value Theory in Corporate Law’ (2010) 39 
CLWR 358. 
84 The ‘nexus of contracts’ theory of the company: see F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel ‘The Corporate 
Contract’ (1989) 89 Colum.L.Rev. 1416.  
85 Unless the circumstances were exceptional, e.g. where the company was essentially a partnership, 
whereupon, as with a partnership, it could be wound up on the ‘just and equitable’ ground: Ebrahimi v. 
Westbourne Galleries Ltd. [1973] AC 360. Cf. O’Neill v. Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
86 Carlen v. Drury (1812) 35 ER 61 (bad, rather than negligent or improper, management was not a valid 
ground for a claim, especially where the plaintiffs could have sought and gotten redress offered under 
the partnership’s constitution). 
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as there is evidence that the latter have acted in good faith in pursuit of the benefit of 
the company 87  and that they exercised their powers for their proper purpose. 88 
Moreover, as Lowry observes,89 s.172 does not give locus standi to the stakeholders 
mentioned in its list of relevant considerations against a director who fails to take into 
account their particular interests. After all, s.170 of CA(2006) makes abundantly clear 
that the only constituent the director owes a duty to is the company and therefore only 
the company may sue the director for breach of any of the duties set out in CA(2006).90 
Nevertheless, Lowry suggests that the effect of a director’s failure to properly consider 
the factors listed in s.172 is to point to ‘action [taken] otherwise than in good faith’.91 
This, he argues, would expose the director to liability beyond that for mere 
incompetence (e.g. for breaching their duty of care skill, now enshrined in s.174), 
thereby extending to liability for breach of trust with all the equitable remedies that this 
implies.92 Equally, if the director can show that they have effectively taken into account 
the interests listed in s.172, their conduct will be virtually unassailable in light of any 
of the relevant sections in CA(2006), so long as they can establish that their primary 
purpose was to secure the interests of the company.93 
I submit that Lowry’s conclusion can be invoked as a response to those critics of the 
long-termist approach to company management (whether or not as part and parcel of 
the ‘enlightened shareholder value’ principle), who contend that subjecting the 
company director to considerations other than those dictated by the free market 
																																																													
87 Re Smith & Fawcett [1942] ChD 304, 306, per Lord Greene MR. 
88 This duty is now enshrined in s.172, CA(2006). The company’s constitution determines the purpose 
and scope of the directors’ powers: Eclairs Group Ltd v. JKX Oil & Gas Plc [2015] UKSC 71: Exercising 
a power so as to restrict the voting rights of minority shareholders on suspicion that they were ‘corporate 
raiders’ was deemed to be improper, given that the purpose, for which the power was originally 
conferred, was merely to incentivise shareholders to disclose information on the beneficial interests 
behind their shareholdings, which the appellants had done.) 
89 J. Lowry, ‘The Duty of Loyalty of Company Directors: Bridging the Accountability Gap through 
Efficient Disclosure’ (2009) CLJ 607, 618. 
90 E.g. through a derivative action brought by a shareholder in the name of the company under s.260.  
91 Lowry, n.89, 622. 
92 Ibid. 
93 This is in line with the ‘primary purpose’ test in Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [1974] 
AC 821, 832B-C, per Lord Wilberforce (considering the issue of additional shares whose ‘primary 
purpose’ was found to be the dilution of the shareholdings of those members who opposed a takeover 
bid, rather than promote the interests of the company, and was therefore deemed to be an improper 
exercise of directors’ powers.) In Eclairs Group, n.88, [55], Lord Sumption suggested that determining 
the ‘primary purpose’ of a director’s exercise of their powers should rely on an enquiry of whether the 
director would have reached the same decision even if they had not had the illegitimate purpose in mind. 
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(consequently exposing the company to substantial opportunity costs) ultimately 
undermines the company’s interests. 94  At worst, the principle of enlightened 
shareholder value, as expressed in the stakeholder interests listed in s.172, provides the 
company with an additional route to legal redress, which goes well beyond that afforded 
by directors’ duties prior to codification, for it offers a clear indication as to what 
constitutes good faith considerations in the performance of directors’ duties. At best, 
s.172 forces directors to conceptualise the company as a member of a wider ecosystem 
and as such imprints upon them the necessity of a positive reputation. This, in turn, 
leads to business strategies whose purpose is to secure a sustainable future for the 
company, rather than the maximisation of its profit in the short-term while facing an 
uncertain future. Understood in this sense, the principle of enlightened shareholder 
value is prima facie consistent with Gauthier’s own conception of moral conduct in an 
imperfect market, as being a rational (i.e. self-interest maximising) response to 
externalities. The company acting through its agents (i.e. its directors and shareholders 
in general meeting) is required by its self-interest to take into account the interests of 
constituents it interacts with, so as to secure its own sustainability in the long-term. 
In summary, a major problem with regard to applying Gauthier’s contractarianism to 
the interpretation of contractual agreements between commercial parties has been 
justifying the presumption that one’s self-interest necessarily implies their long-term as 
opposed to short-term welfare. Indeed, Gauthier does not justify this presumption, 
which appears to be entirely intuitive. Regardless, Gauthier’s contractarian 
methodology has much in common with the manner in which current English law 
perceives rational economic behaviour, i.e. that a self-interested pursuit of one’s 
preferences must take into account the interests of others with whom they directly or 
indirectly interact, so as to secure one’s long-term (economic) interest. This tendency 
in English law is showcased clearly in its regulation of companies and, more 
specifically, in the evolution of directors’ duties, which now expressly adopt a long-
term outlook taking into account the wider community of which companies are 
members. Based on this example, I have sought to justify my presumption that an 																																																													
94  E.g. M.E. Van Der Weide, ‘Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders’ (1996) 21 
Del.J.Corp.L. 27; M. Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to increase its Profits’ New 
York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970; Cf. Upon review of the legislative impact of s.172 on 
businesses, directors have demonstrated ‘high awareness [of the s.172 duty] but minimal changes in 
behaviour’; Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, ‘Post-legislative Assessment of the 
Companies Act 2006 – Memorandum to the Business, Innovation and Skills Select Committee’, 12 
January 2012, 11. 
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economic agent pursues, or is presumed by law to pursue, their self-interest in the long-
term. Therefore, I contend that the problem of the cunning or powerful freeloader will 
not be a logical barrier to ascertaining the intentions of a rational party to a commercial 
contract, according to Gauthier’s methodology for rational bargaining. 
1.4 Thesis Breakdown 
The aim of this chapter was to present the main argument of this thesis and lay down 
its method. Thus, I will make the case for a new legal framework to govern contractual 
joint ventures as a separate legal category. I will argue that the central purpose of this 
new framework must be to give effect to the contractual parties’ original intentions and 
to preserve the original spirit of the contractual relationship. To address this most 
central issue, i.e. ascertaining the parties’ original intentions, I will be utilising 
Gauthier’s method of utility maximisation in the context of cooperation. Thus, in this 
chapter I have sought to demonstrate that Gauthier’s unique approach to rational 
bargaining is an effective solution to the limitations of rational choice theory, when it 
is employed to ascertain the intentions and strategies of economic agents in the context 
of cooperation. I have also sought to address the inevitable roadblock to judicial 
application of my argument created by the limitations of Gauthier’s own methodology, 
i.e. his a priori assumption that self-interest denotes an agent’s long-term, as opposed 
to short-term, welfare. I have done this by establishing that English law already 
endorses the conception of self-interest as long-term welfare, which is amply 
demonstrated in its approach to the regulation of companies and their management, and 
argued that this fundamental presumption operates to dispel the limitations of 
Gauthier’s methodology in practice. 
The rest of this thesis unfolds in five chapters. Chapter 2 examines the concept of 
contractual joint ventures from an economic perspective so as to establish the motives 
behind their creation. These motives will, in turn, inform any efforts on the part of the 
law to ascertain the intentions of the commercial parties at the core of the venture. 
Chapter 3 goes on to examine the legal rules, which currently govern the contractual 
joint venture. Its purpose is to demonstrate that the current law does not adequately 
reflect the rationale behind contractual joint ventures and as such it is not an appropriate 
means by which to regulate the joint venture relationship or arbitrate co-venturers’ 
disputes. The chapter ultimately argues that contractual joint ventures should be 
addressed as a separate legal category of their own through a new legal framework. The 
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essence of my proposed framework is the implication of default rules into the 
contractual joint venture relationship, while allowing for the joint venture agreement to 
be otherwise fully enforceable as between co-venturers without first having to 
dismantle the joint venture relationship.  
The purpose of Chapter 4 is then to discuss the mechanics of English contract law with 
respect to the implication of such default rules and to answer the question of whether 
the implication of default rules into the joint venture is even desirable, let alone 
possible. To this end, the chapter will address what I regard as the three main objections 
to the imposition of extra-contractual rules on contractual parties, specifically in the 
context of commercial agreements between ‘sophisticated parties’ dealing at arm’s 
length. These objections are: (a) English law should not intervene into contractual 
relationships between commercial parties, where there is no actionable defect in the 
bargaining process (such as mistake, undue influence, misrepresentation, or fraud); (b) 
English law already provides for a mechanism through which the parties can 
substantially change their contractual obligations post-contractually; (c) the joint 
venture is by definition a relational contract and over-regulating through extra-
contractual default rules would be counter-productive – the parties may address any 
friction that arises in their relationship organically and privately. Ultimately, in this 
chapter I conclude that implying default rules into a commercial relationship of the type 
I examine in this thesis is not only possible, but also desirable for the sake of legal 
certainty and commercial predictability. 
The purpose of Chapter 5 is to determine the content of the default rules to be implied 
into the joint venture relationship, by reference to what a constrained utility maximiser 
would intend had they properly reflected on what their self-interest requires. Thus, the 
chapter first identifies a generic ideal of good faith as best reflecting the other-regarding 
values required of constrained maximisation. Secondly, it examines the jurisprudential 
and procedural avenues available to the court for the implementation of the good faith 
ideal in the joint venture relationship, in light of the parties’ presumed goal of (overall) 
utility maximisation. Thirdly, it concludes that implementing the good faith ideal 
through the contract mechanism affords the least utility to co-venturers understood as 
constrained maximisers.  
In response to this, Chapter 6 examines default rules implementing the good faith ideal 
into the joint venture relationship through the mechanism of fiduciary law. The chapter 
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concludes that a good faith standard of conduct mandated through the fiduciary 
mechanism represents the highest utility option for the co-venturers, as, in theory, it 
effectively addresses the freeloader problem. Finally, Chapter 7 frames the central 
argument of this thesis in terms of the hypothetical imperative. It argues that if English 
commercial law purports to be consistent with its own tenets (of giving effect to the 
objectives of commercial parties) then it must imply other-regarding conduct 
constraints into collaborative commercial relationships by default (on the basis that this 
is what the parties would have intended, had they reflected on what their long-term 
interest requires); or abandon the goal of being consistent with its own tenets. 
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2 JOINT VENTURES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Cooperative strategies have long featured in commercial activity. The facilitating 
effects of cooperation are evident from the long history of organisations, such as 
merchant guilds, cooperatives and trade associations, as well as from routine 
arrangements between commonplace economic actors, such as banks, entrepreneurs, 
raw materials producers, manufacturers and distributors. Over the past four decades, 
however, cooperative strategies have been on the rise between economic actors who 
had hitherto been fierce competitors; a trend that directly contradicts the traditional 
paradigms of business growth. This unprecedented but increasingly widespread 
phenomenon now affects all fields of commercial and economic activity.1 The purpose 
of this chapter is to examine the incentives driving these arrangements and the forms 
which they frequently take, in order to understand the place of the contractual joint 
venture in the worldwide commercial (and legal) ecosystem.  
2.2 The Firm, the modern Enterprise and Models of Growth 
2.2.1 The Evolution of the Firm 
An exchange economy manifests in the continuous production and direction of 
resources by and amongst various economic agents. In this system, the price of those 
resources is the mechanism governing the organisation of production and the 
subsequent direction of its outputs. Thus, the economic system ‘work[s] itself’2 with 
‘supply [being] adjusted to demand, and production to consumption, by a process that 
is automatic, elastic and responsive’.3 However, the price mechanism is not without 
flaws. Discerning the price for the exchange to take place can be a costly exercise in 
																																																													
1 E.g., several law firms have taken the synergy route: see G. Johnson et al., Exploring Corporate 
Strategy (Pearson, 2008), 361. See also P. Lorange and J. Roos, Strategic Alliances: Formation, 
Implementation and Evolution (Blackwell, 1992), 13-14 for examples from the IT, biotechnology, air 
transport and pharmaceuticals sectors. 
2 A. Salter, Allied Shipping Control: An Experiment in International Administration (Clarendon Press, 
1921), 15. 
3 Ibid. 
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itself.4 Furthermore, completing exchanges on the strength of price alone leads to only 
short-term market relationships because prices tend to fluctuate between vendors. This 
can be very problematic when long-term relationships are desirable, either to avoid 
repeating price negotiations and the associated transaction costs, or to mitigate the risk 
of losing supply of a commodity.5 Thus, Coase observed that the need to supersede the 
price mechanism and overcome its inefficiencies in a specialised exchange economy 
gave rise to the firm, an organisation headed by an authority (‘the entrepreneur’), which 
organises the distribution of resources. He defined the firm as ‘the system of 
relationships which comes into existence when [in a specialised exchange economy] 
the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur’ and not on their price.6 
The effect on the firm itself of this transaction-centric view of the economic system is 
that the size of the firm will grow the more transactions the entrepreneur chooses to 
organise. These transactions concern none other than the mundane day-to-day business 
of the firm, i.e. payments for labour, production equipment, raw materials, distribution 
of outputs and so forth. The size of the firm will ultimately be determined by a number 
of factors. These may include the cost of organising additional transactions within the 
firm, such as the cost of recruiting specialised labour, the entrepreneur’s efficiency in 
allocating production resources and the price of the factors of production.7  According 
to this view, the firm will inevitably experience growth and this will be proportionate 
to the number of transactions the firm becomes the catalyst in. In fact, Coase concludes, 
firms will continue to expand so long as the costs of organising an extra transaction 
within the firm are smaller than the costs of carrying out the same transaction in the 
open market or in another firm.8   
Coase’s theory materialised with the onset of the industrial revolution of the late 19th 
century. Before that time, firms were restricted in terms of geography, size and outputs.9 
However, with the development of the new transportation and communication networks 
(the railroad, steam engine and telegraph), raw materials were more easily delivered to 
																																																													
4 R.H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4(16) Economica 386, 390. 
5 Ibid, 391. 
6 Ibid, 393. 
7 Ibid, 394-395. 
8 Ibid, 395. 
9 A.D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Belknap Press, 1990), 26. 
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production sites, while outputs could be more widely distributed. This led to the 
development of more efficient production technologies, accommodating the larger 
outputs at a lower price per unit. Construction of larger plant, then, became necessary, 
so that the new technology could be exploited to its fullest potential. The unprecedented 
volume of production had to be matched with a corresponding volume of sales, meaning 
that firms now had to invest in marketing and distribution networks of analogous reach. 
These new functions had to be managed and coordinated seamlessly in order to produce 
the cost advantages they were set up to secure leading to the creation of a new 
organisational model for the firm, the managerial hierarchy.10 This model involved the 
establishment of several separate departments administering each function of the firm, 
such as purchasing (of raw materials, equipment, etc.), production, sales and 
distribution. This gave rise to what Chandler called ‘the modern enterprise’. 
2.2.2 Traditional Models of Growth: Market Exchanges vs. Integration 
The modern enterprise embodies Coase’s vision of the firm in that it evolved by 
initiating increasingly more transactions, adding more units to accommodate them and 
ultimately responding to the market’s demands. Its growth was motivated by the 
advantages inherent in the firm’s internalising certain processes rather than seeking to 
source them through exchanges in the open market. Williamson classified these 
advantages into three categories: incentives, controls and structural advantages.11 From 
an incentive perspective, when processes are organised internally interests are aligned 
and, even if not perfectly harmonised, they are free of the opportunistic, self-promoting 
aspects of arm’s length bargaining, which is characteristic of market exchanges. 
Internalisation is therefore preferable to the market where an exchange is likely to 
require repeated and protracted bargaining. From a control perspective, internalisation 
means that the entrepreneur has access to all the data necessary to monitor the progress 
of the internalised processes and to enforce policies or resolve conflicts by fiat alone. 
Finally, from a structural perspective, internal organisation allows for ‘economies of 
information exchange’,12 namely systems which not only codify information for the 
sake of efficiency, but also clearly identify which communications are authoritative. 
																																																													
10 Ibid, 31. 
11 O.E. Williamson, ‘The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations’ (1971) 61 
AER 112, 113 [hereafter, Williamson(1971)].  
12 Ibid, 113-114. 
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When these exchanges take place internally, repeated communications become even 
more economical and effective. Conversely, such economies are difficult to achieve 
through market exchange where the relationships resulting from spot contracts lack the 
requisite familiarity.13 
Growth can take several forms, with the firm adding more units by building new plant, 
taking on more staff or buying up more storage space or distribution outlets. This can 
be done in as many different ways – through (short- or long-term) contracts or 
integrating the new units to its existing outfit. According to transaction costs 
economics, the optimal mode of growth for the firm will depend on three factors: asset 
specificity, uncertainty and transaction frequency. Asset specificity refers to the degree 
to which an asset supporting a trade operation is tied to the operation at issue or whether 
it can be moved and used in different operations. The asset can be anything from plant 
and equipment, to production processes and administrative procedures, to human and 
knowledge capital. Therefore, where specificity is high, rather than short-term 
transactions, which are more akin to market exchanges, integration may be the optimal 
mode of growth, so as to allow the firm to whose operation the asset is specific (and 
therefore essential) to be in full control of the asset.14  
Uncertainty, on the other hand, refers, to the parties’ inability to predict certain aspects 
of the transaction, namely the environment in which the transaction takes place or the 
ultimate behaviour of the parties in it. Environmental uncertainty is common in volatile 
industries, such as information technology, where product life is short and knowledge 
can quickly become dated, which makes its value as a transaction-specific asset 
fluctuate dramatically. Behavioural uncertainty refers to the possibility that a party in 
the transaction will act opportunistically by reneging on the contract in pursuance of its 
own self-interest. The transaction costs resulting from seeking to enforce the original 
agreement through external arbiters, e.g. the courts, will be considerable. Therefore, 
where asset specificity is high and there is a considerable chance of opportunism, it 
																																																													
13  Ibid, 114. See also the discussion on the importance of accurate information exchange in O.E. 
Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (The Free Press, 1975), 31-
37 [hereafter, Williamson(1975)]. 
14 So holds a version of transaction cost economics, which views the firm as a collection of assets rather 
than the sum of relationships arising from repeated transactions, placing greater importance on control 
of these assets (and where that control lies) rather than on the transaction costs inherent in securing them: 
see S.J. Crossman and O.D. Hart ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration’ (1986) 94(4) J. Political Econ. 691. 
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may be optimal to internalise vertically related assets rather than securing their use 
through contract 15  Finally, transaction frequency relates to the frequency of 
transactions over a specific issue. The degree of such frequency determines whether it 
would be optimal to invest in internal governance structures that accommodate the 
transaction in question, e.g. setting up a human resource department, rather than having 
an external agency handle recruitment, payroll, etc. 
When integration is deemed optimal, at the outset, the firm will necessarily grow thus 
potentially producing economies of scale. These economies are achieved when the 
increase in the size of the production or distribution operation results in the decrease in 
the cost of producing or distributing a single unit.16 Integration itself can take place 
through horizontal or vertical internalisation of assets. Horizontal integration involves 
expansion by combination with firms operating at the same level of the production 
process and in the same or similar line of business. These firms may have been 
competitors, but their combination may be what ensures their survival where a larger 
competitor enters the field. Horizontal integration has been shown to be the most 
efficient mode of expansion, where the firms in question seek to diversify their product 
or operations portfolio and thus achieve economies of scope.17 Economies of scope are 
those achieved when the cost for joint production of all outputs is less than the cost of 
producing each output separately.18 Chandler identifies further benefits in horizontal 
integration, such as achieving the size necessary to control prices, market entry and 
industry standards and to even achieve first-mover advantages (especially in the 
																																																													
15  See B. Klein, et al., ‘Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting 
Process’ (1978) 21(2) J. Law Econ. 297. The chance of opportunism increases where the asset is 
specialised and there are appropriable quasi rents, i.e. the rent that arises from the asset being ‘so 
expensive to remove [once installed] or so specialised to a particular user that if the price paid to [the 
asset’s] owner [for its use] were somehow reduced, the asset’s services to that user would not be reduced’ 
(my emphasis); ibid, 299. In other words, the rent arises from the high cost of making a highly specialised 
asset available to other users. Therefore, the user to whom the asset is specialised cannot source it 
elsewhere, while the asset’s owner (even though unable to easily transplant it) will have considerable 
margin to act opportunistically by withholding its use despite any previous agreement. In this case 
integrating the asset into the specialised user’s outfit may be the optimal way to deal with post-contractual 
opportunism.  
16 Chandler, n.9, 17. 
17 See generally D.J. Teece, ‘Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise’ (1980) 1 J. Econ. 
Behav. Organ. 223 
18 Ibid, 224. 
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research and development department) if the integration comes early enough in the 
process.19 
On the other hand, vertical integration involves internalising vertically related assets, 
i.e. assets which are used at different stages of the production chain. For example, for 
a copper wire manufacturer, vertically related assets would be a copper mining 
operation, a copper processing plant, a wire manufacturing facility and a storage and 
distribution network. From the outset, and based on the discussion on growth 
determinants above, vertical integration has a number of advantages. These include 
security of supply of raw materials (while potentially controlling availability of supply 
to competitors), as well as lower transaction costs, which would normally be associated 
with extensive pre-contractual bargaining, as well as post-contractual monitoring and 
enforcement. Furthermore, vertical integration is considered an optimal growth model 
where there is technological interdependence. Waterson offers an example of such 
interdependence from the newspaper industry, where typesetting, printing and 
publishing were traditionally carried out on the same premises so as to avoid time 
delays, given that reporting speed in the news industry is crucial.20 Joskow offers 
another potent example from coal powered electricity generation, where the power 
plant must be designed according to the type of coal available, which determines the 
type of generation technology to be deployed. When the plant is optimised to the 
characteristics of the coal available (e.g. chemical composition, sulphur content, ash 
content, grindability etc.) it becomes more efficient thermally, thus minimising 
maintenance costs and the risk of power outages.21 In this case, it may well be advisable 
to not only acquire the coal mine providing the fuel but also to build the plant in its 
vicinity so as to ensure uninterrupted fuel supply. According to Williamson, vertical 
integration is indicated where there is technological interdependence, because of the 
‘flow economies’ observed in these examples. Such economies may also be present in 
a non-integrated firm operating on long-term contract with the owners of the vertically 
linked assets, but because of pervasive behavioural and environmental uncertainty no 
contract could be complete in the sense that it addresses every eventuality. As a result, 
in addition to flow economies, the vertically integrated firm benefits from the general 																																																													
19 Chandler, n.9, 37.  
20 M. Waterson, ‘Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints’ (1993) 9(2) Oxf.Rev.Econ. Policy 41, 45. 
21 P.L. Joskow ‘Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: the Case of Coal-burning Electricity 
Generating Plants’ (1985) 1(1) J.L.Econ.& Org.  33, 44.  
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advantages of internalisation; namely the harmonisation of interests defeating 
opportunism, as well as the more efficient decision making aided by direct access to 
information pertaining to the vertically linked but separable processes and the summary 
control mechanisms available to internal organisation.22 
2.2.3 The middle road  
The previous section considered two extremes: growth through market exchanges and 
growth through integration. At the one end of the spectrum, the firm grows by initiating 
more transactions in the open market, each exchange determined primarily by the price 
mechanism. At the other end, the firm grows by internalising assets, placed either 
horizontally or vertically in the production chain. Neither model requires on-going 
coordination or cooperation with other firms as agents of production, beyond what is 
expected under a spot or short-term contract in the market exchange scenario. Between 
these two extremes comes another type of growth structure which combines the 
transactional independence afforded in firms operating under the market exchange 
model with several of the advantages of the integrated model, whether horizontal or 
vertical. These relationships Williamson first named ‘hybrids’.23 Hybrid models of 
growth depend on profound collaboration and coordination between otherwise 
independent and often competing firms, i.e. the type of cooperation which corporate 
strategies worldwide have been increasingly pursuing since the 1980s.24 
The hybrid route is indicated where the parties’ objective requires a more enduring 
arrangement than those featured in market exchanges and short-term contracts but 
where vertical integration is equally unsuitable, for instance where the objective of the 
arrangement is the flexibility necessary to adapt to rapid change. Thus, integration is 
particularly counter-indicated where product cycles are short, technological change is 
rapid, innovation is key and markets are specialised. This is because large scale 
integrated firms tend to adopt an invariably bureaucratic structure, featuring strict 
adherence to written rules and procedures and a highly decentralised decision making 
																																																													
22 See Williamson(1971), n.11, 116-117. 
23 See generally Williamson(1975), n.13. 
24 On the growth of hybrids see indicatively E.A. Murray and J.F. Mahon, ‘Strategic Alliances: Gateway 
to the New Europe?’ (1993) 26(4) LRP 102, J.M. Podolny and K.L. Page, ‘Network Forms of 
Organisation’ (1998) 24 Annu.Rev.Sociol. 57 and, in more detail, W.W. Powell, ‘Neither Market nor 
Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organisation’ (1990) 12 Res.Organ.Behav. 295. 
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process, in the sense that day-to-day decision making is delegated to several stages 
down the vertical chain of command and does not necessarily come from those high up 
in the hierarchy.25 The ensuing structure is unavoidably cumbersome, unable to respond 
to changes in international markets and systematically resistant both to process 
innovation, which affects the structure of the production chain, and to the introduction 
of new products. These were the conclusions of Mariotti and Cainarca’s research in the 
textile clothing industry, an intensely turbulent market characterised by non-
standardised production processes, a long production to distribution line (creating 
various intermediate products), as well as rapid technological changes stemming from 
the development of new fibres and associated textile production processes.26 In this 
type of industry, where speed of response to change is crucial, the traditional integrated 
model is not indicated. Powell offers an example from the US auto industry, 
characterised by tight vertical integration until the mid-1970s, when the US firms 
started facing international competition.27 The emergence of new competition exposed 
the US system’s inflexibility and its inability to innovate due to its cost-minimising 
mentality. Because of the auto-manufacturers’ tight grip on their parts suppliers, the 
latter were prevented from developing expertise, which in turn lowered the skill 
standard of their workforce. The suppliers had neither the incentive nor the ability to 
update equipment or suggest technological changes. In response to the ensuing drop in 
their market share, US auto-manufacturers started to disaggregate their production 
chain and to enter into complex cooperative arrangements with their Japanese 
counterparts, seeking to revitalise their production processes, as well as retrain labour 
and establish new relationships with auto parts suppliers.28 
The hybrid route is also indicated where the firm seeks to achieve benefits of growth, 
such as economies of scale and scope, but without increasing its size as such. Merging 
with or acquiring another concern in the spirit of horizontal or vertical integration may 
lead to the firm acquiring assets for which it has no use. More importantly, increasing 
the size of the firm beyond what is optimal may lead to what Williamson named ‘the 
																																																													
25 See J. Child, ‘Organisation Structure and Strategies of Control: A Replication of the Aston Study’ 
(1972) 17(2) Adm.Sci.Q. 163, esp. 169-170. 
26  S. Mariotti and G. Cainarca, ‘The Evolution of Transaction Governance in the Textile-Clothing 
Industry’ (1986) 7 J.Econ.Behav.Organ. 351. 
27 See Powell, n.24, 320. 
28 Ibid. 
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control loss’ phenomenon.29 Control loss refers to the decision maker’s inability to 
make correct decisions about the firm due to erroneous or incomplete information. This 
issue arises from transmission of information over serially linked individuals in an 
organisation which changes radically the content of the material transmitted. In the 
context of growth through integration, Williamson explains that the firm’s top manager 
‘cannot have all the information he had before the expansion plus the information 
generated by the new parts… he has more resources under his control, but the quality 
(serial reproduction loss) and the quantity (bounded capacity constraint) of his 
information are both less with respect to the deployment of each resource unit.’30 In 
other words, over-expansion may cause the firm’s management to lose a substantial 
degree of control over the firm’s assets and production stages. This may also create 
significant transaction costs where the management attempts to counter this 
phenomenon by implementing safeguards, such as information coding or a reduction 
of the management chain.31 
2.3 Drivers of Cooperation 
2.3.1 Sharing Risk 
The previous section established some of the advantages of the hybrid option over the 
more traditional models of growth. The purpose of this section is to explain the factors 
that make cooperative strategies so prevalent among established and start-up firms 
worldwide. The first of these factors is rather straightforward: cooperation provides a 
platform for risk sharing. Risk is the potential for the firm to lose value32 and can arise 
due to factors internal or external to the firm.  This rather broad definition entails that 
risk can take numerous forms and therefore its magnitude may depend on anything from 
the size of the firm’s own investment, to the stability of the regulatory system, the 
political regime, even the weather. Therefore, for a firm seeking to not only maximise 
its revenue but to ensure its continued existence and growth, minimising risk in every 
foreseeable form is a major priority. This is particularly the case in resource and capital-
																																																													
29 O.E. Williamson, ‘Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size’ (1967) 75(2) J. Political Econ. 123, 
126. 
30 Ibid, 127. 
31 Ibid. 
32 DePamphilis, D. Mergers, Acquisitions and Other Restructuring Activties (Academic Press, 2010), 
547. 
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intensive fields such as natural resources extraction, pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology, as well as information technology and electronics. These are industries 
where innovation is a key factor not only to success but also to survival. Thus, when 
developing new projects, firms in such fields face enormous risks, not least because of 
the heavy initial investment in both cash and capital. The potential for loss will be even 
higher where the project is meant to address a market with which the firm is unfamiliar 
and even more so where the market is entirely new.33  
Risk lies also in the time it takes for the project to produce something not only 
marketable but also profitable and in the possibility that a competitor might get there 
first. This is a major concern in areas that reward first-comers, such as pharmaceuticals 
and biotechnology, where being the first to patent is crucial for recouping the costs of 
research and development and, consequently, future growth. The importance of 
innovation and the ensuing investment in research and development is further 
underscored by the markets’ growing awareness of ever shorter product cycles, as is 
notoriously the case with information technology. 
In addition to its role in innovation, time may pose a further risk by exposing the firm 
to legal liability where, once marketed, the product eventually reveals actionable faults. 
The pharmaceutical industry, for instance, has often been the subject of mass tort 
litigation, because a drug can lead to side effects, undiscovered at the time of its initial 
development, which affect a large number of people over significant periods of time.34 
The large players in the pharmaceutical industry have long tackled this risk by actively 
investing in synergies with smaller, more entrepreneurial firms for the development of 
new drugs. This is because not only are the smaller partners more administratively 
nimble due to a much smaller management structure, and thus able to pursue new ideas 
faster, they ultimately shoulder the legal risk of liability as primary developers.35 At the 
same time, the larger partner shoulders the risk of the heavy cost associated with the 																																																													
33 E.g. consider the tablet market which ballooned over 2010 and 2012, catching many established 
players in the IT industry by surprise: ‘Microsoft’s Windows Monopoly now at Risk as Tablet Market 
sprouts without it’, Forbes Magazine, 30 April 2010. 
34 Notably, see the Thalidomide litigation which exploded in the 1960’s in Europe following the release 
of the drug for use as a sedative to counter morning sickness during pregnancy. The drug led to major 
birth defects in infants born to mothers who took it in early pregnancy: see K.I. MacDuff ‘Thalidomide- 
The Aftermath’ (1967) 1 AULR 53 and A. Bernstein, ‘Formed by Thalidomide: Mass torts as a False 
Cure for Toxic Exposure’ (1997) 97 Colum.L.Rev. 2153. 
35 See e.g. D.G. Owen, ‘Dangers in Prescription Drugs: Filling a Private Law Gap in the Healthcare 
Debate’ (2010) 42(3) Conn.L.Rev. 733. 
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research and development stage, while they both share in the revenue from the drug 
when it is finally released many years later. This illustrates strongly the role of risk in 
driving synergies – cooperation allows partners to spread the risk of a large project over 
several firms and to exploit the strengths of each other’s management skills and 
structural idiosyncrasies. 
2.3.2 Deregulation 
Another factor encouraging cooperation rather than competition between firms 
operating in the same or related field is the deregulation drive that has been dominating 
both developed and developing economies. Heavily regulated industries, such as 
utilities, insurance, banking and air transport, were traditionally dominated by 
oligopolies featuring strong vertical integration. However, with their deregulation and 
ensuing liberalisation the incumbents of these industries, formerly state-owned firms, 
were faced with competition which opened up new business opportunities. For instance, 
competition in the airline industry today is based on cooperative strategies between 
otherwise competing airlines. These strategies involve sharing booking information and 
flight codes when two airlines operate the same route, allowing one to use the other’s 
excess capacity to satisfy excess demand.36  Deregulation in the electricity market 
allowed then newcomer Enron to develop synergies with technology firms ABB and 
Motorola, whose electronic meters and wireless modem technology respectively 
allowed Enron to collect and analyse consumer usage data and thus predict electricity 
demand.37 
2.3.3 Learning 
Finally, the need to learn and develop new expertise is a major incentive for 
cooperation. Learning new skills or how to reutilise existing ones may not only 
invigorate a firm’s processes, from production to resource management to 
administration, but can confer significant competitive advantages. For instance, 
throughout the 1990s Japanese firms would strike synergies with US firms in order to 
learn their technologies and design processes as well as to streamline their own 
																																																													
36 See F-C.Y. Chen and C. Chen ‘The Effects of strategic alliances and risk pooling on the load factors 
of international airline operations’ (2003) 39(1) Transportation Research Part E, 19, 24. 
37 F.J. Contractor and P. Lorange, ‘The Growth of Alliances in the Knowledge Based Economy’ in 
Contractor and Lorange (eds), Cooperative Strategies and Alliances (Pergammon, 2002) 3, 8. 
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manufacturing capacity, which allowed for faster marketing timescales.38 The fact that 
corporate knowledge has become a major asset for most firms is evident from the 
increasing emphasis on knowledge management processes. An early example is the 
technology audit (namely, an inventory of technical assets and strategic capabilities), 
performed by Dow Chemicals, which produced a knowledge base so valuable that upon 
licensing yielded an estimated revenue increase of $100 million.39 The importance of 
corporate knowledge as an asset is also evident in many firms’ strategic emphasis on 
intellectual property registration and enforcement. The phenomenal surge in patent 
litigation throughout 2011 and 2012 in the information technology and consumer 
electronics industries is a vivid illustration of this.40 This wave of lawsuits and counter 
lawsuits amongst the primary players in the tablet, smartphone and software markets 
illustrates that the value of many highly profitable firms has come to depend on tacit 
knowledge developed through their various operations, so much so that software giants 
like Microsoft and Google are valued primarily on the strength of their patents and 
knowledge capital. 
2.4 Cooperative strategies in practice: strategic alliances 
The factors briefly outlined above have led to a massive increase in cooperative 
strategies, collectively referred to as business or strategic alliances. A strategic alliance 
can be broadly defined as ‘a voluntary arrangement between two or more firms that 
involves the exchange, sharing or co-development of products, technologies or 
services’.41 Alliances take a myriad forms which, technically, depend on the alliance’s 
ultimate objective. Alliance typology – which could provide a basis for predicting 
alliance form, its associated costs and, even, output – has become the focus of much 
research since cooperative strategies entered the mainstream corporate agenda. 
However, due to the consequent diversity in applied epistemology no definitive alliance 
typology has emerged. Nonetheless, from this research it is possible to identify 
elements common to all or most synergies, thus not only building on our understanding 
of the alliance business model but also mapping out the requisites for its success and 																																																													
38 D. Lei, ‘Offensive and Defensive Uses of Alliances’ (1993) 26(4) LRP 32, 33. 
39 Contractor & Lorange, n.37, 11. 
40 E.g. ‘Will Google have to start a patent war to get $9bn of value from Motorola?’, The Guardian, 29 
January 2012; ‘Facebook buys 750 IBM patents: but why does it need to fight Yahoo?’, The Guardian, 
23 March 2012. 
41 A. Inkpen and K. Ramaswamy, Global Strategy (OUP, 2005), 80 
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the likely causes of failure. This section will consider the main approaches applied in 
the examination of alliances in order to identify some of the elements which determine 
alliance form. 
2.4.1 Determinants of alliance form 
A major determinant of alliance form can be the partners’ relative competitive position 
in a particular business segment. Examining alliances from this point of view, Lorange 
and Roos have identified four archetypes – the ‘ad hoc pool’, the ‘consortium’, the 
‘project based joint venture’ and the ‘full-blown joint venture’.42 The ‘ad hoc pool’ type 
tends to be formed between a market leader and a market follower (and competitor) for 
a highly specific, short-term project and with a minimum set of resources pooled in by 
both parties. Importantly, the project will pertain to the core business of both partners 
and its outputs, while the resources committed by each partner will return to them upon 
completion.43 The ‘consortium’ type, on the other hand, is more involved than the ad 
hoc type and tends to arise between partners who are market followers rather than 
leaders. An example could be a research alliance among several pharmaceutical 
companies, each having too few resources to carry out the research on its own.44 
Similarly to the ad hoc type, consortium alliances also involve projects pertaining to 
the core business of each partner and even though they entail the commitment of more 
resources for a longer time period, the outputs are still expected to flow back to each of 
the partners once the project is completed. ‘Project-based joint ventures’, however, tend 
to arise between market leaders in their core business but the project in question is 
peripheral to the partners’ overall portfolio of operations, for instance where the 
objective is to enter a new market. The outputs in this case, along with the limited 
resources committed by each partner, remain with the vehicle formed to carry out the 
objective of the joint venture.45 This entails a much longer-term arrangement than in 
the case of ad hoc pool and consortium types. Finally, the ‘full-blown joint venture’ is 
formed among followers in a business segment and pertains to projects which are 
peripheral to each partner’s overall portfolio of operations. The objective of such 
arrangements is generally to pool resources in order to catch up with the rest of the 																																																													
42 P. Lorange and Roos, n.1, 40. 
43 Ibid, 44. 
44 Ibid, 46. 
45 Ibid, 48. 
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market or to create more value by making operations more efficient. As a result, these 
arrangements tend to involve heavy resource commitment, including administrative 
and managerial resources, on a long-term basis. All project outputs and committed 
resources remain with the alliance so as to enable its long-term sustainability as a 
separate operation.46 
Another key factor liable to determine the form of the alliance is the level of specificity 
of the resources required to achieve the alliance’s objective. It will be remembered that 
asset specificity refers to the degree to which it is possible to substitute the required 
asset. For example, an asset of high specificity would be a patented process for the 
production of a sought-after chemical. According to the resource-based theory of 
alliance typology, the higher the level of specificity, the more hierarchical the business 
form of the alliance arrangement. For instance, empirical evidence shows that the 
higher the proportion of tacit knowledge in a technology the more likely the knowledge 
transfer will take place through incorporated joint ventures or wholly owned 
subsidiaries.47 Ultimately under this approach the partners’ goal is to deal with the 
uncertainty of situations which they cannot control or determine through contract by 
sharing essential knowledge and competencies and making learning the alliance’s 
priority. Similarly, the manner in which the parties apportion property rights in alliance 
assets, as well as rents and payoffs, has been identified by the property rights theory as 
another powerful determinant of alliance form.48 
The problem of ‘non-contractibles’, 49  i.e. eventualities whose effect cannot be 
determined by contract, is also central to the relational contracts theory (see Ch.4), 
which points to the strength of relational contracts as a determinant of alliance form. 
According to this approach, parties enter into ‘informal agreements and unwritten codes 
of conduct that powerfully affect the behaviours of individuals within firms’.50 The 
purpose of these contracts is to tackle opportunistic behaviour, the costs of information 
																																																													
46 Ibid, 49. 
47 E. Tsang, ‘Motives for Strategic Alliances – a Resource-based Perspective’ (1998) 13(4) SJM 207, 
212. 
48 See generally, G. Baker et al., ‘Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between Islands of Conscious Power’ 
(2008) 22 JJIE 146. 
49 C. Menard, ‘Hybrid Modes of Organisation: Alliances, Joint Ventures and Other Strange Animals’ in 
R. Gibbons and J. Roberts (eds), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton UP, 2012), 19. 
50 G. Baker, et al. ‘Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm’ (2002) 117(1) Q.J.Econ. 39, 39. 
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asymmetry among partners or partners and the alliance vehicle, as well as the difficulty 
of enforcing agreements riddled with non-determinable elements. Relational contracts 
and their efficacy depend on several components ranging from differences between the 
partners, such as their respective motivations for the alliance or corporate or national 
cultures, to their respective bargaining power, to trust. 51  Trust, in particular, is a 
significant element which encompasses belief that the partner will fulfil its obligations 
competently and as per its contractual obligations or that it will behave fairly and refrain 
from engaging in opportunistic behaviour even in unforeseen circumstances.52 Where 
an alliance is based on relational contracts, trust will feature more strongly when the 
levels of uncertainty and/or interdependence between the partners are high, in each case 
making opportunistic behaviour more likely and/or prejudicial respectively.53 
However, perhaps the most powerful determinant of alliance form is the cost of dealing 
with uncertainty and the possibility of opportunistic behaviour by a partner. This is the 
focus of transaction cost economics, the main theory employed in alliance typology in 
various forms. This approach starts off on the assumption that economic organisation 
is a problem of contracting and that when the various contracts, whether implicit or 
explicit, have been put in place in order to accomplish a certain task, the associated 
costs must be examined.54 These are collectively referred to as transaction costs and 
they can be ex ante or ex post. The former include the costs of researching, negotiating, 
drafting and safeguarding an agreement, for instance through common ownership of 
the assets committed to the deal.55  The latter arise from the difficulty in drafting 
contracts that cover every possible eventuality and ultimately represent the costs of 
behavioural uncertainty and non-contractibles. They typically include ‘maladaptation 
costs’ incurred when the transaction has drifted out of alignment with the original 
objective, ‘haggling costs’ incurred when the parties try to correct the misalignment, 
‘set up and running costs’ pertaining to the dispute resolution mechanisms adopted and 
‘bonding costs’ incurred when seeking to secure commitments from each party to the 
																																																													
51  P. Kamminga and J. Van Der Meer-Kooistra, ‘Management Control Patterns in Joint Venture 
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52 Ibid. 
53 This is particularly the case in information technology alliances: see C.E. Ybarra and T.A. Turk, ‘The 
Evolution of Trust in Information Technology Alliances’ (2009) 20 JHTMR 62, 64ff. 
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renegotiated objective.56 According to transaction costs economics, it is the level of 
these costs and the degree to which they can and should be mitigated that will ultimately 
determine the form of the alliance. 
2.4.2 Appropriation concerns and other sources of conflict 
In practice, the factors examined above translate into a set of issues which the parties 
must consider before embarking on a common venture. Naturally, the venture itself 
may fail for reasons external to the partners’ working relationship, but internal conflict 
will render the failure that much more likely. Here, conflict will invariably stem from 
the fact that the decision to cooperate by definition entails that the party considering it 
must relinquish at least some control over the resource it is prepared to commit to the 
alliance. Such compromise is made on the understanding that the party will benefit from 
the alliance in a fair, or at least previously agreed, manner. Therefore, from the start, 
each party is concerned about whether it will be able to secure a fair share of the alliance 
payoffs. 57  These considerations are known as ‘appropriation concerns’. From a 
transaction costs perspective, they arise at the prospect of ex post transaction costs, as 
described above. From a relational contracts perspective they could arise from a 
fundamental lack of trust between the partners, especially where the parties had no 
relationship before considering the alliance or where neither party has past experience 
in handling alliances. 58  In general terms, appropriation concerns stem from the 
uncertainty associated with future stipulations in an unavoidably incomplete contract, 
the associated costs, and the possibility that allies do not comply with agreed 
contribution levels. The higher the levels of expected interdependence in the alliance, 
the more profound the appropriation concerns, because of the relational risk inherent in 
the ensuing relationship. Relational risk refers to the probability that an ally firm doe 
s not commit to the alliance in the agreed manner.59 So, for example, appropriation 
concerns have been shown to be high when the alliance involves tacit knowledge 																																																													
56 Ibid, 21. 
57  R. Gulati and H. Singh ‘The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing Coordination Costs and 
Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances’ (1998) 43 Adm.Sci.Q. 781, 788. 
58 The history of the partner firms’ relationships is a significant determinant of the level of cooperation 
in an alliance: see E. Todev and D. Knoke ‘Strategic Alliances and Models of Collaboration’ (2005) 
43(1) Management Decision 123, 128. 
59 T.K. Das and T. Bing-Sheng, ‘A Risk Perception Model of Alliance Structuring’ (2001) 7 J.Int.Manag. 
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transfer between partners or has a major technology component.60 In the first case, 
where the knowledge in question is proprietary, a partner may be reluctant to reveal its 
true extent, which makes it difficult to assess its value as a contribution to the alliance. 
In the second case, where the alliance pertains to a technology exchange, appropriation 
concerns tend to arise from the ambiguity surrounding the technology to be transferred 
and the extent of its use.61  
A related source of conflict in alliances is the lack of a common goal for collaboration. 
A case in point is the 1987 alliance between French company Matra S.A. (Matra) and 
the Swedish LM Ericsson (Ericsson), who formed Matra Ericsson Telecommunications 
(MET). For Matra, the purpose of MET was to provide access to Ericsson’s technology 
portfolio, while, for Ericsson, MET was to be a point of access to the then newly 
privatised French telecommunications market. However, despite being profitable the 
collaboration between the two companies was dissolved in 1997. The reason was 
Ericsson’s opposition to forming a deeper technological collaboration with Matra, 
leading Matra to form a new collaboration with Ericsson’s competitor Nortel, thus 
putting serious strain on the Matra-Ericsson relationship.62 Evidently, the divergence 
between otherwise complementary strategic goals may induce opportunistic behaviour, 
i.e. deceitful, self-interested conduct,63 or even a learning race between the allies, where 
the firm that acquires the desired knowledge first is the winner. In the latter scenario a 
firm’s entire portfolio of skills, processes and technologies is potentially available to 
its allies for assimilation. A case in point are the US – Japanese/Korean alliances of the 
1980s and 1990s in the power equipment (e.g. Westinghouse with Mitsubishi), 
consumer electronics (General Electric with Samsung), and office equipment (Kodak 
with Canon) industries, where the Asian firms not only outlearned their US allies but 
developed new technologies and applied them to a wider range of uses.64 
																																																													
60 Ibid, 788-789. 
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62 Inkpen, n.41, 91-92. Note also the Ericsson and Hewlett Packard alliance, who formed Ericsson 
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2.5 Forms of alliances 
2.5.1 Equity Alliances 
Where appropriation concerns are high, transaction costs economics has identified 
hierarchical modes of alliance structure as a means to address uncertainty and 
opportunism.65 These modes include elements such as a clear command structure and 
system of authority determining which communications are authoritative, standard 
operating procedures, dispute resolution mechanisms as well as internal pricing 
systems, which facilitate the determination of appropriate remuneration levels. 66 
Hierarchical governance structures are more clearly implemented in the equity joint 
venture, which involves two or more firms pooling resources and forming an 
independent and separate legal entity. The parents of the new entity retain their 
autonomy and acquire equity in it, the size of the resulting interest usually depending 
on the level of the parent’s contribution to the alliance.67 Contributions are made for a 
specific purpose and could take the form of hard finance and assets such as plant and 
equipment, as well as skilled personnel and IP rights. The joint venture entity may be 
formed completely anew, i.e. with new plant, personnel, management, etc., or through 
a divisional merger, whereby parents contribute entire departments of their own 
operation to the alliance.68 An example of this is the alliance between Canadian brewers 
Molson with the Australian Elders IXL, both of which in 1988 contributed their existing 
Canadian brewing operations to the joint venture.69 The advantage of an equity joint 
venture over less hierarchical alliance structures lies in the simplification of the decision 
making process and the autonomy of the entity itself, who sets out to complete tasks 
with a view to further its own purposes, which in turn will translate into specified 																																																													
65 Cf. K. Langfield-Smith, ‘The Relations Between Transactional Characteristics, Trust and Risk in the 
Start-up Phase of a Collaborative Alliance’ (2008) 19 Mana.Account.Res. 344, presenting a very 
successful alliance between a local water authority and a number of construction firms, which adopted 
some hierarchical elements in its structure. 
66 Gulati, n.57, 785. 
67 Equity joint ventures may take the form of International Joint Ventures (IJV), i.e. alliances based on 
the formation of a separate entity in a foreign country, either to comply with or bypass national legislation 
of the host country or to take advantage of the local partner’s expertise. The level of equity sharing in 
the IJV will depend on several factors, including the strategic intentions of the incoming partner for 
forming the IJV with the local firm in the first place. E.g., were the intention is for the IJV to mitigate 
and share risk of operational uncertainties with local firms it may be advisable for the incoming partner 
to acquire a lower equity share; see Y. Luo, ‘Equity Sharing in International Joint Ventures: an Empirical 
Study of Strategic and Environmental Determinants’ (2001) 7 J.Int.Manag. 31, 39ff. 
68 See generally DePamphilis, n.32, 546ff. 
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payoffs for the parents. Furthermore, it helps alleviate the parents’ appropriation 
concerns by providing a clear and pre-agreed appropriation regime.  Normally based 
on the parents’ contributions to the joint venture in the first place, the returns regime in 
an equity joint venture may be more easily monitored which also allows for more 
effective enforcement of agreed contribution levels for each parent.   
Equity alliances may, however, take the form of mutual equity sharing without the 
establishment of a separate legal entity. Such alliances are common between established 
firms and start-ups in technology and research and development intensive industries, 
such as information technology, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. In this case, the 
smaller of the two firms sells a non-controlling equity interest to its more established 
ally when the relationship is formed. The purpose of this is to give the larger partner a 
stronger incentive to avoid acting opportunistically during the course of the alliance. In 
addition to this, the transfer of the minority equity stake is usually accompanied by 
granting the investing partner representation on the smaller partner’s board of directors. 
This allows the investing partner to monitor its ally’s behaviour, which is particularly 
important when the smaller firm is tasked with the development of a new product. In 
addition to this, participation on the smaller ally’s board of directors provides the 
alliance with a forum for conflict resolution, as well as the exchange of strategic 
information and the adjustment of the alliance’s strategic goals as contingencies arise.70 
2.5.2  Contractual Alliances 
While the presence of equity is not a prerequisite, all alliances tend to be based on 
written contracts. In the absence of equity, a contract helps maintain an arm’s length 
relationship between the otherwise autonomous collaborators, while specifying each 
ally’s obligations and entitlements in the relationship. Alliances based solely on 
contract tend to be project oriented and form when the envisaged relationship is not 
expected to last for more than three years71 or does not require close monitoring and 
coordination by the allies. Most consortia, i.e. loose networks of firms or even entire 
alliances, are based on contract, as are the project-specific alliances examined in this 
thesis. Other common forms of contractual alliance include licensing, franchising and 																																																													
70 G.P. Pisano, ‘Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology 
Industry’ (1989) 5(1) J.L.Econ.& Org. 109, 112. 
71 Cf. Joskow, n.21, who shows that most fuel supply relationships tend to be based on long-term 
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supply chain systems, all featuring entirely autonomous, self-interested participants 
constrained only by the alliance agreement.  
Licensing involves granting another the right to use an asset (frequently, a trademark, 
patent or copyright) for a set period of time and in a specified manner (e.g. the licence 
may be exclusive to the licensee but restricted geographically) in exchange for royalties 
or a fee. This simple alliance form requires little coordination of the parties’ 
relationship, save for the licensor’s monitoring of the licensee’s use of their asset. 
Supply chain systems, on the other hand, function like a vertically integrated operation 
requiring tight coordination. The supply chain operates through a complex matrix of 
contracts between autonomous organisations with complementary competencies, 72 
comprising all the organisations involved in the making of a product – from extracting 
and processing the raw materials to final assembly and distribution.73 Finally, much 
like licensing, franchising involves a brand owner (franchisor) granting another 
(franchisee) the right to trade under the franchisor’s brand name and business format at 
a specified geographic location and for a specified term in exchange for an initial fee 
(representing the franchisee’s investment) and royalties, based on a percentage of the 
franchisee’s sales.74 
These contractual alliances give rise to generally straightforward legal relationships, 
following set models of rights and duties. There is no such model for the project-
specific contractual alliance considered here, which has no separately recognised form, 
making it a legal quagmire for the allies. The next chapter will examine the law 
applicable to such alliances, with a view to underscoring its incongruity with what the 
allies must have intended at the start of their relationship. 
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3 THE LAW ON CONTRACTUAL JOINT VENTURES 
3.1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the project-specific type of contractual alliances, and, for 
the sake of consistency with the existing legal literature in the area, I will refer to them 
as contractual or unincorporated joint ventures. It should be noted at the outset, that no 
universally accepted definition of a ‘joint venture’ has emerged in the law and related 
literature, even though the term itself has been used (controversially, as will be 
discussed later) as a term of art in both.1 The most apt description of the legal position 
on joint ventures is that provided by Mann J in Winton v. Rosenthal: 
‘The expression “Joint Venture” is not a term of art with a fixed meaning and 
is convenient shorthand to cover a variety of possible arrangements.’2 
Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, a ‘joint venture’ is defined as an alliance based on 
a contract between two or more business concerns with the purpose of combining their 
resources and capabilities in order to complete a specified project over a limited time 
period and sharing its outputs. The contract here is of paramount importance as it sets 
out not only the rights and duties of the members to the joint venture, but addresses 
everything else from the venture’s scope, to its management structure, voting and 
termination procedures as well as consequences of default on the contract by a 
member.3 The contractual joint venture does not generally involve the creation of a 
separate entity to carry out the business of the joint venture. This tends to be carried out 
jointly by the venturers either by setting up a committee for the purpose, 4  or by 
appointing a third party to manage the venture for all of them. The latter option can be 
particularly useful in addressing ‘failures of coordination’, that arise from the 
																																																													
1 Particularly in American literature and case law: indicatively see J. Taubman, ‘What constitutes a Joint 
Venture’ (1956) 41 CLQ 640; H.W. Nichols, ‘Joint Ventures’ (1950) 36 Va.L.Rev. 425; W.H.E. Jaeger, 
‘Joint Ventures: Origin, Nature and Development’ (1960) 9 Am.U.L.Rev. 1; J.M. Mullen, ‘Joint 
Adventures’ (1944) 8 Md.L.Rev. 22; Cf. Mair v. Wood (1948) SC 83. 
2 [2013] EWHC 502, [77]. 
3 See, e.g. for an analysis of different contract terms in context: S.R. Salbu, and R.A Brahm ‘Strategic 
Considerations in Designing Joint Venture Contracts’ (1992) Colum.Bus.L.Rev. 253. 
4 R.C. Sampson, ‘The cost of misaligned Governance in R&D Alliances’ (2004) 20(2) J.L.Econ.& Org. 
484, 488, and note particularly the references to the alliance between Ramtron Inc. and ULVAC 
(hereafter, ‘Sampson(2004)’); and generally W.H.E. Jaeger, ‘Joint Ventures: Membership, Types and 
Termination’ (1960) 9 Am.U.L.Rev. 111. 
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autonomous parties in the joint venture ‘reading and reacting to signals differently’.5 In 
this case, the managing party – who can be one of the co-venturers or a subsidiary, as 
well as a specially formed company or an outsider – carries out the day-to-day 
operations of the joint venture business and is, in turn, overseen by a committee of the 
co-venturers. The duties of this managing party are usually set out in a separate 
management agreement.6 
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that the current legal regime governing the 
contractual joint venture is unfit to give effect to the parties’ intentions as economic 
agents. To demonstrate this, I will examine the legal regime governing contractual joint 
ventures in light of the economic drivers underlying their growing popularity (see 
Ch.2). Thus, I will first examine the advantages of the contractual joint venture over its 
equity counterpart in order to establish its significance as a vehicle for growth and the 
relevance of an argument supporting the development of a new legal model reflecting 
the allies' intentions more accurately. Secondly, I will discuss the implications of the 
contractual route for the allies and their relationship with third parties. Thirdly, I will 
discuss the fitness of the current law as a governance mechanism for unincorporated 
joint ventures in light of the alliance drivers examined in Chapter 2. Finally, I will argue 
that a separate legal model applicable to the unincorporated joint venture is necessary 
to both realise the parties’ intentions and support their growth.  
3.2 Why form a contractual joint venture? 
At the outset, any lawyer would agree that the equity joint venture confers several legal 
advantages to the participants,7 not least of which is the limited liability afforded by the 
creation of a separate legal entity to carry out the business of the venture. Nonetheless, 
Sampson reports that contractual joint ventures tend to far outnumber equity-based 
ones.8 This is because the equity joint venture is by definition a hierarchical structure 
with all the administrative and bureaucratic costs that this entails. By contrast the 
contractual joint venture is closer to the market exchange end of the spectrum, and as a 																																																													
5  O.E. Williamson, ‘Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural 
Alternatives’ (1991) 36(2) Adm.Sci.Q 269, 278. 
6 I. Hewitt, Joint Ventures (Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), [4.10]ff. 
7 See, e.g., D. Yates and G. Cooke, ‘Legal Problems in Financing Maritime Joint Ventures’ (1989) JBL 
197, 202-203, who clearly favour the equity form on the strength of its transparency and risk limiting 
attributes. 
8 R.C. Sampson, ‘The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances’ (2003) 53 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 909, 917. 
	 59	
result it retains the incentive characteristics of markets (i.e. profit seeking, efficiency of 
resource allocation, etc.), while it allows for a longer term relationship which is better 
monitored and coordinated through mechanisms adopted in the contract (such as the 
appointment of a venture manager).9 In other words, the purely contractual relationship 
allows the parties to retain their autonomy, only devoting resources prescribed in the 
contract for the purpose of completing a single project. Additionally, the more elastic 
nature of the contract allows for easier adaptation of the parties’ relationship by 
amending terms in response to unforeseen changes in the course of the project.10 
The flexibility of the contractual route aside, according to Oxley ‘it is the attributes of 
the transaction and not firm-level characteristics that determine the type of alliance 
form chosen’.11 Thus, if the scope of the venture is multifaceted (e.g. in an R&D joint 
venture, which involves not only the development of a new technology or material, but 
also its mass production, marketing and distribution) then an equity joint venture is 
more frequently chosen. 12  This is also the case where the venture has a heavy 
international element (despite a much narrower scope). 13  However, where the 
transaction raises few appropriability concerns, then the contractual route is generally 
preferred, especially where the implementing legal environment features a strong rule 
of law and enforcement mechanisms, which is a significant concern where intellectual 
property is concerned.14 
Contractual joint ventures (provided they are not treated as partnerships) in some 
jurisdictions can confer significant tax advantages to participants. In Australia for 
instance, joint venture participants are treated separately for tax purposes, so that they 
can selectively offset losses from one project against income from their other projects, 
independently from the other venture members.15 Another significant advantage of the 																																																													
9  J. Oxley, ‘Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost 
Approach’ (1997) 13 J.L.Econ.& Org. 387, 390. 
10  I. Hewitt, n.6, 62; see also D.G. Smith and B.G. King, ‘Contracts as Organizations’ (2009) 51 
Ariz.L.Rev. 1, arguing – similarly to Williamson as to contractual incompleteness – that the relational 
aspect of contracts must be acknowledged and augmented through an understanding of the parties’ goals 
as organisations. 
11 Oxley, n.9, 405. 
12 Sampson(2004), n.4, 510ff, in the context of R&D in biotechnology. See also Oxley, n.9. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid, 511. 
15  G.L.J. Ryan, ‘Joint Venture Agreements’ (1982) 4(1) AMPLJ 101, 126-127; A.J. Black, ‘Joint 
Ventures, Partnerships and Fiduciary Duties: United Dominions Corporation Limited. v. Brian Pty 
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contractual route is that it allows the parties to raise finance separately, using separate 
security and through different financiers. Ladbury, for instance, explains that the 
unincorporated joint venture can prove an effective vehicle for large-scale project 
financings, provided the core joint venture agreement is designed to accommodate this 
route.16 
3.3 The legal framework on contractual joint ventures 
Despite its flexibility, a purely contractual relationship is a distinctly problematic 
structure, because of the uncertainty surrounding such issues as the status of the 
undertaking in law and that of the relationship between the parties inter se, as well as 
with third parties. In English law, the contractual joint venture as envisaged by the 
parties does not have distinct legal status with an associated set of default rules, as is 
the case with, for example, partnerships or agencies.17 The parties generally envisage 
the contractual joint venture as a relationship between principals, bargaining at arm’s 
length and, assuming that this is indeed how they conduct their relationship,18 this is 
how the courts would approach their arrangement in the event of dispute.19 Uncertainty, 
however, ensues where the relationship in reality is much closer than the parties initially 
claimed it to be. Questions arise as to its true nature and therefore as to the legal 
consequences in the event of dispute, either between the parties themselves or between 
the parties and third persons. These questions can be numerous but for the purposes of 
this thesis, I will focus on the three main ones. First, is the joint venture relationship in 
fact one of a partnership and is it possible for the parties to define their relationship at 
the outset, so as to avoid this characterisation? Secondly, if not a partnership, can it be 
said that the contractual joint venture is a distinct legal category? Thirdly, if not, should 
																																																													
Limited’ (1985-1986) 15 MULR 708, 709; By contrast, contractual joint ventures in the UK do not attract 
special tax treatment, but equity joint ventures do: see Corporation Tax Act 2010, s.450. 
16 E.g. the agreement must support separate security, usually in the form of a lender’s charge over a co-
venturer’s interest in the venture and/or over the venturer’s share in the outputs; R.A. Ladbury, ‘Mining 
Joint Ventures’ (1984) 12 ABLR 312, 331ff. 
17 See Ross River Limited v. Waveley Commercial Limited [2012] EWHC 81, [ 237], per Morgan J, who 
refused to attach fiduciary duties to the parties’ relationship merely on the basis that they were in a joint 
venture.  
18 The court will examine all the circumstances in the case, to determine whether any extra-contractual 
rights and duties could be implied, but will generally defer to the contract where the parties are 
commercial, bargaining at arm’s length: Ross River Limited v. Cambridge City Football Club [2007] 
EWHC 2115, [197], per Briggs J. 
19 E.g. Thames Cruises Limited v. George Wheeler Launches Limited [2003] EWHC 3093, [49]-[52], per 
Smith J; Daniels v. Deville [2008] EWHC 1810, [36], per Lindsay J.  
	 61	
we acknowledge the contractual joint venture as a distinct legal category, so that 
associated rules as to rights, duties and liabilities can be developed and applied as a 
default system for its governance? I will now turn to the first of these questions. 
3.3.1 Are co-venturers partners? 
In the UK, the definition of a partnership comes from s.1(1) of the Partnership Act 1890 
(hereafter, PA(1890)):  
‘Partnership is the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a 
business in common with a view of profit.’ 
This definition appears broad enough to cover almost every type of commercial 
arrangement, short of a corporation (s.1(2)), and certainly one that could cover the type 
of commercial relationship envisaged by the contractual joint venture. In fact, the 
definition is broad enough to identify a partnership in the simplest of circumstances – 
all that is required is two or more persons (legal or natural) embarking on a business 
together with a view to share profits (the so-called ‘partnership at will’). Generally, 
partnership law is default law and, in the absence of an express agreement between the 
parties, the PA(1890) will govern their relationship from inception to dissolution. 
However, this may not be immediately the case with the project-specific contractual 
joint venture, as defined in this thesis. In order to establish whether the PA(1890) 
applies to this type of alliance I will now analyse it in light of s.1(1). 
3.3.1.1 “… Carrying on a business” 
The carrying on of a ‘business’, which includes every trade, occupation or profession,20 
is central to a partnership. The undertaking must be a commercial one – therefore no 
partnership will arise if two persons pool their finances and share travel expenses in 
order to watch a show in London. In this regard the project-specific joint venture clearly 
satisfies the s.1(1) definition, as its purpose is fundamentally one of commercial gain. 
There has been, however, some debate as to whether the fact that the scope of the 
project-specific joint venture is limited to the completion of a single undertaking (e.g. 
the development of a new material, extraction of ore) falls under the category of 
‘business’ in the first place. The argument goes that the term ‘business’ denotes some 
																																																													
20 PA(1890), s.45. 
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continuity of trade, and therefore a single or ad hoc joint undertaking cannot be a 
business for the purposes of a partnership.21 First, s.32(b) of PA(1890) on partnership 
dissolution, provides that a partnership entered into for a single undertaking is dissolved 
upon the termination of that undertaking, making it clear that the PA(1890) envisaged 
single undertaking partnerships as well.  Secondly, when a similar point was raised by 
the creditor in Re Abenheim, ex parte Abenheim,22 Phillipmore J held that the word 
‘business’ in the PA(1890) relates ‘not merely to a life-long or a universal business or 
a long-undertaking, but to any separate commercial adventure in which people may 
embark’. Therefore, the project-specific nature of a contractual joint venture does not 
preclude it from being a partnership. 
On the other hand, in the context of the project-specific joint venture which seeks to 
develop a capital asset for further exploitation, Merralls argued it would be difficult to 
maintain that an arrangement of this type was either a business or with a view to profit. 
He explained that the object of obtaining the capital asset is ‘not the kind of systematic 
activity normally connoted by the word business’.23 I argue, however, that the meaning 
of ‘business’ is broad enough to encompass all types of activity that are intended to 
generate revenue of any type.  For instance, in English law, the parties to a joint 
undertaking are regarded as trading even though the business concern originally 
contemplated has not yet been fleshed out. Thus a ‘business’ is born or starts trading 
when the parties have embarked and done enough towards their ultimate commercial 
objective to show their commitment to it. This was established in Khan v. Miah,24 
which concerned a joint venture for the launch of a restaurant. The relationship between 
the venturers collapsed before the restaurant started trading, but at that point over 
£50,000 had been invested. The parties acquired premises, began to fit them out, and 																																																													
21 The argument has American origins and is considered one of the main reasons for distinguishing 
between a partnership and a joint venture in North America: see Jaeger, n.1, 13, who offers examples 
from undertakings in drilling and operating oil wells (Shell Oil Co. v. Prestidge, 249 F.2d 413 (1957)), 
the purchase, development and sale of land (Lasry v. Lederman, 147 Cal. App. 2d 480, 305 P.2d 663) 
and the construction of a garage and storage building (Matanuska Valley Bank v. Arnold, 223 F 2d 778 
(1955)); Cf. R. Flannigan, ‘The Joint Venture Fable’ (2008-2010) 50 Am.J.Leg.Hist. 200, 205, who 
argues that the trend stems from a misinterpretation of a judgment from the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania allowing two partners to bring an action in law to resolve a dispute about a single 
partnership item (in this case, $12.50), where an accounting would be too long-winded and unnecessary 
in the circumstances. He explains that the ‘single item’ became ‘single transaction’ in subsequent cases 
contributing to the confusion as to the status of the joint venture in law. 
22 (1913) 109 LT 219, 220. 
23 J.D. Merralls, ‘Mining and Petroleum Joint Ventures in Australia: Some Basic Legal Concepts’ (1980) 
3 AMPLJ1, 3. 
24 Khan v. Miah [2000] 1 WLR 2123. 
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purchased tables, table linen and other equipment. Eventually the restaurant opened for 
business run by three of the former co-venturers. The issue was whether the fourth 
member of the former joint venture could claim his share in the business, a 50 per cent 
share as envisaged in the original agreement between them. The House of Lords held 
that:  
‘the question is not whether [the business] had commenced trading, but whether 
the parties had done enough to be found to have commenced the joint enterprise 
in which they had agreed to engage.’25 
I submit that, by analogy, a joint venture like that contemplated in Merralls’ argument 
certainly gives rise to a business: the parties secure finance, licences, professional 
advice, specialised equipment, an expert workforce, put operational policies in place 
and actually start on the work, for which everyone involved is remunerated and tax is 
paid accordingly. The fact that all this culminates in a capital asset rather than sales 
revenue should be immaterial. After all, eventually the asset will be exploited in such a 
way that sales revenue will be the ultimate outcome. 
 
3.3.1.2 “… in common” 
The partnership business must be run as a common concern for the joint benefit of the 
parties, who must show an intention to be partners by accepting either expressly or 
impliedly mutual rights and duties in respect of each other. Thus, in Hawksley v. 
Outram26 Lopes LJ held that:  
‘the true test of whether a partnership was intended is… whether there was a 
joint business, or, whether the parties were intending to carry on the business as 
the agents of each other’.27  
The test was based on the application of the landmark decision in Cox v. Hickman,28 
where in exchange for allowing a debtor to continue trading, the debtor’s creditors 
																																																													
25 Ibid, at 2128, per Millett LJ. 
26 [1892] 3 Ch 359. 
27 Ibid, 377 (my emphasis). 
28 (1860) 8 H.L. Cas. 268; see also Mollwo March & Co v. Court of Wards (1871-73) LR 4 PC 419 
(creditor entitled to 20% of profits and given significant control over the firm’s management in a deed, 
even though exercised very little of it, was not a partner). 
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signed a deed whereby they would be entitled to the part of the profits in discharge of 
the debt owed to them. It was held that they were not partners of the debtor, as the trade 
was not carried on by or on account of the creditors, but for the sole benefit of the 
debtor. ‘The debtor was still the only person interested in the profits, save only that he 
[had] mortgaged them to the creditors’.29 The intention to be each other’s agent was 
also central to the court’s reasoning in Kilshaw v. Jukes.30 There, the three defendants 
started a land development venture, one of them being an ironmonger to whom the 
other two had been indebted for goods furnished in previous ventures. The ironmonger, 
was not deemed a partner of the other two, not having been party to the contracts for 
purchasing building materials and having given no authority to the other two to 
purchase materials for him. Instead, the court held that the relationship between him 
and the other two defendants amounted to a simple loan repayment. In Bullen v. 
Sharp,31 the trustees under a settlement received the profits of an underwriter’s business 
in order to secure the losses of the business, with any reserve going to the underwriter 
himself. When the underwriter became bankrupt and could not pay on an insurance 
policy, the issue was whether the trustees could be recovered from as his partners. They 
could not; the underwriter was still the only beneficiary of the business’ profits as they 
accrued and therefore the business was not carried out for the trustees but for him alone. 
The undertaking to submit to each other’s authority denotes that carrying on a business 
in common for the purposes of a partnership means that the parties have a mutual 
unqualified legal interest in the management of the business as well as its assets. This 
is more than a mutual interest in the financial success of the venture. For instance, in 
Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) v. CIN Properties32 it was held that common economic 
interest was insufficient to create a partnership between parties, who, on the facts, had 
no way of binding each other directly to any agreement. Thus, the manner in which the 
partnership business is managed will be a good (if not conclusive) indication of the 
status of a party in a relationship. In Stocker v. Brockelbank33  the plaintiff ran a 
manufacture business for the defendants in exchange for a share of the profits. Because 
he was to contribute no capital in the business, sustain no loss, his credit was not to be 																																																													
29 Cox, ibid, 307. 
30 (1863) 3 B&S 846. 
31 (1865) LR 1 CP 86, 112. 
32 The Times, 21 April 1995. 
33 (1851) 42 ER 257, 262-263. 
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pledged, was to manage the business according to the direction of the defendants and 
had no unconstrained discretion, he was found to have neither the liability, nor the 
authority or the interest of a partner. Similarly, in Triffin v. Lester Aldridge34 the Court 
of Appeal affirmed the decision of an employment Tribunal, which held that a solicitor, 
who, while working at the respondent firm, participated in the management of the firm 
and was allowed to vote in management meetings, and was entitled to a small share of 
profits (as well as to a share in surplus assets of the firm on winding up) was a partner 
in the firm and not an employee. Finally, the level of kinship required of and afforded 
to partners was illustrated in M Young Legal Associates. v. Zahid,35 where a solicitor 
who was hired in order to satisfy the supervision requirement of the Solicitors’ Practice 
Rules 1990 and had no share in the profits, was not required to provide capital and was 
paid a fixed salary, was nonetheless held to be a partner. This is because without the 
appellant the partnership could not legally operate and therefore his agreeing to be 
engaged in the firm’s business in order to satisfy the Practice Rules indicated clearly 
his and the firm’s intention to establish a partnership. 
In light of these authorities, could the contractual joint venture satisfy the ‘in common’ 
element of s.1(1)?  The answer will depend on the parties’ conduct of the joint 
undertaking, which will indicate their intentions as to the nature of their relationship. 
On this issue, Ladbury argued that contractual joint ventures are merely exercises in 
risk and expense sharing. At least in the context of the mining and petroleum joint 
venture and, I would extrapolate, contractual project-specific joint ventures in general, 
the manner of its operation should not satisfy the ‘in common’ requirement. This is 
because the only common aspects of the typical venture are the parties’ contribution to 
expenses, their use of common assets and their decision making through a joint venture 
committee, all of which relate to one specific, often narrow, project.36 In response to 
these points, Flannigan argued that such an approach disregards the heavy ‘in common’ 
element of such arrangements, explaining ‘they are each engaged both in their separate 
businesses and collectively in their shared business’.37  
																																																													
34 [2012] EWCA Civ 35. 
35 [2006] EWCA Civ 613; see also Hodson v. Hodson [2009] EWCA Civ 1042. 
36 R.A. Ladbury, ‘Commentary’ in P.D. Finn, (ed.) Equity and Commercial Relationships (Law Book 
Co., 1987), 37, 41. 
37 R. Flannigan, ‘The Legal Status of the Joint Venture’ (2009) 46 Alta.L.Rev. 713, 727. [hereafter, 
‘Flannigan(2009)’]. 
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With respect, I submit that Flannigan missed the point of Ladbury’s argument. Ladbury, 
like many practitioners dealing with project-specific, unincorporated joint ventures,38 
simply deferred to the manner in which the parties themselves view their arrangement, 
which can also be inferred from the strategic alliance drivers discussed in Chapter 2. It 
will be remembered that the point of going into business with, in effect, a competitor 
or relinquishing part of one’s control of a business opportunity in order to develop it in 
conjunction with another, is to take advantage of the other party’s capabilities without 
actually having to assimilate them into one’s own structure. A legal partnership would 
effectively do this, as by default one party will be able to bind its partner in affairs that 
are within the scope of the partnership business. Therefore, should a legal partnership 
be upheld contrary to the manifest intentions of the co-venturers, the latter will have 
ended up relinquishing more than control of a business opportunity. They will have 
relinquished control over their respective businesses; at least as far as the partnership 
business is concerned. Therefore, if the law is to claim that the parties’ intention is what 
determines its treatment of their relationship, then the economic drivers of their 
relationship cannot be ignored.  
Moreover, Flannigan does not appear to consider that s.1(1) refers to more than the 
operating arrangements between the co-venturers. The pivotal issue in the case law is 
the extent to which the parties operate their joint undertaking as agents of each other. 
A case where the ‘in common’ element was considerable, but there was no discernible 
mutual agency is Thames Cruises v. George Wheeler Launches.39 In this case the court 
considered whether a partnership existed between members of an association (WPSA) 
of passenger boat operators on the Thames. The WPSA members provided their own 
boats and crews but otherwise operated as a single entity (in terms of ticket sales and 
pricing, marketing, operating timetables, staff training and sharing of net profits, with 
shares calculated according to the number of boats each operated). Despite that, 
Thomas J held that there was no partnership on the facts.40 This was so, despite the fact 
																																																													
38 E.g. G.M. Lewis, ‘Comment: the Joint Operating Agreement: Partnership or Not?’ (1986) JERL 80; 
M.R.K. Garnett, ‘Joint Ventures’ (1984) 49(4) Arbitration 327. 
39 [2003] EWHC 3093. 
40 Ibid, [50]-[51]; See also Heap v. Dobson [1863] 143 Eng. Rep. 864 for a similar arrangement, where 
co-venturers who chartered a cargo ship together and apportioned profits from the sale of the cargo 
according to the value of cargo each provided, was also held to not be a partnership; Cf. Fromont v. 
Coupland (1824) 2 Bing 170. 
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that they agreed to bear the losses of operating the WPSA business jointly.41 The judge 
pointed out that each of the three WPSA members had their own separate limited 
company with activities distinct from those of the WPSA, was responsible for providing 
their own crew and boat at their own risk and there was never any question of being 
responsible for losses incurred by other WPSA members operating their own boats. 
Furthermore, the judge observed, they never submitted tax returns as a partnership, each 
member’s share of the profits being accounted for in their respective company 
accounts.42 
Conversely, Russell v. Austwick,43 concerned an agreement between the plaintiffs and 
defendants to carry on the business of common carrier between London and Falmouth, 
a separate portion of the road being allotted to each, on the proviso that ‘each of them, 
in his separate limit or division, should be considered as conducting an exclusive 
business, separate and apart from the others’. The defendants entered into an agreement 
with the officers of the Mint to carry silver coin by the waggons belonging to the 
different parties to the towns on the London-Falmouth route. Upon payment the 
defendants accounted to the plaintiffs fully. The defendants by themselves then entered 
into a second agreement with the Mint to carry coin to towns which were not on the 
London-Falmouth route, for which they did not account to the plaintiffs and claimed 
the whole benefit for themselves. It was held that the defendants had to account to the 
plaintiffs for the second agreement. The court considered the two agreements linked. 
In both cases the payments were made by cheque to the firm in general. Furthermore, 
even though the second agreement, being of a riskier nature, was charged at a higher 
rate, the officers of the Mint readily agreed to it because of their positive reflection on 
the first agreement. The mutual agency aspect of the relationship is evident from the 
defendants’ brokering the first agreement and its execution by all members of the 
venture. The court considered this arrangement to be continuous when the defendants 
relied on the success of the first agreement to secure the second one.  I submit, however, 
that in this case the involvement of the third party, the officers of the Mint, was crucial 
																																																													
41  Smith J held this to be acceptable in the circumstances, on the basis that it was a reasonable 
consequence of operating the WPSA service; ibid, [50]; see also Pratt v. Stick (HM Inspector of Taxes) 
[1932] 17 TC 459 (an agreement to share in losses was not definitive evidence of an intention to form a 
partnership).  
42 The WSPA membership changed often, which must also have been a relevant consideration in holding 
that the WSPA was not a partnership, along the lines of Daniels v. Deville, n.19. 
43 (1826) 1 Sim 52. 
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in the court’s decision to order an accounting on the second agreement. Had the client 
in the second agreement been different, the defendants might well have kept the whole 
benefit from that deal on the basis that it was outside the scope of the partnership. This 
was the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Dean v. MacDowell, 44  where the former 
partners of a salt merchant sought an accounting for profits he had gained by becoming 
involved in a secondary salt manufacturing business, while he was in a partnership with 
the plaintiffs. It was held that an account would have been available if the defendant 
had been engaged in business analogous or connected with the business of the firm, 
which was not the case on the facts.45 
Finally, the ‘in common’ element of a partnership was considered in Spree Engineering 
& Testing v. O’Rourke Civil & Structural Engineering.46 The case involved a joint 
venture between two companies for the construction of a natural gas compressor station 
for a third company. The venture was held not to be a partnership. Each co-venturer 
conducted its own part of the work independently from the other and dealt with the joint 
client separately. In spite of any joint meetings from time-to-time to review progress 
and some attempts to show a united front for their client’s benefit (e.g. the use of 
stationary in the joint venture’s name), the court held that the undertaking was not run 
as a single business for the purposes of PA(1890).47 Flannigan dismissed Stow QC’s 
judgment as misguided, not least because the judge relied on a text of dubious authority 
on contractual joint ventures to reach his verdict. Thus, despite their distinct roles in 
the operation of the undertaking, Flannigan observed, the fact that the undertaking was 
operated in common could not be denied.48 After all, it is commonplace that parties in 
a joint undertaking will assume distinct roles and perform their separate parts to achieve 
their common objective. Otherwise a joint undertaking would have been unnecessary. 
But I submit that the decision here was in fact correct, despite any misgivings as to the 
judge’s choice of guidance. The parties’ approach to their client should be sufficient 
evidence of their approach to their own relationship.  Indeed, despite some attempts to 																																																													
44 (1878) 8 ChD 345. 
45 Cotton LJ, went on to clarify what would amount to a ‘connection’ between the two businesses: ‘if he 
makes any profit by the use of any property of the partnership, including … information which the 
partnership is entitled to, then the profit is made out of the partnership property and therefore … it must 
be brought into the partnership account’; see also Somerville v. McKay (1810) 16 Ves. 382; Trimble v. 
Goldberg (1906) AC 494. 
46 [1999] EWHC 272. 
47 Ibid, [16]-[17]. 
48 Flannigan(2009), n.37, 717. 
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show a united front in order to facilitate matters for their client, nothing in the operation 
of the undertaking was, in fact, common. Each venturer would contact the client 
separately from the other and would not apprise the other of this. It appears that the co-
venturers approached their common client as two separate businesses, who happened 
to operate the client’s brief at the same time. In my view, this is a rather strong 
indication that the co-venturers never intended to submit to the other’s authority so as 
to be bound by the other during dealings with their joint client.49 They did not intend to 
be, nor did they become, each other’s agent in the joint undertaking and therefore no 
partnership could arise between them. 
 
3.3.1.3 “… with a view to profit” 
Finally, the purpose of the parties embarking on the joint undertaking must be the 
generation of profit. Generally, profits are defined as the result of deducting total costs 
(operational and fixed) and expenses from the total revenue of a business. Thus, s.2(3) 
of PA(1890) provides expressly that receipt of profits in a business, as opposed to gross 
returns,50 is prima facie evidence of a partnership. This proposition used to be applied 
strictly so that any share of profits from a business, regardless of the circumstances, 
would give rise to a partnership.51 The position changed drastically following the House 
of Lords’ decision in Cox v. Hickman considered above, so that the sharing of profits 
should now be considered fairly together with any other circumstances, ‘not attaching 
undue weight to any of them, but drawing an inference from the whole’.52 So in Smith 
																																																													
49 Cf. Thames Cruises, n.39, where the co-venturers presented a united front to their customers. However, 
the customers of the cruise boats were not the only third parties dealing with the co-venturers, each of 
whom dealt separately with their own distinct suppliers, as they provided their own crews and boats to 
the venture. The suppliers dealt with each participant in their own distinct capacity and therefore again, 
the mutual agency requirement is defeated. See also Barton v. Hanson (1809) 2 Taunt 48. 
50 PA(1890), s.2(2). 
51 See, e.g., Grace v. Smith (1775) 96 ER 587; Waugh v. Carver (1793) 126 ER 525. 
52 Davis v. Davis (1894) 1 Ch. 393, at 399, per North J; See also Badeley v. Consolidated Bank (1888) 
38 ChD 238, 258, per Lindley LJ; and see Mollwo March, n.28, where the Privy Council held that a 
lender, who, having started getting involved in the firm’s affairs in order to obtain security for the 
significant outstanding debts to him, became entitled to receiving 20 percent of profits was held not to 
be a partner. The receipt of profits was a mere repayment on the loan. Cf. Pooley v. Driver (1876) 5 ChD 
458 and Ex parte Delhasse (1878) 7 ChD 511. 
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v. Watson,53 an agent receiving a share of profits in lieu of commission was not a 
partner. Instead, the court held that the profit sharing was intended to be merely a 
performance incentive for the agent. Generally, the current legal position is that the 
prima facie evidence can be rebutted by other evidence, which, on the balance of 
probabilities, may show that no partnership was in fact intended.54 Regardless, the 
sharing of profits is still a strong indication of the intention to create a partnership as 
illustrated more recently in Geary v. Rankine.55 In this case, despite the fact that the 
appellant ran a guesthouse together with the respondent for nearly 12 years, she was 
held not to be a partner in the business, because, inter alia, the business’ profit and loss 
accounts showed no share of profits ever having been paid to the appellant. This 
indicated that the arrangement was never intended to be a business partnership.  
Conversely, sharing gross returns in the business is not evidence of partnership at all56 
and in fact, in practice, tends to point away from it.57 Indeed, one of the reasons Stow 
QC rejected the partnership argument in Spree Engineering was the fact that the co-
venturers shared in gross returns rather than profits. Therefore, in order to ascertain 
whether a contractual joint venture would give rise to a partnership among its 
participants, it is important to determine what kind of outputs from the joint venture 
constitute ‘profit’ for the purposes of ss.1(1) and 2(3) of PA(1890). These findings 
along with any observations as to the manner in which the parties conduct their joint 
undertaking should give us a clear view of the status of their relationship in law.  
For these purposes, difficulties may arise when the parties share not in profits (or indeed 
gross returns, as classically viewed) but in product. For instance, there is some debate 
in the literature on contractual joint ventures as to whether partnership law would apply 
to the project-specific joint venture given that many such arrangements involve the 
																																																													
53 (1824) 2 B&C 401; see also Holme v. Hammond (1871-72) LR 7 Ex 218 (executors of a deceased 
partner in receipt of profits from the partnership business, as per the partnership deed, were not partners, 
as they took no part in the business nor had any say in its affairs).  
54 Phillips v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2010] SFTD 332, [79]-[81]. 
55 [2012] EWCA Civ 555. 
56 PA(1890), s.2(2). 
57 Burnard v. Aaron and Sharpley (1862) 31 LJCP 334 (joint owners of a ship, where one had exclusive 
management of it, bore all expenses and paid 1/3 of gross earnings to the other, were held not to be 
partners); Dry v. Boswell (1808) 1 Camp 329 (an owner and a master of a ship who shared gross earnings, 
were not partners). 
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sharing of product among the co-venturers rather than profit.58 This is the case with 
many joint ventures for natural resources exploration and extraction, where the parties 
agree to share in the resource (usually for further processing) rather than sell it and 
share the profits. In this regard, Crommelin went as far as to observe ‘the receipt of 
product is one step further removed from partnership than the sharing of gross 
returns’.59  
On the other hand, Flannigan made nothing of this distinction, explaining that whether 
sharing in product or profit is immaterial, as the product will eventually translate into 
profit for the receiving venturer in any case.60 This is, of course, correct, as the co-
venturers’ paramount objective in pursuing a joint undertaking is always commercial 
gain, however indirect the means. Nonetheless, I submit that if the drafters of PA(1890) 
intended that a distinction between receiving net profits and gross returns was to be 
made in s.2, so that sharing profits is prima facie evidence of partnership and sharing 
gross returns is not, then any similar distinction from receipt of profits should be 
considered seriously.  
The question of partnership is one of both law and fact.61 It will be remembered that 
the law’s current approach to the application of the partnership regime defers to the 
intention of the parties as manifest from their conduct of the joint undertaking. The law 
requires the parties to commit to a high degree of kinship, what Lord Halsbury 
described as ‘community of interest’. 62  A share of profits, where there are no 
contradicting circumstances, would, I submit, signify such kinship. Before the co-
venturers can share profits, they must first deduct costs and expenses from total 
revenue. If those costs exceed the total revenue then the alliance has suffered a loss, 
which at this stage will be born jointly. For if the parties had agreed to bear losses 
separately, they would have agreed to share the total revenue and deduct their own costs 
from their respective shares. And such a situation would normally point away from 
partnership. However, sharing losses, as well as profits, is powerful supporting 
																																																													
58 M. Crommelin, ‘The Mineral and Petroleum Joint Venture in Australia’ (1986) 4 JERL 65; Merralls 
n.23, Ryan n.15, Ladbury, n.16, Lewis, n.38. 
59 Crommelin, ibid, 68. 
60 Flannigan(2009), n.37, 728. 
61 Keith Spicer Ltd. v. Mansell [1970] 1 All ER 462, 463e, per Harman LJ.   
62 Adam v. Newbigging [1888] 13 AC 308, 315 (my emphasis). 
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evidence of an intention to form a partnership,63 for there is an evident ‘community of 
interest’ in the parties’ willingness to address the risks of their venture jointly.64 
This is not the case where receipt of product is concerned. Naturally, as Flannigan 
observes, product to be shared has been generated from activities carried on in 
common.65 But, as Spree Engineering and later Thames Cruises indicate, an activity 
carried out in common does not equal community of interest. So, in the contemplated 
project-specific joint venture, sharing in product entails that each co-venturer acquires 
a distinct property interest in the quantity of product they receive. This means that they 
are each entitled to make whatever use of their share as they see fit, without any 
interference from the others. Any profits generated from the subsequent sale or 
processing of their share will be theirs alone, as will any losses. In this respect, Lord 
Cairns in Syers v. Syers66 held that a co-partnership in profits is a co-partnership in the 
assets by which the profits are made. Therefore, when the assets from which the profit 
is eventually generated are split before a collective assessment of profit and loss is 
made, no partnership can subsist on these facts alone, for there is no evident community 
of interest. This is also supported by Lord Loughborough’s dicta in Coope v. Eyre,67  
‘in order to constitute a partnership, a communion of profit and loss is essential. 
The shares must be joint, though it is not necessary that they should be equal. If 
the parties be jointly concerned in the purchase, they must also be jointly 
concerned in the future sale, otherwise they are not partners’.  
																																																													
63 Moore v. Davis [1789] 11 ChD. 261; Green v. Beesley (1835) 132 ER 43; In re Howard [1877] 6 ChD 
303. (here, the court noted the distinction between bearing losses and being responsible for the business 
debts); Fenston v. Johnstone (1940) 23 TC 29; Walker West Developments v. Emmett (1978) 252 E.G. 
1171 (here, an agreement providing for reasonable distribution of financial burden and a degree of 
sharing overheads between a property developer and a builder was held to be a partnership – no provision 
on loss-sharing was necessary, as this was to be dealt with under PA(1890), s.24: in the absence of 
agreement, partners are to share losses equally); Cf. Walker v. Hirsch [1884] 27 ChD 460 and Mair v. 
Glennie (1815) 105 ER 323 (But note: in both these cases the plaintiffs had not been allowed any 
discretion in conducting the business affairs, despite having been given shares in profits and obligations 
to bear a proportion of the losses), see also Smith v. Watson, n.53, as well as Stocker v. Brockelbank, n.33 
and, more recently, Wilson v. Dodd [2012] EWHC 3727 (the plaintiff was held not to be partner, as there 
was no evidence or suggestion that he was to be directly liable for the losses and debts of the business). 
64 Along the lines of Reid v. Hollinshead (1825) 107 ER 1281. 
65 Flannigan(2009), n.37, 728; even in the cost-paid production scenario that Flannigan contemplates, 
the fact that the parties would eventually receive, in his words, “net product” is immaterial when 
considered in light of the wider community of interest requirement: the economic incentive of entering 
into the joint undertaking for each co-venturer had been the generation of profit and this is the purpose 
of generating the product – the fact that the contemplated profit is not generated jointly is what indicates 
lack of community of interest in the larger venture. 
66 (1876) 1 App Cas 174. 
67 (1788) 1 Hy Bl 37, 48. 
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Coope v. Eyre involved an agreement among a number of merchants to purchase a 
cargo of oil jointly, but in the name of one of them only, and to take distinct shares of 
the cargo, to dispose of independently of each other. When the ostensible buyer failed 
to pay for and take the oil, the rest of the merchants were not liable as partners of the 
buyer. Similarly, the earlier decision of Hoare v. Dawes68 involved the purchase of 
large quantities of tea by a broker for several merchants, each, the broker included, to 
take separate shares and dispose of the tea independently of the others. When the broker 
borrowed using the tea-warrants as security, the lenders sought to recover from his 
employers as partners, after the broker had become bankrupt. It was held that the broker 
was not in partnership with the merchants who brokered the purchase. There was ‘no 
undertaking for one to advance money for another, nor any agreement to share with one 
another in the profit or loss’.69 Therefore, merely sharing the product generated from 
the common activities, assuming that the parties have not been conducting their 
undertaking in such a way as to manifestly submit to each other’s authority within the 
scope of the venture, entails that there is no community of interest in the joint 
undertaking and therefore no partnership intended.  
3.3.2 Consequences of a partnership finding for the co-venturers 
What is the practical effect of the parties to a contractual joint venture being identified 
as partners? First of all, their relationship, subject to the joint venture agreement,70 will 
become subject to PA(1890). The relationship being identified as a partnership will not 
give rise to a separate legal entity,71 therefore the parties will continue to be personally 
liable for debts incurred while conducting the joint venture business. Furthermore, as 
the law recognises that the parties are carrying on the business in common with a view 
to profit, it also provides that all parties will have an equal right to participate in the 
joint venture’s management72 and be entitled to share in the profits,73 as well as bear 
any losses jointly. 74  Therefore, thus far, a partnership characterisation would not 																																																													
68 (1780) 1 Dougl 371. 
69 Ibid, 373, per Lord Mansfield. 
70 PA(1890), s.24. 
71 With the exception of Scotland, where a partnership is a legal person distinct from the partners, 
although individual partners may still be liable for debts of the partnership; PA(1890), s.4(2). 
72 PA(1890), s.24(5). 
73 PA(1890), s.24(1). 
74 Ibid. 
	 74	
significantly alter the mechanics of the joint venture relationship, given that the manner 
in which the venture’s outputs (or any losses) are apportioned was to be determined by 
the joint venture agreement anyway.  
What changes is the foundation of the joint venture relationship; the joint enterprise is 
now carried on by the parties not only as principals in a contractual relationship, but 
also as each other’s agent.75 In other words, the parties run the business for each other’s 
benefit and bind each other in all matters within their authority.76 Four consequences 
stem from this: 
a) Joint and several liability 
First, the parties are now jointly and severally liable for the alliance’s liabilities and 
obligations.77 This is especially significant, as any one venturer could become liable for 
the whole of the business’ debts, regardless of any agreement among the parties as to 
the proportion of liability each is to bear.78 In this case, the venturer would be entitled 
to an indemnity from his co-venturers,79 although this would be pointless where the 
latter have become insolvent.  
b) Default fiduciary status 
Secondly, the once purely contractual relationship will take on a fiduciary character, 
which arises automatically from the parties’ now established mutual agency status. For 
the parties, this entails mutual duties of the highest standard of conduct, such as duties 
of utmost loyalty and good faith and to avoid conflicts between their own interests and 
those of the alliance. The operation and effect of such duties on the relationship will be 
examined in Chapters 5 and 6. However, for the purposes of this section, it suffices to 
observe that following a partnership finding the co-venturers will become subject to a 
set of duties, which they may not have accounted for when they agreed to the joint 
undertaking. 
																																																													
75 PA(1890), s.5. 
76 Ibid; PA(1890), s.6. 
77 PA(1890), ss.9-10, 12. 
78 Although it may be possible to avoid liability where the debt was incurred by a partner outside of his 
agreed authority and the affected third party had notice of this; PA(1890), s.8. 
79 PA(1890), s.24(2). 
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c) Partnership property? 
Thirdly, as partners, the co-venturers own the joint venture business as joint tenants, 
having ‘a beneficial interest in the form of an undivided share in the partnership 
assets’.80  The partnership assets comprise ‘all property and rights and interests in 
property originally brought into the partnership stock or acquired, … on account of the 
firm, or for the purposes and in the course of the partnership business’.81 In principle, 
therefore, the assets originally brought into the joint undertaking by each co-venturer 
become partnership property. Consequently, individual co-venturers may end up 
relinquishing control over major and/or sensitive assets, particularly where these are 
knowledge based, such as proprietary technology or processes, which up to that point 
gave the proprietor a competitive advantage in the industry and over its co-venturers. 
This may be particularly problematic where the asset in question is not protected by a 
registered property interest, such as a patent (which by default has a finite duration), 
but by a matrix of confidentiality agreements, if at all.  
Having said that, in anticipation of their relationship being identified as a partnership, 
it might be possible for the parties in the contractual joint venture to ensure that they 
retain sole ownership of the asset, along the lines of the decision in Yafai v. Muthana.82 
The issue in this case was whether the property from which a car servicing business 
was being conducted constituted partnership property. The property was bought in the 
name of the appellant only and the partnership deed referred to it throughout as being 
the property of the appellant, who was leasing it out to the business. The definition of 
the business itself did not include the property either. On these facts, the Court of 
Appeal held that the property in question was not partnership property.83 It should be 
possible therefore to draft the joint venture agreement in such a way as to assert 
exclusive ownership of particularly sensitive assets for individual co-venturers, in 
anticipation of a partnership finding. On the other hand, I contend that such a provision 
might be of little use where the sensitive asset, e.g. an industrial process, is integral to 
the conduct of the business. Arguably, the property in Yafai v. Muthana was not integral 
to the car servicing business as the business could be carried on from other premises if 																																																													
80 Memec Plc v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1998) I TLR 3, 16, per Peter Gibson LJ. 
81 PA(1890), s.20. 
82 [2012] EWCA Civ 289. 
83 Ibid, per Sir Andrew Morritt C, [28]-[31]. 
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necessary. This will not be so where the business is thoroughly dependent on the 
availability of an industrial process or sensitive technology. An inability to separate the 
asset from the joint venture business may mean that the asset becoming partnership 
property may not be avoided. 
d) Remedies in the event of default 
Fourthly, once the co-venturers are identified as partners their remedy options in the 
event of default by a co-venturer become significantly limited. This is because the 
courts are generally reluctant to intervene in the affairs of a partnership unless the 
parties are in fact seeking the dissolution of the partnership.84 Moreover, a consequence 
of partnership is that partners cannot sue each other in contract, and therefore they 
cannot claim damages for another partner’s breach of the partnership agreement.85 This 
is because partners cannot be in a relationship of debtor and creditor.86 Thus, while the 
partnership subsists, the remedies available to partners as against each other are strictly 
equitable.87 These include an injunction to stop a partner’s offending conduct (e.g. 
where the partner is involved in a competing business or is using partnership assets, 
including information, for their own gain or is excluding other partners from the 
management of the business); specific performance of certain obligations in the 
partnership agreement (e.g. to compel a partner to make the partnership books available 
for inspection); rescission of a partnership agreement where it was entered as a result 
of fraud or misrepresentation; appointment of a receiver; an order for an account of the 
partnership affairs; and/or an order for dissolution of the partnership following an 
account.  
Contractual damages are only available to partners as against each other following an 
account of the partnership affairs and the dissolution of the partnership.88 Thus, in the 																																																													
84 See Lord Lindley’s comments in R. I’Anson Banks, Lindley and Banks on Partnership (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2010), [23.16]. 
85 See, e.g., the discussion of the rule in Rosenberg v. Nazarov [2008] EWHC 812, [48]-[56], per Thomas 
Ivory QC.  
86 Hesketh v. Blanchard (1803) 102 ER 785; Clark v. Glennie (1820) 3 Stark 10; Fromont v. Coupland 
(1824) 2 Bing 170; Bovill v. Hammond (1827) 6 B&C 149; Richardson v. Bank of England (1838) 4 
My&Cr 165; Carr v. Smith (1843) 5 QB 128; Meyer and Co. v. Faber (No 2) (1923) 2 Ch 421. 
87 See I’Anson Banks, n.84, [23.15]ff. 
88 I’Anson Banks, ibid, [23.210], contends tentatively that an action in damages can be available as 
against partners and cites Trimble v. Goldberg (1906) AC 494, where, at 500, Lord Mcnaghten remarked 
obiter that “[had the partnership agreement expressly forbidden the purchase of certain land] the other 
… partners discovering the breach of contract might have claimed immediate dissolution, or even 
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case of a contractual joint venture identified as a partnership, damages against a co-
venturer who breached the joint venture agreement causing loss to one or more of the 
others would be available only once an account of the joint venture affairs is complete, 
i.e. once all external obligations have been met, the co-venturers have been apportioned 
their due from the joint outputs and assets and the joint undertaking has been 
dissolved.89 This is also the case where the co-venturers seek to expel one of their 
number from the joint undertaking for frequent or severe breaches of the joint venture 
agreement. If the relationship is deemed to be a partnership, it must be dissolved, all 
assets sold off90 and an account taken, before it can be reconstituted, if at all, between 
the co-venturers who wish to continue the joint undertaking without the offending 
party.  
I submit that, more than anything else, it is this consequence of the partnership form 
that renders it unfit as a governing mechanism for the contractual joint venture. 
Considering the tenets of rational bargaining in the context of cooperation and the 
widely accepted drivers of synergy, examined in Chapters 1 and 2 respectively, it 
should be clear that the primary objective of the joint undertaking and – I would 
extrapolate – the joint venture agreement, is the preservation of a working relationship 
between the co-venturers. The courts’ prioritising the dissolution of the relationship, 
where it should be presumed that the parties’ intention is to preserve it, makes the 
partnership form a patently unsuitable regime to govern contractual joint ventures.  
																																																													
damages, on proof of actual loss to the partnership”. However, I contend that this point only confirms 
that damages cannot be available without prior dissolution of the partnership. Given the subsequent 
development of the law on this issue, it is more plausible to interpret these dicta as damages being 
claimed in addition to dissolution.  Therefore, unless other equitable remedies are more appropriate, 
dissolution appears to be a compulsory route for the parties seeking recourse against each other. This 
was also the case in Broadhurst v. Broadhurst (2006) EWHC 2727 (damages were available as against 
a former partner, but the partnership had already been dissolved and an account agreed to be taken. The 
court did not need to consider the alternative, i.e. whether damages would have been available if the 
partnership was ongoing). 
89 Hurst v. Bryk (2002) 1 AC 185, 194 (on the special nature of the partnership contract), and 199-200 
(on the nature of the remedies available as against partners, and in particular the applicability of the 
doctrine of repudiation and its effect on a partner’s obligation to contribute towards the liabilities that 
the partnership incurred while they had been a partner), per Lord Millett; see also Cowan v. Wakeling 
(2008) EWCA Civ 229, where the Court of Appeal held that the judge at first instance had no basis to 
award damages as against a partner. The damages award was instead to be treated as constituting the 
taking of an account of what the defendant owed the claimant.  
90 Although, a Syers v. Syers order, n.66, (i.e. where a partner’s interest in the business is small enough 
so that it may be bought out by the other partners without the partnership business being dissolved and 
its assets sold off) may be available in the circumstances. 
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In addition to this, the inability of the parties to rely on the provisions of the joint 
venture agreement to effectively curtail opportunistic behaviour from co-venturers 
increases the risks of cooperation to a degree where, realistically, it could be imprudent 
to pursue a relationship in the first place. Granted, it may be possible for co-venturers- 
turned-partners to take out insurance against the consequences of joint and several 
liability for obligations incurred or wrongs committed, while conducting the joint 
venture-turned-partnership business. However, not being able to enforce the letter of 
the joint venture agreement itself, and particularly the provisions on party default, 
entails the parties’ losing more control than they were prepared to relinquish originally. 
This could render the contractual joint venture route unduly risky with wider knock-on 
effects on its employment as a vehicle for growth. Indeed, aside from the higher degree 
of financial risk, it could also prove fatal for the securing of finance for individual co-
venturers. For instance, it will be remembered that in return for providing finance to 
individual co-venturers, lenders may insist on being assigned choses in action based on 
the joint venture agreement.91 Therefore, in addition to the joint venture members, 
lenders also have a vested interest in the enforceability of the agreement against all 
relevant parties, including parties to the joint venture itself. In the absence of such a 
right, a loan may be more expensive or even improbable. For these reasons, I submit 
that the difficulties arising from the partnership form in this context are precisely what 
a legal regime fixated on the integrity of the commercial bargain should seek to avoid. 
3.3.3 Excluding partnership in contract? 
Could the co-venturers overcome the difficulties considered above by including in the 
contract a declaration that they intend no partnership? The rule in this case is rather 
clearly stated by Cozens-Hardy MR in Weiner v. Harris: 
‘Two parties enter into a transaction and say “it is hereby declared there is no 
partnership between us.” The Court pays no regard to that. The Court looks at 
the transaction and says “is this, in point of law, really a partnership? It is not in 
the least conclusive that the parties have used a term or language intended to 
indicate that the transaction is not that which in law it is.’ 92 
Regardless, it is common practice in commercial joint venture contracts to include 
clauses which specifically deny the creation of a partnership or agency between the 																																																													
91 Ladbury, n.16, 332. 
92 [1910] 1 KB 285, 290. 
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parties.93 In Ketteringham v. Hardy94 a clause of this type was successful. The case 
involved a joint venture between two lifelong friends one of whom passed away and 
his estate was then sued by his co-venturer, who claimed that the estate had to contribute 
to the significant losses of the venture because he and the deceased had been partners. 
The no-partnership clause was upheld, on the basis that it had been drafted by the 
defendant’s lawyers and, in contrast to past dealings, the defendant and the deceased 
bought the development land in the defendant’s sole name, who alone had been 
responsible for the mortgage payments. It is clear then that the clause was simply used 
as a means of confirming the parties’ intentions as manifest from their conduct of the 
joint venture up to the point of the dispute. Similarly, a no-partnership clause may be 
useful for ascertaining the nature of the parties’ relationship when the agreement on 
which they conduct their joint undertaking is vague or simply badly drafted. This was 
the case in Macintyre House v. Maritsan Developments, 95  which concerned the 
treatment of VAT in a joint venture between a land developer and a consultant. The 
court held that the way the agreement was drafted made no business sense and relied 
on the clause to confirm that the parties never in fact intended to form a partnership. 
These cases illustrate the fact that the Court will look into the reality of the parties’ 
relationship and any clause that seeks to define it will be used as a mere tool for 
ascertaining their intentions. The question then becomes one of whether the court 
should take this statement of intent by the co-venturers at face value, given the 
commercial nature of the contract and the courts’ general aversion to interfering into 
commercial bargains negotiated at arm’s length.96 Flannigan contends97 that where the 
status assertion clause is clearly worded, it should duly bind the parties who have agreed 
to it. In the interests of commercial certainty and consistency with past court practice 
regarding commercial bargains, I agree. It is of course trite law that a clause of this type 
cannot bind third parties, because they are not privy to the contract between the co-
venturers. 98  Thus, following such cases as Waugh v. Carver, 99  there may be a 																																																													
93 Early examples include Waugh v. Carver, n.51; Russell v. Austwick (1826) 1 Sim 52; Bullen v. Sharp, 
n.31. 
94 [2011] EWHC 162. 
95 [2011] CSOH 45. 
96 Considered at length in Ch.4. 
97 R. Flannigan, ‘The Limits of Status Assertion’ (1999) 21(4) A.Q. 397 (hereafter, ‘Flannigan(1999)’) 
98 See e.g. the comments of Blackburn J in Bullen v. Sharp, n.37, 113. 
99 (1793) 126 ER 525. 
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distinction drawn between how the co-venturers conduct their relationship inter se and 
the co-venturers’ relationship with regard to third parties. Waugh v. Carver concerned 
a joint venture between two well-established shipping agents at different ports who 
agreed to share in certain proportions the profits of their respective commissions and 
the discount on the tradesmen’s bills employed by them in repairing the ships entrusted 
to them. The agreement included a detailed provision, which essentially denied all 
incidents of partnership between them. Eyre LCJ held that they were not partners inter 
se, but were liable as partners with reference to third parties.100 This reasoning was 
employed later in Hesketh v. Blanchard101 and in Smith v. Watson,102 both of which did 
not concern no-partnership clauses, but it was evident from the facts that the parties 
never intended to be partners inter se although their relationship could be perceived as 
such by third parties.103 
Therefore, in practice, any difficulty regarding such clauses would normally arise in 
disputes between co-venturers who wish to declare the clause void. There may be a 
number of reasons for this. Following on from the last section, the party asserting 
partnership may wish to avail itself of the pervasive proprietary interest in the business, 
which comes with being a partner in it.104 Alternatively, the partnership hopeful may 
wish to avoid an action in damages for the breach of the joint venture agreement, given 
that partners are not in a position to recover debts from their co-partners. For instance, 
in Green v. Beesley105 the plaintiff sued on an agreement for the transport of mail 
between Northampton and Brackley, which entitled him to a yearly payment of £9 per 
mile. The agreement also provided that the plaintiff was to pay his proportion of the 
expense of the cart, money to be received for the carriage of parcels to be divided 
between the parties and the damage occasioned by the loss of parcels to be borne in 
																																																													
100  They were liable on the basis that they shared profits. This side of the Court’s reasoning was 
discredited later in Cox v. Hickman, n.28.  
101 (1803) 102 ER 785. 
102 n.53. 
103 This line of reasoning could also be another way of justifying the court’s approach to the ship 
operators’ alliance in Thames Cruises, n.39.  
104 See e.g. Reynolds v. Bowley (1866-67) LR 2 QB 474, concerning the interest of a dormant partner, 
where a brother and sister owned a farm in partnership, the business of which was run by the brother as 
his own, the sister assisting him. Upon the brother’s bankruptcy, the question arose as to whether the 
farm assets could be transferred to his trustee in bankruptcy. Kelly CB held that this was a partnership 
with a dormant partner and that since the farm was partnership property, both partners were owners, so 
that there could be no property transfer in the circumstances. 
105 (1835) 132 ER 43. 
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equal proportions. On these facts, the court held that the plaintiff and defendant were 
in fact partners and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to sue the defendant for the 
agreed £9 per mile. Another example would be the attempt to establish a partnership, 
despite having agreed to a no-partnership clause, in order to benefit from tax relief 
afforded specifically to partnerships. Thus, in Fenston v. Johnstone106 the plaintiff 
sought a declaration that the tax commissioners assessed his income tax erroneously as 
remuneration for services rendered rather than as income from a partnership interest. 
The business in question was the purchase and development of land, in which the 
plaintiff was to receive one half of the profits in consideration for his assistance in the 
purchase (he introduced the land to his co-venturer), development and sale of the land. 
The agreement contained a no-partnership clause. The court held that on its true 
construction the agreement created a partnership, even though the third party, the tax 
commissioners, relied on the no-partnership clause to perform their assessment of the 
plaintiff. 
I submit that it is in such cases that the courts tend to lose sight of the interests they 
wish to protect. For, by the courts’ own admission on numerous occasions, a 
commercial bargain must remain intact so as to ensure certainty in commercial matters 
and to give effect to the parties’ intentions. For instance, the court will not alter a 
contract in order to correct a bad bargain. At the same time, third parties are protected 
in any case, since there is a clear set of rules as to when they may be given recourse 
against one or more partners. Thus, if the co-venturers are in fact partners inter se, or 
have held themselves out to be partners (in cases such as Smith v. Watson and Waugh 
v. Carver, considered above), or the party who has held himself out to be a partner is, 
in fact, the other(s)’ agent,107 then the wronged third party will have recourse against 
the offending partner, ostensible or not, and his co-partner. A no-partnership clause 
between the co-venturers cannot affect that. Therefore, the only parties these no-
partnership clauses affect are the parties to the joint venture agreement. Why, then, 
disregard a provision in an agreement between commercial parties when both have 
voluntarily conceded it? My contention is that there are no applicable policy reasons 
for dismissing no-partnership clauses and that the parties should not be allowed to use 
the judicial process to alter an agreement merely because it would suit them in future 
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circumstances. However, my contention is subject to the proviso that a no-partnership 
clause is not to be synonymous with a clause disclaiming the existence of all fiduciary 
duties. The jurisprudence and mechanics of individual fiduciary duties (generally 
arising from agency) are quite distinct from the partnership regime, which operates 
autonomously, where the circumstances so warrant. The criticism in this chapter is 
restricted to the law of partnership governing the contractual joint venture by default 
and does not extend to the latter being subject to the fiduciary doctrine in general. 
3.4 The joint venture as a distinct legal category? 
In this section I will argue that the contractual joint venture should be acknowledged as 
a distinct legal category, so that a default governance model can be developed which 
accurately reflects the co-venturers’ intentions. Thus, I will first consider the status of 
the contractual joint venture in different common law jurisdictions, where it has been 
addressed with varying degrees of clarity. Secondly, I establish that given the tenets of 
rational bargaining in the context of cooperation and the economic drivers behind 
collaborative market relationships considered in Chapters 1 and 2, a separate joint 
venture category is defensible. 
3.4.1  The position in the UK 
It is plain that in the UK the unincorporated joint venture does not comprise an 
autonomous legal category.108 Regardless there have been instances where the courts 
have identified the contractual joint venture as something other than a partnership 
governed by default partnership law. In some of these cases the court was prepared to 
affix to the joint venture duties of honesty and good faith seemingly beyond those 
contracted for in the joint venture agreement. One such case was Hampton & Sons v. 
Garrard Smith (Estate Agents),109 where the Court of Appeal considered a dispute 
between estate agents for the accounting of commission on the sale of a number of flats. 
Dillon LJ held that ‘this [was] not a partnership, but it [was] a joint venture raising 
obligations of good faith [towards the plaintiffs]’.110 He did not explain why this was 
not a partnership nor what was the basis for a duty of good faith, especially since there 
																																																													
108 See Mair v. Wood, n.1, 84: ‘A joint adventure is simply a species of the genus partnership’. 
109 [1985] 1 EGLR 23. 
110 Ibid, 24. 
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is no such default duty in English contract law. 111  Nonetheless, in Ross River v. 
Cambridge City Football Club112  the court was prepared to distinguish between a 
partnership and a joint venture holding that the sale agreement at issue ‘had enough 
about it in the nature of a joint venture to require the parties to conduct themselves with 
mutual good faith’.113 Again, there was no explanation as to the basis of the good faith 
obligation. This was also the case in Rosenberg v. Nazarov, where Thomas Ivory QC 
held that  
‘one can have a joint venture which is not strictly a partnership governed by the 
Partnership Acts, but which (depending on the circumstances) could give rise 
to duties of honesty and good faith similar to that of a partnership.’114 
At any rate, these cases serve to illustrate that, in the UK, while the contractual joint 
venture is by no means an established legal category in its own right, the courts have 
started to recognise that default partnership law can be an inappropriate means of joint 
venture governance, because of the different drivers behind traditionally perceived 
partnerships and many contractual joint ventures. In Daniels v. Deville,115 for instance, 
Lindsay J was prepared to accept that the relationship between a property developer 
and a solicitor, via his various companies, was not a partnership but ‘instead was a 
hybrid form consisting of both individuals and companies’.116 
3.4.2 The position in the USA 
In the USA, the courts have been far more willing to distinguish between a partnership 
and a contractual joint venture, so as to almost afford the latter separate legal category 
status, even though, in practice, the result for the parties may well have been the same, 
if they had been identified as partners. For instance, in 1928 Justice Cardozo in the New 
York Court of Appeals equated co-venturers to ‘copartners [owing] to one another, 
while the enterprise continues, the duty of finest loyalty’ but did not label the 
relationship between the land developer and financier as a partnership, but went on to 																																																													
111 Good faith in contract will be considered in Ch.5. For the moment, it should be noted that the lack of 
any analysis in Garrard Smith makes it a highly doubtful authority for the joint venture as a separate 
legal category: see Smith J’s comments in Thames Cruises, n.39, [65]. 
112 n.18. 
113 Ibid, [229]. 
114 n.85, [58]. 
115 n.19. 
116 Ibid, [36] (my emphasis). 
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treat it as a ‘joint venture’.117 This attitude is more clearly evident in an even earlier 
decision where the court explained that the growing popularity of the joint venture 
‘[arose] from a desire to find words descriptive of joint enterprise yet not amounting to 
a partnership’.118 The result of this judicial trend was polarising and produced a rather 
confused jurisprudence on the nature and status of joint ventures. 
On the one hand, there are several American courts and legal scholars who treat the 
joint venture concept as distinct from a partnership. This faction has developed a list of 
criteria on what makes a collaborative relationship a ‘joint venture’ as opposed to a 
partnership but which does not help in drawing any clear-cut distinctions, not least 
because all of these are in fact attributable to partnerships as well. Thus, Jaeger 
summarises the essential elements of the ‘joint venture’ as follows:  
‘(a) A contribution by the parties of money, property, effort, knowledge, skill 
or other asset to a common undertaking; 
(b) A joint property interest in the subject matter of the venture; 
(c) A right of mutual control or management of the enterprise; 
(d) Expectation of profit, or the presence of ‘adventure’… ; 
(e) A right to participate in the profits; 
(f) Most usually, limitation of the objective to a single undertaking or ad hoc 
enterprise.’119 
Most importantly, however, the joint venture must be founded on contract, express or 
implied, and the parties to it must make their intention to form a joint venture clear.120  
The similarities of the joint venture, as described here, to the partnership form examined 
earlier are overwhelming. It is for this reason that the other side of the debate tends to 
be unrelentingly dismissive of the distinction between the two concepts. For instance, 
Mechem argued that if the legal consequences of being in a joint venture are the same 
																																																													
117 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 NY 458 (1928), 464. 
118 Joring v. Harriss, 292 Fed. 974 (2d Cir. 1923), 978. 
119 Ibid; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 155 F. Supp. 121 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.) 
120 Learning Annex Holdings, LLC v Whitney Educ. Group Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 403, at 412, (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
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as being in a partnership then joint ventures and partnerships must be the same thing.121 
The circular logic of this argument is problematic as it assumes the very thing it seeks 
to establish, but I submit that in the circumstances it is reasonable. For instance, one of 
the main arguments in American literature supporting the distinction between the two 
concepts is that, in contrast to partners, co-venturers can sue each other in contract.122 
Naturally, one has to establish that the relationship before the court is not one of 
partnership, before the parties can be allowed to proceed with their case in law. 
Therefore, simply observing that co-venturers can sue each other in contract cannot 
assist in distinguishing the relationship from a partnership beforehand, for the ability to 
sue depends on a finding that the relationship is not in fact a partnership. Regardless, 
when dealing with the ‘joint venture’, American courts have on multiple occasions 
awarded co-venturers equitable remedies normally available to partners, and legal 
remedies (albeit in very limited circumstances) to partners, who as a rule, cannot sue 
each other in law.123 More tellingly, co-venturers may also be jointly and severally 
liable with respect to third parties if they have held themselves out to be in a ‘joint 
venture’. This was the case in Shell Oil Company v. Prestidge,124 where Shell was 
found liable for the accident suffered by a third person at the work site of its drilling 
contractor, Rocky Mountain, and caused by the recklessness of one of Rocky 
Mountain’s employees. Counsel for Shell argued that Rocky Mountain’s relationship 
to Shell was that of an independent contractor. The Court of Appeals held that on the 
true construction of the agreement between them, it was obvious that the parties had 
joint control of the project and therefore were in a ‘joint venture’. Consequently, Shell’s 
vicarious liability for the actions of Rocky Mountain’s employee was upheld, as it 
would have been, if the relationship had been approached as one of partnership.  
Furthermore, it will be remembered that the joint and several liability of partners for 
acts committed within the scope of the partnership business stems from the fact that 
partners run the business as principals and agents of each other. However, some 
American courts have displayed confusion on this front when seeking to distinguish the 																																																													
121 F.L. Mechem, ‘The Law of Joint Adventures’ (1931) 15 Minn.L.Rev. 644. 
122 Joring v. Harriss, n.118; cf. Ellis v. Frawley, 165 Wis. 381, 161 N.W. 364 (1917), where the court 
ordered an accounting despite dealing with a ‘joint venture’ because of the complexity of the financial 
transactions involved. 
123 See a discussion of this in G.W. Miller, ‘The Joint Venture: Problem Child of Partnership’ (1950) 38 
Cal.L.Rev. 860, 864ff.  
124 249 F.2d 413 (1957). 
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joint venture from a partnership. Thus, in Matanuska Valley Bank v. Arnold the Court 
of Appeals held that:  
‘a joint venture is distinguished from a partnership in that one member cannot 
bind another unless he has either express authority or authority implied from the 
necessities of the particular transaction with which the joint venture is 
concerned’.125 
With respect, this is precisely the basis upon which a partner may bind the firm as per 
s.5 of the UK’s PA(1890), which was reproduced in s.9 of the Uniform Partnership Act 
(1914) in the US. 126 
Taubman attempted to establish a distinction between the two concepts by identifying 
several incidents characterising the joint venture, which purport to set it apart from 
partnerships and would explain the American courts’ approach to it. These are: 
1. Mobility of Association 
2. Frequency 
3. Diversity of factual patterns,  
4. Confusion with other relationships,  
5. Use of this resulting confusion for hindsight legal manoeuvring, 
6. Incomplete formulation of its principles of law 
7. Lack of planning for the joint venture.127 
With respect, the incidents contemplated are not points of law in themselves, but 
observations from the employment of the joint venture concept in different contexts. 
This does not serve to distinguish the joint venture from partnership but rather to 
establish that ‘joint venture’ is such a generic term that could be applied to virtually 
any commercial activity which involves interaction between multiple economic agents: 
agency, lease, licence, partnership, contract for services, etc. From the proposed list, I 
can discern no reason for the American Courts’ resistance to simply applying long 
																																																													
125 223 F.2d 778 (1955), 780. 
126 Now s.301 of the Uniform Partnership Act (1997). 
127 Taubman, n.1, 649; see also Weissburg, A. B. ‘Reviewing the Law on Joint Ventures with an Eye 
Toward the Future’ (1990) 63 S.Cal.L.Rev. 487. 
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established partnership law principles on the basis that the relationship under 
examination is in fact a partnership.  Regardless, the treatment of joint ventures as 
distinct from partnerships has endured, despite the consequences for co-venturers being 
the same as those for partners. More recently this was demonstrated in Excalibur 
Ventures v. Texas Keystone,128 where the High Court of England and Wales sought to 
apply New York law in a dispute between international parties in an oil and gas joint 
venture. In that case, Clarke LJ remarked that the US joint venture is in essence a 
partnership for a limited purpose.129 Ladbury observes that this is certainly the case 
with the way the American courts treat the joint exploration or production of oil and 
gas, which tends to not attract partnership-like status at all.130  
3.4.3 The position in Australia 
In Australia, the courts’ position on the joint venture/partnership debate is closer to that 
of the UK with the exception of the mining joint venture, which like its counterpart in 
the USA, appears to have taken a status of its own.131 This is because joint venture 
arrangements in the resources industries are meant to avoid the tax implications of 
partnerships, but most importantly to allow individual co-venturers to raise finance 
from separate lenders.132 This is possible because of the different ownership structure 
achieved through a contractual relationship among principals, where individual parties 
have identifiable shares in joint venture assets as specified in the joint venture contract. 
This is not the case with partners, who have joint ownership over the entirety of the 
business and the firm’s assets. 133  Thus, Merralls observed that the distinguishing 
characteristics of a standard mining and petroleum joint venture are that:  
‘first that the participants hold their interests in the assets of the venture in 
common and their liability is several, second that an operator or a manager is 
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129 Ibid, [1157]-[1161]; note also the discussion of the ‘single transaction’ argument in 3.3.1.1. 
130 Ladbury, n.16, 322. 
131 See Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Seltrust Mining Corp., 5 July 1985, (1994) 13(4) AMPLA Bulletin 172; 
Red Hill Iron Ltd. v. API Management Pty Ltd. [2012] WASC 323, where the Supreme Court of Western 
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Corporation (1983) 1 NSWLR 490, 506, where Samuels JA adopted the US definition of joint ventures. 
132 Ryan, n.15, 122-124. 
133 See 3.3.2(c). 
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interposed between the participants and the operation and third that the 
participants receive the fruits of the venture separately and in kind’.134 
However, outside the natural resources realm, the Australian position on the status of 
joint ventures is well illustrated by the decision of the High Court in Canny Gabriel 
Castle Jackson Advertising v. Volume Sales (Finance).135 Here, the High Court of 
Australia considered an agreement between Fourth Media Management (FMM), a 
music promoter who held contracts for appearances by Cilla Black and Elton John, and 
Volume Sales (VS), a financier. Under the terms of the agreement, VS undertook to 
finance FMM’s contracts to the tune of $70,000, in consideration of which VS was to 
take a half interest in FMM’s contracts. The agreement further stipulated that the 
advance was to be treated as a loan and repaid to VS prior to the distribution of profits 
(and in full, with no deductions, should the FMM contracts fail), the profits were to be 
divided equally between FMM and VS, and the policy of the joint venture was to be 
decided jointly by them. Finally, all proceeds on the FMM contracts were to be paid 
into a bank account to be set up solely in VS’ name. At first instance, the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales held that the arrangement between FMM and VS was a joint 
venture, which did not constitute a partnership but did provide VS with an equitable 
interest in the joint venture proceeds as they accrued. On appeal, the High Court upheld 
the judge’s declarations as to VS’ equitable entitlements but on the ground that the joint 
venture between FMM and VS was in fact a partnership. This was because the parties 
were co-venturers in a commercial enterprise with a view to profit; they were to share 
the profits; the policy of the joint venture was a matter of joint agreement; and the 
parties were concerned with each other’s financial stability, which is generally common 
with partners.  
A few years later, the High Court solidified its approach towards collaborative 
commercial relationships in United Dominions Corporation v. Brian. 136  The case 
concerned a joint undertaking for the development of certain land between United 
Dominions (hereafter, UDC), the primary lender, SPL, the venture manager in whose 
name the land was purchased, and Brian, an investor. Prior to completion of their formal 																																																													
134 Merralls, n.23, 2. See also M.C. Chetwin, ‘Joint Ventures – A Branch of Partnership Law?’ (1990-
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and the operation can avoid the co-venturers’ acting as each other’s agents; for an account of the typical 
main provisions of such an agreement see Ryan, n.15, 122-124. 
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agreement, SPL took out a mortgage on the land for the benefit of UDC in order to 
secure the money it lent to the venture. The land was successfully developed and sold. 
UDC then sought to rely on a collateralisation clause and cash in on the mortgage in 
order to satisfy debts owed to it by SPL in respect of past dealings between UDC and 
SPL, which were in no way related to the venture between UDC, SPL and Brian. Thus, 
UDC placed a claim on the profits of the development, which otherwise would have 
been distributed among the co-venturers. Brian sued for breach of fiduciary duty, on 
the ground that it was inequitable for UDC to take out the mortgage against the land in 
order to recoup money owed to it by SPL without first disclosing its intentions to the 
other co-venturers. Because of the scarce Australian authority on the distinction 
between joint ventures and partnerships, the New South Wales Court of Appeal relied 
on American authority and held that there was a joint venture between the parties, 
which by default raised fiduciary duties, similar to those of partners, extending from 
the negotiation stage through to the completion of the venture. However, the High Court 
held that the parties had in fact formed a partnership, which was limited to the joint 
undertaking and therefore there was a fiduciary duty to disclose by default. In other 
words, the High Court refused to attribute separate legal status to the joint venture 
concept. However, the High Court accepted that whether fiduciary duties arise between 
parties in a commercial agreement is not always a question of the status of their 
relationship in law (namely, partnership, agency, etc.), but whether the circumstances 
pointed to a fiduciary relationship between them137 (see Ch.6). In Brian the fiduciary 
relationship happened to stem from the parties’ being in a partnership. As with Canny 
Gabriel, the High Court relied on the fact that the agreement between the parties 
involved common participation in a commercial enterprise with a view to sharing the 
profit; the joint venture property, which was bought in SPL’s name alone, was to be 
held in trust for the benefit of all the parties; and the undertaking was to be managed 
jointly by the parties. 
3.4.4 The position in Canada 
Canadian courts appear to have taken the US approach to the joint venture concept, as 
illustrated by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court decision in Central Mortgage & Housing 
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Corporation v. Graham.138  Here, the plaintiff (CMHC), a social housing financing 
company, contracted with a builder to build a number of houses for low-income buyers, 
CMHC to cover the full cost of the construction and also provide the mortgages for 
prospective buyers, whom CMHC alone would approve. The defendant purchased one 
of the houses with the help of a mortgage provided by CMHC but refused to continue 
with the mortgage repayments, when the house he moved into developed serious 
defects. CMHC sought to foreclose on the house and the defendant countersued seeking 
damages on the basis that CMHC was liable for the defective construction of the houses 
because it was in a joint venture with the builder. Jones J held that:  
‘… there was a contribution by both parties of money, property, skill and 
knowledge to a common undertaking. There was a joint property interest in the 
subject matter even though evidenced only in the mortgages. The parties had a 
mutual control and management of the enterprise during the construction of the 
houses and in the sales. The arrangement was limited to this project. There is no 
doubt that [the builder] intended a profit from the project. While there was not a 
mutual sharing of the profits, Central Mortgage clearly had a financial interest at 
stake and was vitally concerned with the successful completion of the venture … 
Based on the evidence, the arrangement between Central Mortgage and [the 
builder] can be characterized as a joint venture. To the extent that [the builder] 
in carrying on the venture incurred liabilities then both parties were 
bound.’139 
According to the judge, the parties clearly displayed the requisite kinship of interest 
in the undertaking to be partners and were therefore jointly and severally liable for 
wrongs committed in the scope of the partnership business. Yet, he did not 
acknowledge the relationship as a partnership, but rather identified it as a joint 
venture, which unaccountably gave rise to joint and several liability. The reason for 
this may have been that, from his own analysis, Jones J was not comfortable with 
declaring the arrangement a partnership because the dissonance in objectives 
between the builder (who sought to profit) and CMHC (whose priority was the 
construction of homes for low-income families) pointed away from the community 
of interest expected of partners. However, if that was the case Jones J should have 
explained that CMHC’s liability towards the defendant, a third party, was founded 
on CMHC’s holding itself out to be in a partnership with the builder or that the 
builder was in fact CMHC’s agent, along the lines of Gosling v. Gaskell. 140 																																																													
138 (1974) 43 DLR (3d) 686. 
139 Ibid, [70], my emphasis. 
140 n.107; see 3.3.3. 
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Otherwise, in the absence of a contractual guarantee by CMHC, there was simply 
no ground for CMHC’s liability for defects in the houses’ construction. 
Graham became a much-cited authority establishing the joint venture as a separate 
legal category in Canada, at least with respect to single-project arrangements, 
placing the Canadian joint venture on all fours with the US model.141 The Alberta 
Law Reform Institute (ALRI) sought to take this approach further by proposing a 
statute allowing parties in single-project joint ventures to opt out from the 
application of partnership law.142 They will be able to do this by declaring in their 
contract that their arrangement is not a partnership and by carrying on the business 
under a name that includes the term ‘joint venture’ or ‘JV’.143 The ALRI’s proposal 
envisages the joint venture as a separate legal form, which will be entirely governed 
by the contract between the parties and the general principles of contract law. The 
ALRI however does not propose to change matters with respect to the co-venturers’ 
relations with third parties, so that members of a joint venture will still be jointly 
and severally liable for debts incurred and wrongs committed within the scope of 
the joint venture.144 Similarly, the ALRI does not propose statutory intervention 
with respect to the possibility of fiduciary duties being implied into the joint venture 
relationship, despite the parties including a no-partnership clause in their agreement. 
The ALRI report on joint ventures is hardly a dependable document, despite the 
authority of its source.145 For one it does not justify with any conviction the statutory 
establishment of the single-project-joint-venture as a separate legal form. It relies 
on vague statements by an Advisory Group, made up of professional legal counsel 																																																													
141 This also appears to be the case in New Zealand, where the courts appear to treat the joint venture as 
a legal form akin to a partnership: In Chirnside v. Fay [2006] NZSC 68, esp. [92], the Supreme Court 
ruled that the parties’ relationship was not a partnership, but a joint venture analogous to a partnership 
and as such raised fiduciary duties; see also Paper Reclaim Ltd. v. Aotearoa International Ltd. [2007] 
NZSC 26, esp. [31], where the Supreme Court chastises the Courts below for being too ready to find a 
joint venture when interpreting a contractual relationship between parties who had been collaborating 
for over 16 years:; similarly in Maruha Corporation v. Amaltal Corporation [2007] NZSC 40, esp. [20], 
the Supreme Court treated the ‘joint venture’ concept as something more than a generic description of a 
collaborative relationship, to the effect that former partners who continued the partnership business 
through a corporate vehicle to which they were both shareholders, were not in a joint venture for the 
purpose of establishing a fiduciary relation. 
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143 Ibid, [37]-[39]. 
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to major industry, as to the uncertainty of the law on joint ventures and the dangers 
of a joint venture being found a partnership. The ALRI does not elaborate as to what 
these dangers are but merely acknowledges ‘the problem’ in a vague, if rather 
urgent, tone.146 It does not explain why clear and long established partnership law 
principles should not apply to single-project contractual joint ventures, especially 
since many of the arguments purporting to distinguish them from partnerships have 
been addressed in the case law.147 However, if the ALRI report does reflect one 
thing accurately, this is the fact that parties in commercial joint ventures 
(particularly project-specific ones) do not generally perceive their relationship as 
one of partnership but simply as a risk-and-expense-sharing affair. And while this 
may not be enough to readily deviate from established law, it should give justices 
cause to reconsider the traditional approach to collaborative relationships and start 
contemplating the economic drivers behind them. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In summary, the default legal regime for contractual joint ventures is that of 
partnerships. Co-venturers pool resources in order to carry on a business in common 
with a view to profit. At the outset this is the very definition of a commercial 
partnership. However, the story told by the courts in different common law jurisdictions 
suggests that matters are rather more complicated. At varying degrees many of these 
courts recognise that co-venturers do not perceive their relationship as having the kind 
of kinship required of partners. For one, they rarely submit to each other’s authority, 
expressly or impliedly,148 so as to be bound by the others’ actions. For another, they 
tend to do everything possible to avoid their relationship being identified as a 
partnership, such as sharing in outputs (including gross returns) rather than profits, 
expressly disclaiming partnership (or other) status in their agreement and filing separate 
tax returns. To my mind, it is this resistance to partnership status that drove courts in 
such jurisdictions as the USA and Canada to move towards recognising joint ventures 
as an autonomous legal form – one that looks remarkably like a partnership.  
																																																													
146 n.142, [28]. 
147 As the ALRI itself acknowledges: ibid, [22]-[25]; and see generally 3.3.1. 
148 It will be reminded, for instance, that the natural resources joint venture tends to be structured around 
an operator/ manager who acts as an agent for each individual co-venturer. This serves to insulate the 
co-venturers from each other. 
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I contend that the partnership regime, a long- and well-established body of law, is not, 
and has never been, an appropriate means of governing contractual joint ventures. Not 
because, as the ALRI contends in its reform proposals, the form and scale of such joint 
ventures has changed so dramatically in modern times that the law has become dated 
in comparison. Rather, it is because partnership law, founded in equity, did not develop 
with the concept in mind of separate business concerns cooperating in a relatively 
narrow regard. I submit that this was also evident to the Courts as early as Waugh v. 
Carver149 where even though it was held that the shipping agents were partners by 
virtue of sharing profits, the Court was happy to accept that they were not partners inter 
se, but only with regard to their joint relationship with the world. Presumably then the 
parties in Waugh v. Carver would have been able to sue each other on the agreement 
between them, even though they would have to face joint and several liability with 
respect to third parties.  
Establishing a new legal category to accommodate this type of collaborative 
relationship would go a long way in addressing the uncertainties complained of by the 
ALRI’s Advisory Group.  The ensuing legal model would recognise the lack of mutual 
agency in the parties and have the distinct advantage of implementing and enforcing 
the agreement underlying the parties’ relationship, without first causing its dissolution. 
Naturally, by operation of estoppel they would still be subject to joint and several 
liability for debts incurred and wrongs committed in the course of joint venture business 
as against third parties. In other words, the new category would reflect the arrangement 
in Waugh v. Carver, where the parties are jointly liable as against the world but still not 
partners inter se.150  
In the following chapters, I examine the mechanics of the contractual joint venture as a 
separate legal category. Specifically, I argue that, in addition to the contract between 
them, the new legal category should carry default rights and obligations for the parties, 
along the lines of partnership law. This is especially relevant since one of the reasons 
co-venturers seek to disclaim partnership status is to avoid the pitfalls of the equitable 
																																																													
149 n.51. 
150 E.g. this prospect is acknowledged expressly in cl.1.05A of the CAPL [Joint] Operating Procedure, 
(CAPL, 2015) 
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remedies that come with a fiduciary relationship.151 Thus, the purpose of the next 
chapter is to discuss the implication of an extra-contractual standard of conduct into the 
joint venture relationship in light of prevalent contract and economic theory. 
																																																													
151 E.g. cl.6.2.4, Model Joint Operating Agreement for the UK Continental Shelf (UKOOA, 2002) 
excluding the Operator’s liability for consequential loss, defined inter alia as loss resulting from breach 
of fiduciary duty – cl.1(b). 
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4 EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter demonstrated that identifying the contractual joint venture as a 
separate legal category, rather than subjecting it to default partnership law where the 
circumstances so require, would best align the objectives of English commercial law 
with those of the co-venturers, for it would reflect the tenets of rational bargaining in 
the context of cooperation and the economic drivers behind the co-venturers’ synergy 
examined in Chapters 1 and 2, respectively. The crux of the new legal model would be 
to ensure that the agreement remains both central to the alliance and enforceable as 
between co-venturers, without prior dissolution of the venture. Yet, there are limitations 
to relying solely on the joint venture agreement to address tensions between co-
venturers, because it is impossible to contract in the present about every eventuality 
that befalls the relationship in the future. I will refer to this issue as the problem of 
‘incomplete presentiation’.1  
Partnership law addresses incomplete presentiation by subjecting the partners to 
specific rights and duties by default. These duties stem from the partners’ status as 
agents of each other. I have argued, however, that mutual agency is unlikely to feature 
in contractual joint ventures, as their advantage lies in the preservation of the parties’ 
autonomy (see 2.5.2 and 3.2). Thus, in order to preserve the joint venture relationship 
and to address the problem of incomplete presentiation, I contend that rights and duties 
akin to those of partners must be implied into the relationship by default. Such duties 
would represent an enforceable framework for appropriate co-venturer conduct (as 
determined by Gauthier’s principle of constrained maximisation – see Ch.1), in effect 
forestalling opportunistic, or outright freeloading, behaviour. A gap-filling set of 
defaults would then effectively address the co-venturers’ appropriation concerns (see 
2.4.2), which is one of the foremost sources of conflict leading to alliance failure. 
																																																													
1 Defined as the parties’ attempt ‘to bring all the future relating to [the transaction] into the present, or,…, 
to presentiate. [The parties] can then deal with the future as if it were in the present’; I.R. Macneil, The 
New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (Yale UP, 1980), 19 (hereafter, 
‘Macneil (1980)’). Incomplete presentiation is discussed in 4.4, but for a general discussion, see D. 
Campbell and J. Harris ‘Flexibility in Long-term Contract Relationships: the Role of Cooperation’ 
(1993) J.L.& Soc'y 166, 169. 
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There are three main objections to such thesis. First, if the relationship is to be governed 
solely by the parties’ contract, then the contract must not be interfered with by 
introducing duties on which the parties never agreed. This would limit their ability to 
govern their own relationship and would introduce new unaccounted for transactional 
costs. This reflects the founding principle of English contract law, namely, that within 
the bounds of the law, parties are entitled to contract on anything they wish and when 
they do so freely, their bargain must be upheld intact. Therefore, English contract law 
would itself be an obstacle to the implication of extra-contractual duties into the co-
venturers’ relationship. Secondly, the problem of incomplete presentiation may be 
properly addressed through existing contract mechanisms, such as the use of adjustment 
clauses in the joint venture agreement. Furthermore, in the event of dispute, tension or 
even doubt over the correct interpretation of a contract term, the relationship itself may 
be refereed through the intervention of a neutral third party such as a mediator or an 
arbitrator. Therefore, the contract itself, through the use of an arbitration or third-party 
intervention clause, may protect the joint venture relationship without the need for 
extra-contractual duties. Thirdly, by definition, the joint venture represents a relational 
contract, namely a contract, which goes beyond the on-off exchange of promises and 
involves a relationship between the parties.2 Parties in such contracts are best equipped 
to deal with whatever befalls their relationship on an ad hoc basis. Therefore, extra-
contractual intervention is unnecessary to address the problem of incomplete 
presentiation – the co-venturers will solve any issues as and when they arise depending 
on the circumstances at the time. Furthermore, given that the preservation of the 
relationship is at the core of a relational contract the parties will address any issues with 
that aim in mind, if they still wish their relationship to subsist. Any further intervention 
in the form of default duties would be protectionist and burden the relationship with 
unnecessary hardship and may even introduce an extra degree of animosity in the event 
of dispute. 
This chapter will address each of these objections in turn. Ultimately, I conclude that 
English contract law need not be an obstacle to the implication of extra-contractual 
duties into the joint venture relationship, so that a set of default duties can and should 
be a feature of a new legal category of contractual joint ventures. Their aim will be to 
ensure a minimum standard of conduct for parties in a contractual joint venture, 																																																													
2 See M.A. Eisenberg, ‘Relational Contracts’ in J. Beatson and D. Friedman (eds.), Good Faith and Fault 
in Contract Law (Clarendon Press, 1995). 
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concurrently addressing the problem of incomplete presentiation which is inherent in 
the strict operation of classical contract theory (objections 1 and 2), as well as the 
freeloader problem, which is the foil to relational contract theory (objection 3). 
 
4.2 Objection 1: The prevalent contract theory in the UK forbids the implication 
of extra-contractual duties 
4.2.1 The Objection: Freedom and Sanctity of Contract are paramount 
The first argument against the implication of extra-contractual duties in the joint 
venture contract is as follows:  
‘The court cannot intervene into a relationship between commercial parties by 
implying into it duties, on which the parties have not agreed, or which they have 
expressly discounted in a contract’.3 
This statement is firmly footed on English contract law. Classical contract theory holds 
that, within the bounds of the law and subject to some well-defined limitations, ‘parties 
are free to contract as they may see fit’.4 This rule applies to all contracts, apart from 
those whose subject matter is governed by a specific statutory regime (such as contracts 
for the conveyance of land, employment, consumer credit, etc.).  
There are two principal consequences of classical contract theory in practice. First, as 
regards the enforceability of the contract, unless there is a defect in the bargaining 
process (such as fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, duress or undue influence) which 
would undermine the validity of the parties’ consent to the bargain,5 courts do not have 
a general power to alter a contract, for instance, in order to address a fundamental 
																																																													
3 See e.g. Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd. [1995] 1 AC 74, 98, per Lord Mustill. 
4 Suisse Atlantique Société D’Armement Maritime SA v. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 AC 
361, 399D, per Lord Reid. 
5 E.g. in National Westminster Bank Plc. v. Morgan [1985] AC 686, 708, Lord Scarman pointed to a 
number of statutes (the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973, Consumer Credit Act 
1974, Consumer Safety Act 1978, Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 and Insurance Companies 
Act 1982 ) enacted to ensure rudimentary fairness in the bargaining process, so much so that he saw no 
reason for the courts to intervene further (by developing a doctrine of ‘inequality of bargaining power’, 
where no actionable undue influence could be made out). 
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change in the circumstances of the original bargain.6 Neither can they refuse to enforce 
an otherwise valid contract (i.e. where there are no questions as to the capacity of the 
parties or the legality of the subject matter), even where its effect is unreasonable or 
unconscionable.7 In the words of Jessel MR: 
‘if there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that 
men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of 
contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily 
shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore, you 
have this paramount public policy to consider – that you are not lightly to 
interfere with this freedom of contract’.8 
The second practical consequence of classical contract theory concerns the parties’ 
performance of the contract. Thus, when performing their respective obligations, 
generally speaking, the parties cannot deviate from what the contract specifies. Any 
such deviation would technically amount to a breach of the contract and expose the 
‘non-performing’ party to liability in damages. For example, in Arcos v. Ronaasen,9 the 
House of Lords upheld the buyer’s strict right to reject goods for not complying with 
their description in the contract, despite their only negligible deviation from the contract 
specification. The case concerned an agreement for the sale and transport of Russian 
timber to an English buyer, who intended to use the goods for the construction of 
cement barrels with the seller’s knowledge of this. The agreement stipulated the length, 
breadth and thickness of the staves to be delivered, and allowed for variation of the 
breadth and length of the staves, but not of their thickness, stipulated at a half inch. The 
staves the seller sought to deliver deviated from that specification by various degrees 
but in every case no more than a fraction above or below the specified half inch. 
Regardless, the buyer sought to reject the goods outright. The matter was referred to an 
umpire who determined that the staves were still suitable for the construction of barrels 
and, when shipped, the timbers had been merchantable under the agreed specification. 
When the issue reached the House of Lords, it was held that the buyer was entitled to 
demand goods answering the description in the contract. According to Lord 																																																													
6 See British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas Ltd. (1952) AC 166. 
7  See, ibid, in the context of exclusion or exemption clauses; Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor 
Transport Ltd. [1980] AC 827, 848, per Lord Diplock. On the implication of terms into a contract: The 
Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64, 68, per Bowen LJ and Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v. Cooper [1941] AC 108, 
137, per Lord Wright. Cf. Ingham v. Emes [1955] 2 All ER 740, where the Court effectively invented a 
good faith obligation in order to deny a frivolous claimant a remedy. 
8 Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq. 462, 465. 
9 [1933] AC 470; Cf. Cehave NV v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m.b.h. (The Hansa Nord) [1976] QB 44. 
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Buckmaster,  
‘If the article they have purchased is not in fact the article that has been 
delivered, they are entitled to reject it, even though it is the commercial 
equivalent of that which they have bought’.10  
In other words, with respect to the performance of contractual obligations, classical 
contract theory translates into a regime of strict liability.11 
4.2.2 Parties dealing at Arm’s Length 
4.2.2.1 The principle 
Classical contract theory is at its purest in the context of commercial contracts, i.e. 
contracts between commercial concerns as distinct from contracts between, say, a 
business and consumer, or between family members.12 In this case the attitude of the 
courts is effectively summarised in the following statement by Lord Steyn:  
‘Commercial men must be given the utmost liberty of contracting. They must 
be left free to decide on the allocation of commercial risks.’13 
Commercial parties are thus said to be dealing at arm’s length, that is to say they have 
no legal relationship or connection other than the contract between them. Atiyah 
explains that in this case ‘neither party owes any duty to volunteer information to the 
other, nor is he entitled to rely on the other except within the narrowest possible 
limits’.14 Commercial parties are presumed to have entered the contract freely, having 
weighed the benefits against the costs, and mitigated any associated risks by adapting 																																																													
10 Ibid, 474. 
11 Having said that, it is now established that remedies for breach will depend on its seriousness. This is 
determined by how far the performance has deviated from what was contracted, i.e. whether the breach 
is one of a ‘condition’ or a ‘warranty’, as per s.15A Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended by the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015), or of something in-between (see Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. 
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. [1962] 2 QB 26, 71, per Lord Diplock), the consequences of which are to 
be determined by the effect the breach has had on the contract, i.e. the extent to which the breach went 
to the ‘root’ of the contract (The Hansa Nord, n.9, 61, per Lord Denning MR). Accordingly, the task for 
the court is ‘to ask whether a particular item in a description constitutes a substantial ingredient of the 
“identity” of the thing sold, and only if it does to treat it as a condition’: Reardon Smith Line Ltd v. 
Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989, 998, per Lord Wilberforce. 
12 Because of the sensitive nature of certain contracts, public policy required that Parliament intervened 
into the contracting process so as to protect the more vulnerable party from unconscionable or speculative 
behaviour: see the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1989.  
13 Homburg Houtimport BV v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] UKHL 12, [57].  
14 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press, 1979), 403. 
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prices accordingly.15 This presumption stems from the fact that commerce runs on 
speculation, and commercial people are expected to be aware of this first and foremost, 
otherwise the whole mechanism would collapse for want of participation.16 Against this 
background, the essence of the arm’s length principle is that the courts will not 
intervene to alter a bargain struck freely by parties dealing at arm’s length. In the words 
of Lord Wilberforce:  
‘[I]n commercial matters generally, when the parties are not of unequal 
bargaining power, and when risks are normally borne by insurance, not only is 
the case for judicial intervention undemonstrated, but there is everything to be 
said, … for leaving the parties free to apportion the risks as they think fit and 
for respecting their decisions.’17 
This is because parties in commercial transactions need the certainty of an expressly 
agreed bargain, so that they can plan ahead and calculate risks.18 Consequently, when 
commercial parties decide to enter into a legally enforceable contract they will 
generally be held bound whatever the outcome.19 Conversely, if such parties decide not 
to enter into a legally binding arrangement, the courts will generally assume that this 
was the intention all along and will treat the arrangement accordingly.20  
Consider the following scenario involving two companies, Acorn and Brazilnut. Acorn 
owns a copper mine, which it operates partly with Brazilnut’s equipment and staff. 
There is no formal agreement between them – simply an understanding that at the end 
of each fiscal quarter Brazilnut is entitled to a percentage of the ore produced from the 
mine in return for the use of its equipment and staff.21 The arrangement continues for 																																																													
15 E.g. see E. A. Grimstead & Son Ltd. Francis Patrick McGarrigan, unreported: Westlaw transcript, 27 
October 1999, 32, per Chadwick LJ; Atiyah posits that such expectations are largely intuitive: ‘we expect 
people to act rationally and not to give up something they own without something of equal or comparable 
value in return’: P.S. Atiyah, ‘Contract and Fair Exchange’ (1985) 35(1) UTLJ 1, 14. 
16 See Lord Neuberger writing extra-judicially in ‘The Stuffing of Minerva’s Owl? Taxonomy and 
Taxidermy in Equity’ (2009) CLJ 537, 542. 
17 Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd, n.7, 843. 
18 E.g. see Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. AB v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana [1983] QB 529, 540-
541, per Goff LJ approved on appeal in [1983] 2 AC 694, 704, by Lord Diplock; see also Daniel Stewart 
& Co Plc v. Environmental Waste Controls Plc [2013] EWHC 1763, in the context of implied terms. 
19 E.g. commodity sales under standard contracts, which themselves tend to become the subject of string 
trades under contracts for differences; see the analysis in M. Bridge ‘Good Faith in Commercial 
Contracts’ in R. Brownsword et al. (eds), Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (Ashgate, 1999).  
20 See the ‘subject to contract’ cases below. 
21 The lack of a formal agreement in such a case is not as difficult to believe as one may think; see, e.g., 
S. Macaulay ‘Non Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28(1) Am.Soc.Rev. 
55. 
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several years. In a permit renewal application to the local authority, Acorn lists 
Brazilnut as a co-Applicant, noting that the Applicant’s status in relation to the mine is 
as ‘site-owner’. Since then, Brazilnut’s board of directors operates under the 
assumption that the company has or will be awarded a proprietary interest to the part 
of the mine, which is operated with Brazilnut’s resources. Because of this assumption, 
Brazilnut invests in new equipment, specific to the mining and processing of copper 
ore. Acorn subsequently merges with another company to form Coconut, which 
promptly terminates the arrangement with Brazilnut and advertises for bids from other 
contractors. 
Applying classical contract theory, Brazilnut’s relationship with Acorn is made up of a 
series of ad hoc contracts, each completed when Brazilnut collects its share of the ore 
at the end of each fiscal quarter.22 So, if Coconut terminated the arrangement partway 
through the fiscal quarter, Brazilnut’s remedy would lie in damages for breach of 
contract, the terms of the contract to be gleaned from the past transactions between 
Acorn and Brazilnut.23 Such damages would be calculated based on the value of the 
share of the ore that Brazilnut would have extracted had it been allowed to operate its 
part of the mine until the end of the fiscal quarter. On the other hand, if Coconut 
terminated the arrangement as soon as Brazilnut collected its share of the ore for that 
fiscal quarter, then the contract would be complete and Brazilnut will have no further 
recourse in contract against Coconut.24 Any expenditure Brazilnut incurred as a result 
of an expectation created by Acorn’s conduct would not be relevant in common law 
(unless Brazilnut could show that Acorn received a benefit from Brazilnut’s reliance 
on Acorn’s conduct, in which case Brazilnut might be entitled to a remedy in 
restitution). 
4.2.2.2 A practical illustration of the Arm’s Length Principle 
The arm’s length principle is triggered when the parties attempt to displace classical 
contract theory by arguing the application of some equitable doctrine. For instance, 
Brazilnut could try to claim a proprietary interest over the part of the mine it had been 
operating with its resources on the basis of the equitable doctrines of proprietary 																																																													
22 Baird Textile Holdings Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer Plc. [2001] EWCA Civ 274. 
23 Mamidoil-Jetoil Greek Petroleum Co SA v. Okta Crude Oil Refinery AD [2003] EWCA Civ 1031. 
24 There is no presumption that continuous dealings are indicative of an implied long-term contract: see 
Baird Textile Holdings, n.22. 
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estoppel or constructive trust. Brazilnut’s argument would be that it suffered loss by 
purchasing copper-processing equipment having relied on Acorn’s conduct, which 
created the reasonable impression that Brazilnut was part owner of the mining site. Due 
to the arm’s length principle, Brazilnut’s claim is unlikely to succeed because Brazilnut 
is a commercial entity involved in a commercial transaction. Indeed, courts have been 
extremely reluctant to award equitable remedies to commercial entities dealing at arm’s 
length, which is amply evidenced from their approach to the ‘subject to contract cases’. 
These cases tend to revolve around ‘agreements to agree’ or agreements in principle, 
which are not enforceable in law. However, in every case, one of the parties acts on the 
agreement to their detriment and consequently seeks a remedy in equity, invariably by 
trying to establish a proprietary estoppel or the existence of a constructive trust. 
Proprietary estoppel involves preventing a party (A) from asserting their proprietary 
rights against another party (B), where B has suffered loss by relying on A’s conduct 
to the effect that A would not assert their rights against B, or that B would be granted a 
proprietary interest by acting on A’s conduct.25 What is interesting in these cases, is the 
difference in approach taken by the courts where the basis of the relationship contains 
a degree of commercial speculation, or operates at arm’s length. 
Thus, in Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Humphreys Estate26 the Privy Council 
considered a dispute between the Government of Hong Kong (HKG) and a group of 
companies of which the respondent, HE, was a member. HKG and HE entered into an 
agreement in principle and ‘subject to contract’, for HKG to acquire 83 flats owned by 
HE, in exchange for granting HE a Crown lease of government property with the right 
to develop it and HE’s adjoining property. The agreement provided that the terms could 
be varied or withdrawn and that it was subject to the necessary documents giving legal 
effect to the transaction being executed and registered. Accordingly, HE permitted 
HKG to take possession of the flats, while HE received permission to enter the lease 
property and demolish the existing buildings in preparation for redevelopment. 
Furthermore, HE paid HKG roughly $104 million, being the agreed difference in value 
between the two properties. Having taken possession of the property, HKG spent 
money on the flats, moved senior civil servants in them and disposed of their former 																																																													
25 See Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129, per Lord Kingsdown on the requirements for triggering 
an equity; Inward v. Baker [1965] 2 QB 29; and also Willnott v. Barber [1880] 15 ChD 96, 105-106, per 
Fry J, on the requirements of establishing an estoppel by acquiescence. 
26 [1987] AC 114. 
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residences. Two years later, HE decided to withdraw from negotiations and served 
notice to HKG terminating its licence to occupy the flats. HE then obtained a court 
order for the return of both the flats and the $104 million. On appeal, the Privy Council 
rejected HKG’s argument that HE was estopped from enforcing their property rights in 
the flats against HKG, because of HKG’s expenditure on them. Such an argument 
would only succeed if HKG had demonstrably relied on an expectation or belief, 
encouraged by HE, that HE would carry out the agreement and transfer the flats to 
HKG. Nothing in the facts suggested that this was the case. If anything, HKG had been 
aware from the beginning that the agreement in principle with HE was not binding, 
until the relevant documentation had been executed. This never happened and therefore 
HE was not bound to uphold the arrangement. 
Humphreys Estate provides a solid example of the courts’ approach towards the 
majority of commercial relationships: where the parties in a commercial transaction 
have omitted to protect their interests in law, equity will not intervene to remedy any 
subsequent harm. The operation of classical contract theory here is clear; as a rule, the 
sanctity of the contract between commercial entities will not be disturbed. Therefore, 
when it comes to the question of extra-contractual duties being implied into the joint 
venture, the response of the orthodox approach under English contract law would 
naturally be in the negative. However, there are limits to this proposition. These limits 
should become clear by considering two ‘subject to contract’ cases with similar facts 
but with drastically different outcomes. The first is Crabb v. Arun District Council,27 
where the court did permit the invocation of an equitable remedy despite a degree of 
commercial speculation in the circumstances. The second case is Cobbe v. Yeoman’s 
Row Management,28 where the rule regarding arm’s length relationships as expressed 
in Humphreys Estate prevailed. 
In Crabb, the plaintiff and defendant District Council (the Council) were adjoining 
landowners. The dispute arose because the plaintiff claimed a right of way over the 
Council’s land giving him access to the public highway. Crucially, without this access 
the plaintiff’s land was landlocked. The issue arose as a result of the plaintiff’s selling 
the portion of his land that did have access to the highway without, in the conveyance, 
reserving a corresponding right of way. An easement of necessity could not be 																																																													
27 [1976] Ch 179. 
28 [2008] UKHL 55. 
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established (because the plaintiff operated on the assumption that his land had an 
alternative access point through the Council’s land). The plaintiff acted on the belief 
that the Council had agreed to grant him a right of way over its own land in an 
agreement in principle reached at a meeting with the Council’s agent, although no 
official action or other formalities followed to that effect. On the facts, the Court of 
Appeal found that: (a) the Council’s actions had not only created the plaintiff’s belief, 
but actively encouraged it by acting on all of the points raised in that agreement, e.g. 
erecting a fence between the two adjoining properties but leaving a gap for the plaintiff 
to access the public highway; (b) the Council never corrected the plaintiff’s belief at 
any point after the agreement in principle had been reached, even though there had been 
plenty of opportunity to do so; and, (c), the Council (through its agent) had knowledge 
of the plaintiff’s intention to sell the portion of his land with access to the highway, that 
he would rely on the mistaken belief that he had a right of way over the Council’s land 
and that, consequently, he would suffer detriment. Based on these three points, the 
Court held that there was an equity in favour of the plaintiff, whose land had become 
sterile as a result of the Council’s refusal to allow access from its own land. Ultimately, 
the Council was estopped from asserting its proprietary rights against the plaintiff who 
was granted a right of way over the Council’s land.  
An agreement in principle was also the subject of the House of Lords’ decision in 
Cobbe. The agreement was between the defendant, who owned a block of flats with 
potential for residential development, and the claimant, an experienced property 
developer. The agreement provided, inter alia, that the defendant would sell the 
property to the claimant at an agreed up front price of £12 million, while the claimant 
would apply for planning permission and develop the land accordingly, at his own 
expense. Pursuant to that agreement (and before any official paperwork was executed) 
the claimant expended a considerable amount of money and time to obtain planning 
permission. The defendant however sought to renegotiate the financial terms of the 
agreement and refused to sell on the originally agreed terms. The claimant sued on the 
ground that the agreement with the defendant gave rise to a constructive trust or a 
proprietary estoppel. The House of Lords dismissed this argument. While the 
defendant’s conduct was indeed unconscionable, unconscionability alone was not 
enough to give rise to a remedy in equity. Lord Scott, in particular, noted that both the 
claimant and defendant were experienced business people, the claimant himself a 
seasoned property developer, who was aware that until any formalities were executed 
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his actions were entirely speculative.29 Therefore, the House of Lords reaffirmed the 
principle that the court will not rush to the aid of commercial people, who having 
knowingly taken a risk end up suffering loss as a result of admittedly unconscionable 
behaviour.30 
At the outset, the similarities between these cases are striking. In both cases, the 
claimant acted on the mistaken belief that they had been granted or would acquire a 
property right as a result of the agreement in principle; the defendant had knowledge of 
these beliefs and did nothing to contradict them; and both claimants acted on their 
mistaken beliefs consequently suffering detriment. Therefore, in light of the House of 
Lords decision in Cobbe, does Crabb remain good law? Writing extra-judicially Lord 
Neuberger suggested that the decision in Crabb might well not survive Cobbe if the 
plaintiff’s belief stemmed primarily from the agreement in principle (which was the 
case in Cobbe) rather than being encouraged by the actions of the Council and with its 
knowledge.31 With respect I disagree. Factually Cobbe is indeed analogous to Crabb: 
the defendant knew of Cobbe’s intentions and encouraged him to proceed with the 
planning application having created in him the mistaken belief that he would honour 
the agreement in principle.32 As Lord Scott emphasised, however, the elements of a 
proprietary estoppel (or indeed a constructive trust) simply did not arise in Cobbe: the 
defendant in Cobbe did not need to be estopped from asserting its proprietary rights 
against the claimant. The claimant in Cobbe had no rights under the agreement in 
principle, which itself could not be the basis of a claim. By contrast Crabb did present 
all the elements for a proprietary estoppel, so much so that whether the plaintiff’s case 
stemmed from an agreement in principle, should be immaterial. The defendant’s actions 
in Crabb rendered it unthinkable that they would not uphold their end of the bargain. 
Moreover, the consequences of the defendant’s actions in Crabb went further than 
pecuniary loss, the possibility of which is inherent in commercial speculation anyway. 
In Crabb the claimant was completely denied the enjoyment of his proprietary rights, 
his land becoming sterile for a number of years due to the Council’s refusal to allow 
access. This point was emphasised by the Court of Appeal when deciding the issue of 																																																													
29 Ibid, [27]. 
30 In Cobbe, the claimant was, instead, awarded compensation on the ground of unjust enrichment. 
31 Lord Neuberger, n.16, 544. 
32 After all, a similar interpretation of the defendant’s behaviour in Cobbe drove the Court of Appeal to 
find a proprietary estoppel in favour of the claimant: Cobbe v. Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2006] 
EWCA Civ 1139, [46], per Mummery LJ. 
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compensation.33 It is difficult to imagine the court allowing a piece of land, which is by 
definition a finite resource, to become sterile34 merely because the plaintiff’s case could 
have been based on the agreement in principle rather than the defendant’s conduct.35  
Turning back to the operation of classical contract theory, at least in the context of 
commercial contracts, the rule may therefore be displaced in the right circumstances. 
In light of this, could Brazilnut rely on the ratio in Crabb to support its claim against 
Coconut? I submit not, because I regard Crabb as exceptional. The plaintiff in Crabb 
sold off pieces of his land for commercial gain. Had he not eventually become the 
owner of landlocked land as a result of his reliance on the defendant’s conduct, there 
might have been deeper scrutiny into whether his reliance on the Council’s conduct was 
reasonable in the circumstances, as was the case in Humphrey’s Estate and Cobbe.36 
This would not necessarily alter the original outcome in favour of the Council.37 
However, deeper scrutiny might have been warranted in light of the speculative element 
in the plaintiff’s actions, which would, in most other cases, raise a presumption of his 
willingness to shoulder risk.38 What becomes clear following Crabb is that where the 
constituent elements for establishing an equity are present, or where public policy 																																																													
33 Crabb, n.27, 189H, per Lord Denning MR.  
34 The House of Lords have condemned allowing resources to become sterile by virtue of unfair reliance 
on another’s strict legal rights as contrary to the public interest: A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd.  
v. Macaulay [1974] 1 WLR 1308 (restraint of trade clause imposed on a musician). 
35 See also Salvation Army Trustee Co Ltd. v. West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council (1980) 41 P 
& CR 179, where reliance on a ‘subject to contract’ agreement in principle was immaterial in the 
circumstances. The plaintiff went into the expense of building on the defendant’s land (with the latter’s 
knowledge) not speculatively, but because the defendant had expressed the intention to acquire the 
plaintiff’s property pursuant to its compulsory acquisition powers as part of a scheme to widen a local 
road. 
36 Uguccioni points out that the proprietary estoppel in both Crabb and Salvation Army Trustee arose 
from conduct by public authorities, i.e. bodies who are typically held to higher standards of conduct than 
private parties and therefore it cannot be said that the relationship in these cases was truly at arm’s length; 
J. Uguccioni ‘Buyer Beware: Failed Joint Venture Negotiations and Involuntary Business Partnerships’ 
(2011) JBL 160, 165. This argument is certainly supported in Salvation Army Trustee, where the claim 
arose out of the public authority’s ultimately erratic exercise of its statutory powers. But I submit that 
this is not the case with Crabb, where the identity of the defendant as a public body did not appear to 
play a role in the court’s reasoning. Rather, the court focused on the impact of the defendant’s actions on 
the plaintiff (and, arguably, his land), and their knowledge of this. 
37 In fact, given that the relationship in Crabb featured no ‘subject to contract’ stipulation, there is little 
to suggest that, ultimately, commercial speculation would have altered the outcome in favour of the 
Council. The plaintiff here was perfectly entitled to glean the Council’s intentions from the actions of its 
agents. On the effect of a ‘subject to contract’ stipulation see London and Regional Developments Ltd. 
v. TBI plc. [2002] EWCA Civ 355, [38], per Mummery LJ. 
38 See e.g. Laskar v. Laskar [2008] EWCA Civ 347, where Lord Neuberger treated as irrelevant the fact 
that the property at issue was purchased by a mother and her daughter, because the property was 
purchased primarily as an investment and therefore the purchase was speculative in nature. This approach 
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Kernott [2011] UKSC 53.  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would so dictate, the court may well intervene in a relationship which is otherwise 
identified as being arm’s length.39 Nonetheless, Brazilnut’s predicament is closer to 
Cobbe than it is to Crabb; for it does not appear to give rise to any issues of public 
policy, nor was there an express bargain with Acorn that Brazilnut would be awarded 
a proprietary interest in the mining site.40 In Cobbe the claimant was allowed to recover 
the cost of obtaining planning permission as a result of his reliance on the agreement in 
principle with the defendant. The rationale behind this conclusion was that the 
defendants’ unconscionable behaviour resulted in their being unjustly enriched (to an 
amount equal to the cost of obtaining planning permission), at the expense of the 
claimant. Acorn benefited from no such enrichment as a result of its conduct; Brazilnut 
acquired the copper-specific processing equipment on its own accord and for its own 
benefit, and therefore it has no remedy in that regard.  
From the above it should be clear that equity might intervene in commercial 
transactions, in exceptional circumstances, to displace the strict application of classical 
contract theory as expressed in the arm’s length principle. By way of contrast, the arm’s 
length principle becomes irrelevant and equitable intervention much more frequent 
when the court is faced with agreements between parties in a domestic, or at least non-
commercial, setting. One such example is Thorne v. Major,41 which, I submit, shares 
many of the characteristics of Acorn and Brazilnut’s relationship but without the 
commercial backdrop. The case concerned an appeal from a decision that the claimant 
could not inherit the estate of his deceased uncle, who died intestate but in possession 
of a farm of considerable value. The claimant had been working at his uncle’s farm 
since the mid 1970s for no remuneration, but by the 1980s he had come to hope that he 
might inherit. In 1990, an incident, whereby the claimant’s uncle presented the claimant 
with two policies on his life saying ‘this is for my death taxes’, turned this hope into 
expectation. Nevertheless, his uncle made no direct statements, nor did he take any 
																																																													
39 This is also indicated in Afia v. Mellor, unreported, 4 November 2013, where a shareholder in a 
company subject to a takeover could benefit from a guarantee by the defendant (the acquiring company) 
that it would buy existing shareholders’ shares, despite the claimant’s notice of intention to sell being 
out of date. This was because the claimant could rely on an estoppel arising from the assurances made 
by the defendant’s solicitor that his client would not take the date of the notice into account. I suggest 
that the public policy issue here would be ensuring that third parties are entitled to rely on the conduct 
of a solicitor acting as agent for another. Cf. Western Fish Products v. Penwith DC [1981] 1 All ER 204, 
217- 219, per Megaw LJ. 
40 Note the relevance of such express stipulation in Kilcarne Holdings Ltd. v. Targetfollow (Birmingham) 
Ltd. [2005] EWCA 1355, [21]-[22], per Sir Martin Nourse. 
41 [2009] UKHL 18. 
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formal action to the effect that the claimant would inherit. At first instance the judge 
held that there was enough evidence from the various witness statements that the 
claimant had reasonably understood his uncle’s words and acts as being an assurance 
that the claimant would inherit the farm and that his uncle intended it to be so. 
Accordingly, the judge established a proprietary estoppel for the claimant’s benefit. 
The Court of Appeal reversed this decision on the ground that the 1990 incident was 
not enough to establish the basis of an estoppel. The House of Lords allowed the 
claimant’s appeal. The evidence available to the trial judge showed a continuing pattern 
of conduct in the 15 years before his uncle’s death, which clearly indicated his uncle’s 
intention with regard to the farm. It would not be helpful to try and break down that 
pattern into discrete elements and then treat each as being insignificant.  
Thorne v. Major is significant in that it addresses the issue of the type of conduct that 
can be reasonably relied on to justify the establishment of proprietary estoppel. For the 
purposes of this section however it serves to indicate the disparity in the law between 
familial and arm’s length relationships: there appears to be little expectation of 
formality in the familial relationship. But if commercial parties choose to dispense with 
such formality, then the law will regard it as a risk they chose to take and treat them 
accordingly when considering appropriate remedies, whatever the pattern in previous 
dealings between them.42 This point establishes that classical contract theory would be 
stoutly against the implication of extra-contractual duties into the joint venture 
relationship, especially if such duties are implied in order to protect the parties from 
opportunistic behaviour; commercial parties are constitutionally expected to secure 
their interests and to do so clearly in the contract between them. 
4.2.3 Is a blanket application of the Arm’s Length principle justified?  
This presumption, demonstrated in the previous section, that (prudent or reasonable) 
commercial parties will seek to legally protect their respective interests in the context 
of a bargain raises two questions. First, is this expectation on the part of the courts 
justified in light of the complex financial and commercial realities facing economic 
agents? This is especially relevant with the varying sophistication of economic agents. 
																																																													
42 This point was confirmed by Etherton LJ in Crossco No 4 Unlimited v. Jolan Unlimited [2011] EWCA 
Civ 1619, [85]-[87]. 
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Secondly, does it actually reflect business practice or is it how the law considers 
business practice should operate?  
4.2.3.1 The role of party sophistication 
The development of the arm’s length principle reveals that it is largely a product of 
intuition, on the part of society and by extension, judges. Commerce is a speculative 
enterprise and those who participate are expected to be aware of its nature and to take 
risks accordingly when engaging in commercial activity. Not doing so would be 
irrational and, therefore, in the absence of a defect in the bargaining process, the law is 
not equipped to intervene otherwise than to give effect to the bargain as originally 
expressed in the parties’ contract, whether express or implied. Notably, the law’s 
criterion of what constitutes rational conduct in contracts, commercial or otherwise, is 
that of prudence, i.e. the pursuit of self-interest.43 It is beyond the aims of this thesis to 
examine why the law, as an expression of society’s expectations, applies this criterion 
of rationality to economic agents. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that if the 
criterion of rationality applicable to economic agents is that of self-interest 
maximisation, then extra-contractual duties must be implied into the contractual joint 
venture to safeguard the joint venture relationship, which itself embodies the paradigm 
for economic growth. In this section, I will demonstrate that the arm’s length principle, 
as applied to commercial parties, is distinctly problematic, for it assumes that a party’s 
aim to act rationally is synonymous to that party’s ability to do so effectively. 
Consequently, it should not be treated as a catch-all ground for refusing parties in 
commercial contracts the intervention of the law (in the absence of consent-invalidating 
facts), because to do so would result in injustice. 
The problem in the application of the arm’s length principle stems from the fact that 
parties in a commercial contract are credited from the outset with an ability to safeguard 
their own interests in a bargain.44 They are treated as ‘sophisticated’ parties, as opposed 
to those who are, from the outset, regarded as weaker parties in an exchange, such as 																																																													
43 See Atiyah, n.14; J. Steyn, ‘Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men’ 
(1997) LQR 433, at 434. 
44 E.g. Springwell Navigation Corporation v. JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 1221, [183], 
per Aikens LJ, on the issue of the ‘reasonableness’ of a contract term exempting an investment bank 
from liability for the purposes of ss. 3, 11 and Schedule 2 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. See 
also IFE Fund SA v. Goldman Sachs International [2006] EWHC 2887, [53]-[54]; Perpetual Trustee Co. 
Ltd. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd.; Butters v. BBC Worldwide Ltd. [2009] EWCA Civ 1160, 
[92], per Neuberger MR. 
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consumers dealing with merchants or employees dealing with employers. 45  The 
‘weaker’ type of contracting party tends to be specifically protected by statute (as is the 
case with both consumers and employees), while the courts will also intervene to 
interpret contracts or set aside bargains in favour of the weak in the interests of 
fairness.46 Commercial parties are afforded no such protection by the courts,47 bar some 
highly contentious examples to be considered later. Yet, while party sophistication 
plays an important role in the courts’ approach to a commercial contract, rarely is the 
nature of sophistication actually discussed.48 Against this background, a sophisticated 
party appears to be one who has the transactional experience (especially if they are ‘a 
repeat player’),49 business judgment, access to legal or other professional advice50 and, 
in general, an ability to allocate specific resources into evaluating a prospective bargain 
and calculating the risks. In certain contexts, any commercial connection will be enough 
to trigger a characterisation of ‘sophistication’ for the purposes of excluding statutory 
intervention to protect the rights of a party in an exchange.51  
																																																													
45 However, this attitude is not entirely consistent, see R.P. Austin ‘Commerce and Equity – Fiduciary 
Duty and Constructive Trust’ (1986) 6 OJLS 444, esp. 448-449, discussing the disparate approaches of 
the Australian High Court in Hospital Products Ltd v. United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 
64 and United Dominions Corporation Limited v. Brian Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 49, both of which involved 
experienced commercial parties with access to expert advice. 
46 In the context of contracting parties of lower income groups or of low intelligence or little education, 
see: Fry v. Lane (1888) 40 ChD 312, 322; Cresswell v. Potter [1978] 1 WLR 255, 257; Backhouse v. 
Backhouse [1978] 1 WLR 243, 252. On the subject of illiteracy as a relevant factor see P. Michell 
‘Illiteracy, Sophistication and Contract law’ (2005) Queen’s L.J. 311; In the context of the courts’ 
intervening where one unconscionably asserts their strict legal rights, see Shaw v. Applegate [1977] 1 
WLR 970, 977-979, per Buckley LJ; Taylor Fashions Ltd. v. Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd. [1982] 
1 QB 133, 147. 
47 The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 applies to business contracts, where one of the parties is dealing 
with the other’s standard terms to the effect that terms which are deemed ‘unreasonable’ will be void: 
s.11. The reasonableness of a term is judged according to a non-exhaustive list of criteria set out in Sch.2. 
Needless to say, the reasonableness of a term will rarely be challenged in the context of sophisticated 
parties: see Springwell Navigation, n.44, and the discussion in Watford Electronics v. Sanderson CFL 
[2001] EWCA Civ 317, [54]-[57], per Chadwick LJ. 
48 For a comprehensive study of the American case law and literature see M.R. Miller ‘Contract Law, 
Party Sophistication and the New Formalism’ (2010) Mo.L.Rev. 493 and also A. Schwartz and R. Scott 
‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’ (2003) 113 Yale L.J. 541, 546-547, who devised a 
theory of identifying ‘obviously sophisticated’ parties determined by number of employees, 
organisational form and type of commercial activity (e.g. a law firm being arguably better placed to vet 
a deal than a construction firm; cf. Feldman v. Google Inc. 513 F Supp 2d 229 (ED Pa 2007)). 
49 E.g. Titan Steel Wheels Limited v. The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc. [2010] EWHC (Comm) 211, [94], 
per David Steel J; Miller, ibid, 532. 
50 E.g. see the ‘assessment and understanding’ clause signed by the defendant in UBS AG (London 
Branch) v. Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig GmbH [2014] EWHC 3615 (Comm), [207]. 
51 Note, e.g., the definition of ‘private person’ in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Rights 
of Action) Regulations 2001/2256, reg.3(1)(b), to the effect that, if the loss complained of was suffered 
in the course of business activity of any kind, an undertaking cannot sue, under s.138D Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000, an ‘authorised person’ in damages for breaching their statutory duty. In a wider 
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The problems associated with a blanket application of the ‘sophistication’ label become 
all too clear in light of the recent debacle concerning the mis-selling by British banks 
of certain financial products, known as Interest Rate Hedge Products or interest rate 
swap agreements (‘Swaps’).52 These products were sold to businesses of various sizes, 
as part of loan agreements and were marketed as a way of mitigating the risk of rising 
interest rates. In 2012, the Financial Conduct Authority (‘FCA’)53 conducted a pilot 
review of a sample of 173 Swap sales and discovered serious failings on the part of the 
banks in more than 90 per cent of the cases reviewed. In many cases, the customers did 
not fully appreciate the financial commitment they were taking on. For instance, on 
several occasions the banks failed to make clear that, should the interest rates drop 
(which they did due to the 2012 credit crunch), the customer would end up owing the 
bank. Furthermore, in many cases the Swaps came with exorbitant break costs or exit 
fees, which the customer had to pay in order to terminate the agreement. In some cases 
these costs exceeded 40 per cent of the value of the loan.54 As a result of the FCA’s 
pilot review findings, eleven banks agreed to review some 40,000 Swap sales to ‘non-
sophisticated’ customers and set up a compensation scheme for those who suffered loss 
as a result of the sale, or who would not have agreed to the sale had the banks conducted 
themselves according to the FCA rules when promoting those products.55 
Crucially, a large number of businesses were not included in the review, and they were 
therefore excluded from the compensation scheme, because they were deemed 
‘sophisticated’ customers by the banks. This determination was supported in most cases 
by the independent reviewer engaged by the FCA to monitor the banks’ conduct with 
																																																													
context, a mercantile connection will displace the operation of a claim to title based on constructive 
notice, both in common law (Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606, 635) and in equity (Swiss Bank Ltd v. Lloyds 
Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584). 
52 K. Loizou ‘Taxpayer May Face £2bn Bill over Swaps Mis-selling Scandal’, The Sunday Times, 25 
January 2015; ‘Still Hedged in by Mis-selling: Thousands of Businesses that Were Sold Costly Financial 
Products by Banks Fear that they will Miss out on Compensation’, The Sunday Times, 24 August 2014. 
53 The FCA is the former Financial Services Authority (‘FSA’), which was renamed by s.6, Financial 
Services Act 2012 with effect from 24 January 2013. The Swaps mis-selling review was conducted in 
the transitional period between the FSA becoming the FCA. For the sake of simplicity, all references to 
the FCA are therefore both to the FSA and the FCA, unless the context requires otherwise. 
54 Financial Services Authority (hereafter, ‘FSA’), ‘Interest Rate Hedging Products: Pilot Findings’, 
March 2013, 13, http://www.fca.org.uk/static/pubs/other/interest-rate-swaps-2013.pdf (accessed 
14.8.18); One company was quoted a £9m break fee when it asked to terminate the swap – the swap itself 
was for 30 years on a three year loan: The Sunday Times (22 August 2018), ibid. 
55 FSA, ibid, 14; The rules in question are set out in the FCA Handbook, Conduct of Business Sourcebook 
(‘COBS’), http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/COBS/ (accessed 14.8.18). 
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respect to the review.56 For the purposes of the pilot review, the sophistication of 
customers was assessed according to the test for small companies set out in s.382 
CA(2006). Thus, a sophisticated customer was one who satisfied at least two of the 
following requirements: (a) more than 50 employees, (b) a turnover of more than £6.5m 
and (c) a balance sheet total of more than £3.26m.57 Furthermore, a customer would 
‘also be deemed sophisticated if the bank could demonstrate that the customer had the 
necessary experience and knowledge to understand the service to be provided and the 
type of product or transaction envisaged, including its complexity and risks’. 58 
However, following the pilot review, the FCA altered the sophistication test so that 
businesses, which exceeded the balance sheet and employee number thresholds (but not 
the turnover threshold) would be considered non-sophisticated and therefore would be 
included in the review, provided that the total value of their swaps did not exceed 
£10m.59 Businesses whose swaps value exceeded £10m, were expressly excluded from 
the review, even where their employee numbers and annual turnover were 
comparatively low, as were businesses which belong to, or have a connection with, a 
corporate group, if that group was collectively deemed sophisticated under the new 
test.60 So, for instance, a business in the property sector, where businesses tend to have 
significant property portfolios and were therefore likely to have swaps well exceeding 
£10m, would be excluded from the review even if it employed 5 people and had a 
turnover of £2m (and for the purposes of CA(2006) would only qualify as a ‘small 
company’). 
The FCA’s rationale behind the new rules was that the review should ‘focus on those 
small businesses that were unlikely to have had the specific expertise and skills needed 
to understand the risks associated with these products’.61 The operative word here is 
‘unlikely’, for, as Zepeda observes,62 it indicates that the FCA did not investigate 
whether a business, which has suffered loss due to the banks’ misconduct, actually had 																																																													
56 The decision of the independent reviewer may now be the subject of a judicial review: R (On the 
application of Holmcroft Properties Ltd) v. KPMG LLP, unreported, 25 April 2015. 
57 FSA, n.54, 10. 
58 Ibid, 11. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Determined according to the criteria in s.382 CA(2006), on parent companies qualifying as ‘small’. 
61 n.54, 12. 
62 R. Zepeda, ‘Derivatives Mis-selling by British Banks and the Failed Legacy of the FSA’ (2013) JIBLR 
209, 217. 
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the necessary resources and access to expert advice to vet the proposed deal. Instead, 
the FCA relied on the likelihood of a business having the ability to appreciate the 
associated risks, by arbitrarily applying a set of criteria whose ultimate purpose was to 
limit the exposure of banks rather than to facilitate the administration of justice.63 
Granted, being labelled ‘sophisticated’ does not prevent the excluded businesses from 
making their case in court. It did, however, remove a major avenue for redress. This is 
because by virtue of s.138D of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (‘FSMA 
2000’) those businesses were excluded from suing the banks for breach of statutory 
duty.64 Moreover, they could not generally sue the banks for negligent misstatement 
and breach of duty of care,65 for there is no common law duty (extending from their 
statutory duty under the FSMA 2000) on the part of the banks to advise on the risks of 
a recommended financial product. 66  The contractual route is also riddled with 
complexity, because a misrepresentation claim against the bank is likely to fail in light 
of the courts’ increasing tendency to uphold non-reliance or entire agreement clauses, 
a staple of banking agreements. 67  Ultimately, businesses that have been labelled 
‘sophisticated’ on a catchall, largely arbitrary basis will likely have no redress against 
institutions, who have failed to act by their own regulator’s standards. 
The exploitation of thousands of businesses by banks during the ‘swaps’ debacle serves 
to illustrate that being a commercial undertaking, even one with years in the trade and 
																																																													
63 FCA’s Chief Executive, Martin Wheatley, admitted that this rule ended up excluding about a third of 
the businesses’ sold interest rate hedging products: ‘Regulators struck secret deal to dilute damages paid 
by big banks’, The Times, 12 February 2015.  
64 Because they fail the ‘private person’ test: see n.49. 
65  Unless the bank has specifically undertaken to advise the customer on the particular deal, thus 
assuming, in the circumstances, a duty of care: Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] 
AC 465. 
66 Green v. Royal Bank of Scotland Plc. [2013] EWCA Civ 1197, [23], per Tomlinson LJ; in the absence 
of a private right of action created by statute, the existence of a statutory duty does not give rise to a duty 
of care in common law: Desmond v. Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire [2011] EWCA Civ 3, [38]. 
67 The aim of such clauses is to assert that the parties have not relied on representations by the other 
before entering the agreement between them: on their effect see Watford Electronics, n.45, [40]-[41]. A 
misrepresentation claim requires reliance on a false representation inducing the claimant to enter into a 
contract with the defendant. Therefore, if successful, ‘non-reliance clauses’ are an effective defence to 
misrepresentation claims: Peekay Intermak Ltd. v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. 
[2006] EWCA Civ 386; Springwell Navigation Corporation v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, n.44; Titan Steel 
Wheels Limited v. The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc., n.49. These decisions support the concept of 
‘contractual estoppel’, i.e. that parties to a contract are entitled to rely on the signed contractual document 
to the exclusion of any pre-contractual representations. For further comment see G. McMeel, 
‘Documentary Fundamentalism in the Senior Courts: the Myth of Contractual Estoppel’ (2011) LMCLQ 
185 and A. Trukhtanov, ‘Misrepresentation: Acknowledgment of Non-reliance as a defence’ (2009) LQR 
648. 
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significant assets to its name, cannot by itself demonstrate sophistication for the 
purposes of the arm’s length principle. In many cases, the swaps in question were traded 
in by experienced investors who had been involved in the purchase of complex 
derivatives several times before and had gained significant profits from these trades.68 
In other cases, however, complex swaps were attached to loan agreements as ‘insurance 
policies’ against rising rates, with little to no explanation of the associated risks and 
costs.69 Yet, through a blanket application of the sophistication label, these two classes 
of bank customer are treated the same with profoundly unjust results, for, in the case of 
a small business, being at the mercy of swap charges or exit costs can affect its very 
future.  
Extrapolating from the swaps mis-selling analogy, application of the sophistication 
label on a commercial party, without further inquiry as to its particular circumstances 
can only lead to injustice. Smaller businesses will be the ones to suffer the brunt of this 
attitude. Garvin notes, for instance, that the dichotomy in the treatment of sophisticated, 
as opposed to unsophisticated, parties has a particularly negative effect on small 
businesses. These entities are commonly treated as sophisticated parties by virtue of 
their mercantile status when, in reality, they can be just as unsophisticated as a 
consumer, in the sense that they lack the resources, expertise and bargaining power 
necessary to protect their interests as against a larger, wealthier or more experienced 
party. 70  This fact has not escaped the notice of European legislators. Thus, 
developments in European contract law suggest that even parties in purely commercial 
relationships may benefit from the type of protective regulation that normally benefits 
consumers. Notable examples of this are the Commercial Agents directive71 and the 
Directive on Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions,72 both of which 
take into account the varying degrees of vulnerability economic agents may face in a 
market exchange. In the case of commercial agents, for instance, the directive secures 																																																													
68 E.g. As in Springwell and Titan Steel, ibid. 
69 E.g. the featured case of a tile manufacturer who got a £2,6m loan to expand its business and signed 
on to the swap offered by the lending bank: M. Scuffham, ‘Special Report – UK Banks say “Smart” 
clients don’t deserve compensation’ Reuters, 25 November 2014. 
70 L. Gravin ‘Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law’ (2005) 40 Wake For.L.Rev. 
295.  
71 Directive 1986/53/EEC; implemented in the UK through the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) 
Regulations 1993, SI 1993/3053 (in force, 1.1.1994). 
72  Directive 2011/ 7/EU; implemented in the UK through the Late Payment of Commercial Debts 
Regulations 2013, which amended the Late Payments of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998 (in force, 
16.3.2013).  
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the agent’s right to a minimum period of notice of termination of the agency agreement, 
as well as the agent’s right to commission and to indemnity or compensation (left to the 
discretion of individual Member States) in the event of termination. The directive 
demonstrates awareness that commercial agents may be particularly vulnerable to their 
principals, since in many cases they become bound to them for long periods of time and 
often operate under some form of exclusivity.73  
In the Late Payment in Commercial Transactions Directive, the EU Council goes even 
further to acknowledge that the manner in which most mercantile transactions operate 
gives rise to undisputable vulnerability, no matter the size or ‘sophistication’ of the 
individual actors. 74  This is because most transactions between commercial 
undertakings operate on a deferred payment basis with one party supplying the goods 
or services under the contract, while the other is given a specific time period, in which 
to pay, which is either set by statute or by the supplier. It goes without saying that late 
payment here would have serious financial repercussions for the supplier, whose 
liquidity and financial planning will be affected and who may even have to resort to 
getting external credit so as to meet its obligations. 
Roppo75  posits that the rationale behind such protectionist intervention lies in the 
asymmetries, whether in terms of information or bargaining power, inherent in most 
commercial relationships. For instance, in the case of commercial agents, the 
asymmetry works in favour of the principal who is in control of the relationship, 
especially in the case of an exclusive distribution agreement where the principal would 
regulate the availability and flow of merchandise to the agent. In Roppo’s view, the 
weaker party in a business-to-business supply contract tends to be the ‘customer’, since 
the supplier is the one in control of the elements of the substantive performance of the 
contract. The supplier has all pertinent information, while the customer is generally an 
																																																													
73 E.g. The EU Commission’s criteria on the calculation of indemnity following termination include 
taking into account such factors as whether the agent is retained exclusively by the principal and/or 
whether the agent is subject to a restraint of trade provision; see EC Commission, ‘Report of the 
Application of Article 17 of Council Directive on the Coordination of the Laws of the Member States 
Relating to Self-Employed Commercial Agents (86/653/EEC)’, COM(96) 364 Final, 23.07.1996. 
74 Recitals to Directive 2011/7/EU, n.40, [2]-[3]. 
75 V. Roppo ‘From Consumer Contracts to Asymmetric Contracts: a Trend in European Contract Law? 
(2009) ERCL 304. 
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outsider.76 In other words, the business customer in this case displays the vulnerability 
attributed to consumers in their transactions with merchants. But such asymmetries are 
not necessarily confined to the supply of goods or services. They apply as a matter of 
course in every contractual relationship. It is common ground that in every contract 
each party has control over the technical and organisational aspects of their respective 
obligations under the contract, while the other party is in every case an ‘outsider’.  
Consider for instance the project-specific contractual joint venture, which is an on-
going relationship rather than a one-off exchange. It could well feature such 
asymmetries, particularly where each party has undertaken to complete distinct parts of 
the project dependent on their respective competencies. In conclusion, it is possible for 
‘sophisticated’ parties to be vulnerable to contractual asymmetries, analogous to those 
faced by consumers, and therefore to merit the protection of outside intervention. The 
arm’s length rule should not, without further scrutiny be used as the basis for refusing 
intervention into a contract. 
4.2.3.2 Party Sophistication and Business Practice 
The previous section demonstrated that the arm’s length principle, with its basis in the 
presumption that commercial parties are by default sophisticated, could yield unjust 
results if applied indiscriminately and without proper inquiry into the circumstances of 
the parties in the dispute. In this section I will establish that, even if, following an 
inquiry, the application of the sophistication label is in fact appropriate, it would be 
inaccurate to assume that sophistication is synonymous with (a) equality of bargaining 
power, when dealing with arm’s length transactions or (b) an ability to effectively 
safeguard one’s own interests once the parties have embarked on a commercial 
relationship.  
With regard to point (a), let us consider a contract for the sale of iron ore, between 
Goldie, the buyer, and Irony, the vendor. Both are sophisticated in the sense that they 
are able to apply specific resources into assessing a prospective deal. The balance of 
bargaining power among them will be largely determined by the information at each 
party’s disposal. Relevant information for instance would be how much iron ore Irony 
has available, whether Goldie can source iron ore elsewhere and how soon Goldie needs 																																																													
76 Ibid, 315; however, once the supplier has substantively performed the contract, the asymmetry would 
then work in favour of the customer, who is given a grace period to pay and is then subject to the controls 
of the Late Payment legislation. 
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it. Either party may signal this information to the other by various means throughout 
contract negotiations (e.g. a specification by Goldie that time of delivery is of the 
essence of the contract will signal the importance of the iron to Goldie),77 so that 
bargaining skill may affect the balance of power.78 To a wider extent, bargaining power 
will largely be affected by the state of the market at the time of bargaining,79 so that a 
global shortage in iron ore would limit Goldie’s options significantly. The effect of this 
is that, regardless of Goldie’s sophistication, Irony would still be able to frame the 
bargain to its utmost advantage, e.g. shifting most of the risk to Goldie by insisting that 
the iron is delivered Ex Works rather than, say, on the more balanced Cost Insurance 
Freight basis. 
With regard to point (b), the absurdity of the presumption that commercial 
sophistication is synonymous with the ability to protect one’s own interests in a joint 
venture is evident in the cases heard by the Court of Appeal following its ruling in 
Pallant v. Morgan. 80  The facts of the Pallant v. Morgan cases demonstrate that 
sophisticated parties may easily become objects of opportunistic behaviour particularly 
when they are at the cusp of an alliance. Yet, with the courts’ traditional adherence to 
the arm’s length principle there has been little opportunity to develop a coherent, 
objectively justifiable principle upon which the law may award a remedy to the 
aggrieved party. Consequently, when the courts decide to forego the application of the 
arm’s length principle in favour of more ‘just’ outcomes, the result can be devastating 
to the understanding of contractual doctrine.  
The Pallant v. Morgan line of cases is the basis for the ‘failed-joint-venture’ 
constructive trust. The extraordinary feature of this particular equitable jurisdiction is 
																																																													
77 For a discussion of signalling games see, e.g., K. Spier, ‘Incomplete Contracts and Signalling’ (1992) 
23(3) RAND J.Econ. 432, who demonstrates that in principal-agent contracts, the pursuit of a complete 
contract can be a signal in itself. In Spier’s model, a complete contract is one that makes provision for 
the agent’s wage being proportional to the output yielded by operating the principal’s productive asset. 
When certain parameters are at play (i.e. asymmetrical information as to the principal’s type, high ex 
post transaction costs, and lower ex ante transaction costs) by pursuing a complete contract, the principal 
signals her ‘type’, in the sense that, on average, a ‘good’ principal yields a higher output than a ‘bad’ 
one. See also B.E. Hermalin and M.L. Katz, ‘Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated 
Parties: A more complete View of incomplete Contracts and their Breach’ (1993) 9 J.L.Econ.& Org. 
230, at 233. 
78 E.g. note the assessment of the parties’ relative bargaining position in Watford Electronics Ltd. v. 
Sanderson CFL Ltd. [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 984, [121]. 
79 E.g. ibid, [126]. 
80 [1953] Ch 43. 
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that the court does not intervene into the relationship so as to give effect to the intention 
of the parties, as is the case with incorporating or implying terms into a bargain, or to 
enforce a bargain that is otherwise unenforceable. Indeed, a common feature of these 
cases is that there is no bargain to be enforced. Rather, the court intervenes because 
‘the defendant has acquired property in circumstances where it would be 
inequitable to allow him to treat it as his own; and where, because it would be 
inequitable to allow him to treat the property as his own, it is necessary to 
impose on him the obligations of a trustee in relation to it.’81  
Pallant v. Morgan itself concerned two neighbouring landowners who wished to 
purchase for conservation a piece of woodland adjacent to both their properties. At the 
relevant auction and having agreed not to bid against each other so as to avoid driving 
the property’s price up, the plaintiff’s agent refrained from bidding on the 
understanding that should the defendant’s agent win, the defendant would transfer such 
part of the land to the plaintiff, as the parties would later agree. There had been previous 
discussions between the plaintiff and the defendant on the formula to be used for the 
division of the land but no agreement in writing. The defendant’s agent entered the 
auction and won the property, but the defendant subsequently refused to transfer any 
part of it to the plaintiff. The court held that although specific performance was not 
available because the agreement between the parties was too uncertain, the plaintiff was 
still entitled to part of the land on the ground that the defendant’s agent bid for both 
himself and the plaintiff’s agent. Therefore, the defendant held the land on trust for both 
himself and the plaintiff. 
The parties in Pallant v. Morgan were not acting in a commercial context, so the arm’s 
length principle would not necessarily apply, although it could be argued that the parties 
were sophisticated as they had access to professional advice and representation with 
respect to the auction. However, the Court of Appeal in Banner Homes Holdings v. Luff 
Developments82 extended the Pallant v. Morgan doctrine to commercial parties. The 
Court held that for the equity to arise it was necessary to establish either a benefit to 
the acquiring party or a detriment to the non-acquiring party. Furthermore, it was 
neither necessary for the arrangement between the parties to be contractually 
enforceable, nor was it essential for the non-acquiring party to have agreed not to 
																																																													
81 Banner Homes Holdings Ltd. v. Luff Developments Ltd. [2000] Ch 372, 400. 
82 [2000] Ch 372. 
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compete with the acquiring party. However, what had to be established was that on the 
facts it would be inequitable for the acquiring party to retain the property for itself in a 
manner inconsistent with the arrangement on which the non-acquiring party had acted. 
The facts in Banner Homes were similar to those of Pallant v. Morgan. The 
arrangement here involved the claimant pulling out of the competition for a property in 
favour of the defendant, so as to develop the property together with the defendant 
through a joint venture company, which had yet to be formed. When the defendant 
changed its mind, the Court of Appeal held that the defendant held the property on 
constructive trust for itself and the claimant.  
This outcome should be contrasted with the ruling of the Court of Appeal in London 
and Regional Developments v. TBI,83 where the Court rejected the claimant’s argument 
that in circumstances similar to those of Banner Homes it was entitled to a constructive 
trust over the property acquired by the defendant. The reason for this was because the 
arrangement between the claimant and the defendant was recorded in a note as being 
‘subject to contract’. This, Mummery LJ held, placed the claimant’s case firmly within 
Cobbe and Humphreys Estate territory (see 4.2.2.2) and demonstrated that the claimant 
knew that the arrangement with the defendant was never meant to be binding until a 
contract was duly concluded. Therefore, the claimant’s actions prior to a binding 
agreement being concluded were purely speculative.  
At first glance, this curious distinction between an equity arising where there is no 
contract, but none arising where the arrangement is subject to contract, would appear 
to limit the Pallant v. Morgan jurisdiction to the specific facts of Pallant v. Morgan 
itself and those of cases like Banner Homes. However, the High Court’s approach to 
the Pallant v. Morgan trust in Kearns Brothers v. Hova Developments84 indicates that, 
if anything, this particular equitable jurisdiction is poised to become wider.85 In Kearns 
Brothers, the judge described the Pallant v. Morgan equity as the constructive trust 
arising out of failed joint ventures for the development of land.86 Accordingly, he held 
that a Pallant v. Morgan trust existed with respect to a property bought by the defendant 																																																													
83 n.37. 
84 [2012] EWHC 2968.  
85 See also Credit & Mercantile plc v. Kaymuu Ltd [2014] EWHC 1746, where a beneficial interest under 
a Pallant v. Morgan trust was considered in terms of priority over the interest of a registered charge 
holder.  
86 n.84, [120]. 
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as part of a tentative agreement under which the claimant was to demolish the existing 
buildings and develop the site. The judge held that the Pallant v. Morgan jurisdiction 
does not necessarily arise from an arrangement or understanding as to the acquisition 
of a specific proprietary interest in the property for the joint benefit of the parties. The 
equity may also arise from an arrangement to utilise or exploit a property for such joint 
benefit.87 Therefore, when the defendant decided to sell the property on, rather than 
having it redeveloped, and offered the claimant a 2% finders’ fee, the judge evidently 
found the outcome inequitable for the claimant and duly awarded him a share of the 
proceeds of sale, despite the fact that the claimant put up no funds for the purchase of 
the site nor was he ever intending to do so. 
The Pallant v. Morgan jurisdiction, therefore, raises several questions. Its basis appears 
to be the sentiment expressed by Millet J below: 
‘It is the independent jurisdiction of equity, as a court of conscience, to grant 
relief for every species of fraud and other unconscionable conduct. When 
appropriate the court will grant a proprietary remedy to restore to the plaintiff 
property of which he has been wrongly deprived, or to prevent the defendant 
from retaining a benefit which he has obtained by his own wrong.’88 
When applied to common business practice however, it appears to completely disregard 
established contractual doctrine. Consider for instance Lord Ackner’s famous statement 
in Walford v. Miles89 addressing counsel’s argument that contractual bargaining must 
be done in good faith [sic]: 
‘The concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently 
repugnant to the adverserial position of the parties when involved in 
negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own 
interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations.’ 
Here lies the crux of the argument against the broadening of the equitable jurisdiction 
established by Pallant v. Morgan to cover commercial transactions.  In the absence of 
fraud, there is little to justify the intervention of equity, for the courts expect parties in 
purely commercial transactions to know that their opposite number is not acting 
altruistically but is pursuing its own self-interest.  Without a clear basis explaining the 
deviation not only from legal principle but also perspective (i.e. what made these 																																																													
87 Ibid, [117]. 
88 Lonrho Plc v. Fayed (No2) [1991] All ER 961, 969. 
89 [1922] 2 AC 128, 138E. 
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particular commercial parties worthy of equitable intervention, when the court cannot 
clearly identify the equitable doctrine applicable in the circumstances?), the results 
appear distinctly inequitable. As Uguccioni astutely points out, for instance,90 the non-
acquiring party in the Pallant v. Morgan scenario is put in the position to cherry pick 
whether to pursue a claim if the property acquisition proves profitable for the acquiring 
party and to refrain from action if not.  
In Banner Homes Chadwick LJ considered a series of cases, which raised issues similar 
to those in Pallant v. Morgan in a commercial context.91 In every case, a constructive 
trust was imposed against a party who, in a commercial understanding with another, 
caused the other to rely on a promise and as a result acquired a benefit at the other’s 
expense. Oliver J in Time Products v. Combined English Stores 92 pointed out that the 
value of the benefit is immaterial. What is relevant, is that for the defendant to retain 
for himself the benefit of the understanding obtained with the other party’s assistance 
(whether or not such assistance was rendered based on an erroneous belief or on a 
promise) would be tantamount to fraud. This may very well be, but it still does not 
explain why commercial parties, who by the courts’ own declaration93 are expected to 
be aware of the speculative nature of all their dealings should be afforded proprietary 
relief in a bargain they knew, in the eyes of the law, was not binding or enforceable. 
The claimant in a Pallant v. Morgan scenario generally loses nothing more than an 
opportunity, which is the essence of commercial speculation. If they were to lose 
something more, then another head of relief could apply, such as unjust enrichment or 
specific performance, if there had been an enforceable bargain. There is no relationship 
between the parties other than a tentative understanding. Yet the basis for proprietary 
relief in such scenarios has never been clearly established, beyond the observation that 
letting the defendant keep the benefit would be objectionable.  
In Crossco No.4 v. Jolan,94 Etherton LJ posited that in the Pallant v Morgan line of 
cases the basis for proprietary relief was breach of fiduciary duty. He did not clearly 																																																													
90 n.36, 165. 
91 Holiday Inns Inc. v. Broadhead [1974] 232 EG 951; Time Products Ltd. v. Combined English Stores, 
unreported, 2 December 1974; Island Holdings Ltd. v. Birchington Engineering Co. Ltd., unreported, 7 
July 1981. 
92 Ibid. 
93 See Cobbe, n.28, Humphreys Estate, n.26, London Regional Developments Ltd, n.37 etc. 
94 n.42, [88]. 
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identify the basis upon which the fiduciary duty arose, but, in my view, the simplest 
and most reasonable explanation would be that it arose out of agency: the defendant in 
every case undertook to bid for the property on behalf of the claimant, as well as for 
himself. 95  FHR European Ventures LLP v. Cedar Capital Partners LLC 96  would 
arguably support this conclusion. In this case, the Supreme Court settled the debate on 
the appropriate relief to be afforded a principal when its agent has accepted a bribe or 
secret commission in the course of its agency. It is now established that in such 
circumstances the agent holds the bribe on trust for its principal, in the sense that the 
principal has a proprietary rather than a personal claim over the property acquired by 
the agent. However, the matter of the basis of the Pallant v. Morgan trust is far from 
settled. For instance, Arden LJ in Crossco97 appears to interpret the Pallant v. Morgan 
equity as a common intention constructive trust.98 
The confusion over the Pallant v. Morgan jurisprudence has had two effects. First, it 
demonstrates that the courts themselves can be uncomfortable with the sweeping 
application of the arm’s length principle. This is because the expectation that 
commercial parties are always aware of the speculative nature of their dealings can be 
simply unrealistic. Sometimes business people, no matter their degree of sophistication, 
feel entitled to place their trust in others when seeking to develop opportunities. This is 
amply evident in Banner Homes, where the claimant’s solicitors were in the process of 
fine-tuning the proposed joint venture agreement before the defendant backed out after 
bidding for and winning the site at issue. Secondly, the Pallant v. Morgan jurisprudence 
has produced the absurd outcome by which prospective co-venturers would be more 
protected (in the sense that they have access to proprietary relief rather than just 
damages) if they have no express agreement whatsoever. 99  Therefore, Pallant v. 
Morgan, as expanded in Banner Homes, is in direct conflict with the arm’s length 																																																													
95 This interpretation is also adopted by Mummery LJ in Beddow v. Gayzer [2007] EWCA Civ 644, [78]-
[79]. 
96 [2014] UKSC 45. 
97 n.42, [129]. 
98 Namely, a trust imposed over property (in a domestic context) to reflect the shared intentions of the 
parties as to ownership at the time of the property’s acquisition; see Stack v. Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 
(providing a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to ascertaining the parties’ intentions) and Jones v. 
Kernott, n.38 (establishing that the parties’ intentions may change over time and this will be relevant to 
the disposition of the trust); cf. the analysis in M. Yip, ‘The Pallant v. Morgan Equity Reconsidered’ 
(2013) 33(4) LS 549. 
99 See Benedetti v. Sawiris [2009] EWHC 1330, which established that the existence of a binding contract 
is fatal to the Pallant equity; [513]-[526]. 
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principle. This introduces an unacceptable degree of uncertainty in the law and 
operation of joint ventures, the paradigm vehicle for growth (see Ch.2). If default extra-
contractual duties were to be implied into project-specific contractual joint ventures, 
the courts might feel less inclined to disregard doctrine they otherwise fight to 
safeguard in order to contain objectionable conduct. 
 
4.3 Objection 2: There is no need for an extra-contractual standard of conduct 
in the form of default other-regarding duties, because English contract law 
already provides the parties with the means by which to protect the joint 
venture relationship. 
The foregoing sections demonstrated that the commercial nature of parties to a joint 
venture (however ‘sophisticated’) is not a sound basis for opposing the implication of 
default other-regarding duties into the contract. If anything, there are several examples 
of English courts intervening in commercial dealings when the interests of justice so 
required. The problem with such intervention is that it tends to take place on an intuitive 
basis, which can only harm the interests of legal certainty in the long run. Default other-
regarding duties are a practical response to this problem and at the same time provide 
a minimum standard of conduct justifiable on what rational commercial parties would 
have intended if they had reflected on what their self-interest requires.  
But there is another argument to contravene such thesis: English contract law already 
provides commercial parties (generally conceived as straightforward maximisers) with 
the means to express their intentions to mutually constrain their self-interest and to 
address the problem of incomplete presentiation (i.e. their inability to contractually 
address in the present whatever befalls their relationship in the future). As regards the 
first point, they can do so by including clauses into their contract, which expressly 
reflect their intention to become constrained maximisers. As regards the second point, 
incomplete presentiation may be addressed either through the doctrine of frustration or 
by the parties’ themselves making provision for adjusting their respective contractual 
obligations when certain events come to pass, thus effectively building into their 
contract the flexibility necessary to deal with future uncertainty. Either way, extra-
contractual intervention through the imposition of default duties is neither desirable nor 
necessary. In this section, I will address each of these points in turn. 
	 124	
4.3.1 The parties expressing constrained utility maximisation by outright 
accepting other-regarding duties in contract: is it probable? 
To a certain extent, a joint venture contract will necessarily represent the parties’ 
intention to be constrained maximisers. If we examine a joint venture in light of 
Gauthier’s methodology on rational cooperative bargaining, we must presume ex 
hypothesi that the collaborating parties have accepted Gauthier’s premise of rationality 
as utility optimisation, otherwise a joint venture would be logically impossible.100 It 
follows that the arrangement between the parties must be presumed to implement, at 
least to some degree, elements of Gauthier’s rational bargaining process, namely that 
all involved partake of the cooperative surplus and no one becomes worse off as a result 
of the bargain.101 The question then for the purposes of my thesis is whether, when 
recording their bargain in the contract, the parties would go as far as to expressly 
commit to duties whose legal effect could be to prioritise the interests of the other party 
ahead of their own. Evidence from practice suggests that they would not, if the 
widespread use of ‘status clauses’ in joint venture agreements (see 3.3.3) is any 
indication.102 
My thesis, it will be remembered, holds that constrained maximisation of self-interest 
in legal terms translates into enforceable other-regarding duties establishing a minimum 
standard of conduct expected of the collaborators, on the ground that this is what their 
rational self-interest requires. But if being rational requires collaborators to submit to 
other-regarding duties, why would they routinely either avoid acknowledging their 
acceptance of such duties (beyond what is already recorded) in the contract, or even go 
as far as rejecting them expressly? I submit that this is a direct result of the operational 
and philosophical dichotomy between the commercial and legal aspects of the joint 
venture. The commercial aspect refers to the economic basis of the venture and its 
various objectives for the collaborators, individually and collectively. The legal aspect 
refers to the organisational form, which the parties apply to the joint venture 
relationship and determines the legal regime applicable to it. In turn, this regime 
																																																													
100 This is because the (presumed) common knowledge of rationality would not allow the parties to go 
past the negotiation stage (see Ch.1). 
101  Whether optimally or not will depend on whether all parties managed to limit their constraint 
according to the minimax relative concession (see Ch.1). 
102 E.g. see cl.3.4(d), Model Petroleum Exploration Joint Operating Agreement (AMPLA, 2011) and 
cl.21.2.1, Standard Joint Operating Agreement for the UK Continental Shelf (UKOOA, 2002). 
	 125	
determines how the venture is to be operated in two respects: a) with reference to third 
parties (including the state, customers and suppliers); and b) with reference to the co-
venturers and their individual roles and expectations. In an ideal world, the commercial 
and legal aspects of a joint venture should be perfectly congruent, in the sense that the 
latter should be simply another lens through which to express the commercial 
expectations of the parties.  
Alas, in the eyes of the commercial world, this is generally not the case. The reason for 
this is that the legal dimension does not just translate the parties’ respective obligations 
in the arrangement. It also seeks to mitigate risk so as to introduce a degree of 
predictability in the relationship by stipulating what is to happen when specified events 
arise in the future. This will invariably involve stipulations with regard to party default, 
which by definition introduce an adversarial element to the arrangement. However 
small, this element contrasts with the hopeful amicability that the parties enjoy at the 
beginning of the venture (or, later on, while it operates smoothly) and this is where the 
operational and philosophical dichotomy between the legal and commercial aspects of 
a joint venture arises. On the one hand, the commercial aspect of the joint venture looks 
to the present and relies operationally on social interaction between the venturers, its 
philosophy being one of informality, amiability and swiftness. On the other hand, the 
legal aspect of the venture looks to the future, is operationally geared toward risk 
mitigation, its philosophy being one of formality, detachment and wariness. The result 
of this dichotomy is that commercial parties tend to get on with their ventures 
addressing any problems on an informal basis and only turn to the legal aspect of their 
arrangement as a last resort, when all other forms of interaction have proven 
unsuccessful.103 
How does this all relate to a joint venture contract being silent on, or expressly 
dismissing, duties prioritising the interests of the collective? The operational and 
philosophical dichotomy as presented above is relevant because on the informal or 
personal level, parties may be willing to compromise their immediate interests so as to 
salvage an otherwise fruitful relationship.104 But things change at the formal level, for 
the contract is the tangible product of the legal aspect of a joint venture. By definition, 																																																													
103 E.g. note the studies of the commercial use of contracts in Macaulay, n.21, and H. Beale and T. 
Dugdale, ‘Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies’ (1975) 2 
Brit.J.L.& Soc'y 45. 
104 See Macaulay, ibid. 
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therefore, to some degree it must represent the operational basis of legal planning, 
which is the mitigation of risk, whatever its nature. Consequently, what prevails in the 
joint venture contract is the cautious nature of legal counsel, rather than the optimism 
of the entrepreneur. This cautious approach is amply summarised in Margaret 
Moore’s105 critique of Gauthier’s theory: it is one thing to expect an economic agent 
(traditionally perceived as a straightforward maximiser) to become a constrained 
maximiser because this is what their self-interest requires in a certain instant, and quite 
another to expect them to become disposed to being a constrained maximiser. There is 
no rational reason for an individual whose disposition is to constrain maximisation of 
their self-interest (so as to achieve maximum utility overall) to balk at expressly 
submitting to (limited) other-regarding duties in contract, because their disposition 
effectively requires them to implement other-regarding imperatives anyway (to the 
extent that doing so will benefit them in the long run). But economic agents are not so 
disposed.106 If anything collaborators tend to expect that their counterparts will act 
opportunistically when their actions are likely to go undetected. 107  On that basis, 
avoiding outright acceptance of, or even expressly dismissing, other-regarding duties 
in the contract represents the legal counsel’s effort to provide a collaborator with an 
exit strategy, in the event that they or their counterpart decide to eschew their 
contractual obligations or the relationship instead. 108  In other words, it would be 																																																													
105 See Ch.1. 
106 E.g. S. Macaulay, ‘An Empirical View of Contract’ (1985) Wis.L.Rev. 465, at 471ff. 
107 E.g. M.E. Schweitzer and T.H. Ho, ‘Trust but Verify: Monitoring in Interdependent Relationships’ in 
Experimental and Behavorial Economics (Advances in Applied Microeconomics, vol.13) 87-106. The 
study demonstrates that collaborators tend to act in a trustworthy manner when they expect their actions 
to be monitored and that they systematically expect their counterpart to act in an untrustworthy manner, 
when not monitored (which, arguably, can be viewed as a product of the ‘common knowledge of 
rationality’ presumption – see Ch.1). 
108 A co-venturer might decide to eschew their contractual obligations pursuant to a wider strategy based 
on the ‘efficient breach’ concept. This concept holds that when the time comes for the promisor to 
perform their obligation under the contract, if it transpires that they would lose more than what the 
promisee would gain from the promisor’s performance, then the promisor should refuse to perform and, 
instead, pay the promisee either a pre-agreed or court-determined value (i.e. liquidated damages or 
damages, respectively) representing the promisee’s expectation interest; see R.L. Birmingham, ‘Damage 
Measures and Economic Rationality: the Geometry of Contract Law’ (1969) Duke L.J. 49, proposing an 
economic approach to rationalise the US courts’ response to ‘wilful’ breaches of contract, of which 
radically conflicting examples are the decisions in Groves v. John Wunder Co. 205 Minn 163, 286 NW 
235 (1939) and Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. 382 P2d 109 (Okla. 1962), affd. in 382 P2d 
116 (Okla. 1963). The concept of efficient breach lies at the heart of the debate on the nature and role of 
contract law and its underlying jurisprudence. Indicatively see: R.L. Birmingham, ‘Breach of Contract, 
Damage Measures and Economic Efficiency’ (1970) 24 Rutg.L.Rev. 273 (advocating an impassive 
response to instances of wilful breach viewing the contract for what it is – an expression of the market 
and no more); and on a more moderate note: C.J. Goetz and R.E. Scott, ‘Liquidated Damages, Penalties 
and The Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient 
Breach’ (1977) 77 Colum.L.Rev. 554 (arguing that ‘efficient breach’ should only be implemented if the 
rule on prohibiting penalty clauses [i.e. liquidated damages which lead to ‘over-compensation’ of the 
	 127	
unrealistic for the English legal system to refuse to imply other-regarding duties into 
the joint venture relationship on the ground that, if they so wished, the parties would 
have recorded their intention to submit to such duties in their contract. This is because, 
the joint venture contract does not necessarily express what the parties would have 
intended if they had reflected on what their self-interest requires. 
4.3.2 Existing contractual mechanisms adjusting the parties’ obligations in 
response to changes in circumstances: are they adequate?  
Regardless of my argument in the previous section, the presumption in English law is 
that a contract reflects the relationship between the parties perfectly or should be treated 
as such. On this basis, for instance, the court will refuse to imply a term into a contract, 
which contravenes an express contractual term,109 commercial common sense not being 
a sufficient justification for undercutting the significance of the actual words the parties 
used.110 Thus, the orthodox approach to a joint venture holds that it is up to the parties 
to ensure that the contract reflects the reality of their relationship. They need only look 
to the existing tools provided by contract law to ensure that this is the case and in so 
doing they can rely on the contract both as a primer for their relationship and as an 
effective risk mitigation device. Thus, systemic intervention through the implication of 
extra-contractual other-regarding duties is unnecessary.  
In this section I argue that there are two problems with this view. The first is the 
problem of the strict liability foundation on which the contract operates (see 4.2.1). 
Accordingly, unless the circumstances are so extreme that they have fundamentally 
altered the basis of the contract, or the essence of the parties’ obligations thereunder, 
the parties will be expected to perform their respective obligations to the letter. Such 
extreme circumstances may range from the elimination of the subject matter of the 
																																																													
promise] is sufficiently relaxed, so as to protect promisees from frivolous, and therefore inefficient, 
breaches.); Cf. D. Markovits & A. Schwartz, ‘The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defences of the 
Expectation Interest’ (2011) 97 Va.L.Rev. 1939 (based, inter alia, on what they term ‘dual performance 
hypothesis’ [i.e. that contractual performance means that the promisor can either trade as per the 
agreement or refuse to trade and pay damages instead – either way the contract is performed] the authors 
dismiss the ‘efficient breach’ concept entirely). 
109 E.g. see Arnold v. Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [47]-[56]. 
110 Cf. Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, where good commercial sense was the basis for 
choosing between two conflicting interpretations of a clause; Aberdeen City Council v. Stewart Milne 
Group [2011] UKSC 56. 
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contract itself111 or render its performance impossible,112 whereupon the contract is said 
to be ‘frustrated’. In Lord Radcliffe’s words:  
‘Frustration occurs whenever the law recognises that without default of either 
party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because 
the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing 
radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract. Non haec in 
foedera veni. It was not this that I promised to do.’113  
The effect of frustration is to excuse the parties from further performing their 
obligations under the contract, 114  thus bringing the contract to an automatic and 
immediate end.115 However, the circumstances where a contract may be terminated due 
to a frustrating event are notoriously limited,116  and so the parties may well find 
themselves trapped in a relationship, which is no longer beneficial for at least one of 
them. The second problem arising from the orthodox approach to the management of 
long-term contracts is the problem of incomplete presentiation, which refers to the 
parties’ inability to address in the present whatever befalls their relationship in the 
future. 
																																																													
111 E.g. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 3 B&S 826 (an accidental fire destroyed a music hall which was hired 
out for the purpose of giving concerts); Howell v. Coupland (1876) 1 QBD 285 (a contract for the sale 
of 200 tons of potatoes to be grown on specific land over a specific period was discharged when a disease 
on the crop significantly reduced the amount of potatoes the seller could deliver.) Cf. the case with 
unspecified or unascertained goods: Blackburn Bobbin Co. Ltd. v TW Allen & Sons Ltd. [1918] 2 KB 
967 (the outbreak of war preventing the seller from procuring timber from the intended source –Finland 
– was not enough to excuse their obligation to perform under the contract); The Mary Nour [2008] 
EWCA Civ 856 (seller of cement let down by their supplier, not excused from their contractual obligation 
as they could source the goods from somewhere else). 
112 E.g. Pioneer Shipping Ltd. v. BTP Tioxide Ltd, The Nema [1982] AC 724. 
113 Davis Contractors Ltd v. Fareham UDC [1956] AC 696, 729. 
114 E.g. Knell v. Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 (a contract for hiring of a flat from which to view the coronation 
processions was frustrated when the processions were not carried out on the days originally fixed and 
therefore the defendant was not liable for the remaining rent, beyond the deposit already paid to the 
plaintiff). 
115 Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corpn Ltd [1942] AC 154. 
116 Indicatively, see British Movietonews, n.6 (a contract may not be frustrated merely because it turns 
out to be difficult or onerous to perform); affirmed again in Davis Contractors Ltd v. Fareham UDC, 
n.113, 716, per Viscount Simonds. See also Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd. v. Noblee Thorl GMBH [1962] AC 
93 (seller still expected to deliver despite the closure of the Suez Canal meaning having to employ a 
shipping route twice as long and costly than originally contemplated). Generally, English law is inclined 
to uphold the bargain as is, notwithstanding hardship, unfairness or unconscionability: see National 
Westminster Bank Plc v. Morgan, n.5, 707-709, per Lord Scarman. 
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In response to the first problem comes the argument that the solution lies in contract 
law itself. On this view,117 the parties must be proactive in drafting their long-term 
contract so as to avoid having to rely only on the rules of frustration, when a future 
event affects the performance of their respective obligations. Thus, they can introduce 
flexibility into their contract through various clauses re-adjusting their obligations in 
response to future events. The most common type of adjustment clause is one dealing 
with acts of God or force majeure, namely events which are outside the control of the 
parties. The presence of such a clause will not preclude the doctrine of frustration from 
applying,118 even if the clause had foreseen the frustrating event and, in its advent, 
provided a right to cancel further performance, which the parties did not ultimately 
exercise.119 However, as McKendrick observes,120 used correctly, these clauses may 
serve to indicate to the court how the parties originally wished to proceed with their 
contract in the event of force majeure, which should not necessarily involve the 
termination of the contractual relationship. Thus, in contrast to contract frustration, a 
force majeure clause may simply modify or postpone performance of the parties’ 
respective obligations in response to or until the force majeure event has been 
resolved.121 Similarly, parties to long-term contracts could ensure that performing their 
respective obligations does not actively end up causing them loss by employing 
‘hardship clauses’, which require that parties renegotiate certain parts of the contract 
where events – unforeseen at the time of contracting – are likely to substantially affect 
																																																													
117 See E. McKendrick, ‘The Regulation of Long-Term Contracts in English Law’ in Beatson and 
Friedman, n.2, 305. 
118 E.g. F.A. Tamplin Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co. [1916] 2 AC 397, 406, 
per Viscount Haldane.  
119 Bank Line v. Arthur Capel & Co. [1919] AC 435. 
120 McKendrick, n.114, 325. 
121 Generally, if the parties have addressed the precise event (or events of similar nature) in the contract 
and have indicated that they wish the contract to continue regardless, the court is inclined to honour this 
intention – see Pioneer Shipping Ltd v. BTP Tioxide Ltd, n.112, and Joseph Constantine Steamship Lire 
Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corpn Ltd., n.115, 163 – but the content of the clause is likely to be construed 
narrowly (see Bank Line v. Arthur Capel & Co, n.119, 455; Countess of Warwick Steamship Co. v. Le 
Nickel Societe Anonyme [1918] 1 KB 372 and, especially, Tandrin Aviation Holdings Limited v. Aero 
Toy Store [2010] EWHC 40), and therefore careful drafting is essential. Cf. Fibrosa Spolka Akeyjna v. 
Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32, where a clause providing for reasonable extension 
on delivery of the goods in the event of delay caused, inter alia, by war was held not to refer to the 
prolonged and indefinite delay caused by World War II. This confirms that frustration may occur 
regardless of stipulation, where the force majeure event effectively renders the contract completely 
different to that which the parties originally contemplated. 
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the ‘equilibrium of the contract’ 122  by making performance more onerous than 
otherwise anticipated.123 
Building flexibility into a long-term contract through the use of appropriate clauses and 
careful wording can certainly address some of the issues arising out of the strict liability 
foundation of contract law. In fact, my thesis supporting the implication of limited 
default duties into the relationship does not refute this observation, nor does it in any 
way interfere with the parties’ ability to use the tools that contract law provides in this 
respect. If anything, the parties may well use the same tools to tweak or further define 
those duties to better suit their relationship (see Ch.6). However, striving for built-in 
flexibility, however prudent and useful, does not address the paradox of incomplete 
presentiation; parties simply cannot address in the contract every future eventuality. 
Price adjustment clauses, for instance, routinely ‘fail’ because of this simple fact.124 In 
the context of contractual joint ventures, I will refer to such an event as a ‘tension-
point’, in the sense that it can change the dynamic of the joint venture dramatically and 
can trigger opportunistic behaviour. Thus, when a tension-point materialises, if the joint 
venture contract is not frustrated (which is likely, given the narrow application of the 
doctrine) and there is no applicable adjustment clause, incomplete presentiation may 
expose at least one of the co-venturers to opportunism from the other(s). However, were 
default other-regarding duties to be implied into the relationship, the spectre of 
opportunism becomes less daunting, encouraging the co-venturers to re-evaluate their 
relationship (if appropriate) in light of the tension-point, on an equal footing.  
In sum, the second argument against my thesis holds that contract law already provides 
the parties with the tools to protect their relationship, if they so wish, and therefore 
extra-contractual intervention is neither necessary nor helpful. My response is that 
systemic intervention by way of default other-regarding duties need not oppose the 																																																													
122 See comment no.2 to art.6.2.2. (Hardship Clauses) in the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts 2010 (UNIDROIT, 2010). 
123 Common examples are a sharp increase in the cost of performance for the promisor or a decrease in 
the value received by the promisee – see ibid, paras. 2(a) and 2(b). English law would not consider an 
increase in price as a hindrance to a party’s ability to perform, even in the context of a force majeure 
clause: Tennants (Lancashire) Limited v. CS Wilson and Company Limited [1917] AC 495). In any case, 
parties tend to employ price escalation clauses to address this issue. But where price escalation clauses 
prove inadequate to cover the losses of the promisor, following Tennants (Lancashire) they can be an 
obstacle to the defaulting party’s claiming either frustration (Wales Ltd. v. Greater London Council 
[1984] 25 BLR 1) or force majeure (Thames Valley Power Limited v. Total Gas & Power Limited [2005] 
EWHC 2208). 
124 Ibid. 
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purposes or operation of contract law. Default duties can work in tandem with extant 
law to ensure that the parties remain true to the cooperative spirit they originally 
displayed, or that they at least do not fall victim to opportunism triggered by a tension-
point they could not have predicted at the start of the relationship. If anything, 
awareness of default duties applying specifically to joint ventures, may encourage co-
venturers to use the very same legal tools to best adjust the implied duties to their 
relationship (e.g. by clearly defining the scope of the joint enterprise – see 3.3.2). 
4.4 Objection 3: As parties to a ‘relational contract’, co-venturers can be 
expected to address any and all issues as they arise and, failing that, a 
contextual interpretation of their relationship would resolve any dispute 
without the need to introduce default rules into the contract 
4.4.1 Relational Contracts – a brief background 
The third argument against my thesis stems from the relational theory of contract law. 
Defining contract as ‘exchange relations’,125 namely ‘relations among people who have 
exchanged, are exchanging, or expect to be exchanging in the future’,126 the theory 
centres upon the relationship127 created by an exchange of promises between two or 
more individuals. It is this relationship, which distinguishes this exchange from those 
which are ‘discrete’, namely bargains made on an one-off basis and are deemed 
concluded,128 where performance of the parties’ respective obligations is completed on 
the spot or at a specific future point.129 A contract, which creates a relationship beyond 																																																													
125 I.R. Macneil, ‘Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries’ (2000) 94 N.W.U.L.R 877, 877. 
126 Ibid. 
127 See M.A. Eisenberg, ‘Relational Contracts’ in Beatson and Friedman, n.2; but note: Eisenberg does 
not define ‘relationship’ beyond the term’s everyday meaning and therefore he does not attempt to 
distinguish when a ‘relationship’ borne out of a series of discrete exchanges, as per the facts of Baird 
Textile Holdings Ltd. v Marks & Spencer Plc., n.22, gives rise to legally binding rights and duties, if at 
all. 
128 E.g. see Goldberg’s definition of the paradigmatic discrete transaction, as one ‘in which no duties 
exist between the parties prior to the contract formation and in which the duties of the parties are 
determined at the formation stage. Prior to their contract, Smith has no duty to Brown; at the time they 
enter their agreement, in a single joint exercise of their free choice, they determine their respective duties 
to each other for the duration of the agreement; completion of the promised performance terminates that 
party's obligation’: V.P. Goldberg, ‘Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract’ (1976) 10(1) J. 
Econ. Issues 45, at 49. 
129 Specificity, either of timing or other performance-related characteristics, being a major characteristic 
of ‘complete’ contracts: see the analogy, e.g., in G.K. Hadfield, ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and 
the Law of Incomplete Contracts’, (1990) 42 Stan.L.Rev. 927. By contrast, relational contracts are not, 
and cannot be, complete and therefore lack of specificity is their defining characteristic: see C. J. Goetz 
and R.E. Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracts’ (1981) 67 Va.L.Rev. 1089, at 1091. 
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the elementary interaction necessary130 for the one-off exchange and performance of 
mutual promises, is a ‘relational contract’.131 On this foundation, relational contract 
theory holds that when the law undertakes to construe and enforce a relational contract, 
it must take into account the (social, cultural and financial) context of the parties’ 
bargain as well as its surrounding circumstances, so as to properly comprehend the 
relationship and give effect to the parties’ intentions. On this view, therefore, the formal 
contract between the parties is only one of the factors that determine the parties’ 
respective rights and duties.  
The relational theory of contracts developed as a response to the perceived failings of 
classical contract law,132 which holds the content of the bargain as paramount. Classical 
theory thereby excludes the surrounding circumstances and the parties’ subjective 
intentions or understanding at the time of contracting, unless expressly given effect by 
the contract itself (see 4.2.1).133 According to relational theory, classical contract law 
is too rigid and its insistence on upholding the bargain as recorded in the parties’ express 
agreement fails to take into account their actual contractual behaviour 134  and the 
problem of ‘incomplete presentiation’, which ex hypothesi renders, particularly long-
term, contracts incomplete.  
For an illustration of the difference in approach between relational and classical theories 
of contract, let us consider the following example. Say that I have a favourite 																																																													
130 E.g. for Komhauser, an additional defining characteristic of a relational contract is that of extended 
interdependence, in the sense that ‘the interdependence of the parties to the exchange extends at any 
given moment beyond the single discrete transaction to a range of social interrelationships’; L. 
Komhauser, ‘Book Review: The Resurrection of Contract’ (1990) 82 Colum.L.Rev. 184, at 188. 
131 To be sure, this is an unfairly simplistic account of relational contracts and is presented here in these 
terms for the sake of brevity. It should be noted that, if anything, the most debated and problematic issue 
in relational contract theory lies in the very definition of a relational contract: see, for instance, R.E. 
Speider ‘The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts’ (2000) 94 N.W.U.L.R 823. 
132 E.g. see I.R. Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical 
and Relational Contract Law’ (1978) 72 N.W.U.L.R 854 [hereafter, Macneil (1978)]. 
133 See, e.g., Arnold v. Britton, n.109, where the Supreme Court considered the interpretation of wording 
concerning a service charge in a 99-year lease. 
134 See I.R. Macneil, ‘Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know’ (1985) Wis.L.Rev. 483; See 
also Goldberg, n.128, who argues along similar lines from an economic perspective and challenges 
economic theory’s assumptions regarding the attributes of parties to commercial contracts and their 
behaviour; In the context of ‘fallacious’ economic analysis of legal remedies, see also I.R. Macneil, 
‘Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky’ (1982) 68(5) Va.L.Rev. 947 [hereafter, Macneil (1982)], 
where he challenges the efficient breach theorists’ insistence on damages as being the most efficient 
outcome (where performance of the contract would produce inefficiency, n.108) and presents specific 
performance as the alternative offered by relational theory, one which seeks to minimise inter alia 
relational costs (Macneil (1982), ibid, 959) by encouraging consultation and negotiation, for this is the 
expectation that real-world contract behaviour tends to raise. 
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greengrocer whom I visit after work every day and from whom I obtain all my cooking 
supplies. I have been doing this every weekday for several years. The greengrocer has 
come to know my habits, likes and dislikes and even what I cook on particular days. In 
anticipation of my arrival, without me expressly asking her for it, she puts aside the 
groceries she knows from experience I will require on each particular day. This is to 
make sure that I will find what I need when I visit her store at the end of my workday 
and that other customers will not beat me to them. Indeed, I am grateful for this 
initiative on her part and gladly pay for the groceries she sets aside for me daily. 
Recently, however, a new grocery store opened close to my workplace and visiting it 
cuts my commuting time down by over 30 minutes. Thus, I start using the new grocery 
store. I do not inform my old greengrocer, who, for the first several days, continues to 
set aside the usual groceries for me every day. However, since I do not visit her store 
any more, the groceries remain uncollected and she has to sell them the next day at a 
significant discount. Some of these groceries she has had to order in especially for me, 
not at my express request but based on orders I have repeatedly asked her to place for 
me in the past. Say that she now wants to recoup from me the losses she incurred by 
ordering in expensive specialty ingredients, which I did not collect and, therefore, did 
not pay for and which she has not been able to sell (or has had to sell at a discount). 
Under classical contract theory, the greengrocer has no case. Our interaction becomes 
a contract once the greengrocer has offered the groceries she has set aside for me and I 
have accepted and paid for them. Each day therefore gives rise to a new discrete 
contract – before the contract is formed, she has no duty to set aside any groceries for 
me and I have no duty to accept those that she has. Consequently, if she has ordered in 
products for me on her own initiative, I am under no duty to accept or pay for them. 
Our numerous past interactions give rise to no enforceable expectations on her part.135 
By contrast, under relational theory, the transaction would be examined in the context 
of the relationship I have built with the greengrocer over the many years of my being 
her customer. The argument here is that my frequent custom and the greengrocer’s 
response to it (with my implied consent) has created a relationship, which has in turn 
given rise to an implied long-term contract whereby the greengrocer has a duty to order 
in or set aside the groceries I need on specific days, and I have a duty to accept or pay 
																																																													
135 See Baird Textile Holdings, n.21. 
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for them, unless either one of us notifies the other otherwise. On a relational 
interpretation, therefore, the greengrocer may well have a viable case against me.136 
4.4.2 The relational ‘objection’ to my thesis. 
Given this background, what is the relational theorist’s objection to my thesis 
advocating the implication of default other-regarding duties in contractual joint 
ventures?  The answer is that my thesis reflects too much of the ‘abstraction’137 of 
classical contract law in its treatment of contracts. Relational theory advocates 
contextualism. In Hillman’s words, ‘the thrust of relationalism is its description of 
reality’.138 Thus, adapting Hillman’s formulation of the relationalist premise, when 
faced with the example of my thoughtless treatment of a perfectly nice greengrocer, a 
relationalist would ask first ‘what are the facts? Did the greengrocer and I have 
“relational intentions”’?139 If so, then I should be liable for the greengrocer’s losses as 
a result of my failure to give her reasonable notice of my intention to stop collecting 
the groceries. This is because – based on our numerous past interactions – I should have 
foreseen that the greengrocer would have set aside the groceries for me and that my 
failure to collect them (or to notify her of my intention to stop visiting her shop) would 
cause her loss. In other words, the relational approach has no use for a priori implied 
extra-contractual duties. This is because if an examination of the context informing the 
parties’ relationship so warrants, a relational interpretation of contract rules could well 
afford the injured party with an appropriate remedy where the bargain is incomplete on 
that front or, theoretically, even where no express bargain had been previously 
hammered out.140  
Adapting this reasoning to contractual joint ventures, the third argument against my 
thesis could be formulated as follows: if contractual joint ventures are interpreted for 																																																													
136 See e.g. the relational analysis of Baird Textile Holdings, n.21, by L. Mulcahy and C. Andrews, ‘Baird 
Textile Holdings v. Marks and Spencer plc. Judgment’ in R. Hunter et al. (eds), Feminist Judgments: 
From Theory to Practice (Hart, 2010) 189. 
137 I am borrowing the term from Beale who uses it to describe the tendency in the law to treat ‘the 
contract in an abstract way, taking little account of the context in which it is made’: H. Beale, ‘Relational 
Values in English Contract Law’ in D. Campbell et al. (eds), Changing Concepts of Contract: Essays in 
Honour of Ian Macneil  (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 116, 117. 
138 R.A. Hillman, The Richness of Contract Law: An Analysis and Critique of Contemporary Theories of 
Contract Law (Kluwer, 1997), 265. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Which should also correspond to the relational characteristics of the contract at issue and therefore 
the needs of the parties – see Macneil (1982), n.132.  
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what they are, i.e. as paradigmatic relational contracts, then there is no need for a 
systemic intervention through a one-size fits-all solution in the form of other-regarding 
duties implied into such relationships by default. This would be cumbersome and ignore 
the reality of the parties’ relationship and actual (as opposed to attributed – as per my 
thesis) intentions. Thus, in the event of a dispute, the parties can be reasonably expected 
to settle their differences through negotiation and compromise, rather than through 
formal means.141 But should attempts at an amicable solution fail, the court can and 
should settle the dispute by examining the specific circumstances underlying the 
parties’ agreement and the overall context informing their relationship. Rather than 
attempting to regulate the conduct of contractual parties (for instance, in an attempt to 
protect the vulnerable following an unforeseen, or inadequately planned for, tension-
point – see 4.3.2) through a priori implied duties specific to the contractual joint venture 
as a class of commercial relationship, the interests of commercial actors would be better 
served by giving effect to their bargain as informed by the circumstances specific to 
each relationship. This approach, therefore, affords the parties and the courts the 
flexibility necessary to address one important empirical observation: the more 
‘relational’ the exchange the more unlikely it is that the parties will have planned and 
allocated risks effectively.142 
In the same vein, relational theory can arguably provide an effective solution to the 
freeloader problem, which inevitably faces rational commercial parties involved in a 
collaborative relationship.143 This proposition engages directly the core premise of my 
thesis. In particular it will be remembered that the purpose of my thesis is to provide a 																																																													
141 See e.g. the findings in Macaulay and Beale’s respective studies, n.21 and n.103. See also the findings 
of M. Crystal’s survey of cases brought under art.2 of the United States Uniform Commercial Code 
(which imposes inter alia a duty of good faith on parties to commercial contracts and includes ‘past 
dealings’ as a factor to be considered in the interpretation of such contracts – a distinctly relational 
approach) demonstrating that the majority of litigated cases over a period of two decades involved 
‘discrete’ contracts: N.M. Crystal, ‘An Empirical View of Relational Contracts Under Article Two of the 
Uniform Commercial Code’ (1988) Ann.Surv.Am.L. 293; the author applied the following definition of 
relational and discrete contracts: ‘A case was classified as relational if the facts reported in the opinion 
showed that the parties had entered into more than one contract over a period of time or if the facts 
showed that the parties had entered into a long-term contract with repeated occasions for performance. 
A case was classified as discrete if the facts showed that parties had entered into a single contract not 
involving repeated occasions for performance.’ Crystal, ibid, at 299.  
142 In contrast to the values in operation when the exchange is on the ‘discrete’ side of the spectrum: for 
an analysis along these lines, see I.R. Macneil, ‘Values in Contract: Internal and External’ (1983) 78 
N.W.U.L.R 340 [hereafter, Macneil (1983)]. 
143 See 1.3.1 and 1.3.2. It will also be remembered that, in the case of the powerful freeloader, whether 
rationality is defined as the maximisation of long-term – as opposed to short-term – self-interest is 
immaterial; the powerful freeloader is logically expected to act opportunistically if they can get away 
with the consequences, either now or in the future. 
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methodology by which to address opportunistic behaviour in contractual joint ventures 
in a predictable and replicable manner, based on objective and therefore uniformly 
applied criteria. My argument is that the a priori implication of extra-contractual duties 
into the contractual joint venture can be justified on the premise that it reflects what the 
parties, as presumed constrained maximisers, would have desired, if they had properly 
reflected on what their (long-term) interest required. However, in contrast to my quest 
for objectivity, the relational theory of contract law insists on the importance of 
subjectivity – ex hypothesi each case must be examined on its own facts and the 
application of contract law, as well as the award of any remedies, must reflect the 
context of the particular relationship.144 Thus, should a contractual joint venture break 
down as a result of opportunism, the relational interpretation of the agreement would 
take into account both the specific circumstances underlying the agreement and the 
overall context of the joint venture relationship. On this basis, the court would be better 
placed to identify actions as opportunistic, which in other contexts might have been 
treated as both reasonable and foreseeable (and, therefore, preventable).145 Therefore, 
a relational application of contract law would be better placed overall to protect the 
vulnerable party and deter opportunistic behaviour by a freeloader, because its 
subjective approach would more accurately reflect the reality of the joint venture 
relationship.  
4.4.3  My thesis: a qualified relational analysis of contractual joint ventures? 
At the outset, I do not inherently disagree with the premise of a relational interpretation 
of contract law, particularly in the context of addressing contractual incompleteness. If 
anything, to an extent my thesis embraces the contextualism underlying relational 
contract theory, in that it advocates re-interpreting contract law so as to take proper 
account of the context informing contractual joint ventures in the interest of both 
commercial and legal certainty. Relational contract theory has also been embraced from 
an economics point of view as well, as the optimal means of handling hybrid 
																																																													
144 Note, for example, Macneil’s critique of the objective theory of contract (as applied in classical and 
neo-classical contract law) whereupon the parties’ necessary consent to the contract terms is deduced not 
from reality but from ‘objective manifestations of intent’, rendering the whole established approach to 
consent fictitious: see Macneil (1978), n.132, 883-884. Cf. R.E. Barnett ‘Conflicting Visions: A Critique 
of Ian Mcneil’s Relational Theory of Contract’ (1992) 78 Va.L.Rev. 1175, 1189-1190. 
145 Cf. J. Adams and R. Brownsword, Key Issues in Contract (Butterworths, 1995), 229-230, observing 
that the opportunism displayed by the plaintiff in Arcos v. Ronaasen was not recognised as bad faith. 
The facts in Baird Textiles are a good example of this.  
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organisational forms, such as contractual joint ventures. Indeed, seeking to identify the 
most economically efficient way of regulating long-term contractual relations, 
Williamson concluded that a more relational application of contract law (in contrast to 
its classical and neo-classical versions146) would be the most efficient way of regulating 
long-term (or relational) contracts, with efficiency being defined as the minimisation 
of transaction costs.147  
Notably, Williamson approaches contracts purely as transactions, rather than as 
relationships with a legal (and financial) component. For Williamson, transactions can 
be simple or complex and their ultimate designation will depend on the degree to which 
they present each of the three major factors giving rise to transaction-generated costs: 
uncertainty, frequency, and the incidence of transaction-specific expenditure. Thus, 
Williamson views ‘relational contracts’ as those transactions, which present 
comparatively high degrees of uncertainty (i.e. not all contingencies have been 
hammered out before agreement to transact takes place), frequency (i.e. they are 
frequently concluded among the same parties) and, most importantly, transaction-
specific expenditure. The reason why transaction-specific expenditure is so crucial in 
the ultimate designation of the transaction itself is that this expenditure is made 
specifically to accommodate the transaction at issue and therefore it is non-
marketable.148 Ultimately, the higher the degree of transaction-specific expenditure, 
according to Williamson, the more complex the transaction and therefore the more 
appropriate the relational interpretation of contract rules in the event of a dispute. 149 
Williamson’s approach to relational contracts, which consists in examining hard, 
transaction-specific data (as opposed to, say, observing the content of the parties’ 
																																																													
146 Macneil utilitised this classification in ‘The Many Futures of Contract’ (1974) 47 S.Cal.L.Rev. 691 
and is what Williamson bases his economic analysis of contract law on. 
147 O.E. Williamson ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ (1979) 22 
J. Law Econ 233.  
148 A classic example of transaction-specific investment is of course the purchase of specialised plant 
and machinery. However, Williamson observes that what drives the transaction’s complexity factor even 
further is where the investment involves the acquisition of not physical but human capital – i.e. the 
deployment of individuals with specialised knowledge, often with regard to the operation of the 
machinery purchased specifically to accommodate the transaction. In this case, the complexity factor of 
a transaction increases, because the identity of the individuals involved in it becomes relevant to the 
transaction’s success. In other words, the success of highly complex (or ‘idiosyncratic’) commercial 
transactions is dependent on the preservation of the relationship between the individual elements of the 
transacting parties; ibid, 242-245. 
149 Ibid, 239. 
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interactions, the cultural context and the social/professional norms at play), may also 
serve as a response to a major criticism of relational contract theory, namely the 
apparent impossibility of identifying relational contracts. The argument here holds that 
if we cannot conclusively determine what makes a contract ‘relational’ then we cannot 
realistically be expected to develop a corresponding relational contract law. Eisenberg, 
for instance, observed that it is as difficult to define ‘discrete’ contracts, as it is to define 
‘relational’ contracts, articulating the problem as follows: 
‘if there is to be a body of contract-law rules to govern relational contracts, it is 
imperative to establish a definition of relational contracts that centers [sic] on 
one or more characteristics that meaningfully distinguish relational and discrete 
contracts, and the definition must do so in a way that justifies the application of 
a special body of contract rules to relational contracts as so defined.’150 
Eisenberg ultimately argues that all contracts are at least to some extent relational and 
therefore classical contract law rules should be adjusted so as to address the 
inefficiencies associated with their axiomatic and rigid nature, rather than develop a 
separate body of legal rules, which specifically addresses ‘relational contracts’.151 
Similarly, Macneil reasons that not only are all contracts-as-transactions inevitably 
relational, but that the values underlying the contract as an institution are fundamentally 
relational as well. As an example of this, he points to the doctrine of consideration – 
the very cornerstone of contract law – which in effect institutionalizes the distinctly 
‘relational’ concept of reciprocity, in the sense of ‘getting something back for 
something that is given’.152 In this light, the classical approach to contract interpretation 
with its superficial consideration of the contract and axiomatic dismissal of factors not 
expressly included in the contract itself,  will arguably only lead to anomalous 
outcomes, despite classical contract theory’s claim that its ultimate purpose is to 
safeguard commercial certainty and market stability by upholding the parties’ express 
intentions.  
																																																													
150 M.E. Eisenberg, ‘Why There is no Law of Relational Contracts’ (2000) 94 N.W.U.L.R. 805, 814. 
151 Ibid, 813-817. 
152 Macneil (1983), n.142, 347. Similarly, Campbell identifies as distinctly relational the obligation on a 
claimant in a contract dispute to mitigate the loss suffered as a result of the defendant’s breach. He argues 
that this obligation reflects a regime where ‘parties are encouraged to cooperate to deal with the 
consequences of breach’; D. Campbell, ‘A Relational Critique of the Third Restatement of Restitution 
§39’ (2011) 68 Wash.& Lee L.Rev. 1063, 1067. 
	 139	
Campbell uses Arcos v Ronaasen153 to demonstrate this point.154 It will be remembered 
that the House of Lords in Arcos ruled that goods sold under a contractual specification 
must correspond to that specification absolutely, which was itself a condition implied 
into the contract by s.13 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (hereafter, SGA1893), then in 
force. Campbell argues that by expressly dismissing the relevance of industry standards 
(as evident in the findings of an industry umpire, on two occasions) in the dispute before 
them, the judges effectively reversed the default standard in sale of goods from that of 
goods having to be of merchantable quality or fit for the purpose for which they were 
sold, which was guaranteed by s.14 SGA1893, to that of goods having to absolutely 
correspond to their description in the contract (s.13). To be sure, Campbell does not 
disagree with a buyer being guaranteed absolute correspondence with the goods’ 
contractual description, and therefore having the automatic right to reject them if that 
guarantee is breached, so long as the buyer has paid for such privilege.155 Therein lies 
the anomaly. A legal regime which claims to track market norms and values cannot 
expect sellers to guarantee absolute correspondence with the goods’ description as a 
default without contradicting its own terms. This is because such expectation would 
lead to higher manufacturing costs, as suppliers would scramble to comply with the 
high standard of contractual performance, leading to higher prices, which in turn would 
be unacceptable to classically defined rational buyers. If given the choice, the latter 
would reasonably be expected to opt to pay less for goods that on the one hand do not 
correspond with their description absolutely, but, on the other, are guaranteed to be fit 
for the purpose they were bought, or, at the very least, to be of merchantable quality. 
Campbell’s ultimate point is that if the judges in Arcos had properly considered the 
dispute in light of the relational norms that made the exchange possible in the first place, 
they would have concluded that the buyer did not in fact have the right to reject the 
goods outright, because the goods substantially corresponded to their description as per 
the default standard as to correspondence set by s.14. Making s.13 SGA1893 the 
default would be contradicting the purposes of the legal regime itself. 
Against this background it is important to emphasise that I do not disagree with the 
main tenets of relationalism, for Gauthier’s own theory of constrained utility 																																																													
153 n.9; see 4.2.1. 
154 D. Campbell, ‘Arcos v Ronaasen as a Relational Contract’ in Campbell et al., n.137, 138 [hereafter, 
Campbell (Arcos)]. 
155 Ibid, at 162. 
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maximisation is fundamentally relational in its application. 156  Nevertheless, on a 
practical level, I contend that if a relational treatment of contracts is to be 
institutionalised, then it must operate at the level of abstraction also envisaged in 
Campbell’s argument above; namely, as an interpretative tool 157  by which to set 
defaults whose purpose is to acknowledge and give effect to the objective intentions of 
rational agents, who, as a given, must adhere to the barest of relational norms, such as 
an expectation of reciprocity,158 if market exchange is ever to be possible. Gauthier’s 
constrained utility maximisation principle is fundamentally relational in its effect, 
because its very purpose is the validation of cooperation in economic activity between 
what he presumes to be rational (i.e. self-interested) agents. In the context of contractual 
joint ventures, the required level of abstraction is achieved through attributing rational 
intentions onto the co-venturers a priori, to the effect that the interpretation of their 
contract ultimately comes down to what they would have agreed to, if they had properly 
reflected on what their self-interest required.159 This approach can then justify a default 																																																													
156 My understanding of the dichotomy is that what distinguishes Gauthier’s contractarian morality from 
the relational theory of contract is their respective epistemologies. Gauthier sought to establish ex ante 
an objective account of what motivates fundamentally self-interested agents to cooperate (and thus allow 
for market and social exchange as we know it). In contrast, relational theory starts from the empirical 
premise that cooperation does take place (Macneil notably describes the question ‘what came first: self-
interest or solidarity’ as a non-issue: Macneil (1980), n.1, 97) and relies ex post on the existence of both 
market and social exchange as evidence of this, its objective being to identify the norms that make 
exchange possible and interpret reality accordingly. 
157 After a long career of being subjected to many a diatribe on either the virtues of relational contract 
theory or its unmitigated flaws, an apparently exhausted Macneil argues along similar lines in 
‘Reflections on Relational Contract Theory after a New-classical Seminar’ in D. Campbell et al., Implicit 
Dimensions of Contract: Discrete, Network and Relational Contracts (Hart, 2003) [hereafter, Macneil 
(2003)] but contends that the starting point of any enquiry should be the context in which the express 
terms of the contract at issue have been formulated and not the other way around. Interestingly, this 
approach is not unlike that applied in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich Building 
Society, where a majority of the House of Lords essentially interpreted a contract in accordance with its 
accompanying explanatory note rather than the meaning of the wording of the clause at issue. I do not 
entirely agree with this approach and discuss its limitations later in this chapter.  
158 Others include role integrity, implementation of planning and effectuation of consent – see Macneil 
(1980), n.1, 36-70 – which are especially relevant in more discrete contracts, as well as preservation of 
relation and harmonisation of relational conflict, which are most relevant to contracts on the more 
relational side of the spectrum; see Macneil (1983), n.142, 349-351. Wider (external) norms informing 
the parties’ interaction also form part of the relevant normative context: e.g. the applicable law as well 
as industry customs; see Macneil (1980), n.1, 37-40 and Macneil (1983), n.142, 367-368. 
159 Cf: ‘the way to criticize market-individualism is to show it cannot realize its own aspiration to 
institutionalize the values of freedom of contract expressed in contract’s core doctrines. This can be done 
only by the relational theory, for those values express the objective relations which the parties to contracts 
must use to make their exchanges possible and they cannot be derived from the subjective intentions of 
the parties conceived of as atomistic individuals’; Campbell (Arcos), n.154, 163-164. My response to 
Campbell’s last observation is that the values surrounding freedom of contract can be objectively 
(objectivity being determined by the – presumed – actions/desires of a rational agent) derived from the 
intentions of ‘atomistic individuals’, if those intentions are effectively attributed to these individuals a 
priori, based on what those individuals would have wanted if they had properly considered what their 
self-interest requires, assuming that rationality is defined as the pursuit of self-interest. 
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setting for a regime regulating the enforcement of mutual promises based on what the 
parties intended at the time the promises were made. The default informs the form and 
structure of the legal regime and allows for predictability and certainty in its 
implementation.  
By contrast, relational contract theory’s quest to identify and enforce the relational 
norms at play as evidenced ex post from the overall context of the parties’ interaction 
allows for neither predictability nor certainty. For one thing, without an a priori 
understanding of how to identify the relevant norms and, once identified, when these 
norms become enforceable, the resultant regime ends up operating on a circular and, 
therefore impracticable, logic: the enforceability of promises is determined by the 
values underlying their exchange, and those values are enforceable because they made 
the exchange possible. So, an exchange of promises ends up being enforceable because 
it is an exchange of promises. This is not helpful. If anything, on a practical level, it is 
downright confusing: in our quest to identify the ‘real deal’, as Macaulay puts it,160 
between the parties which context is relevant in that it reveals the values that inform 
the parties’ relationship and, in a dispute, where does the burden of proof really lie? 
What makes one party’s case better than the other’s? 
The problem with implementing relational contract theory in its most contextualist form 
is evident in Baird Textile Holdings v. Marks & Spencer.161 The case concerned Baird 
Textiles (Baird), a decades-long supplier of retailer Marks and Spencer (M&S). Baird 
had been supplying textiles to M&S for 30 years. Their arrangement was not based on 
an express long-term contract to that effect, but on M&S placing its orders with Baird 
in advance of every retail season every six months. After a total 60 orders, M&S 
notified Baird that it would place no more orders with them. Baird sued, claiming inter 
alia that there was an overarching implied contract between Baird and M&S, which 
required the latter to provide Baird with reasonable notice, before it ended their 
relationship, one so close that even the CEO of M&S had described as ‘symbiotic’. 
Baird calculated the period of reasonable notice at 3 years and justified the amount of 
time on the basis that it was necessary to allow Baird to disentangle its affairs from 
those of M&S. Indeed, over the preceding three decades M&S had come to be involved 
																																																													
160 S. Macaulay, ‘The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the 
Urge for Transparent Simple Rules’ in Campbell et al., n.157, 51. 
161 n.22. 
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intimately in, and on many occasions even determine, Baird’s most crucial business 
decisions, e.g.  with regard to plant expansion, investment in specialised machinery and 
even the identity of Baird’s other clients. M&S’s response was that in the absence of 
an express long-term contract, its legal relationship to Baird consisted of 60 separate, 
albeit consecutive, contracts and, therefore, any obligation to Baird begun with the 
placement of each order and ended with its completion. Affirming the High Court’s 
decision at first instance, the Court of Appeal held that despite the ample evidence of 
co-dependency in the parties’ relationship, the fact remained that, as with an implied 
contract term, an entire contract can only ever be implied as a matter of necessity and 
that, in this case, any such attempt would be impossible anyway for lack of certainty.162  
How is the court to decide on the actual content of an agreement, with a view to 
enforcing it, when the parties themselves appear to have opposing impressions as to the 
very nature of their relationship? Campbell contends that this is possible by reference 
to the objective values, which informed the relationship and made it possible in the first 
place.163 This is fair but let us consider the context in which those values operated. 
Baird was a well-established textile manufacturer, when M&S chose it to be one of its 
four major textile suppliers. All the same, the arrangement with M&S was especially 
lucrative for Baird because of M&S’s own widely advertised policy with regard to its 
relationships with its suppliers, namely that the latter could rely on M&S’s long-term 
custom and support in return for complying with M&S’s own stringent manufacturing 
and marketing standards. However, throughout the 30-year relationship between the 
two, M&S resisted signing an express long-term contract with Baird in order to retain 
flexibility in that side of its business (see 2.5.2). For its part, Baird apparently accepted 
this risky state of affairs in the face of a lucrative arrangement that took over 40% of 
its output and more than doubled its turnover. What should also be relevant here is that 
the relationship was one of co-dependency; M&S had invested in the relationship at 
least as much as Baird had – if Baird suddenly decided to break from M&S, the latter 
would have found itself one major supplier short and, therefore, in dire straits when it 
came to satisfying its retail demands. Baird could have used this fact to leverage an 
agreement, which, if nothing else, at least provided for a period of notice. My point 
																																																													
162 Baird’s second ground, promissory estoppel arising from the long-standing and extremely close 
relationship with M&S, failed on the basis that an estoppel can only be the basis of a defence, rather than 
a cause of action in its own right. 
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here is that, Baird’s understandable woes aside, M&S has an equally valid claim in 
terms of context. 
Brownsword framed the fundamental problem posed by a purely contextualist 
interpretation of contract in terms of contract law’s professed objective to give effect 
to the reasonable expectations of the parties.164 Specifically, Brownsword asks ‘relative 
to what precisely is a particular contractor’s expectation “reasonable”?’165 In response, 
he identifies two diametrically opposite standards of reasonableness. The first of these 
is established through practice to the effect that an expectation is reasonable only 
because it is accepted through practice as being reasonable. These are ‘practice-based 
expectations’. The second standard designates an expectation as reasonable irrespective 
of whether the parties accept it as such, namely an expectation is reasonable because 
we ought to accept it as reasonable. These are ‘entitlement-based expectations’.166 
Clearly, practice-based expectations are identified through a contextualist analysis, an 
approach already familiar in English contract law.167 However, when a practice-based 
paradigm of reasonableness becomes the sole compass for determining whether an 
expectation may be enforced, then the problem becomes one of how the practice-
established norms are to be identified and related to the contract at hand, a task easier 
said than done. Brownsword demonstrates this through his analysis of the House of 
Lords’ decisions in Investors Compensation Scheme v. West Bromwich Building 
Society168 and Mannai Investments Co v. Eagle Star Life Assurance Co.169  
In Investors Compensation the appellant handled claims by investors who, following 
the advice of independent financial advisers, had mortgaged their homes with certain 
building societies and used the advances to invest in equity-linked bonds. Due to falling 
equities and escalating interest rates, the investors suffered heavy losses and claimed 
compensation through the appellant, as their financial advisers had become insolvent. 
The appellant was a statutory body established pursuant to s.54 of the Financial 																																																													
164 See e.g. Steyn, n.43. 
165 R. Brownsword ‘After Investors: Interpretation, Expectation and the Implicit Dimension of the ‘New 
Contextualism’ in Campbell et al., n.157, 103, 105. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Examination of the relevant ‘factual matrix’ having already been established as a major element in 
contract interpretation in Reardon Smith Line Ltd v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen, n.11, 997, per Lord 
Wilberforce. 
168 [1998] 1 WLR 896. 
169 [1997] AC 749. 
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Services Act 1986 to provide a compensation fund for investors with unsatisfied claims 
against persons authorised under the Act to carry on investment business. Crucially, 
certain losses were excluded from the compensation scheme so that the investors were 
only partially compensated in every case. Here, having compensated the investors, the 
appellant sought to recover from the respondent building society in damages for breach 
of duty in common law and under the 1986 statute. The appellant could do this on the 
basis of a clause in its compensation claim form by which the investors assigned to the 
appellant all rights arising out of the transaction with the financial advisers and any 
third parties. The clause was, however, subject to an exception in s.3(b) of the 
appellant’s form, whereby the investors retained absolutely the benefits of: 
‘Any claim (whether sounding in rescission for undue influence or otherwise) 
that you have or may have against the West Bromwich Building Society in 
which you claim an abatement of sums which you would otherwise have to 
repay to that society in respect of sums borrowed by you from that society in 
connection with the transaction and dealings giving rise to the claim (including 
interest on any such sums).’  
Based on this exception, some investors commenced separate proceedings against the 
respondent building society for rescission of their mortgages and damages. 
Consequently, the issue arose as to whether the exception in s.3(b) was restricted to 
claims in rescission or covered any claim the investors may have against the building 
society seeking to reduce the amount repayable to the latter in respect of the mortgage 
loans, thus rendering the assignment clause void, at least with respect to claims against 
the building society. Being sued by both the investors and the appellant, the building 
society argued that on a simple reading of its wording, s.3(b) had to be interpreted in 
the broader sense, thus rendering the assignment clause void and the appellant’s claim 
groundless. The alternative would be contrary to public policy, for it would mean the 
respondent would end up being sued for the same damages twice. 
A majority of the House of Lords held that, taking account of the context and what a 
reasonable person with knowledge of the context would have understood from the 
wording of s.3(b),170 the latter had to be interpreted as being restricted to claims in 
rescission. Lord Hoffmann argued that, along with the claim form itself, s.3(b) was 
obviously only meant to be read by lawyers.171 As laymen, investors were expected to 																																																													
170 n.168, 912H-E, per Lord Hoffmann. 
171 Ibid, 913H. 
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rely on the explanatory note accompanying the claim form, paragraph 4 of which made 
unequivocally clear that the investor was giving up all rights against anyone else and 
transferred them to the appellant. Thus, while it was clearly the only document to 
legally govern the relationship between the investors and the appellant, the claim form 
had to be interpreted in light of the explanatory note.172 Dissenting, Lord Lloyd argued 
that s.3(b) had to be interpreted in the broader sense and that the explanatory note 
merely added to what a reasonable person would already have understood from the 
claim form itself; namely that they were expected to assign all claims but the right to 
sue the building society in order to reduce any outstanding debt on the mortgage.173 
Lord Lloyd contended that such a conclusion must be obvious in light of the fact that 
the appellant expressly excluded certain types of claims from its compensation scheme, 
to the effect that it covered only between half and three quarters of the amounts claimed 
by the aggrieved investors.174 In other words, a broader interpretation of s.3(b) must 
have been what a reasonable investor would have understood and intended when they 
signed the appellant’s claim form, for it would allow them to pursue additional 
compensation, at the very least to cover some of the losses which the appellant would 
not. Furthermore, addressing the respondent’s argument that the commercial 
consequences of such interpretation would be ‘ridiculous’ (i.e. that in seeking to recover 
from the respondent – and other financial institutions and advisers in similar legal 
actions – the appellant would essentially be competing against the investors), Lord 
Lloyd observed that while the appellant was not a charity, it was also not a commercial 
organisation; as a statutory body its very essence was the compensation of aggrieved 
investors. In this light, there was nothing commercially unreasonable about an 
agreement providing that investors retain the whole of their rights against the 
respondent building society, while the appellant could recover from virtually everyone 
else involved.175 Therefore, the specific reference to rescission in s.3(b) had to be 
																																																													
172 Addressing the claim form’s specific reference to the right to rescission, Lord Hoffman explained that 
this was necessary, for an investor who was entitled to rescission of the mortgage (e.g. if the building 
society had constructive knowledge of undue influence exercised by the financial adviser) or to an 
abatement of the debt by way of rescission, could not assign this right to someone else, in any event: a 
claim in rescission could only be made by the owner of the mortgaged property; ibid, at 916A-F. 
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interpreted as merely an example of the options that might be open to individual 
investors against the building societies who provided the mortgages.176 
Ultimately, the debate in Investors Compensation boiled down to the question ‘what 
context is relevant to the task of determining the reasonable expectations of the parties 
to the specific contract at issue’. More importantly, the debate did not revolve around 
the interpretation of the wording in s.3(b) qua wording, but rather of the section’s 
wording in light of the case’s ‘factual matrix’. For the majority, led by Lord Hoffmann, 
the relevant context began and ended with the explanatory note accompanying the 
appellant’s claim form. A reasonable investor would have read it and understood that 
they were expected to relinquish all rights to claim (apart from those arising from 
rescission). For Lord Lloyd, however, it was also necessary to consider the fact that the 
appellant had expressly excluded certain claims from its remit and that investors would 
only ever be partially compensated as a result. A reasonable investor would have 
understood that they could keep the right to claim at least against the building society, 
whether in rescission or damages. In other words, both sides to the debate were devoted 
to identifying the context that shaped the expectations of the investors. However, 
despite its taking place at the highest level of adjudication, the debate in Investors 
Compensation still does not provide any guidance as to what made the majority’s 
selection of facts from the case’s ‘factual matrix’ more relevant to the dispute, than that 
of Lord Lloyd’s. If anything, I contend that the Supreme Court in Rainy Sky SA v. 
Kookmin Bank177 over a decade later supported Lord Lloyd’s reasoning, for it held that 
where language can be interpreted in more than one way the court is entitled to choose 
the meaning consistent with business common sense and exclude all other meaning. 
My argument here is that business sense should be understood from the point of view 
of the reasonable investor, signing the appellant’s claim form and having knowledge of 
the relevant background, which includes the explanatory note as well as the appellant’s 
restrictions in its compensation policy. If this is the case, then Lord Lloyd’s reasoning 
reflects the thought process of the reasonable investor more closely than the alternative 
presented by the majority, because the latter expects the reasonable investor to act in 
accordance with what made business sense for the appellant, which is improbable and 
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self-contradictory, given the legal system’s understanding of contractual parties as 
rational (i.e. self-interested) agents (see Ch.1).  
To summarise, relational contract theory advocates contextualism, which on a practical 
level, involves cherry-picking the facts relevant to the dispute, from the tapestry of 
events and inter-party interactions that make up the relationship. 178  Investors 
Compensation demonstrates that there is an alarming element of arbitrariness in 
determining what context is relevant in the task of ascertaining the reasonable intentions 
of parties to a contract, particularly where the language of the document actually 
governing the dispute is vaguely drafted. Do things improve where the court is afforded 
a slightly more reliable compass, along the lines of, say, ‘business common sense’? 
Brownsword argues that they do not,179 as demonstrated in Mannai Investments, where 
the House of Lords sought to determine the reasonable expectations of a commercial 
person by taking into account standard commercial practice. In particular, the House of 
Lords in Mannai Investments had to consider the validity of a notice to terminate two 
identical 10-year commercial leases, which bore the wrong date for termination. In 
particular, the tenants sought to terminate in accordance with a break clause in the 
leases, which provided them with a single opportunity to terminate the leases prior to 
the expiry of their fixed 10-year term. The break clause required the tenants to serve 
the landlord written notice of no less than six months determining each lease ‘on the 
third anniversary of the term commencement date’, which in this case was 13 January 
1995 for both (the leases having been signed on 13 January 1992). Unfortunately, in 
their identical written notices the tenants indicated that the date of termination was 12 
January 1995. A majority of the House of Lords held that the issue was how a 
reasonable recipient, rather than the landlord in this particular case, would have 
understood the notices, which had to ‘be construed taking into account the relevant 
objective contextual scene’.180 Applying this test, Lord Steyn held that: 
‘a reasonable recipient with knowledge of the terms of the lease and third 
anniversary date (13 January), … would have appreciated that the tenant wished 
to determine the leases on the third anniversary date of the lease but wrongly 
described it as the 12th instead of the 13th. The reasonable recipient would not 
																																																													
178 Macneil insists that not only is this not problematic, but rather expected in the adjudication of 
ultimately all contracts: Macneil (2003), n.157, 210-212.  
179 Brownsword, n.165, 113. 
180 Mannai Investments, n.169, 767G-H, per Lord Steyn. 
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have been perplexed in any way by the minor error in the notices. The notices 
would have achieved their intended purpose.’181 
Lord Steyn then went on to address the long-established argument put forward by Lord 
Greene MR in Hankey v. Clavering182 that: 
‘Notices of this kind are documents of a technical nature, technical because they 
are not consensual documents, but, if they are in proper form, they have of their 
own force without any assent by the recipient the effect of bringing the demise 
to an end.’  
As such, Lord Greene continued, where they are clear and specific but inaccurate as to 
a detail, such as the date of termination, the court cannot ignore the inaccuracy and 
substitute the correct detail ‘because it appears that the error was inserted by a slip’.183 
This is because ‘that would not cure the defect because the document was never capable 
on its face of producing the necessary legal consequence’.184 In response, Lord Steyn 
pointed out that documents of this type (commercial contracts and unilateral contractual 
notices) tend to be construed in a commercially sensible way, or how a reasonable 
commercial person would interpret them, the reason for this approach being ‘that it is 
more likely to give effect to the intention of the parties’.185 In other words, the court 
should reason based on what a person with knowledge of commercial practice would 
have considered reasonable in the circumstances, i.e. that, here, the tenant clearly 
wished to terminate the leases in accordance with their break clause.  
This is fair, but one must take into account all aspects of commercial practice, lest some 
relevant context is overlooked. So, as Brownsword observes186 and a dissenting Lord 
Goff alludes to,187 it should be relevant to this process that termination clauses in 
commercial leases are often worded in such a convoluted way, precisely so as to make 
it difficult for the tenant to comply. In other words, a commercial person with 
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knowledge of relevant practice would recognise such technical documents for the 
‘traps’ that they are. Indeed, Lord Goff pointed out that all the tenant had to do in order 
to comply with the break clause was to simply reproduce the wording in the clause itself 
thus avoiding the ‘trap’ altogether.188 Instead, the tenant made a reference to a specific 
date – which turned out to be wrong, for the wording of the break clause appeared 
intentionally vague in that regard. Thus, if the objective relevant context was 
determined by what a commercial person with knowledge of the background would 
consider reasonable, then on Lord Steyn’s reasoning, the notices should have been 
deemed ineffectual. 
Ultimately, as with Investors Compensation, the adjudication process in Mannai 
Investments boiled down to the task of choosing one set of facts ostensibly relevant to 
the dispute over another set of facts, arguably, just as relevant to the dispute. There was 
no clear justification as to why Lord Goff’s reasoning failed to satisfy the majority, 
despite the fact that it was consistent with established judicial precedent and, more 
importantly from a contextualist point of view, took account of actual commercial 
practice, which both sides to the debate accepted from the beginning was relevant to 
the case’s factual matrix. To be sure, Brownsword observes that both Mannai 
Investments and Investors Compensation are hard cases for contextualism and that a 
contextual methodology does not always lead to the problems discussed here. Indeed, 
where the language in the contract is deemed clear then context can be a valuable tool 
in its interpretation.  
This was the case in Amlin Corporate Member v. Oriental Assurance Corporation189 
which concerned the interpretation of a typhoon warranty clause in a charterparty 
prohibiting the vessel from sailing in the event that a storm warning was raised either 
at the vessel’s port of origin or port of destination. When the vessel did sail amidst 
warnings raised in the wake of typhoon Frank, consequently suffering catastrophic 
losses of life and cargo, the issue was whether the warranty was breached, if a circular 
from the coast guard at the port of origin did not expressly prohibit the vessel from 
sailing, given the relatively low level of the storm warning raised at the time of the 
vessel’s departure. Affirming Field J’s ruling at first instance, the Court of Appeal held 
that the wording of the typhoon warranty was clear: the vessel was not to sail if any 																																																													
188 Ibid, 757E-F. 
189 [2014] EWCA Civ 1135. 
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type of severe weather warning was raised, the wording of the circular itself bearing 
little significance in its construction. The Court of Appeal applied Investors 
Compensation to the letter: ‘the typhoon warranty should be construed having regard 
to the language actually chosen by the parties and giving those words their ordinary 
natural meaning, unless the background indicates that such meaning was not the 
intended meaning’. 190  The relevant background knowledge in light of which the 
typhoon warning (and the policy behind it) was to be interpreted consisted in: 
‘a) the prevalence of typhoons in the Philippines from the end of May to October 
[i.e. the time of the vessel’s sailing];  
b) the grave danger that typhoons pose to shipping;  
c) the routine issuance by [the relevant authorities] of [storm warnings and 
severe weather bulletins]; and 
d) guidelines issued by [the coast guard] from time to time on movements of 
vessels when there are warnings of storms and typhoons. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that the policy underlying the typhoon warranty 
was clearly one of ‘safety first’, and therefore sailing in the face of a warning (however 
low) rendered it breached.  
To my mind, and in stark contrast to both Mannai Investments and Investors 
Compensation, Amlin demonstrates that identifying the relevant context serves as mere 
ex ante confirmation of the court’s understanding of the wording in the warranty clause, 
for no other reason than the clause was fairly clear. Its purpose was clearly to prevent 
the unnecessary risk of sailing in severe weather and, in turn, informed the task of 
identifying the relevant context. On that basis, whatever guideline was provided in the 
coast guard’s circular had to be deemed irrelevant; the vessel was not to sail in any 
event, if a severe weather warning had been issued. At the same time, the relative 
straightforwardness of Amlin also serves to show that in the absence of clear principle 
as to what makes certain pieces of the factual matrix relevant to the dispute a priori, it 
is impossible to instil any certainty in a contextualist adjudication process ex post: the 
outcome will most likely depend on judicial intuition, which is the only way, in my 
																																																													
190 Ibid, [44], per Gloster LJ. 
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opinion, to explain the selection of relevant facts by the majority in both Investors 
Compensation and Mannai Investments. 
In short, Investors Compensation and Mannai Investments demonstrate the difficulty in 
authoritatively identifying the relevant context, even where all parties involved in the 
adjudication process are clearly inclined to follow a contextualist – rather than literal – 
approach to the contractual dispute at hand. The difficulty stems from the fact that 
without an objective guiding principle informing the task of interpretation, such as an 
objective standard of reasonableness where we seek to ascertain a party’s reasonable 
intentions,191 what determines which context is relevant and how it is to be related to 
the issue at hand ultimately depends on the adjudicator’s intuition, which is patently 
subjective.192 This is not to say that contextualism can never be a successful paradigm 
for the resolution of contractual disputes. It must, however, operate abstractly. For 
instance, in the context of the research and development economy, which features 
primarily collaboration through joint ventures, Jennejohn, dismisses contextualism at 
the outset, because, on a practical level, it tends to focus on trade norms and the course 
of past dealings between the parties to determine their disputes.193 He argues that (a), 
by definition, the innovation economy does not have established trade norms to be used 
as an interpretation tool, because the innovation economy consists in economic agents 
coming together to create entirely new products, for which no market yet exists; and 
(b) that in a joint venture formed in a market vacuum between two parties who have 
not collaborated before, reliance on the course of their past dealings is meaningless, for 
they tend to deal with issues as they arise. Yet, Jennejohn proposes a novel adjudication 
model for the innovation economy, which is not only fundamentally relational but also 
contextualist. Briefly, this model, which Jennejohn calls ‘experimentalist’, holds that 
once a third-party adjudicator becomes involved (the parties having exhausted all other 
dispute resolution processes set out in their contract), instead of producing a judgment 
awarding a one-off remedy to the aggrieved party, the adjudicator establishes an 
																																																													
191 Brownsword, n.165, 137. 
192 Note, for instance, Lord Hoffmann’s discussion of the paradox posed by the ‘reasonable man’ as the 
objective standard in law, where he points out the (arbitrary) fluidity of the meaning of ‘reasonable 
person’ or reasonable behaviour (the latter examined in terms of what is ‘unreasonably’-held consent) 
and its dependency on what outcome the court wishes to prioritise in every case: the redistribution of 
loss or the attribution of liability based on some ill-defined moral responsibility; Lord Hoffmann, 
‘Anthropomorphic Justice: The Reasonable Man and his Friends’ (1995) 29(2) The Law Teacher 127. 
193 M.C. Jennejohn ‘Contract Adjudication in a Collaborative Economy’ (2010) 5(2) Va.L.& Bus.Rev. 
173. 
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enforcement programme with milestones that parties will each be required to meet as 
appropriate. This is profoundly relational because it seeks to preserve the relationship, 
which through a one-off judgement would likely collapse following its enforcement, as 
it expects the parties to continue addressing their issues, albeit with official direction 
and supervision. Jennejohn’s model is also distinctly contextualist, albeit on an abstract 
level, for it takes into account and addresses the unique properties of the innovation 
economy.  
Indeed, when applied on a more abstract level, contextualism can prove indispensable 
as an adjudication tool, which is amply demonstrated by such areas as insurance, 
construction and product liability law, all of which are fields of contract (and tort) law 
that have been informed by the factual similarities of the cases arising in their respective 
contexts and were developed accordingly. 194   The legal framework governing 
contractual joint ventures, which I propose in this thesis, is meant to operate at a similar 
level of abstraction, namely as a default legal structure informed by what the parties 
would have intended if they purported to act rationally, i.e. if they had properly 
reflected on what their self-interest requires. It is the latter proposition that determines 
the relevant context in the exercise of structuring the default legal relationship: 
contractual co-venturers would submit to extra-contractual duties being implied into 
the relationship by default, so as to avoid the risk of freeloading behaviour by their 
peers. Thus, in that regard, my thesis may well be said to have a relational or 
contextualist basis, albeit qualified. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter sought to address what I consider to be the three main arguments in English 
contract law opposing a thesis, which proposes the implication of extra-contractual 
duties into the contractual joint venture as a default. The first of these arguments stems 
from the notion that the type of parties most commonly forming contractual joint 
ventures are commercial and therefore sophisticated enough to at least take account of 
and appreciate the risks involved in the venture before they agree to any bargain. The 
law should therefore treat them as if they are dealing carefully at arm’s length and resist 
intervening into their relationship, for this would undoubtedly contravene the parties’ 
reasonable expectations as evident from their contract. My response to this is that blind 																																																													
194 J.M. Feinman ‘Relational Theory in Context’ (2000) 94 N.W.U.L.R 737, 744ff. 
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adherence to the arm’s length principle risks oversimplifying the parties’ commercial 
and contractual relationship and can produce injustice and even considerable 
uncertainty in the law, where, seeking to avoid apparent injustice, the courts end up 
inventing ways to circumvent the arm’s length approach altogether. 
The second argument opposing my thesis holds that contract law already allows for 
parties to deal with changes in their relationship dynamic through clauses designed to 
adjust their respective obligations in response to specified events. Therefore, to 
introduce a new legal framework for contractual joint ventures alone would be 
unnecessarily interventionist and cumbersome for co-venturers. Here, I contend that, 
though prudent, adjustment clauses cannot ultimately overcome the problem of 
incomplete presentiation, which exposes the parties to opportunistic behaviour in the 
event of a tension-point, which has not been adequately addressed in the contract. 
The third argument holds that the context shaping the relationship between the parties 
is just as important when adjudicating disputes between them as the express terms of 
their contract, which should be treated merely as a starting point of our enquiry. To this, 
I respond that this fundamentally contextualist approach to contract adjudication must 
be qualified heavily so as to conform to a web of a priori assumptions, if the logical 
and practical problems it raises are to be overcome. Viewed in this light, my thesis 
adopts, rather than opposes, contextualism but on a procedural rather than a substantive 
level. 
The next chapter discusses the substance of default, extra-contractual duties to be 
implied into the contractual joint venture.  Specifically, it examines the meaning of 
other-regarding duties in the context of constrained maximisation, arguing that utility 
maximisation is ultimately to be determined by the procedural mechanism through 
which it is implemented. 
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5 THE INADEQUACY OF CONTRACTUAL DEFAULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Institutionalising Gauthier’s ‘constrained maximiser’ in the English law 
of joint ventures 
In the previous chapters I have demonstrated that the legal regime currently applying 
to the contractual joint venture in the UK does not capture the aims of the joint venture 
as a vehicle for growth nor does it accurately reflect the co-venturers’ (presumed) 
contractual intentions (see Ch.2 and Ch.3). These, I contended, would be best addressed 
through the instrumental use of Gauthier’s approach to rational bargaining in the 
context of cooperation (see Ch.1), which legally would translate into a set of default 
other-regarding duties to be implied extra-contractually into the joint venture (see 
Ch.4), on the basis that this is what the co-venturers would have desired had they 
properly reflected on what their self-interest requires (namely, having duly calculated 
their respective minimax relative concessions). My task over the next two chapters is 
to answer the question: what kind of default rules would best reflect Gauthier’s rational 
bargaining principle for the purpose of a new legal framework specific to contractual 
joint ventures? In other words, what type of rules should the law presume that rational 
co-venturers would choose to submit to, on the basis that they maximise the co-
venturers’ self-interest in the long run?  
To answer, we must examine the different jurisprudential avenues supporting the 
implication of default rules in English law specifically in the context of restraining the 
freedom of an agent to act with respect to a bargain. In this chapter, I identify three such 
avenues: the doctrine of unconscionability, the doctrine of good faith in contract and 
the doctrine of fiduciary obligation. For the reasons set out in the next section, I will 
focus on the last two. The second part of this chapter then goes on to examine the 
substantive content of a conduct-constraining default implied into the joint venture, 
observing that its moral essence is common to defaults implied either through the 
contract mechanism or the mechanism of fiduciary obligation. The third part examines 
the procedural aspects of conduct-constraining defaults, specifically examining the 
contract law procedure of implying such defaults into the joint venture. Having 
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established the limitations of the contract law mechanism in this regard, this chapter 
then assesses the level of utility, which a constrained maximiser (whom the law must 
presume has chosen to submit to conduct-constraining defaults having reflected on 
what their long-term self-interest requires) can expect to derive from such a default.  
5.1.2 Jurisprudential avenues for implying conduct-constraining defaults 
There are three jurisprudential avenues for implying default duties in the context of a 
contract. The first lies in the concept of ‘unconscionability’, namely an expectation that 
the law is to intervene, if allowing one of the parties to rely on its strict legal rights 
would yield unreasonable or patently unjust results. Thus, in this context the court has 
intervened to set aside an overly broad restraint of trade clause in an agreement 
regarding song-publishing rights,1 while a contract whereby the defendant agreed to 
transfer her house to the plaintiff was set aside on the ground that, in the circumstances, 
such transfer would cause undue hardship to the defendant.2 The court has also reversed 
transfers of property interests either by individuals who lack understanding of the 
transaction,3 or by those whom the law presumes4 have been taken advantage of as a 
result of undue influence exerted by a family member or someone equally close to 
them.5 Considered specifically in a commercial context, the basis for court intervention 
into a contract by reason of unconscionability is similar to that for intervention by 
reason of common mistake or misrepresentation, namely that in the last two cases there 
is no ‘meeting of the minds’ on the subject matter of the bargain and therefore the 
bargain cannot be enforced. There is, in other words, an unmitigated defect with regard 
to the very foundation of the bargain itself. This means that, when challenged, the 
bargain is treated either as not having existed in the first place (in the case of mistake 																																																													
1 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v. Macaulay [1974] 1 WLR 1308. 
2 Patel v. Ali [1984] 1 All ER 978 (the defendant had lost a leg to bone cancer, which developed after the 
contract was made. The plaintiff was awarded damages only, rather than specific performance). Cf. 
Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co AB v. Flota Petroleva Ecuatoriana [1983] QB 529 (parties dealing at 
arm’s length could not argue unconscionable enforcement of a forfeiture clause). 
3 Fry v. Lane (1888) 40 ChD 312 (transaction whereby property sold at gross undervalue by poor and 
ignorant vendor without independent advice was void). 
4 National Westminster Bank v. Morgan [1985] 1 AC 686, (avoiding a transaction on grounds of undue 
influence requires evidence that the transaction itself was wrongful in the sense that it constituted an 
advantage taken of the plaintiff, in addition to evidence of the plaintiff’s close relationship with the 
defendant). 
5 Cresswell v. Potter [1978] 1 WLR 255; Backhouse v. Backhouse [1978] 1 WLR 243 (in both cases 
absence of legal advice rendered the transfer of a wife’s property interest to husband unconscionable); 
Cf. Butlin-Sanders v. Butlin [1985] Fam Law 126 (wife acted despite legal advice and therefore 
transaction was valid). 
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and misrepresentation) or as contravening natural justice to the point that it cannot be 
allowed to stand (in the case of unconscionability). Having said that, it would be rather 
ambitious to claim that there is a separate doctrine of unconscionability in English law,6 
for much of the courts’ equitable jurisdiction tends to be invoked on similar grounds.7  
The second jurisprudential avenue to conduct-restraining defaults lies in the concept of 
good faith, namely an expectation that parties to a bargain are to treat each other fairly, 
for instance by sufficiently bringing onerous terms to the affected party’s attention.8 
Again, in English contract law there is no doctrine of good faith subjecting contractual 
parties to an overarching duty to deal in good faith.9 This is so emphatically the case 
that Powell10 argued that, as a result, judges have had to resort to bending the legal rules 
by, say, implying terms in a contract 11  or twisting the application of the 
misrepresentation doctrines12 in order to provide a just result in the circumstances.  
Finally, the third avenue to conduct-constraining defaults lies in the concept of 
fiduciary obligation, namely the understanding that individuals in positions of trust 
																																																													
6 For example note the discussion in G. Muir ‘Contract and Equity: Striking a Balance’ (1986) 10 
Adelaide Law Review 153, arguing that a doctrine of unconscionability would undermine the courts’ 
equitable jurisdiction and would cause significant uncertainty in the market place. See also P.D. Finn 
‘Equity and Contract’ in P.D. Finn (ed) Essays on Contract (New South Wales: The Law Book Company, 
1987). 
7 E.g. proprietary estoppel – see 4.2.2.2. Indicatively: Taylor Fashions Ltd v. Liverpool Victoria Trustees 
Co Ltd [1982] 1 QB 133; Crabb v. Arun DC [1976] Ch 179; Dillwyn v. Llewelyn (1862) 45 ER 1285; 
Inwards v. Baker [1965] 2 QB 29; Plimmer v. Wellington Corporation (1884) 9 App Cas 699; ER Ives 
Investments Ltd v. High [1967] 2 QB 379; Pascoe v. Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431. 
8 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. [1987] 1 QB 433 (a particularly 
onerous condition in the plaintiff’s standard terms of trade was only brought to the attention of the 
defendant after the goods were delivered –the condition was on the accompanying delivery note– and 
was therefore not part of the contract). 
9 L’Estrange v. F. Craubcob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394; Walford v. Miles [1922] 2 AC 128, esp. 138D-G, per 
Lord Ackner. 
10 R. Powell ‘Good Faith in Contracts’ (1956) CLP 16. 
11 Ingham v. Emes [1955] 2 All ER 740 (the plaintiff breached an implied obligation to notify her 
hairdresser of skin sensitivity to certain hair dye, despite the hair dye itself being subject to an implied 
condition of fitness for purpose); note also Lord Denning MR’s famously dissenting opinion in Liverpool 
City Council v. Irwin [1976] QB 319, 329-331, where he sought to relax the rule on contract term 
implication from ‘only when necessary’ (as per The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64, 68) to ‘when 
reasonable’, so as to hold the city council accountable for repairs of the common areas of a council 
housing estate; for further comment, see M. Bridge ‘Good Faith in Commercial Contracts’ in R. 
Brownsword et al. (eds), Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (Ashgate, 1999) 140, 146-147. 
Cf. B.J. Reiter ‘The Control of Contract Power’ (1981) 1 OJLS 347, supporting strong judicial 
intervention into contracts, particularly where social and economic pressures do not operate adequately 
to curb contract power and legislation has not been introduced, essentially along the lines of Lord 
Denning’s reasoning in Irwin. 
12 Curtis v. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co [1951] 1 KB 805. 
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(fiduciaries) are under a duty to conduct themselves with ‘utmost good faith’ and only 
in the best interests of those, who, society presumes, have placed their trust in them 
(beneficiaries). The concept of fiduciary obligation, as will become apparent in later 
sections, is underpinned by the same ideal as a contractually mandated legal duty of 
good faith, namely the social expectation that interaction between agents takes place on 
a basis of fairness and mutual respect for each other’s right and ability to pursue their 
own interests. However, unlike a contractual duty of good faith, the duties on those 
who have been designated as fiduciaries, either because of their formal status being 
recognised as such in law (e.g. trustees, partners, solicitors, company directors) or 
because the circumstances of their relationship with the other party in the transaction 
put them into the position of a de facto fiduciary, have a long history in English law 
and are grounded firmly in the court’s equitable jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the 
circumstances giving rise to fiduciary obligations in a commercial context are far from 
clear-cut (see 4.2.2.2 and Ch.6). 
In practice, these three jurisprudential avenues to conduct-constraining defaults give 
rise to three separate standards of conduct, whose effect is to restrict the freedom of the 
parties to commercial bargains to different extents. First, the standard of conduct arising 
from the law’s apparent aversion to unconscionable bargains would require the parties 
to refrain from actions, which affect the soundness of the bargain itself, for instance, by 
creating a defect in the other party’s consent. This quality, however, makes default rules 
reflecting this standard of conduct irrelevant to my thesis. This is because the 
commercial relationships I envisage here are not burdened by such defects, for all 
parties are presumed to have the necessary transactional experience and possess all 
necessary resources to both thoroughly vet the bargain and mitigate any foreseen risks. 
Therefore, a claim of unconscionability, in the sense that the bargain when struck was 
unconscionable, could not successfully stand in the envisaged circumstances. Instead, 
I will focus on default rules, which reflect standards of conduct arising from either the 
ideal of good faith in contract or from the better-established (in English law) concept 
of fiduciary obligation. My task in the following sections will be to identify which one 
of these two legal standards of conduct, procedurally, maximises in the long run the 
utility of co-venturers, who (the law must presume) have chosen to become constrained 
maximisers in accordance with Gauthier’s approach to rational bargaining. 
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5.2 The substantive content of constraints to contractual conduct 
Whereas, as a matter of procedure (and because of the current state of the law), the 
default rules I advocate in this thesis can only be built on distinct jurisprudential 
grounds, i.e. either upon contract law or the fiduciary doctrine, as a matter of substance 
they share a common moral basis. This is the principle that one has a duty to carry out 
the obligations they have freely taken on (whether expressly or impliedly) as part of an 
agreement, which they have struck with similarly consenting agents. It is the purpose 
of this section to explore the substantive content of such an obligation, before I go on 
to examine the procedural vehicle that best implements it, in the sense that, in the long 
run, it maximises the utility of the parties involved.  
To begin with, it bears repeating that the existence of the ‘bargain’ is instrumental in 
this discussion, for Gauthier’s contractarian morality operates on the assumption that 
agents cooperate on the basis of a prior agreement to pursue a joint strategy for mutual 
gain. At the outset, therefore, the answer to the question ‘what does constrained utility 
maximisation entail in actual practice?’ should be simple, i.e. it entails compliance with 
the content of the agreement setting out the joint strategy. However, this cannot be 
where the buck stops. Indeed, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, all agreements 
suffer from the problem of presentiation, namely the inability of the bargaining parties 
to fully predict whatever befalls their relationship in the future and thus effectively 
address the foreseeable consequences in the present. If the meaning of constrained 
utility maximisation were limited to the letter of the agreement itself, it would render 
Gauthier’s entire thesis meaningless. Specifically, if the joint strategy were only 
determined by the letter of the agreement between them, it would be possible, and 
indeed rational, of the parties to opportunistically take advantage of the agreement’s 
incompleteness, whether or not at the other party’s expense,13  without technically 
having defected from the joint strategy at all. Gauthier’s response to this problem is that 
constrained maximisation is more than one of many strategies towards utility 
maximisation. In his words: ‘constrained maximisation is not parallel to such strategies 
as tit-for-tat, for constrained maximisers may co-operate even if neither expects her 
																																																													
13 This is similar to Hume’s ‘sensible knave’ problem: ‘That honesty is the best policy, may be a good 
general rule; but is liable to many exceptions: and he … conducts himself with most wisdom, who 
observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions.’; An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals (A. Millar, 1751), 193. 
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choice to affect future situations.’14 Rather, constrained maximisation is a disposition. 
More specifically, the choice to be a constrained maximiser is a choice among 
dispositions to choose, i.e. a choice between the disposition either towards constrained 
maximisation or straightforward maximisation.15 In this regard, it is one’s choice of 
disposition that determines whether a chosen strategy is choice worthy. Therefore, an 
agent who chooses to be a constrained maximiser will by definition make constrained 
choices in strategic contexts. 
However, a disposition towards constrained maximisation does not change the fact that 
the constrained maximiser is first and foremost a rational (i.e. utility maximising) agent. 
This means that constrained maximisation is still a disposition whose purpose is to 
maximise the agent’s expected utility in the long run. In this light, a disposition toward 
constrained maximisation will only make rational sense, if it is employed in bargains 
with like-minded agents. In other words, a constrained maximiser will only achieve the 
benefits of constrained maximisation if they can be reasonably certain that they are 
bargaining with another constrained maximiser. To do this they must be reasonably 
adept at detecting the other party’s disposition. In turn, such disposition will be 
reasonably evident by the prospective collaborators’ conduct during the bargaining 
process and the extent to which they display compliance with norms that society tends 
to associate with collaboration, such as honesty (in the sense of the parties’ being 
truthful as to what they have, and are willing to, offer in return for the other party’s 
compliance) and fairness (at least in the sense of expected reciprocity, i.e. an 
acknowledgment that all parties involved in the bargain are entitled to the outputs of a 
successful collaboration). Fundamentally, however, it is an assumption of at least 
rudimentary honesty attributed to all involved that makes the bargaining process 
possible in the first place. Compliance with the expectations of honesty and fairness 
during the bargaining process, will in turn signal the parties’ disposition toward 
voluntary compliance with the joint strategy agreed through the bargain, which in turn 
should signal the party’s overall disposition toward constrained maximisation.16 In 
other words, for Gauthier’s approach to rational bargaining to work, the bargaining 
																																																													
14 Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, 169-170. 
15 Ibid, 183. 
16 Ibid, 182-183. 
	 160	
parties must comply with a priori expectations of honesty and fairness, which form the 
necessary preconditions for a bargaining process toward collaboration to even begin. 
Against this background, I contend that it is these preconditions for rational 
collaborative bargaining among parties we assume have chosen to become constrained 
maximisers, that inform the content of duties to be implied by law into the ensuing 
contractual relationship, alongside the terms of the agreement the parties reached as the 
result of the bargaining process. To be sure, the purpose of subjecting one’s pursuit of 
their self-interest to constraints imposed by norms such as honesty and fairness (in the 
sense of expected reciprocity) is not to ensure that the constrained maximiser sacrifices 
their self-interest for that of the other parties in the bargain.  Their purpose is, however, 
to ensure that the bargaining playing field is level on the one hand and, on the other, 
that the parties comply with the joint strategy once the bargaining is complete. From 
this point on, I will refer to conduct so constrained as ‘conduct in good faith’. In the 
following sections, I will examine the jurisprudential avenues that best implement a 
duty to act as a constrained maximiser, i.e. in good faith, in the sense that it maximises 
the parties’ expected utility in the long run. 
5.3 Good Faith based in contract: a background 
A legal duty to act in good faith with respect to contracts is a well-established concept 
outside of England and Wales. For instance, it features heavily in the Principles of 
European Contract Law,17 a set of model rules first drafted in 1998 for use by EU 
member states or parties doing business in the EU who wish to use it as applicable law 
for their contracts,18 and is a fundamental element of contract law in many civil law 
jurisdictions, notably Germany, France and Italy. The duty is no stranger to common 
law either, with the USA having institutionalised it in the form of s.2-205 Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), a model law which provides that parties to commercial 
contracts are subject to a duty of good faith and fair dealing both with regard to contract 
performance and enforcement. In contrast – it bears repeating – no such duty exists in 
English contract law, while the possibility, or indeed desirability, of introducing a good 
																																																													
17  http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/eu.contract.principles.parts.1.to.3.2002/, accessed 14.8.18. Article 1:201 
imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing on contractual parties and explicitly prohibits exclusion or 
limitation of the duty in the contract. 
18 Ibid, article 1:101. 
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faith standard of conduct into it has spawned fierce debate.19 This debate consists in 
three main arguments, which Brownsword has classified as neutral, negative and 
positive. 20  The first holds that there is no need for an overarching good faith 
requirement, for English law is able to deal with good faith issues as and when they 
arise and to achieve similar results with the tools already available to it. The second 
argument altogether rejects the concept of good faith in contract and is most succinctly 
expressed in Lord Ackner’s dicta in Walford v. Miles, 21  a case concerning the 
enforceability of an agreement to negotiate:  
‘The concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently 
repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in 
negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own 
interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations… A duty to negotiate 
in good faith is as unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with 
the position of a negotiating party. … In my judgment, while negotiations are 
in existence either party is entitled to withdraw from those negotiations, at any 
time and for any reason. There can be thus no obligation to continue to 
negotiate until there is a “proper reason” to withdraw.’  
Finally, the third argument in the debate, which Brownsword himself espouses, calls 
for an overarching duty of good faith in English contract law. Brownsword’s position 
is that English law must adopt a principle of good faith so as to be rational (and therefore 
legitimate), in the sense that it is free from contradiction in the promulgation of its legal 
doctrine and how this doctrine is applied in practice, the ideal being that ‘the game 
should be played according to the declared rules’.22 He points to inconsistent judicial 
attitudes to the exercise of the right to withdraw from a contract for breach of condition, 
as one of numerous examples of the judiciary’s reactionary approach to having their 
ideals of fair dealing offended by opportunistic behaviour, which classical contract law 
is otherwise indifferent to.23 In such cases, Brownsword observes,24 what is technically 
a breach of condition, has been considered either as a non-breach25 or as merely a 																																																													
19 Seminally, see R. Powell, n.10; J.F. O’Connor, Good Faith in English Law (Dartmouth, 1990). 
20 R. Brownsword, ‘Positive, Negative, Neutral: The Reception of Good Faith in English Contract Law’ 
in R. Brownsword et al. (eds.), Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (Dartmouth, 1999) 
[hereafter, Brownsword (Reception)]. 
21 n.9, 138D-G. 
22 R. Brownsword ‘Two Concepts of Good Faith’ (1994) 7 JCL 197, at 203 [hereafter, Brownsword (Two 
Concepts)]. 
23 Ibid, 203-204. 
24 Ibid, 204. 
25 Cehave NV. v. Bremer Handelsgesellshaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [1976] QB 44. 
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breach of warranty.26  This fluidity is all but facilitated by the ‘innominate terms’ 
doctrine established in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha.27A 
principle of good faith unequivocally espoused in contract law would have rationalised 
such fluidity on the basis that withdrawal from the contract was done in bad faith and 
therefore could not be enforced in law. The outcome, Brownsword continues, would 
not necessarily be more just than the law’s current state, but it would mean that English 
law can avoid the ‘rationality-deficit’ which currently burdens it. 28  
This observation is further bolstered by the fact that judges, despite acknowledging in 
every case that English contract law accepts no overarching duty of good faith, have on 
occasion explicitly used good faith as a justifying first principle for such landmark 
decisions as Interfoto Picture Library v. Stiletto.29 Here, a particularly onerous standard 
term of trade was held to be unenforceable for it had not been properly brought to the 
attention of the affected party before the contract was made. Even more recently, 
Leggatt J in Yam Seng Pte Ltd. v. International Trade Corp30 unequivocally linked an 
expectation of good faith with conventionally conceived relational contracts, when he 
emphasised the importance of recognising, and acting on, an ideal of good faith and fair 
dealing in all contractual relationships and especially those which involve long-term 
collaborations such as joint venture agreements, franchise agreements and long-term 
distributorship agreements. 31  Building on this rationale, the High Court in Bristol 
Groundschool v. Intelligent Data Capture32 held that not only was an implied duty of 
good faith a given in relational contracts, but that it went beyond a mere requirement 
of honesty. The relevant test was that of conduct, which reasonable and honest people 
would regard as ‘commercially unacceptable’ in the case’s particular context.33  
																																																													
26 Ibid, in response to the claim that the goods had not been shipped in a good condition. 
27 [1962] 2 QB 26; the doctrine holds that for contract terms, which it is unclear from the outset whether 
they are conditions or warranties, their nature will be determined by the seriousness of the consequences 
of their breach. 
28 Brownsword (Two Concepts), n.22, 204. 
29 n.8, per Bingham LJ. 
30 [2013] EWHC 111.  
31  In this context, see Brownsword’s take on Philips Electronique Grand Public SA v. British Sky 
Broadcasting Limited [1995] EMLR 472 in Brownsword (Reception), n.20, 28-29. 
32 [2014] EWHC 2145. 
33 Here the judge applied the test for dishonesty as set out in Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan [1995] 2 AC 
378 and adapted by Beatson LJ in the context of an express contractual term requiring good faith in 
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Yet, it appears that not all ‘relational’ contracts are subject to a good faith requirement. 
A case in point is Property Alliance Group v. Royal Bank of Scotland, 34  where, 
distinguishing Yam Seng on the facts, Asplin J refused to imply a term imposing good 
faith conduct on the part of a bank in two – long-standing – agreements for banking 
services with a property investment and development company, on the ground that, on 
the one hand, the agreement explicitly excluded equitable duties35 thus indicating that 
the parties did not intend to be bound by duties outside of those prescribed in the 
contract and, on the other, that such duties were unlikely to arise in any case, given that 
the agreements were negotiated at arm’s length between two sophisticated commercial 
parties. Regardless of the soundness of this rationale (see 4.2.2.3), it is not the purpose 
of this section to add to the debate on the desirability of an overarching duty of good 
faith being introduced into English contract law. Rather, in this section I will consider 
what a duty of good faith would entail in current contract law practice, with respect to 
an agreement made by rational commercial parties who have chosen to become 
constrained maximisers having reflected on what their self-interest requires. Therefore, 
given its set parameters, my thesis overcomes the hurdle of determining the parties’ 
intentions from the express terms of their agreement, by attributing to them – from the 
outset – an intention to submit to voluntary constrains on their behaviour, so as to 
achieve the mutual benefits of cooperation.  
Nonetheless, where it is open to interpretation whether the duty to be implied into the 
relationship directly contradicts an express term of the contract, as, in my view, was the 
case with Asplin J’s argument in Property Alliance Group, I contend that the contract 
should be interpreted in favour of the duty’s implication. This is because – on its own 
– the agreement as set out in the express contract does not necessarily reflect the reality 
of the parties’ relationship (see 4.2.2 - 4.2.3). Thus, unless the contract specifically 
denounces a general duty on the parties to act in good faith, no such disclaimer should 
be inferred from a term, which denounces other types of similar, related, or derivative 
duties, such as equitable or fiduciary duties,36 as was the case in Property Alliance 																																																													
Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd v. Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust [2013] EWCA Civ 200, 
[150]. 
34 [2016] EWHC 3342. 
35 Ibid, [275]-[276], and see [250], regarding the conflict with express terms disclaiming the existence 
equitable duties. 
36 Although, it will be remembered, the effectiveness of such disclaimers is moot where the reality of the 
case contradicts the express agreement – see 3.3.3. 
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Group.37 For one, equitable or fiduciary duties trigger a score of equitable remedies, 
which are not normally available with respect to conventional contractual duties (see 
Ch.6) and this, rather than the duties’ substantive content, may well be the reason for 
the parties’ attempt to disclaim them. In other words, I do not necessarily regard an 
express provision denouncing the operation of good faith-like duties as an obstacle to 
the implication of a general good faith requirement into the contractual relationship, 
unless such disclaimer is clear and unequivocally against such implication.38 Finally, I 
will limit my discussion of the operation of good faith to contract performance and 
enforcement. This is because I do not regard a requirement of good faith at the 
negotiation stage as relevant to the scope of this thesis, which presumes that the bargain 
is free from procedural defects and that the parties are reasonably adept at discerning 
each other’s dispositions as constrained maximisers, at least with respect to the early 
stages of the relationship, given their resources and transactional sophistication.  
Thus, in the next section I will examine the practical implications of good faith (in the 
sense of adherence to mutual pre-contractual expectations of honesty and compliance 
with the joint strategy) mandated through the mechanism of contract law, in order to 
determine the extent to which such a duty would maximise the utility of co-venturers, 
who – the law must presume – have chosen to become constrained maximisers having 
properly reflected on what their self-interest requires. 
5.4 Good faith mandated through the contract mechanism 
5.4.1 The duty’s content in the context of constrained maximisation 
A natural starting point in determining what it means to perform one’s contractual 
obligations in good faith are the basic social norms which make bargaining possible in 
the first place. These are an expectation of honesty (at least as to what each party has 
and is willing to offer in the bargain) and of fairness (in the sense of an expectation of 
basic reciprocity).39 Indeed, in the USA, the UCC, which subjects all contracts in its 																																																													
37 Cf. Compass Group v. Mid Essex Hospital Services, n.33 (an express obligation on the parties ‘to co-
operate in good faith’ was interpreted restrictively, so that the obligation applied only to the context of 
the clause in question and not to the entirety of the contract). 
38 E.g. along the lines of Lord Wilberforce’s reasoning in Liverpool City Council v. Irwin [1977] AC 
239, 256E-F; and Greys v. Societe Generale [2012] UKSC 63, [55]-[56], per Lord Hope.  
39 While good faith has been a contract law staple of several civil, and some major common law, 
jurisdictions its content has not been definitively ascertained, although aspects of fair dealing and honesty 
(which form what is generally understood to be the normative basis of good faith – e.g. see B.J. Reiter 
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purview to a duty of good faith in both performance and enforcement,40 defines ‘good 
faith’ as ‘honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing’.41 For the purposes of this sub-section I will discuss the meaning of post-
contractual honesty and fair dealing separately.  
5.4.1.1 Fairness/ Fair Dealing 
Having identified ‘fairness’ (or ‘fair dealing’) with an expectation of reciprocity at the 
contract’s bargaining stage, we must now consider what happens to this expectation at 
performance stage. It will be remembered that once the contract has been completed, 
bar any defects of substantive procedure, the law assumes that the bargain is fair in the 
sense that all involved have sacrificed something and gained something else in return. 
If the agreement is by definition ‘fair’, then all the obligations it imposes should be fair 
as well, otherwise, the law assumes, rational parties would not have accepted them.42 
Therefore, assuming that the agreement is by definition fair, one could argue that it 
would be superfluous for the law to demand that the parties treat each other fairly as 
part of a general obligation to perform their contractual obligations in good faith. This 
is not so. If the definition of ‘fairness’ lies in an expectation of reciprocity, then the 
operation of the expectation cannot end with the successful negotiation of the contract, 
for the parties cannot obtain the benefit of the contract without it being performed. 
Therefore, the meaning of ‘fairness’ here must be adapted so as to specifically 
accommodate the context of contractual performance, whose declared purpose at 
negotiation stage was to generate mutual benefit.  
Then, what does fairness in contract performance entail? Given the purpose of the 
contract is to generate mutual benefit, an expectation of fairness or fair dealing in this 
context should translate into an expectation that, at the very least, the parties avoid 
																																																													
‘Good Faith in Contracts’ (1983) 17 Val.U.L.Rev. 705) can be identified in several contractual doctrines, 
such as those dealing with fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. Arguably, the most extreme 
manifestation of a practical good faith obligation manifests in the German ‘culpa in contrahendo’ or 
‘fault in negotiating’ doctrine, which carries severe penalties for those who knowingly or negligently 
create in the other a false expectation of a forthcoming bargain; seminally see F. Kessler & E. Fine, 
‘Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith and Freedom of Contract: a Comparative Study’ 
(1964) 77(3) Harv.L.Rev. 401. 
40 UCC, art.1-304. 
41 UCC, art.1-201(20). 
42 E.g. P.S. Atiya ‘Contract and Fair Exchange’ (1985) 35(1) U.T.L.J. 1. 
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conduct, which would deprive the other of its expected benefit under the contract.43 
Indeed, the US Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains that: 
‘Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasises faithfulness 
to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations 
of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as 
involving “bad faith” because they violate community standards of decency, 
fairness or reasonableness.’44  
In the case of a joint venture where by definition the parties’ respective benefit is 
presumed to derive from the joint strategy, parties must avoid conduct, which ultimately 
harms the joint strategy. In other words, a fairness component of the post-contractual 
duty of good faith, to my mind, should be framed in terms of a negative duty.45 
5.4.1.2 Honesty 
Matters are different for a requirement of post-contractual honesty adapting the pre-
contractual expectation of honesty (regarding the parties’ initial factor endowment and 
what they are willing to sacrifice for the purposes of the bargain) to the context of 
contractual performance. Indeed, in contrast to the negative duty implicit in the 
expectation of post-contractual fairness articulated above, a separate duty of post-
contractual honesty must be a positive one. This is because a fairness-based obligation 
to avoid conduct, which would deprive the other party of the benefit of the contract, 
arguably includes a duty to avoid being actively dishonest, such as a seller concealing 
a defect in a product they are selling. If this is the case, then – to avoid duplication – a 
separate duty of honesty must be a positive one,46 in the sense that the parties are 
expected to volunteer information, which is pertinent to the furtherance of the joint 
strategy.47 This interpretation is necessary in order to avoid a divergence of duties, 
because unless the duties of good faith-as-fairness and good faith-as-honesty run in 																																																													
43 This is consistent with the interpretation of contract terms that expressly impose a duty of good faith 
in the performance of the parties’ obligations – see, e.g., CPC Group Ltd v. Qatari Diar Real Estate 
Investment Co. [2010] EWHC 1535, [246], per Vos J. 
44 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, [205]. 
45 This is arguably consistent with Summers’ understanding of good faith as an ‘excluder’, i.e. the content 
of the duty being determined by what good faith is not; R.S. Summers, ‘“Good Faith” in General Contract 
Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code’ (1968) 54(2) Va.L.Rev. 195. 
46 Cf. Summers, ibid, 204, arguing that a definition of good faith which relies on honesty merely excludes 
dishonesty, which is hardly the only type of bad faith conduct one encounters in contracts.  
47 Similarly see Brownsword’s conception of good faith-as-a-rule in contract negotiation: Brownsword 
(Two Concepts), n.22, 228-230. 
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complete synchronicity, they could end up requiring conflicting things.48 In this sense, 
then, a duty of good faith-as-honesty should entail a positive duty to disclose. In the 
case of a seller with a defective product to sell, such duty entails actively pointing out 
the defect, which would inevitably have a knockdown effect on the price of the product 
itself.49  
Therein lies the problem raised by a duty of good faith-as-honesty understood as a 
positive duty of disclosure (outside of contexts where it is specifically imposed, such 
as insurance, where the insured is subject to strict duties of disclosure and ‘utmost good 
faith’) – to what extent is the self-interested economic agent underpinning Gauthier’s 
contractarian morality compelled to disclose facts, which can be detrimental to their 
economic interest? Where the impact of the disclosure on the agent’s long-term self-
interest is positive or neutral, Gauthier’s constrained maximiser will naturally comply 
with the requirements of the duty and disclose all facts that are reasonably expected to 
further the joint strategy. This is because complying with the duty signals the agent’s 
disposition as a reliable constrained maximiser to other prospective collaborators, thus 
contributing to the maximisation of the agent’s self-interest overall. However, where 
the disclosure is likely to be detrimental to the agent’s self-interest beyond the scope of 
the joint strategy or the agent’s self-interest overall, then compliance with a positive 
duty to disclose would be outright irrational. In other words, if constrained 
maximisation as expressed through compliance with a conduct-restricting rule, such as 
a duty of good faith, were to conflict with an agent’s long-term interest, then a duty 
defined in terms of what would be prudent for a rational agent to conform to would be 
self-contradictory and therefore unenforceable. 
5.4.1.3 Example 
Let us consider a hypothetical joint venture between Acorn and BrazilNut. Acorn is 
wholly owned and managed by an inventor and through her it has an exclusive licence 
to an ultrasound technology, which can be applied in petroleum development to 
stimulate oil and gas production. BrazilNut is long-established in petroleum exploration 
																																																													
48 See Z.X. Tan ‘Keeping Faith with Good Faith? The Evolving Trajectory post-Yam Seng and Bhasin’ 
(2016) JBL 420, 441ff, who points out the confusion, which can be generated by conflating honesty with 
fair conduct. 
49 This is assuming that the defect is not one, which renders the product unsafe or otherwise illegal to 
sell. 
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and development. The two companies have signed an agreement establishing a joint 
venture for the acquisition of underperforming or late-life oil wells and their 
exploitation through the application of Acorn’s technology. Under the agreement, 
BrazilNut is responsible for identifying, securing the finance for, acquiring and 
developing the wells for the benefit of both parties. Acorn is solely responsible for the 
presentation of its technology to investors at the project-financing stage and its 
operation at development stage, through its own specially retained and trained 
engineers. In keeping with their agreement, BrazilNut acquired a severely 
underperforming well, where, with the application of Acorn’s technology, oil 
production increased to almost double. Using this outcome as proof of concept, 
BrazilNut secured a confidential, multi-billion, long-term financing offer from Coconut 
Bank plc. The offer, however, is contingent upon Acorn licensing its technology to 
BrazilNut for mass application to a large number of wells, which are to be 
simultaneously acquired before their price hikes up once news of the technology’s 
effect becomes widely public. The licensing process requires Acorn to disclose the 
algorithm and map out the computer code at the core of its technology. Acorn knows 
that by disclosing the technology’s operating system, it will lose its exclusive control 
over the technology and risk it being reverse engineered by Acorn’s competitors or 
even by BrazilNut itself (in breach of their agreement). This could effectively push 
Acorn out of the petroleum development market entirely. Nonetheless, wishing to avoid 
a breakdown in the joint venture relationship, Acorn goes ahead with the licensing 
process with an important addendum, which goes unnoticed by both BrazilNut and 
Coconut: Acorn’s owner (and inventor of the technology) is solely responsible for 
emergency technical support. Thus, when BrazilNut proceeds with the mass acquisition 
of several wells with Coconut’s financing and applies the technology successfully over 
several weeks based on Acorn’s instructions, Acorn is the only one who can correctly 
calibrate the equipment following an emergency reboot. Such reboots are necessary 
when the equipment presents a small but significant glitch, which distorts the feedback 
it receives from the field it operates in and renders the technology ineffective. The glitch 
does not happen often, but it cripples BrazilNut’s field operations when it does. Thus, 
after a few times of having to fly Acorn’s owner to the middle of nowhere in order to 
calibrate equipment which, by all accounts, should work perfectly on the instructions 
they were given, BrazilNut caught on to the fact that Acorn not only had known of the 
glitch’s existence, but that it had actively ensured that it would be the only party capable 
of dealing with it when it arose. Being responsible for the finances of the venture, 
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BrazilNut now wants to recoup the costs it incurred from its stalled operations as a 
result of the glitch. Acorn, however, is not in breach of its express obligations under 
the joint venture agreement. If a duty of good faith were to be implied into the contract 
on the basis that this is what the parties, as constrained maximisers, would have wanted, 
then BrazilNut could argue that Acorn breached this duty by failing to disclose material 
facts regarding the operation of its technology. 
First, let us consider this claim in light of good-faith-as-fairness, i.e. a negative duty to 
avoid doing anything, which would jeopardise the common strategy. On the facts, 
Acorn’s withholding information on the glitch does not necessarily harm the common 
strategy in the long-term.50 If anything, Acorn ensured that the joint venture secured 
the necessary financing by capitulating to Coconut’s terms, thus ultimately securing the 
future of the joint strategy itself. However, BrazilNut’s claim might have merit if 
considered in light of good-faith-as-honesty, in the sense of a positive duty to disclose 
facts material to the success of the joint venture. Withholding knowledge of both the 
glitch and its solution would arguably qualify in this regard, given the costs arising 
from freezing operations and the potential repercussions of this on the joint venture’s 
relationship with third parties, like Coconut, at least in the short-term. 
Whether BrazilNut’s claim is successful will depend on how broad Acorn’s duty to 
disclose is. This is the difficulty arising from the operation of positive duties. Whereas 
the content and extent of a negative duty is determined by its very definition and the 
effect of a failure to comply, the content of a positive duty could literally encompass 
all action and therefore compliance is equally indeterminable. Nonetheless, for the 
purposes of this thesis, an overarching duty of good faith is capable of being implied 
into the joint venture agreement from the outset, only because it is a conduct-
constraining rule that rational agents contemplating cooperation would have agreed to, 
if they had properly reflected on what their self-interest requires. Therefore, here, a 
positive duty to disclose must be limited by Gauthier’s minimax relative concession, 
namely the maximum amount of information that a rational agent can disclose without 
damaging its self-interest in the long-term.  On the facts, if Acorn had not withheld the 
information on the glitch and, more importantly, its solution, it faced the distinct 
																																																													
50 E.g. if the possibility of difficulties in securing future finance is raised then the costs caused by stalled 
operations due to the glitch could be factored into the joint venture’s budget. 
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possibility of being pushed out of the market entirely and becoming defunct.51 Indeed, 
when a similar point was raised in BP Gas Marketing v. LA Societe Sonatrach,52 the 
High Court held that an express obligation of good faith in the contract did not require 
a party to relinquish a contractual right to its own financial detriment and to the benefit 
of the other party.53 Therefore, it would be irrational to seek to enforce a good faith 
obligation understood as a positive duty to disclose against Acorn, given that as a 
rational agent it would never have accepted the duty in the first place, since it would 
jeopardise its self-interest overall.54 
5.4.2 Procedure 
Having broadly determined the content of a duty of good faith implied into a joint 
venture, I will now examine the level of utility that a rational agent contemplating 
collaboration can expect to achieve through a duty of good faith based in current 
English contract law. In the absence of an overarching duty of good faith governing all 
contracts as a rule, a duty on the co-venturers to perform and enforce the contract in 
good faith can only be imposed as an implied contract term. However, this is no simple 
task. A term will not be implied into a contract with the intention of improving upon 
the bargain between the parties,55 nor will it be implied because it would be fair or 
equitable to do so.56 Rather, the purpose of the exercise is merely to assist in the 
interpretation of the contract, when the parties have made no provision as to what is to 
happen when a specific event occurs.57 In that case, a term will be implied based on the 
																																																													
51 Notably, similar conduct in Bristol Groundschool Ltd v. Intelligent Data Capture Ltd, n.32, was not 
deemed to be in bad faith, but essentially precautionary in the face of genuine concerns for the claimant 
(and defendant in counter-claim) company’s legitimate interests; ibid, [196], per Richard Spearman QC. 
52 [2016] EWHC 2461; see also Hamsard 3147 Ltd (t/a Mini Mode Childwear) v. Boots UK Ltd [2013] 
EWHC 3251, [82]-[93]; Gold Group Properties Ltd v. BDW Trading Ltd [2010] EWHC 1632, [91]. 
53 Ibid, [400]-[402]. 
54 In this sense, therefore, the Court of Appeal in Philips Electronique v. British Sky Broadcasting, n.31, 
was correct to reject the claim that the defendant had breached several implied good faith-related duties 
to avoid doing anything which frustrated the commercial purposes of its joint venture agreement with 
the claimant, by the defendant’s merging with its competitor and thus rendering the joint venture with 
the claimant obsolete. Cf. Brownsword (Reception), n.20, 28-29.  
55 The court does not have the power to improve upon an instrument; it is only concerned to discover 
what the instrument means. This is determined by what a reasonable person having ‘all the background 
knowledge, which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they 
were at the time of the contract, would have understood the parties to have meant’: Rainy Sky SA v 
Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, [21], per Lord Clarke JSC. 
56 Philips Electronique v. British Sky Broadcasting, n.31, 482, per Bingham MR. 
57 Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] WLR 1988, 1993, per Lord Hoffmann. 
	 171	
presumed intention of the parties ‘with the object of giving the transaction such efficacy 
as both parties must have intended that at all events it should have’.58 Thus, the term to 
be implied must either be one which makes commercial common sense, in the sense 
that the term is necessary to ensure the contract’s ‘business efficacy’,59 or it must be a 
term that would have been so obvious at the time of contracting that it went without 
saying.60 Only one of these two conditions need be satisfied and the test for each is an 
objective one. Therefore, the court needs no evidence of the parties’ actual intention 
when negotiating the contract.61 Rather, the question is what would notional reasonable 
people in the position of the parties, at the time at which they were contracting, have 
agreed.62 
This formulation of the doctrine maps on to Gauthier’s methodology for ascertaining 
the type of duties, which presumed constrained maximisers in a joint venture would 
agree to undertake in order to further the joint strategy. The reasoning here is that 
implying into a joint venture agreement a term imposing a duty to perform all 
obligations in the contract in good faith 63 is necessary to ensure the business efficacy 
of the joint venture agreement, namely, the furtherance of the joint strategy. Adopting 
a markedly contextualist approach,64 Leggatt J in Yam Seng Pte Ltd. v. International 
Trade Corp. 65  arrived at a similar conclusion. The case concerned a 30-month 
distributorship agreement, for fragrances to be sold duty-free by the claimant in various 
																																																													
58 The Moorcock, n.11, 68, per Bowen LJ. 
59 Marks and Spencer plc v. BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2016] AC 742, 754, 
per Lord Neuberger JSC; Arnold v. Britton [2015] UKSC 36 , [112], per Lord Carnwath JSC; Greys v. 
Societe Generale, n.38, [55], per Baroness Hale JSC; Liverpool City Council v. Irwin, n.38, 254, per 
Lord Wilberforce. Cf. Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telecom Ltd, n.57, where Lord Hoffmann 
suggested that a term could be implied into an agreement where the context of the dispute so required, 
so as to address a gap caused by the inability of the parties to address all contingencies at the time the 
contract was made. In Marks and Spencer, the Supreme Court roundly rejected this interpretation and 
re-asserted that a term may only be implied when strictly necessary and only to aid in the interpretation 
of the contract: Marks and Spencer, ibid, 755-756 per Lord Neuberger JSC. 
60 See Reigate v. Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) Ltd [1918] 1 KB 592, 605, per Scrutton LJ and 
Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206, 227, per McKinnon LJ.  
61 Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Hyman [2002] 1 AC 408, 459, per Lord Steyn. 
62 Marks and Spencer, n.59, 754, per Lord Neuberger JSC. 
63	Interestingly, in many recent cases where the court has encountered an express term requiring the 
performance of a specific contractual obligation to be performed in good faith, the court has been 
reluctant to extend the duty beyond the narrow confines of the obligation at issue: see Compass Group 
v. Mid Essex Hospital Services, n.33, [106]-[107], per Jackson LJ, and Ilkerler Otomotiv Sanayai Ve 
Ticaret v. Perkins Engines [2017] EWCA Civ 183, [29], per Longmore LJ. 
64 n.30, [160]-[164]. 
65 n.30. 
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specified territories in South East Asia bearing the ‘Manchester United’ brand name 
which the defendant was to supply. The claimant argued, inter alia, that the defendant 
had breached an implied duty of good faith by providing the claimant with false 
information (as to the products’ retail price and their availability altogether) and 
outright undercutting the claimant’s duty-free prices by allowing the products to be sold 
more cheaply by the defendant’s retail distributors. Leggatt J explained that at its core 
the duty of good faith was based, and certainly went beyond, a duty of honesty, which 
the defendant had breached by being actively dishonest with regard to the products’ 
retail prices. More importantly, the defendant’s conduct in this regard also amounted to 
a repudiatory breach, making the implied term of good faith performance one that went 
to the core of the contract.66 Consequently, the claimant was entitled to terminate the 
contract on this ground and was awarded damages to recoup the net expenditure it 
incurred throughout its contractual relationship with the defendant. 
 
5.5 Level of utility achieved from basing good faith in contract 
Having demonstrated how a good faith duty may be implied into contractual joint 
ventures following Gauthier’s approach to rational bargaining, this section will 
examine the level of utility, which a constrained maximiser would achieve, if it had 
agreed to a duty of good faith implemented through the contract mechanism. A duty of 
good faith in the context of cooperation includes both a negative and a positive 
component. It is the positive component that would cause a constrained maximiser to 
pause before accepting the duty, given that it is by definition nebulous and therefore 
difficult to implement in practice. One could argue that this difficulty would adversely 
affect the level of utility a co-venturer could expect to achieve through a contractually 
mandated duty of good faith. This is not necessarily so. As noted earlier, the too-broad 
aspects of the duty can be bounded based on Gauthier’s minimax relative concession, 
to the effect that the law would presume that a constrained maximiser would have 
agreed to an extra-contractual other-regarding duty of this type, only to the extent that 
the duty did not cause it to lose out in the long-term. This will be a question of fact and 
																																																													
66 As per the tenets described in Heyman v. Darwins [1942] AC 356, 397, per Lord Porter. Cf. MSC 
Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. v. Cottonex Anstalt [2016] EWCA Civ 789, [45], per Moore-
Bick LJ (who cautioned against Leggatt J’s approach entirely). 
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relevant context. Therefore, the substantive content of a duty of good faith based in 
contract will not necessarily be the limitation on the level of utility it yields. 
Rather, I submit that this limitation is purely procedural and lies in the remedy available 
to the innocent party as a rule in the event of its collaborator’s breach of the joint venture 
agreement, namely damages. Indeed, it is a cornerstone of English contract law that 
breach of a contract term automatically entitles the innocent party to damages. Briefly, 
‘damages’ refers to a monetary value, which aims to reflect the value that the innocent 
party would have obtained if the contract had been performed. This value is assessed 
based on the principle that ‘the victim of the breach should be placed, so far as damages 
can do it, in the position he would have been in had the contract been performed.’67 In 
one-off transactions, this task should be fairly straightforward, in the sense that the 
parties’ respective expectations from the contract are generally evident from the basic 
content of the transaction itself, namely what they each have agreed to sacrifice and 
gain in return. The relative simplicity of this interaction makes the loss – which the 
innocent party has suffered as a result of the other’s breach – and the innocent party’s 
ultimate objective under the contract more easily quantifiable and the award of a 
remedy based on that value relatively straightforward. 
In contrast, this process is less straightforward in the context of a contractual joint 
venture. Here, the parties’ interaction is constant and informed by an agreed strategy to 
achieve agreed objectives. In terms of contract procedure, this relationship could be 
understood as several interlinked transactions, each representing a tension-point closer 
to the parties’ agreed objectives. Before each tension-point is cleared, one party will be 
vulnerable to loss until the other has performed its part of the transaction, with the 
power pendulum swinging back and forth until the joint project is deemed complete. 
Given the fluidity of such relationship, what does it mean to put the innocent party – 
through an award of damages – in the position he would have been in had the contract 
been performed? Bearing in mind that the purpose of this section is to assess the utility 
derived from the enforcement of a good faith obligation through the current contract 
mechanism, I submit that this question should be examined in terms of practicality. In 
this sense then, the question boils down to: what is the baseline for determining the 
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appropriate amount of damages in the event of default in a collaborative relationship? 
Is it:   
a) the expectations of the innocent party as shaped by the joint venture’s 
ultimate objective; 
b) the value (including any expected value) attributed to the specific task which 
the breaching party has failed to perform; or  
c) the loss the innocent party has suffered as a result of that failure?  
Of the three options, I submit that (a) presents the highest utility, because it puts the 
injured party in the position it would have been in had the joint venture, as a whole, 
been successful, in the sense that it bore fruit from which the injured party can expect 
a share. Option (c) presents the least utility given that the injured party may not suffer 
any actual or, at least, quantifiable loss from its collaborator’s failure to perform under 
the contract. Regardless, of these options English contract law focuses on the third, 
aiming to compensate the innocent party only for the loss it has suffered as a result of 
the other’s breach. In a nutshell, this is the compensatory principle, which determines 
the calculation of an award of damages following a breach of contract. The following 
sections will discuss how the compensatory principle operates and how it can become 
an obstacle in maximising the utility a constrained maximiser may derive from 
enforcing good faith obligations through the contract mechanism. 
5.5.1 The supremacy of the compensatory principle and its application 
Following recent Supreme Court rhetoric, it is now undisputed that the purpose of 
contractual damages is to make good the loss suffered by the innocent party and nothing 
more.68 The award itself is to be calculated in the strictest terms with the declared 
objective to avoid over-compensation, the interests of ‘justice’, in this sense, outplaying 
those of commercial certainty (or, indeed, rational reasoning). The supremacy of this 
principle is nowhere more evident than in the area of ‘anticipatory breach’, where a 
contractual party repudiates, i.e. renounces, its contract with another in anticipation of 
the latter’s failure to perform its obligations under the agreement. A seminal case in 
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point is Golden Strait Corpn v. Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory),69 
where, by a bare majority, the House of Lords held that post-repudiation events that the 
court, in hindsight, knows would have limited the contractual rights of the appellant 
had the contract not been repudiated, were a significant factor in assessing the damages 
available to the appellant. Accordingly, the Lords limited the damages awarded in 
respect of a repudiatory breach in 2001 of a seven-year charterparty with about four 
years left to run, to the amount that the appellant would have received had the 
charterparty been instead terminated in accordance with the war clause therein, 
following the outbreak of the second Gulf War in 2003. Dissenting, Lord Bingham was 
of the view that the damages should have been assessed at the point of repudiation and 
that hindsight should not have been relevant to the court’s calculation of the award. The 
respondent charterers’ core argument was that the appellant would have been 
overcompensated had it been awarded damages reflecting the contract’s would-be 
performance to its original term. In response, Lord Bingham accepted that the value of 
a contract in the market may well be reduced, if the contract is terminable by an event 
which the market perceives as likely, but not necessarily certain, to take place.70 If a 
contract were repudiated during such circumstances, then the appellant receiving an 
award reflecting the consequent reduction in the contract’s market value would be a 
fair outcome. However, this was not the case in The Golden Victory. Lord Bingham 
stressed that, at the time the contract was repudiated, the prospect of war had been 
described as a ‘mere possibility’, which suggested strongly that it did not in fact affect 
the contract’s marketable value at the time of repudiation.71 Lord Bingham’s emphasis 
here is significant, because it suggests that the time of repudiation was the latest point 
in time, when the court could be certain that it was reasoning on the basis of verifiable 
facts rather than conjecture. 
Unsurprisingly, the majority’s opinion in The Golden Victory drew heated criticism.72 
For instance, commenting on the Court of Appeal’s ruling in The Golden Victory, which 
the majority in the House of Lords accepted on appeal, Treitel pointed out that the 																																																													
69 [2007] UKHL 12, [29]ff, per Lord Scott. 
70 Ibid, [22]. 
71 Ibid. 
72 See for example J. Morgan, ‘A Victory for ‘Justice’ over Commercial Certainty’ (2007) 66 CLJ 263, 
264; M. Mustill, ‘The Golden Victory – Some Reflection’ (2008) 124 LQR 569, 585; E. Peel 
‘Desideratum or Principle: The Compensatory Principle Revisited’ (2015) 131 LQR 29, 33, commenting 
on Flame SA v. Glory Wealth Shipping Pte Ltd [2013] EWHC 3153. 
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compensatory principle as applied therein presented several problems, not least because 
of its sweeping treatment of post-repudiation events which are likely to affect the 
measure of damages available to the injured party and may go well beyond the historic, 
far-reaching type giving rise to the problem in The Golden Victory. What if the injured 
party were to suffer an unforeseen setback post-repudiation rendering it unable to 
perform its original obligations under the contract?73 Could the repudiating party use 
this as a basis to (a) justify its repudiation of the contract retrospectively and (b) limit 
the damages available to the injured party?74 I submit that, the pointless opening for 
opportunistic breaches of contract aside, this also does not explain how the interests of 
justice are served by safeguarding the financial interests of the repudiator rather than 
those of the injured party. Avoiding the award of excessive compensation is one thing,75 
but doing so by stretching the limits of rational reasoning is another. If anything, and 
on policy grounds alone, it sends a rather problematic message, one where opportunism 
is rewarded rather than actively discouraged. 
Building onto Treitel’s observation regarding the sweeping nature of the majority’s 
argument in The Golden Victory, what would the case be if the court had been faced 
with a sequence of post-repudiation events every one of which had been capable of 
affecting the value of the contract, whether positively or negatively? Say, for example, 
that following the post-repudiation onset of war, the now injured party in The Golden 																																																													
73 Not to be confused with an undiscovered absolute inability to perform on the part of the innocent party 
prior to the contract being made, along the lines of Universal Cargo Carriers v. Citati (No2) [1958] 2 
QB 254, where unbeknownst to the respondent charterer no cargo was ever going to be available for 
freight under a charterparty for the carriage of scrap iron from Basra, which the ship owners cancelled 
before this issue became known to the respondent. 
74 G.H. Treitel ‘Assessment of Damages for Wrongful Repudiation’ (2007) 123 LQR 9, 15. Cf. Gill & 
Duffus SA v Berger & Co Inc. [1984] AC 382 and Fercometal SARL v. MSC Mediterranean Shipping 
Co SA (The Simona) [1988] AC 788, the House of Lords established that post-repudiation failure to 
perform on the part of the innocent party was not to be taken into account in the calculation of damages 
in a claim arising from the repudiation. Addressing these points, Lord Toulson in Bunge SA v. Nidera 
BV, n.68, [88], distinguished the principle in Gill & Duffus, and The Simona on the basis that they did 
not concern events which may lead to the cancellation of the contract, as per The Golden Victory. 
Specifically, they concerned circumstances pertaining to the subjective ability of the parties to perform 
the contract, rather than extra contractual events, which would more likely than not lead to cancellation 
of the contract as a whole, presumably because the environment in which performance was to take place 
would be altered radically by the event originally contemplated in the contract itself. On this reasoning, 
‘anticipatory repudiation’ appears to operate as ‘repudiation in anticipation of frustration’, which triggers 
another set of problems if one considers the sheer rigidity by which the regime on contractual frustration 
operates – see 4.3.2. 
75 E.g. Lord Diplock in Gill & Duffus, ibid, 390, made certain of this by taking into account that in the 
calculation of an award following a claim for repudiation, the repudiator was entitled to offset the 
damages due by the value of the innocent party’s performance of its own obligations, which would have 
been contractually due, but were extinguished at the point when the repudiation was accepted or could 
be deemed as such.  
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Victory could have availed itself of a number of exclusive trade incentives put in place 
by the allies of one of the warring parties in order to assist the latter in its war effort. 
To be sure, cancellation of the contract on the basis of the ‘war clause’ would still be 
possible, but for the purposes of the calculation of the award of damages such events 
could be significant. In particular, the opportunities in question would arguably not only 
restore the value of the now-defunct charterparty but could even increase it. What if the 
governments of the allied states faced considerable political opposition in their own 
territories on account of their pledge to support their ally’s war effort with lucrative 
trade incentives? Would the resulting political turmoil, whether small or significant, 
have a bearing on the perceived would-be value of the now-defunct charterparty? At 
which point in this sequence of events is the court expected to stop its speculation as to 
the value of the repudiating party’s performance, if at all? To my mind, allowing 
hindsight to affect the assessment of damages in The Golden Victory was irreparably 
harmful not only to commercial certainty but also to legal principle. This is because, 
apart from the relevance of certain events affecting retrospectively the perceived market 
value of a contractual promise, the House of Lords offered no guidance as to which 
factors made such events relevant or, indeed, when the court’s inquiry into extraneous 
events and its speculation as to their retrospective effect should end. Indeed, when 
attempting to rationalise the law on ‘anticipatory repudiation’, Lord Mustill concluded 
that:  
‘the concept of anticipatory breach cannot be rationalised, but must be seen as 
a piece of positive law, firmly established but not anchored in or deducible from 
the ordinary course of the law of contract. The act can be called a breach, if one 
wishes, but it must always be kept in mind that this is not what it really is, and 
it follows to my mind that applying mainstream damages law to this arbitrary 
concept will not yield reliable results.’76  
Regardless, some years later in Bunge SA v. Nidera BV, 77  the Supreme Court 
unanimously applied the compensatory principle as expressed by the majority in The 
Golden Victory, and stressed that it applies as much to one-off transactions as to 
instalment or period contracts.78 It follows, then, that for the purposes of this thesis the 
current view of the compensatory function of damages applies squarely to joint venture 
relationships and that freeloading, in the sense of opportunistic breaches of the joint 																																																													
76 Mustill, n.72, 584. 
77 n.68. 
78 Ibid, [22], per Lord Sumption, and [87] per Lord Toulson. 
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venture contract (whether pursuant to an ‘efficient breach’ strategy or not) will do little 
to affect its operation. 
5.5.2 The supremacy of the compensatory function of damages and good faith 
Having demonstrated the fervour with which current judicial thinking seeks to uphold 
the compensatory function of damages, I will now examine the level of utility that this 
mechanism affords a co-venturer, who, as a constrained maximiser, has decided to 
submit to an overarching good faith requirement having properly reflected on what its 
self-interest requires. It will be remembered that, however nebulous as a concept, the 
substantive content of a good faith requirement may be determined on a case-by-case 
basis by applying Gauthier’s adaptation of the Lockean proviso, namely the minimax 
relative concession.79 But, even if we manage to get over the hurdle of a ‘good faith’ 
definition, we must still address the hurdles raised by the contradictions inherent in the 
contract mechanism itself. Indeed, on the one hand the contract mechanism operates on 
a strict liability basis, which by definition entails the examination of tangible facts. On 
the other hand, the contract mechanism may allow for unbridled speculation to 
substitute for judicial reasoning where the interests of justice so require, as the whole 
area of ‘anticipatory breach’ demonstrates. But the difficulties inherent in the contract 
mechanism do not stop there. In the context of a contractually implied duty of good 
faith in a joint venture, the most significant difficulty probably lies with assigning a 
concrete value to the injured party’s loss as a consequence of the other’s bad faith. All 
the while we must bear in mind that Gauthier’s minimax relative concession requires 
constrained maximisers to only concede their short-term self-interest up to the point 
when their long-term self-interest is jeopardised. 
So, what happens when, as is commonly the case with this type of relationship (see 
Ch.2), the joint venture is both risky and entirely speculative, much like the ‘novel’ set 
of circumstances in Philips Electronique v. British Sky Broadcasting?80 In Philips 
Electronique, the plaintiff had agreed to produce receiving equipment for use with the 
defendant’s soon-to-be-launched satellite broadcasting service. Under the agreement, 
Philips was responsible for a) manufacturing a large number of units to be sold to 
subscribers of the defendant’s service, and b) ensuring that it had the manufacturing 																																																													
79 See 1.3. 
80 n.31. 
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capacity to produce a minimum number of units in set periods. Philips both 
manufactured the prescribed number of units and expanded its operations to 
accommodate an increase in production requirements at a large cost. On the other hand, 
BSB was responsible for launching the satellite service and marketing it. However, 
having spent around £70 million in marketing the service, BSB had only succeeded in 
attracting 120,000 subscribers – some 280,000 fewer than initially projected. At the 
same time, and mere months before BSB launched its service, its competitor, Sky, 
launched a rival satellite, which transmitted to a lower quality but much cheaper 
standard, with which the equipment manufactured by Philips was incompatible. When 
Sky proposed a merger with BSB, the latter accepted and promptly terminated its 
agreement with Philips. Philips then sued claiming that BSB had breached several 
implied obligations to perform its duties in good faith, which included not doing 
anything that would frustrate the purposes of the agreement. 
Delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Sir Thomas Bingham MR observed 
that ‘the agreement related to an operation which was known to be novel, to involve 
more than ordinary risk and to be more than ordinarily uncertain in its outcome.’81 The 
venture’s novelty lay in the fact that it was premised on an agreement, which was itself 
highly unusual. As Sir Thomas pointed out, under the agreement ‘Philips undertook to 
manufacture receivers, but BSB did not agree to buy them or to ensure that they were 
paid for. Philips agreed to maintain manufacturing capacity, but BSB did not undertake 
to place orders or warrant that there would be a market.’82 Would even an established 
duty of good faith have afforded Philips a remedy in this case? Sir Thomas doubted that 
it would. On the one hand, the parties gave no indication as to how they planned to 
apportion risk in the event that the venture turned out to be a major commercial flop, 
which it ultimately was, rendering the calculation of damages essentially impossible. 
On the other hand, Philips did not really suffer its loss by BSB’s termination of their 
agreement, but by the fact that, despite its efforts, BSB failed to create a market for its 
broadcast service, and therefore for Philips’ product, having itself suffered significant 
losses in promoting both. In other words, even if BSB persisted with the project as per 
the core agreement, Philips was in no way guaranteed a profit or even a smaller loss.  
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To be sure, according to Gauthier’s approach to rational bargaining, it would not have 
been prudent for BSB to persist with the joint venture with Philips because it was 
clearly not in its own long-term interest to do so. Therefore, BSB would not have 
breached a good faith duty determined by what a constrained maximiser would have 
chosen to do in the circumstances. This is also consistent with current judicial thinking 
on the nature of good faith, which does not require a party to actively sacrifice its own 
self-interest.83 However, even if it could be established that BSB had acted in bad faith 
in a framework where implied good faith obligations were readily enforceable, Philips 
Electronique should still illustrate that a duty of good faith being enforced through the 
mechanism of contract law would not necessarily provide the innocent party with a 
meaningful remedy. Given that here we are concerned with the level of utility, which a 
constrained maximiser can expect to achieve through conduct-constraining rules 
mandated through the contract mechanism, this limitation is rather significant. Thus, it 
could be argued that if BSB had been held to be in breach of a good faith obligation by 
ending the contract with Philips so as to establish a competing business with a third 
party, Philips would still be entitled to at least nominal damages, since, as per The 
Mihalis Angelos,84 the right to damages arises automatically from breach even where 
the innocent party suffered no actual loss. But an award along those lines would be of 
little use to Philips.  
It will be remembered that in the absence of an express relevant obligation on BSB, 
there was nothing to connect Philips’s expenditure and subsequent loss to BSB’s failure 
to comply with that obligation. Therefore, Philips’ loss in the event of BSB’s bad faith 
would consist in being deprived of the benefit of the contract with BSB, essentially by 
BSB doing the very thing that it had contracted not to do,85 i.e. pursuing an opportunity 
with its competitor. The court’s strict adherence to the compensatory principle, 
however, would do little to remedy this issue. A case in point is, Surrey County Council 
v. Bredero Homes, 86 where the claimant had offered some 12 acres of its land for 
housing development with the defendant agreeing to build no more than 72 homes. In 
breach of its promise, the defendant built 77 homes. The Court of Appeal held that as 
it suffered no direct loss from the defendant’s breach, the claimant was only entitled to 																																																													
83 n.51 and accompanying text. 
84 [1971] 1 QB 164. 
85 On this issue see also the examples in P. Birks ‘Profits of Breach of Contract’ (1993) LQR 518. 
86 [1993] 1 WLR 1361. 
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nominal damages. But the claimant did suffer loss. The Court’s strict adherence to the 
‘purely’ compensatory function of damages discounted the very reason behind the 
claimant’s restriction on the number of homes to be built on its land; namely the 
prospect of opening up more of its land for development in the future and thus creating 
an additional source of income. In other words, the claimant’s actual loss consisted in 
the income it could reasonably expect to generate had it offered up licences for the 
development of an additional 5 homes. 
5.5.3 Exceptions to the compensatory function of damages: restitutionary 
damages, their scope and their relationship to good faith 
Had an implied duty of good faith been upheld in Philips Electronique, the claimant 
might have been able to argue exceptionally that in having been deprived of the benefit 
of the contract due to the defendant’s bad faith, it was entitled to restitutionary damages 
instead. The purpose of such damages, whose award in a contractual context is very 
much the exception rather than the rule, is to deprive the defendant of the gain it 
generated from its behaviour, rather than to compensate the claimant for the loss it 
suffered as a result of this behaviour. At first glance, such proposition would go a long 
way to remedy the problems highlighted in the previous section. Thus, two decades 
before Bredero, the Court had tackled similar circumstances in Wrotham Park Estate 
Co. v. Parkside Homes,87 where the defendant constructed a road and built 14 homes 
in breach of a covenant, whereby no construction on the allotted land could take place 
without the claimant’s consent. The claimant sought an injunction to restrain the 
defendant from going ahead with the development, as well as a mandatory injunction 
to demolish any buildings constructed in breach of the covenant. However, the claimant 
did not seek an interlocutory injunction and in the meantime the defendants not only 
received deposits for the houses under construction but by the time of the trial the 
purchasers had taken possession and moved in. Brightman J held that in the 
circumstances it would have been inequitable to grant a mandatory injunction for the 
demolition of the houses and awarded damages in lieu of an injunction, pursuant to the 
power granted the court under the Chancery Amendment Act 1858.  The defendant 
argued that the compensation the claimant would have been entitled to for breach of 
covenant would have been nil or, at most, nominal damages, because the value of the 
claimant’s land was not in any way affected by the construction of a road and 14 homes. 																																																													
87 [1974] 1 WLR 798. 
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Regardless, Brightman J calculated the claimant’s damages at 5 per cent of the 
defendant’s anticipated profits from the sale of the homes, reasoning that this sum 
represented what the claimant would have reasonably required in return for relaxing the 
covenant.  
O’Sullivan described the reasoning in Wrotham as ‘somewhat fictitious’ for there was 
no indication that the claimant was ever willing to relax the covenant at any price.88 
Indeed, while the claimant did not suffer loss, the defendant did gain something at the 
claimant’s expense by breaching a covenant benefiting the claimant’s land. Thus, 
Brightman J’s insistence on regarding the award of damages as compensation (the 
purpose being to make good the claimant’s loss), rather than restitution (the purpose 
being to ensure that the defendant does not retain a benefit from a wrong it committed) 
gives rise to an irreconcilable fault in his reasoning. Awarding compensation implies 
that the claimant has suffered loss, when, on the facts, it has not. And if this is the case, 
providing any measure of damages in lieu of the remedy the claimant is actually seeking 
is simply illogical.89  And while the strain in the Wrotham ratio would have been 
avoided had the awarded damages been simply regarded as restitutionary,90 later courts 
have doubled down on the compensatory nature of the Wrotham award.  
Thus, in Experience Hendrix v. PPX Enterprises91 the Court of Appeal held that where 
in a clear and deliberate breach of contract the claimant cannot show financial loss 
resulting from the breach, the award of damages may be calculated by reference to the 
profits generated by the defendant as a result of the breach. In this case, in breach of a 
settlement agreement with Jimi Hendrix’s estate, the defendant record company 
																																																													
88 J. O’Sullivan, ‘Reflections on the Role of Restitutionary Damages to protect contractual Expectations’ 
in D. Johnston et al. (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (CUP, 2002), 
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89 For a discussion on the importance of correctly and clearly distinguishing between the concepts of 
compensation (making good a loss) and restitution (taking away a gain) see P. Birks, ‘Misnomer’ in W. 
Cornish et al. (eds), Restitution: Past, Present and Future (Hart, 1998), emphasizing restitution as a 
direct effect of the concept of unjust enrichment and not the other way around, unjust enrichment itself 
being capable of giving rise to a number of actions, restitution being one of them; see also D. Friedman, 
‘Restitution for Wrongs: The Basis for Liability’ in Cornish et al., ibid, for an examination of restitution 
and its operation as an autonomous remedy in an action for unjust enrichment, where the author argues 
that an action in restitution should not require the existence of a wrong in contract or tort for it to subsist, 
essentially, parasitically – all that should be required is ‘the invasion or appropriation of another’s 
protected interest’; ibid, 136ff. 
90 See for instance C. Rotherham, ‘“Wrotham Park Damages” and Accounts of Profits: Compensation or 
Restitution?’ (2008) 1 LMCLQ 25; Cf. F. Giglio, The Foundations of Restitution for Wrongs (Hart, 2007). 
91 [2003] EWCA Civ 323. 
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licenced to third parties a number of Hendrix’s recordings without the consent of the 
estate. The estate then sued for an account of profits based on the House of Lords’ 
ruling in Attorney General v. Blake. 92  In Blake the Crown sued a former British 
Intelligence agent who defected to Russia, where he published a book disclosing state 
secrets and detailing covert missions he carried out while in the service of the British 
Government. The House of Lords held that despite the fact that the Official Secrets Act 
no longer applied to the information disclosed in the book, Blake had committed an 
egregious breach of confidence by breaching the non-disclosure agreement he signed 
when he joined British Intelligence. Furthermore, having had access to such 
information by virtue of his unique position alone, his relationship to the Crown was 
not unlike that of a fiduciary, particularly given the national security risk that disclosure 
of this information represented for the country.  Consequently, Blake was compelled to 
account to the Crown for the profits he generated as a result of his breach, including a 
book advance and a substantial sum in royalties due. Mance LJ in Hendrix observed 
that while the case did not arise from the exceptional circumstances the House of Lords 
tackled in Blake, there were still significant similarities, given that in both cases the 
defendant had done the very thing that he contracted not to do,93 while the claimant had 
a ‘legitimate interest in preventing the defendant’s profit-making activity and, hence, 
in depriving him of his profit.’ 94  Mance LJ then considered the possibility of a 
restitutionary remedy along similar lines, but in a purely commercial context, as in Esso 
Petroleum v. Niad. 95  Here, the claimant was entitled to an account of profits 
representing the amount by which the fuel prices charged by the defendant to the 
claimant’s customers exceeded the prices recommended by the claimant. 
Exceptionally, as in Hendrix, the claimant in Esso found it impossible to calculate the 
loss it suffered as a result of the defendant’s actions, but unlike Hendrix, the case 
featured a fiduciary-like element, which justified a full account of profits on the ground 
that the defendant had received financial assistance from the claimant so as to be able 
to afford charging the claimant’s recommended prices. Because of the unique context 
of both Blake and Esso, which featured elements resembling those of a fiduciary 
relationship, Mance LJ distinguished both cases and held than an account of profits 
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could not be ordered in the circumstances before him. However, he supported the 
concept of ensuring that the defendant is deprived of the benefit he received as a result 
of his wrongdoing and turned to Wrotham Park, observing that Brightman’s J 
reasoning: 
‘has the merit of directing the court's attention to the commercial value of the 
right infringed and of enabling it to assess the sum payable by reference to the 
fees that might in other contexts be demanded and paid between willing 
parties.’96 
Accordingly, he held that the claimant was entitled to an award of damages, which 
represented the sum which the defendant would reasonably have been required to pay 
as a quid pro quo for the benefit he acquired as a result of his conduct.97 This line of 
reasoning was adopted by the Court of Appeal in One-Step (Support) v. Morris-
Garner,98  which for a time pointed to the development of an exceptional type of 
compensatory award, or ‘buy-out damages’, assessed on what the defendant might 
reasonably have expected to pay the claimant for the right to act as he did.99 However, 
when the question of ‘buy-out’ damages reached the Supreme Court,100 the result was 
to materially restrict the circumstances in which an award of this type may be made;  
specifically where the loss of a tangible or quantifiable asset is concerned.  
In any event, it could be argued that the existence of ‘buy-out’ damages could, 
theoretically, address the problem of damages awards being too rigid in their 
application for the purposes of a constrained maximiser seeking to enforce a standard 
of conduct mandated through the contract mechanism. However, ‘buy-out’ damages 
are an exceptional award. They arise where the circumstances and the interests of 
justice make it imperative for the court to deprive the defendant of the gain resulting 
from their wrongdoing. The power to award ‘buy-out damages’ is, in other words, 
																																																													
96 Hendrix, n.91, [45]. 
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entirely discretionary and very much outside of normal contract procedure.101 For this 
reason, I submit that conduct-constraining rules mandated and enforced through current 
contract procedure would not be a utility maximising option for the purposes of a 
constrained maximiser, whom the law must presume has accepted extra-contractual 
duties in the context of rational collaborative bargaining. Even if such duties were to 
be implied into the joint venture contract as a default, for instance along the lines of 
Leggatt J’s reasoning in Yam Seng, the standard remedies available for breaching the 
duty would hardly be a disincentive to freeloading. If anything, the freeloader could 
just budget for a damages award, along the lines of an ‘efficient breach’ strategy.  
To be sure, in addition to damages, remedies for breach of contract include specific 
performance and injunction, but these are also discretionary and, therefore, far from 
standard. I submit that constrained maximisers would derive far greater utility from 
conduct-constraining duties, which are enforced through restitutionary remedies as a 
matter of course,102 rather than on the exceptional circumstances envisaged in Blake 
(account of profits) or Wrotham and Hendrix (‘buy-out damages’). Therefore, for the 
purposes of this thesis, which at this stage seeks to establish the highest-utility method 
of implying extra-contractual conduct-constraining duties into the joint venture, 
contract procedure presents the lowest utility of the two options identified. In response 
to the hurdles raised by contractual procedure, the next chapter will discuss, and assess 
the level of utility achieved through, the implication of default conduct-constraining 
rules into the joint venture based on the jurisprudence and process of fiduciary law. 
 
																																																													
101 See, e.g., Blake, n.92, 285, per Lord Nicholls. 
102 These are considerably more flexible and may be awarded even in circumstances where the restitution 
is of money which has been paid to the defendant for an illegal purpose: Patel v. Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 
(the Supreme Court expressly overruling the ‘reliance test’ (i.e. a claim must be barred if it relies on 
illegality) established in Tinsley v. Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340). 
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6 GOING BEYOND CONTRACTUAL DEFAULTS: FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
 
6.1 Good faith mandated through fiduciary law 
The standard of conduct mandated through fiduciary law is by far the most stringent in 
civil law. The expectation is that those who are identified as fiduciaries in relation to 
others, owe the latter a duty of utmost loyalty. From this core duty flow a number of 
related duties, which range from the well-defined, such as the duty to avoid conflicts of 
the fiduciary’s own interests with those of the individuals whose interests they are 
expected to serve, to the nebulous, such as the duty to act with utmost good faith and 
always in the latter’s best interests. The purpose of this chapter is to establish that a 
fiduciary good faith standard implied by default into the relationship represents the 
highest utility strategy for constrained maximisers, who choose to cooperate through a 
contractual joint venture.  
Thus, in the first section I will establish the necessity of fiduciary duties being implied 
into contractual joint ventures by default, rather than on a case-by-case basis, which is 
the preferred approach when it comes to dealing with sophisticated commercial 
transactions (see Ch.4). Specifically, I will discuss the nature, role and operation of 
fiduciary law with reference to commercial transactions and sophisticated commercial 
parties. I will then demonstrate that the development of fiduciary law in the context of 
commercial transactions is problematic, particularly since the circumstances which 
trigger the fiduciary obligation remain nebulous, rendering the ad hoc imposition of 
fiduciary duties impractical.  
Penultimately, I will examine the extent and content of the fiduciary duties to be 
implied into the joint venture by default, in keeping with Gauthier’s approach to rational 
bargaining in the context of cooperation. In the final section I will demonstrate that a 
fiduciary standard of good faith, whose operational parameters are defined a priori, 
represents the highest utility option in constrained maximisation. By examining the 
remedies available to a claimant following a breach of fiduciary duty, I will establish 
that, in the current state of the law, good faith mandated through the fiduciary standard 
of conduct will most effectively address the practical limitations of Gauthier’s 
contractarian morality – namely the problem of the powerful freeloader.  
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6.2 The necessity of a default fiduciary standard in contractual joint ventures 
Fiduciary obligation is a peculiar concept in that there is considerable resistance from 
academics and judges alike to coming up with anything approaching a concrete 
definition for it. The very act of attempting to define the fiduciary concept is 
controversial. This attitude stems from the origins of the fiduciary concept as a 
cornerstone of the equitable jurisdiction, whose raison d’etre was to rectify the social 
injustice caused by an overly technical and rigid common law. The argument here is 
that, given the equitable jurisdiction developed as a response to common law’s 
inflexibility, an attempt to force the fiduciary obligation into a concrete mould would 
be to defeat the doctrine’s very purpose.1 Thus, while we understand that the fiduciary 
obligation comprises a duty of utmost loyalty, it still remains rather nebulous, defined 
more by the circumstances where it appears to arise and less by any a priori judicial 
definition or expectation.  
Against this background, Finn argued that what determines the existence of a fiduciary 
obligation is an expectation somehow created in one of the parties to the relationship 
that the other is going to act in the first party’s interests to the exclusion of its own 
individual interest. He thus provided the following definition: 
‘A person will be a fiduciary in his relationship with another when and in so far 
as that other is entitled to expect that he will act in that other’s interests or (as 
in partnership) in their joint interests, to the exclusion of his own several 
interests.’2 
He went on to clarify that ‘this entitlement may arise from what one party undertakes 
or appears to undertake for the other, from what actually is agreed between the parties, 
or, for reasons of public policy, from legal prescription’.3 
																																																													
1 For example, see Midcon Oil & Gas Ltd v. New British Dominion Oil Co Ltd (1958) SCR 314, where 
the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the argument that the parties to a joint venture were in fact in a 
fiduciary relationship, because their relationship did not fall into any established category which created 
a fiduciary obligation (and they had expressly excluded the characterisation of agency in the joint venture 
agreement). 
2 P. Finn, ‘Fiduciary Law and the Modern Commercial World’ in E. McKendrick (ed.), Commercial 
Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (Clarendon Press, 1992) 7, 9. 
3 Ibid. 
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The essence therefore of the fiduciary obligation lies in an undertaking by one party 
and a corresponding entitlement on the other party that the former will act in the latter’s 
best interests to the exclusion of his own. The law recognises a number of 
circumstances, where the undertaking/corresponding entitlement pair arises by default. 
These are the circumstances surrounding specific professional relationships, such as 
those of business partners inter se, company directors in relation to their company, 
commercial agents in relation to their principals, solicitors in relation to their clients, 
and, quintessentially, trustees in relation to the cestui que trust, which the law identifies 
as fiduciary by default. The underlying policy here appears to be an institutional desire 
to maintain the public’s confidence in certain professional relationships, which are 
generally perceived as socially valuable.4 
Where the parties do not fall in a recognised fiduciary relationship, however, 
identifying the circumstances which give rise to the fiduciary obligation becomes a 
much more complex task. This is because the circumstances in which a person can be 
deemed entitled to expect that the other will act in that person’s best interests to the 
exclusion of his own are not defined in any meaningful way, nor are the principles 
arising from the case law  consistently applied.5 This is especially true of commercial 
relationships, where the proposition that an economic agent is entitled to such 
expectation directly contradicts the law’s operative presumption that the primary driver 
of economic activity is an economic agent’s pursuit of their own self-interest. From an 
economics standpoint, the ‘common knowledge of rationality’, which is presumed to 
underpin all interaction between economic agents, by definition precludes the 
possibility for such an entitlement to arise. I contend that the courts’ understanding and 
application of this fundamental presumption is too simplistic and does not properly take 
into account the drivers behind collaborative economic activity (see Ch.2 and Ch.3), 
where, incidentally, the fiduciary obligation may de facto arise.  
Because of this ostensible contradiction, English law tends to presume that, outside of 
the prescribed status-based fiduciary categories, the fiduciary obligation rarely, if at all, 
																																																													
4 Peculiarly, in the UK, this does not include the relationship between doctor and patient – see below. 
5 E.g. see the marked discrepancy between Hospital Products Ltd v. United States Surgical Corporation 
[1984] HCA 64 and United Dominions Corporation Ltd v. Brian Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 49, in both of 
which the High Court of Australia dealt with joint ventures between sophisticated commercial parties at 
different stages of development – notably, it found a fiduciary relationship only with respect to the 
venture which was still at negotiation stage, albeit advanced (Brian). 
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arises in a commercial context. This does not mean, however, that de facto fiduciary 
loyalty and the commercial world are mutually exclusive. Thus, the next two sections 
will illustrate the mystifying state of the law on the commercial fiduciary obligation, 
first with respect to its operation, and, secondly, with respect to its content. The purpose 
of this exercise is to demonstrate the necessity of implying fiduciary duties into 
contractual joint ventures by default.  
6.2.1 Problem 1: Identifying the circumstances giving rise to the fiduciary 
obligation in commerce 
Because of its origins in the court’s equitable jurisdiction, whose very purpose was 
remedial to begin with, the fiduciary obligation is a fundamentally unpredictable 
animal. Not only does it impose a very high standard of conduct on those identified as 
fiduciaries, but also it opens up a slew of potent equitable remedies, which are not 
normally available to a claimant at common law. In practical terms, then, the fiduciary 
obligation gives rise to a paradox. This is because it is simultaneously a formidable 
constraint on the parties’ conduct – making it repugnant to the classically conceived 
utility-maximising economic agent; and the route to arguably the furthest-reaching 
remedies available in private law – making it the basis of a particularly attractive 
strategy in the event of a dispute. Thus, it should come as no surprise that commercial 
parties routinely attempt to avoid being identified as fiduciaries by explicitly describing 
their relationship as non-fiduciary through the use of ‘status clauses’, despite the fact 
that the effect of such clauses is dubious at best.6 Yet, when a dispute arises, the same 
parties will often claim that the relationship was in fact fiduciary, so as to access the 
equitable remedies this would trigger if successful.  
It is then for the court to answer the fiduciary question. However, given the lack of a 
concrete legal definition of the term itself, the answer to the fiduciary question may 
well be determined by the outcome the court deems just in the circumstances. The 
																																																													
6 See 3.3.3; This is because a de facto fiduciary finding does not depend on the parties’ own description 
of their relationship, but rather on the mantle that the Court deems the relationship to have taken once 
the reality of it has come into effect; see e.g. Reid v. Hollinshead (1825) 4  B&C 867, 107 ER 1281 and 
Adam v. Newbigging [1888] 13 AC 308, which established that whether a partnership exists is a matter 
of substance and not form; Cf. Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq. 
462, where Jessel MR articulated the freedom of contract principle as the established orthodoxy. 
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circular logic of this is illustrated in Fry J’s dicta in Re West of England and South 
Wales District Bank, ex parte Dale7 where he described a fiduciary relationship as: 
‘one in respect of which if a wrong arises, the same remedy exists against the 
wrongdoer on behalf of the principal as would exist against a trustee on behalf 
of the cestui que trust.’ 
Later definitions of the concept do not shed more light as to the circumstances which 
would definitely give rise to a fiduciary relationship. Let us consider, for instance, 
Millet LJ’s influential account of the fiduciary obligation in Bristol and West Building 
Society v. Mothew:8 
‘A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another 
in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust 
and confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of 
loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. 
This core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must 
not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where 
his duty and interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the 
benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal. This is 
not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of 
fiduciary obligations. They are the defining characteristics of the fiduciary.’ 
The learned judge did not elaborate on the circumstances giving rise to the fiduciary 
obligation, beyond what appears to be the established consensus at least with respect to 
the starting point of the enquiry, namely that the obligation arises from an individual’s 
own undertaking to act in the best interests of another.  
Nevertheless, the natural next step in the enquiry is to examine the effect of this 
undertaking. Thus, what appears to be of major significance in the authorities is that 
the effect of this undertaking is to simultaneously create an ascendancy on the part of 
the fiduciary and a dependency on the part of the beneficiary of the fiduciary’s actions. 
In fact, some Commonwealth authorities focused on the incidence of an ascendancy 
and a corresponding dependency as a determining criterion of circumstances giving rise 
to a fiduciary relationship. Thus, in International Corona Resources v Lac Minerals,9 
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the defendant was in breach of its fiduciary 
duty to the plaintiff, when it took advantage of confidential information about a mining 																																																													
7 (1879) 11 ChD 772, 778. 
8 [1998] Ch 1, 18. 
9 [1990] FSR 441. 
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prospect, which the plaintiff divulged in the process of negotiations for a joint venture 
with the defendant, so as to enable the latter to make an informed decision as to the 
viability of the prospect. The court’s decision was especially influenced by the fact that 
according to industry custom parties in such circumstances would not be acting to the 
detriment of each other.10 Flannigan argues that the court here should have reasoned 
along the lines of – what he dubs– ‘vigilant trust relationship’11 rather than rely on 
industry custom, which had been deemed irrelevant in the past.12 I contend that this 
would not have been correct on the facts of the case. All Flannigan’s references to 
‘vigilant trust relationships’ derive from a sort of agency, in the sense that one party 
undertakes with the other’s consent and expectation to represent the other to the 
world.13 The facts of the case simply did not support an agency, however loosely 
interpreted.14 To my mind, the significance of the industry custom lies in the fact that 
the practice effectively took over the parties’ imputed adherence to the ‘common 
knowledge of rationality’, causing the plaintiff to suspend the vigilance arising from 
this default position (see 1.3.1). In turn this rendered the plaintiff particularly vulnerable 
to the defendant’s defection from the implied agreement, given that compliance was 
clearly not an equilibrium strategy, but merely an optimum one along the lines of 
Gauthier’s reasoning. In effect, therefore, the court in Lac Minerals simply enforced a 
constrained maximisation strategy, which had established itself organically within that 
particular industry, and serves as a prime example of the courts’ key role in tackling 
freeloading.  
The High Court of Australia adopted a similar approach in United Dominions 
Corporation v. Brian,15 only the vulnerability argument was framed in terms of ‘trust 
and confidence’.16 Here, the parties were commercial, sophisticated and dealing at 
arm’s length, in the sense that they had no other relationship outside of the joint venture 
																																																													
10 Ibid, 460, per La Forest J. 
11 I.e. a fiduciary relationship arising as a result of socio-legal policy whose purpose is to reduce the costs 
of mischief by intermediaries who have control of another’s property or affairs for a limited purpose, e.g. 
solicitor-client, employer-employee, partners inter se, director-company; R. Flannigan, ‘The Fiduciary 
Obligation’ (1989) 9 OJLS 285, 286. 
12 Specifically, in the seminal north-American authority Meinhard v. Salmon 249 NY 458 (1928). 
13 Flannigan, n.11, 289-295 and 309, with respect to the Lac Minerals judgment. 
14 Representation and its role in the definition of the fiduciary position is further discussed below. 
15 n.5; see 3.4.3. 
16 Ibid, [6], per Gibbs CJ,. 
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negotiations for the development of certain properties. Regardless, the court held that 
the parties were in a fiduciary relationship. The deciding factor was the trust and 
confidence which the parties had reposed in each other given the advanced stage of 
negotiations between them. This allowed the court to imply a partnership. 17  In 
particular, Gibbs CJ drew an analogy between the vulnerability of persons invited to 
purchase shares in a company by its promoters and that of persons invited to join a 
partnership: the vulnerability arises from the information disparity inherent in both 
interactions, for the invitee’s decision to participate will be to some extent influenced 
by the information provided by those who invite their participation.18  
Nevertheless, vulnerability of itself is not the determining factor of a fiduciary 
relationship. For instance, an archetypal relationship which should give rise to fiduciary 
duties given one individual’s voluntary undertaking and the dependency/vulnerability 
this creates in another, is that of a doctor and her patient. However, when this point was 
put to the House of Lords in the context of a surgeon’s deliberate failure to inform his 
patient of the risks inherent in a recommended treatment, their Lordships roundly 
rejected the argument, with Lord Scarman observing in Sidaway v. The Board of 
Governors of the Bethlem Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital that: 
‘there is no comparison to be made between the relationship of doctor and 
patient with that of a solicitor and client … or the other relationships treated in 
equity as of a fiduciary character’.19 
Parenthetically, Sidaway’s argument here was based on the idiosyncratic decision of 
the House of Lords in Nocton v. Lord Ashburton20 (discussed below). The case has 
muddled in some respects the conceptual foundation of the fiduciary obligation, which 
normally rests solely on the duty of loyalty. Specifically, Nocton suggested that the 
																																																													
17 Ibid, [6], per Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ. 
18 Ibid, per Gibbs CJ, [4], citing the principle in Venezuela Central Railway v. Kisch (1867) LR 2 HL 99, 
113, per Lord Chelmsford. Cf. Lord Romilly’s opinion urging the court to treat the relationship between 
the company and the public as a contract between any two individuals, with the false representations 
addressed on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentation principles, rather than a contrived fiduciary 
relationship; Venezuela Central Railway, ibid, 125. 
19 [1985] AC 871; their Lordships’ deferred to the expertise of the surgeon, who – as per the specialised 
test for negligence previously established in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 
WLR 582– was best placed to determine whether such information was necessary given that its very 
purpose was to deter the patient from consenting to what the surgeon, in his expertise, regarded as 
lifesaving treatment; Sidaway was mercifully overruled by the Supreme Court in Montgomery v. 
Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] AC 1430.  
20 [1914] AC 932. 
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duties arising in the context of a fiduciary relationship may go well beyond those 
identified by Milett LJ above, which conceptually arise from the duty of loyalty alone.21 
In any event, what is striking here is that the ascendancy/dependency argument alone, 
even in a context as profoundly evocative of vulnerability as that of a doctor being in 
de facto control of another’s wellbeing, was an insufficient ground for finding a 
fiduciary relationship.22 
To my mind, this affirms Finn’s opinion that although vulnerability may feature heavily 
in ordinary contractual or social interactions, frequently, it will not attract fiduciary 
status because those relationships are nevertheless regulated through ‘a significant 
array of doctrines (tortious, contractual and equitable), which serve to ensure that 
neither party takes the pursuit of his own interests beyond acceptable bounds or unduly 
prejudices the interests of the other’.23 What appears to be entirely uncontroversial, 
however, is that where the ascendancy/corresponding dependency pair arises from a 
person’s voluntary undertaking to act in the interests of another, having been previously 
granted a power to exercise discretion in the conduct of that other person’s affairs, then 
a fiduciary relationship unquestionably will be made out. This proposition is founded 
on the fiduciary’s core function as a representative, whose actions can have a legal or 
practical effect on the person for whom the fiduciary is acting. Thus, in Guerin v. The 
Queen24 Dickson J observed: 
‘Where by statute, agreement or perhaps by unilateral undertaking, one party 
has an obligation to act for the benefit of another and that obligation carries with 
it a discretionary power, the party thus empowered becomes a fiduciary. Equity 
will then supervise the relationship by holding him to the fiduciary’s strict 
standard of conduct.’25 
What is important to note here is that the alleged fiduciary has not merely assumed a 
power to exercise discretion in the conduct of another’s affairs. Rather they have been 
																																																													
21 Bristol and WBS, n.8. 
22 Cf. Slater v. Bisett (1986) 69 ACTR 25 (Supreme Court of Australian Capital Territory), in the context 
of doctor-patient confidentiality, which should have been tackled through the law on breach of 
confidence rather than as a breach of fiduciary duty. 
23 P.D. Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T.G. Youdan (ed.), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell, 
1989), 1, 35 (hereafter, ‘Finn (1989)’).  
24 (1984) 2 SCR 335. 
25 Ibid, 384. 
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empowered to do so by the latter, whether consciously or unconsciously.26 Relying on 
the existence of this power to exercise discretion in the conduct of another’s affairs as 
the catalyst for the incidence of a fiduciary relation conceptually accommodates both 
the proposition that the core of the fiduciary’s function is that of a representative and 
the consequent expectation that the purported beneficiary of the fiduciary’s actions is 
entitled to the latter’s absolute loyalty.27 I will demonstrate the connections between 
these propositions on the basis of an implied agreement between fiduciary and 
beneficiary. In any event, the proposition that the defining criterion of the fiduciary 
position is the fiduciary’s role as a representative, who has been given discretion over 
another’s affairs, is strongly supported in the law.28 
This is illustrated through such seminal English authorities as Boardman v. Phipps29 
and Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver,30 which, incidentally, reinforced the strict liability 
associated with a party identified as a fiduciary. In Boardman, the later of the two 
decisions, the appellant was solicitor to a family trust, whose assets included a 
significant minority shareholding into a struggling textile company with operations in 
England and Australia. Boardman realised early that the company could be turned 
around (through consolidating its operations and capital), thus improving the value of 
the trust’s asset, but only if the trust were duly represented on the company’s board, 
which in turn could be achieved through a majority shareholding. On this basis, 
																																																													
26 See the examples in L.S. Sealy, ‘Fiduciary Relationships’ (1962) CLJ 69, esp. 78ff, with respect to 
relationships giving rise to the presumption of undue influence; F. Dowrick, ‘The Relationship of 
Principal and Agent’ (1954) 17 MLR 24, 36; see also the ‘vigilant trust’ and ‘deferential trust’ dichotomy 
articulated in Flannigan, n.12. Cf. English v. Dedham Vale Properties, considered later. 
27E.g. see the analysis of authorities on conflicts of interest in E.J. Weinrib, ‘The Fiduciary Obligation’ 
(1975) 25 U.T.L.J. 1 and in J. Gummow, ‘Compensation for Breach of Fiduciary Duty’ in T.G. Youdan 
(ed.), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell, 1989), 57. 
28 Examples of some early influential authorities are Keech v. Sandford (1726) 25 ER 223 (trustee in 
control of the minor beneficiary’s interest with respect to a lease), Hichens v. Congreve (1828) 38 ER 
917 (directors in control of company’s interests); Fawcett v. Whitehouse (1829) 39 ER 51 (partners 
representing and being in control of each other’s interests within the context of the partnership); 
Aberdeen Railways v. Blaikie Bros (1854) 1 Macq 461 (director was conflicted out having allowed the 
company to contract with a business of which he was managing partner); Lister v. Stubbs (1890) 45 ChD 
1, (employee in charge of purchasing for claimant firm was conflicted out having received bribes from 
suppliers); Aas v. Bowen [1891] 2 Ch 244 (partner acting on information acquired during partnership 
business was not in breach of fiduciary duty having used that information to his own profit in the course 
of a transaction which was unrelated to his firm’s business); Dean v. MacDowell [1878] 8 Ch 345 (retired 
partner prohibited from competing with his previous firm); and recently: FHR European Ventures LLP 
v. Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45(brokerage firm had to disgorge unauthorised 
commission paid by the party with whom it brokered a deal for the appellants). 
29 [1967] 2 AC 46. 
30 [1967] 2 AC 134. 
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Boardman urged the trustees to purchase more shares in the company so as to build up 
to a majority shareholding. However, it transpired that this would have been ultra vires 
their authority and the trustees were therefore unable to act. Boardman then procured 
financing along with one of the trustees to purchase more shares personally and to 
combine that shareholding with that of the trust. Boardman’s scheme did go through 
with the knowledge and consent of the trustees and most, but crucially not all, of the 
trust’s beneficiaries. This triggered a shift in the company’s management strategy, 
which significantly increased the value of the trust-fund, with Boardman and the trustee 
with whom he had partnered up making a very sizeable profit. The one beneficiary who 
had been kept out of the loop sued to recover the profit that Boardman had made as a 
result of the transaction. The House of Lords upheld the decisions of both the courts 
below that Boardman was compelled to account to the respondent for his share of the 
profits he had obtained as a result of the scheme.  
Crucially, it was not relevant that the trust, and therefore its beneficiaries, could not of 
itself have benefitted from the opportunity in question. It was also irrelevant that 
Boardman’s actions caused the trust-fund to be significantly increased and that he had 
clearly acted with both integrity and business acumen. 31  The fact was that, in 
representing the trust in the negotiations with the company,32 Boardman had been a 
fiduciary in relation to the trust and, as such, he had been outright forbidden from 
obtaining any personal benefit in the course of the conduct of his duties as a fiduciary. 
Lord Cohen stressed that this was directly correlated to the duty of loyalty and 
specifically to the duty of a fiduciary to avoid putting themselves in situations, where 
their own interest conflicts with that of their beneficiary.33 Lord Cohen observed that 
given Boardman’s capacity as the trust’s solicitor, the trustees would be accustomed to 
relying on his advice. It was difficult to see how that advice would be prioritising the 
																																																													
31 Dissenting, Viscount Dilhorne in Boardman, n.29, 90-91, argued along these lines citing dicta by 
Bowen LJ in Aas v. Bowen, n.28, 257-258, and Cotton LJ in Dean v. MacDowell, n.28, 354 to the effect 
that a partner, who benefits from information which came into his knowledge in his capacity as a partner, 
should not be liable to account for such benefit, if it came from a transaction which, as in Boardman, had 
been outside the scope of the partnership. 
32 Lord Cohen emphasised that the information with respect to the opportunity to purchase the shares 
only came to Boardman in his capacity as the trust’s representative to the company’s board, as the 
company was private and such information was not publicly available: Boardman, n.29, 100-101 and 
102-103. 
33 Ibid, 103; The no-conflict rule had been first articulated in Hamilton .v Wright (1842) 8 ER 357 and 
later established in Aberdeen Railway, n.28, 471, per Lord Cranworth LC.   
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interests of the trust, when the advisor himself had an interest in the business 
opportunity he was advising on.34 
Their Lordships, thus, reiterated the principle they had articulated earlier in Regal 
(Hastings) v. Gulliver, where, similarly to Boardman, the four company directors of the 
appellant company made a profit by purchasing shares, which had originally been 
intended for Regal. However, the company had no funds and so could not avail itself 
of the opportunity. As the directors had become aware of the opportunity in their 
capacity as Regal’s directors, the opportunity and any proceeds from it duly belonged 
to Regal. Accordingly, the directors were held liable for breaching the no-conflict rule. 
Rejecting Lord Greene MR’s argument in the Court of Appeal, their Lordships were 
keen to emphasise that the directors’ honest state of mind was entirely irrelevant and 
that their liability was established by the mere breach of their no-conflict duty as 
fiduciaries.35 
In both of the cases above, the liability arose from the power of discretion inherent in 
the fiduciaries’ function in representing the interests of their respective beneficiaries. 
Loke argues that reliance on the triptych of power-discretion-vulnerability to determine 
the existence of a fiduciary relationship is question-begging. He contends that while 
vulnerability explains the policy motivation behind fiduciary law, it is merely a 
consequence of exposure to the relationship and it does not help in identifying the 
interest to be protected or explain why the relationship is fiduciary in the first place.36 
My contention, however, is that, as a starting point, the focus of the enquiry must be on 
the discretion which may be inherent in the alleged fiduciary’s position as a 
representative. Thus, it is important to distinguish this position from the case where the 
representative has no discretion over the conduct of their duties, as is the case with 
many types of employee in relation to the affairs of their employer, such as manual 
																																																													
34 Boardman, ibid. 
35 Regal (Hastings), n.30, 154, per Lord Wright, and 158, per Lord Porter.  
36 A.F.H. Loke ‘Fiduciary Duties and Implied Duties of Good Faith in Contractual Joint Ventures’ (1999) 
JBL 538, 554. See also L.I. Rotman, ‘Fiduciary Doctrine: A Concept in Need of Understanding’ (1995-
1996) Alta.L.Rev. 821, 850, who points out that not all positions of power attract fiduciary duties in the 
sense of acting in another’s best interest, a case in point being members of the judiciary. My response to 
this is that (as demonstrated in 6.3), the scope of fiduciary duties is to be determined by the circumstances 
in which they arise. Therefore, while a judge may not be expected to act in the best interests of the 
accused to the same extent as the accused’s legal representative, the judge is still expected to safeguard 
the accused’s interests by ensuring that they are subject to due process, which begins with the judge 
ensuring that they are not conflicted out when hearing the case.  
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workers or those low in the hierarchy of their employer’s organisation.37 Their function 
as a representative in that case is limited to the extent that the employee does something 
within the scope of their job description for which the employer is then vicariously 
liable in tort.38 Thus, with the existence of discretion taken as the starting point of the 
fiduciary enquiry, the vulnerability associated with the legal and practical effect on the 
beneficiary’s interests is to be recognised as the logical consequence of the fiduciary’s 
exercise of this discretion, rather than the source of the fiduciary obligation itself.  
The benefit of focusing our enquiry on one person’s power to exercise discretion over 
another’s affairs is twofold. First, it provides us with a well-defined criterion through 
which to conceptualise fiduciary law as the means of regulating the exercise of the 
fiduciary’s discretion, however it arises, or even fettering its scope. Secondly, it enables 
a clear jurisprudential distinction between fiduciary law and the realms of contract or 
tort law, which have been significantly interfered with through the courts’ rather 
capricious application of the fiduciary doctrine. The following section will briefly 
explore this tendency in order to demonstrate that reliance on the court to determine 
whether a contractual joint venture has either created a fiduciary relationship or has 
elements thereof, would be neither useful nor conducive to commercial certainty. 
6.2.2 Problem 2: pinning down the content of the commercial fiduciary 
obligation 
It will be remembered that the paradox of the commercial fiduciary obligation does not 
lie in the law’s misguided view of what constitutes a vulnerable party (which, as 
demonstrated earlier, is merely a consequence of the fiduciary relation – not its source) 
but in the push-pull relationship it has with commercial parties themselves, who will 
often seek to exclude the obligation altogether only to plead it where they want to access 
the formidable remedies it unlocks. In this light, answering the fiduciary question 
accurately is of profound importance, because, if successfully invoked, the doctrine will 
take over entirely from other relevant doctrines, be they contractual or tortious.39 This 
																																																													
37 Cf. Reading v. Attorney-General [1951] AC 507. 
38 Cf. the case where an employer ends up bound to a third party by the acts of an employee acting with 
ostensible authority to represent their employer’s will, although the enquiry then will include the question 
of whether, in the circumstances, it was reasonable for the third party to infer authority on the part of the 
rogue employee. 
39 E.g. see Finn(1989), n.23, 2; and 24ff. 
	 198	
in turn impacts on the type of remedies available to the successful claimant, as well as 
the evidential process in establishing and recouping loss.  
This is because liability for breach of fiduciary duty is strict, namely it arises 
automatically where the fiduciary has breached his obligation of loyalty, their state of 
mind being entirely irrelevant to the enquiry, which is purely one of fact. Because the 
wrong lies in the fiduciary’s gaining from their position, rather than in actively causing 
the claimant-beneficiary loss, the remedies available to the successful claimant-
beneficiary are restitutionary. This means that the errant fiduciary is expected to 
disgorge the gain from his actions rather than to make good the claimant’s loss (see 
5.5.3). Thus, unlike actions in contract and tort, the claimant-beneficiary need not show 
loss or injury respectively, nor are they burdened with demonstrating mitigation of loss 
(contract) or absence of contributory negligence (tort) on their part, which would 
normally impact the size of a (compensatory) award. Consequently, the evidential 
process and remedial regime associated with actions for breach of fiduciary duty are 
extremely favourable to the claimant – making actions based on the fiduciary doctrine 
a prudent litigation strategy in commercial disputes. 
In this sense, the fiduciary doctrine is prone to abuse by strategic claimants. 
Consequently, courts are generally wary of such claims arising in a commercial context 
and they are notoriously reluctant to identify commercial parties as fiduciaries. 40 
Nevertheless, the fiduciary doctrine has been consistently abused in the courts’ own 
attempts to provide sympathetic claimants with remedies, despite relationships between 
the parties featuring few, or even none, of the characteristics of the fiduciary relation. 
Worse still, in doing so, they muddle fiduciary law jurisprudence by conflating the 
fiduciary doctrine with contractual and tortious principles, thus throwing off our 
understanding of an already nebulous concept. The purpose of the following sections 
is to demonstrate this problem by examining a series of cases, which illustrate the 
courts’ remedy-driven application of the fiduciary doctrine in individual cases and the 
wider implications for legal principle and certainty. 
																																																													
40  Unless there is a straightforward trust involved: Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Quistclose Investments 
Ltd. [1968] UKHL 4; Cf. Noranda Australia Ltd. v. Lachlan Resources, 1988 WL 859786 (Westlaw): 
the parties expressly identified their relationship as fiduciary, but the court significantly limited the scope 
of the duty to reflect their agreement as a whole; 17, per Bryson J. 
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6.2.2.1 English v. Dedham Vale Properties 
In English v. Dedham Vale Properties,41 the claimant sued the purchaser of a piece of 
land she sold him seeking, inter alia, an account of profits, on the basis that prior to the 
contract being completed the defendant had, unbeknownst to the claimant, applied for 
and acquired planning permission in the claimant’s name for the development of the 
land. Here, Slade J relied on dicta by Lord Denning MR in Phipps v. Boardman,42 
where he introduced the concept of a ‘self-appointed agent’ to describe Boardman’s 
actions with respect to the family trust and relied on this description to rule against him 
for breach of fiduciary duty (as opposed to Boardman’s actual role as a solicitor for the 
trust, who acted for personal profit on information he received in this capacity). Slade 
J was not convinced by counsel’s argument that the mere application for planning 
permission being made in the plaintiff’s name could not give rise to a fiduciary 
relationship. Thus, he held that the fiduciary relationship arose from the defendant 
having taken an action with respect to the vendor’s property, without the vendor’s 
authority or consent, ‘which, if disclosed to the vendor, might reasonably be supposed 
to be likely to influence him in deciding whether or not to conclude the contract’.43 By 
failing to disclose the application for, and grant of, planning permission the defendant 
was accordingly in breach of fiduciary duty and was therefore liable to account to the 
plaintiff for any profits he had made as a result.  
English, which remains good law, stretches the limits of the fiduciary doctrine in that 
it completely disregards the fact that for an agency to subsist the person represented 
must have at least consented to being represented or have positively empowered the 
representor to act on their behalf.44 Even Lord Denning’s highly controversial ‘self-
appointed agents’ in Phipps v. Boardman were, on the facts, acting with the knowledge 
and, arguably, implied consent of the majority of the trustees and beneficiaries, given 
the defendants’ pre-existing fiduciary relationship with the family trust.45 Thus, an 
																																																													
41 [1978] 1 WLR 93. 
42 [1965] Ch 992, CA, 1017. 
43 [1978] 1 WLR 93, 111. 
44 McMeel refers to these views of agency as the ‘consensual’ and ‘power-liability models’ respectively: 
G. McMeel, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of law of Agency (2000) 116 LQR 387, arguing that the 
ostensibly competing models of agency are in fact complementary. 
45 Which is why Lord Denning’s argument should have been heavily qualified and expressed along the 
lines of an unauthorised exercise of power rather than an entirely new type of agency. 
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agency does not arise when someone claims they are acting on behalf of an alleged 
principal,46 but rather when the alleged principal has held this person out to be acting 
as their representative.47 On this basis, where a principal has expressly granted another 
the power to represent the principal’s interests to the world, it is trite that the principal 
will be bound in contract, or in tort,48 to honour dealings with third parties which the 
agent has concluded on the principal’s behalf. However, the pivotal role of the 
purported principal’s actions on the operation and effect of an agency relationship is 
further emphasised where the enquiry into the principal’s liability for the agent’s 
actions requires us to consider the extent of the agent’s authority, whether the latter’s 
actions have in any way exceeded it and, perhaps more importantly, how the agent’s 
authority appears to the world. It is the principal’s, rather than the agent’s, actions that 
determine the answer to all three questions and will ultimately determine whether the 
principal is in fact legally bound by the agent’s conduct. A principal’s liability for 
actions, which an agent has committed outside of the authority conferred by the 
principal, will flow from an estoppel, namely: 
‘where a principal, by words or conduct, has represented that the agent has the 
requisite actual authority, and the party dealing with the agent has entered into a 
contract with him in reliance on the representation. The principal in these 
circumstances is estopped from denying that actual authority existed.’49  
																																																													
46 Freeman & Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480, esp. 505, per 
Diplock LJ; Note also Hely-Hutchinson v. Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549, 583, per Lord Denning MR, 
who pointed out that the agent ‘himself may do “the holding-out”’ as to the extent of his authority. 
However, I submit that this must be read in context of the rest of the judgment, to the effect that for the 
agent’s own holding-out to be binding on the principal, the latter must have held the agent out as being 
in a position, which is generally understood to carry the relevant authority (e.g. managing director of a 
company). This interpretation is in line with the Court of Appeal’s approach later in First Energy (UK) 
Ltd. v. Hungarian International Bank Ltd [1993] BCC 533; Cf. McMeel, n.44, 403. 
47 Indicatively, see: Farquharson Brothers & Co v. C. King & Co [1902] AC 325; Freeman & Lockyer, 
ibid; Armagas Ltd v. Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost) [1986] AC 717; First Energy (UK) Ltd. v. 
Hungarian International Bank Ltd, ibid; Kelly v. Fraser [2013] 1 AC 450. 
48 By operation of the vicarious liability doctrine, where the agent has acted within the scope of his 
authority: Lloyd (Pauper) v. Grace, Smith & Co. [1912] AC 716 (firm vicariously liable for their agent’s 
fraud committed in the course of his employment); Kooragang Investments Pty v. Richardson & Wrench 
[1982] AC 462 (the defendant estate agents were not liable for their employee’s negligence, when 
preparing valuations of properties, which he had been expressly forbidden from doing and was therefore 
acting outside the course of his employment); Various Claimants v. Institute of the Brothers of the 
Christian Schools [2012] UKSC 56 (the defendant religious order were vicariously liable for the sexual 
abuse by brother teachers at a residential school for boys, even though the school was not managed by 
the defendants); Cox v. Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10 (vicarious liability may also arise, where the 
tortfeasor’s actions are in furtherance of the defendant’s interests – an employment relationship is not 
essential). 
49 The Ocean Frost, n.47, 777, per Lord Keith of Kinkel. 
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To be sure, the estoppel’s operation here is heavily qualified. Thus, as per Lord Keith’s 
dicta above, the party claiming against the principal must have both relied on the 
principal’s representation and acted to their detriment as a result.50 Furthermore, where 
it is known to the claimant that the agent they are dealing with has limited authority in 
certain respects, the claimant will not be able to rely on the principal’s representations 
to the contrary.51 Similarly, the agent’s actions must have been within the ambit of the 
general authority conferred to an agent in a similar position.52 Thus, a particularly 
unusual transaction will be unlikely to fall within an agent’s apparent authority and the 
claimant will be expected to have made enquiries as to the extent of the agent’s actual 
authority.53 
It is clear therefore that the driving force behind the agency relationship flows from the 
principal’s actions. In English, there was simply no such initiative on the part of the 
plaintiff, who knew nothing of the defendant’s actions aside from his part in the sale 
negotiations with regard to her property. Therefore, there was no agency in English 
because there was no indication that the plaintiff ever intended for there to be one. In 
effect, Slade J cherry-picked the parts of the fiduciary doctrine which most favoured 
the claimant, ignoring its operative elements, at the expense of legal principle and 
certainty. 
6.2.2.2 Nocton v. Lord Ashburton 
In Nocton v. Lord Ashburton54 the appellant solicitor had advised the respondent client 
to lend a large sum to a property venture, in which the solicitor had a personal interest 
(with his client’s knowledge), on the security of the property in question. Thus, the 
respondent was to take on a loan at a preferential interest rate and, in turn, loan the 
advance to the venture, but at a higher interest rate. The interest from the mortgage 																																																													
50 See e.g. Rama Corp Ltd. v. Proved Tin & General Investments Ltd [1952] 2 QB 147, where Slade J 
held that the claimant could not rely on ex post knowledge of the defendant’s power to confer authority 
on its agent (arguing along the lines of constructive notice) in order to establish ex ante apparent authority 
for the purposes of its claim. 
51 Russo-Chinese Bank v. Li Yau Sam [1910] AC 174. 
52 See, e.g. Freeman & Lockyer, n.47, 494, per Wilmer LJ. 
53 E.g. Houghton v. Nothard, Lowe and Wills Limited [1927] 1 KB 246, (the managing director of two 
separate companies pledged the revenues of both as security for a loan advanced to only one of them); 
Frederick v. Positive Solutions (Financial Services) Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ. 431 (respondent was not 
liable for their agent’s fraud, committed while ‘moonlighting’ through an online portal which was 
unrelated to the respondent’s business). 
54 [1914] AC 932. 
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payments would then serve to offset the payment on the original loan. Some years later 
the appellant advised his client to release part of the security on the mortgage, so that 
the solicitor could raise funds on the property as a first charge (again, with the 
respondent’s knowledge). The result was to significantly reduce the amount the 
respondent held as security against the original mortgage. When the first expected 
mortgage payments from the venture fell into arrears, the respondent suffered 
significant losses, as he was liable to keep up interest payments on the original loan. 
Thus, the respondent sued on the ground that the appellant had acted fraudulently and 
to his own interest when he advised the respondent. At first instance, and treating the 
action as one of deceit, Neville J applied the rule in Derry v. Peek,55 which requires 
proof of fraudulent intention, ruling that while the solicitor fell short of the standard of 
care required of a person in his position, there had been no evidence that he had in fact 
acted fraudulently. Overturning the decision of the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords 
agreed with Neville J’s judgment on the issue of fraud, but went further to establish 
that, while it was not possible to substitute an action based on deceit with one based on 
negligence, the judge still should have recognised that the appellant was in a special 
relationship to the respondent, a fiduciary one, which gave rise to a duty to exercise 
care in giving information or advice. Viscount Haldane went on to say that the case 
before the court:  
‘was really an action based on the executive jurisdiction of a Court of Equity 
over a defendant in a fiduciary position in respect of matters which at law would 
also have given a right to damages for negligence’.56 
In other words, the House of Lords in Nocton ruled against the appellant on the basis 
that he had been rash and negligent in his conduct of his duty as a fiduciary, which 
required that he exercised care and skill in the provision of his professional advice.57 
Thus, their Lordships treated the cause of action in Nocton as a straightforward action 
in negligence which arose incidentally from the appellant’s fiduciary capacity as a 
solicitor. Accordingly, they went on to make the first ever award of equitable damages, 
requiring the appellant to restore to the mortgage security the amount the respondent 
																																																													
55 (1889) 14 App Cas 337. 
56 Nocton, n.54, 957. 
57 Ibid, 958. 
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lost, as well as make good the corresponding amount of interest lost, due to the 
appellant’s actions.  
The House of Lords in Nocton used the appellant’s fiduciary capacity as a springboard 
for the court’s equitable intervention in a case where the respondent would otherwise 
obtain no remedy, given that negligence had not been pleaded on his behalf and fraud 
could not be made out on the facts. However, their Lordships’ fast and loose treatment 
of the content of the fiduciary obligation has far-reaching consequences for our 
understanding and application of the fiduciary concept.  
Following Nocton, the breach of a professional duty of care and skill by a person in a 
fiduciary role may well be treated as a breach of fiduciary duty, as Lord Browne-
Wilkinson indicated in White v. Jones.58 Here, a solicitor who had negligently failed to 
execute a will in time for his client’s death owed a duty of care to the intended 
beneficiaries of the will, who had been disinherited by the deceased in a prior will. His 
Lordship relied squarely on Nocton declaring that: 
‘there can be special relationships between the parties which give rise to the law 
treating the defendant as having assumed a duty to be careful in circumstances 
where, apart from such relationship, no duty of care would exist … a fiduciary 
relationship is one of those special relationships.’59  
To be sure, both Nocton and Jones can and should, in my opinion, be interpreted as 
merely using the defendant’s fiduciary status as the source of a duty of care, which is 
necessary to found a claim in negligence. 60  However, as there is no relevant 
qualification in either judgment, both cases could be treated as an indication that an 
action for professional negligence in tort may well be substituted with an action for 
breach of fiduciary duty, simply because the associated evidential process and remedies 
are more favourable to the claimant.  
																																																													
58 [1995] 2 AC 207. 
59 Ibid, 271. 
60 E.g. along the lines of a trustee managing investments of the beneficiaries’ trust-fund, who has been 
held to be subject to a duty of reasonable care, namely the care expected of an ordinary prudent man of 
business with respect to his own affairs: Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co. [1980] Ch 515, 531-532, 
per Brightman J. 
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If cases like Mahoney v. Purnell 61  are any indication, this is more than just an 
unfounded fear. Here, the plaintiff had been pressured by his defendant son-in-law to 
sell his shares in the family company, which ran a hotel business. The defendant later 
sold the hotel for a considerably higher price than that reflected in the amount the 
plaintiff sold his shares for. The plaintiff sued for rescission of the share sale agreement 
claiming that he had been unduly influenced by the defendant, but, before trial, the 
company went into liquidation. The court held that the relationship between the parties, 
was based on trust and therefore could be described as fiduciary. Accordingly, because 
the company was in liquidation and the defendant had not personally profited from the 
sale of the plaintiff’s shares, the plaintiff had no remedy other than equitable 
compensation to which he was entitled as a consequence of his alleged fiduciary 
relationship with the defendant. Thus, along the lines of Nocton, he was awarded an 
amount equal to the true value of the shares at the time of their sale.  
I contend that the court here was rather flippant with its use of the fiduciary label, given 
that there was no indication that the defendant had in fact any control or discretion in 
the conduct of the plaintiff’s affairs beyond the fact that the plaintiff tended to defer to 
the defendant’s judgment with respect to the operation of the business (e.g. regarding 
its incorporation from a partnership some years before). Furthermore, with regard to 
the sale of his shares, it was the plaintiff who, needing cash, initiated the transaction 
with the defendant and negotiated the price with him and the company’s accountant 
based on what the company could afford at the time. On May J’s analysis, the case was 
in fact one which fell squarely into the realm of undue influence, the relevant 
presumption arising from the fact that the relationship between plaintiff and defendant 
had been one of trust and confidence and the impugned transaction had been 
particularly onerous for the plaintiff.62 Nevertheless, May J acknowledged that the 
normal remedies for undue influence (namely setting the impugned transaction aside 
and ordering an account of the profits gained from it) would not bring about ‘practical 
justice’ given that in the circumstances it was impossible to place the parties into their 
original position. Consequently, he established a basis for an award of equitable 
																																																													
61 [1997] 1 FLR 612. 
62 Note the criteria giving rise to the presumption of undue influence in Barclays Bank v. O’Brien [1994] 
1 AC 180 (referred to in May J’s judgment) and, later, in Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge [2001] UKHL 
44, which established that along with the trust and confidence, the impugned transaction must not be 
readily explicable on the relationship of the parties. 
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compensation by shrewdly identifying the defendant as fiduciary,63 even though there 
was little in the facts to justify this.   
6.2.2.3 Chase Manhattan Bank v. Israel-British Bank 
The previous sections demonstrated that the remedies available to a successful 
claimant-beneficiary following an action for breach of fiduciary duty are considerably 
more expansive than those available pursuant to other (legal) doctrines. This is because 
the remedies arising from breach of the fiduciary obligation, an archetypical equitable 
doctrine, are by necessity equitable. It will be remembered that the equitable 
jurisdiction evolved in its flexibility as a response to the common law’s rigidity, so that 
the resulting evidential and remedial regime was far more permissive than its legal 
counterparts. It should be no surprise then that equity’s approach is equally flexible 
with respect to the tracing of assets for the purpose of their recovery. Incidentally, 
tracing is not itself a remedy or a claim, a point that the House of Lords drove home in 
Foskett v. McKeown.64 Instead, tracing is: 
‘merely the process by which a claimant demonstrates what has happened to his 
property, identifies its proceeds and the persons who have handled or received 
them and justifies his claim that the proceeds can properly be regarded as 
representing his property’.65 
Crucially, the rules of tracing are understood to be different in equity and common law, 
equity providing the more permissive regime.66 Specifically, under the common law 
rules a claimant may trace their asset into the hands of another or into the proceeds of 
its sale. However, the buck stops once the asset has been mixed with something else so 
that it is no longer identifiable as the original asset, e.g. wood chips being mixed with 
resin to make chipboard.67 The same reasoning applies where the proceeds of its sale 																																																													
63 [1997] 1 FLR 612, 642. 
64 [2001] 1 AC 102; I use the term ‘tracing’ to encompass both ‘tracing’ (tracking an asset into a substitute 
asset or the proceeds of its sale) and ‘following’ (tracking the same asset as it changes hands); the two 
terms were defined ibid, 119, per Lord Millet. 
65 Ibid,120, per Lord Millet. 
66  Their Lordships in Foskett v. McKeown were very dismissive of this distinction, though their 
comments were obiter; ibid, 128, per Lord Millet and 113, per Lord Steyn. 
67 Borden (UK) Limited v Scottish Timber Products Limited [1981] Ch 25; The claimant’s ability to 
identify their asset is key in its retrieval: see Clough Mill Limited v. Martin [1984] 2 All ER 152, (Yarn 
sold to insolvent buyer could be identified as the original asset and retrieved on the basis of a retention 
of title clause); Re Peachdart Limited [1984] Ch 131, (leather used in the manufacture of various leather 
goods could in theory be traced into the substitute goods or the proceeds of their sale); Hendy Lennox 
(Industrial Engines) Limited v. Grahame Puttick Limited [1984] 1 WLR 485, (diesel engines which could 
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have been mixed with other funds, so that it is not possible to make the connection 
between those proceeds and the original asset.68 If the claimant cannot identify the asset 
they want to recover or its substitute, then they cannot assert a claim against it, which, 
if successful, would give the claimant a proprietary right over the asset in question. In 
the absence of a claim against specific property (e.g. through an action in money had 
and received or for tortious interference with goods, when the action is for recovery of 
a specific chattel), the claimant is only left with a debt to enforce against the defendant. 
This, however, is of little use where the defendant is insolvent, as the claimant is then 
an unsecured creditor entitled to share pari passu with other unsecured creditors69 in 
whatever is left of the defendant’s assets once the secured creditors (i.e. fixed charge 
holders), the expenses of liquidation and various preferential creditors70 have been paid. 
In contrast, where a claimant can demonstrate a fiduciary relationship with the 
defendant,71 equity allows the claimant to trace their asset into its substitute, as well as 
through mixed funds, thus establishing a beneficial interest in the asset or its substitute, 
which is then kept separately from the assets available to a liquidator to discharge the 
defendant’s liabilities to its creditors.72  
It is unsurprising, therefore, that claimants attempt frequently, and with various degrees 
of success, to apply the fiduciary label onto otherwise arm’s length relationships in 
																																																													
be identified by their serial numbers could be retrieved by the plaintiff and did not form part of the assets 
available to the liquidator); Cf. Indian Oil Corpn Ltd v Greenstone Shipping SA [1988] QB 345 (oil 
wrongfully mixed with existing oil in a tanker by the ship’s master was held on trust for the plaintiff) 
and Re Oatway [1903] 2 Ch 356 (where a trustee mixes trust-funds with his own, the beneficiaries are 
entitled to the whole). 
68 Banque Belge Pour L'Etranger v. Hambrouck [1921] 1 KB 321 (tracing of embezzled funds was 
possible through substantially empty bank accounts); Cf. Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547 
(funds cannot be traced in common law if mixed with other funds or where they have been through the 
banking clearing system: ibid, 566, per Fox LJ). 
69 The pari passu principle is reflected in s.107 Insolvency Act 1986 (voluntary liquidation), r.14.12 
Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016/1024 (compulsory liquidation) and s.328 Insolvency Act 
1986 (bankruptcy); see also British Eagle International Airlines Ltd. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France 
[1975] 1 WLR 758, where the House of Lords rejected a contractual arrangement whose effect was to 
defeat the statutory pari passu requirement; see also the discussion of the law in Perpetual Trustee Co 
Ltd. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1160. 
70 Set out in ss.175, 176A, s.176(3) Insolvency Act 1986 and defined in s.386. 
71 Re Hallett’s Estate (1879) 13 ChD 696; Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC  398; In Re Diplock a.k.a. 
Ministry of Health v. Simpson [1951] AC 251. 
72  See Re Hallett’s Estate, ibid, which originally established that the claimant’s remedy in such 
circumstances was equitable lien. The principle was later extended in Foskett v. McKeown, n.64, to the 
effect that a claimant may choose to assert either an equitable lien or a constructive trust over the mixed 
fund, thus founding a claim over any new asset acquired through the mixed fund to the proportion of the 
claimant’s own contribution to the acquisition. 
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order to trigger the equitable rules of tracing.73 A case in point is Chase Manhattan 
Bank v. Israel–British Bank.74 Here, the plaintiff bank made a payment into a bank 
account held at the defendant bank and due to a clerical error made a second payment 
into the same bank account. Shortly after that, the defendant bank became insolvent 
and went into liquidation. Goulding J relied on the House of Lords decisions in Sinclair 
v. Brougham75 and In Re Diplock76 to hold that the defendant had been in a fiduciary 
position in relation to the plaintiff and therefore held the mistaken payment on trust. 
Specifically, on the basis of Sinclair, he argued that the fiduciary relationship was a 
result of the defendant’s mere receipt of the mistaken payment, the defendant becoming 
a trustee of the funds for the plaintiff from the moment of receipt.77 Accordingly, the 
plaintiff was entitled to trace the mistaken payment into mixed funds held by the 
defendant and the assets acquired through them so as to support a claim in restitution.  
At this point, it is worth considering the circumstances in Sinclair that appear to give 
support to Goulding J’s reasoning. Briefly, the case concerned a building society, which 
had operated a banking business for a number of years and which, it later transpired, 
had been ultra vires its objects. Regardless, in that time it had amassed deposits of some 
£10 million. The deposits had been wrongfully mixed with the building society’s 
general assets. The building society later became insolvent and was wound up, raising 
the question of where the depositors ranked in relation to the society’s shareholders, 
given that after settlements paid to certain priority creditors, the assets available were 
insufficient to cover the society’s liabilities to both the depositors and its shareholders. 
The House of Lords held that a common law claim for money had and received could 
not stand, as the shareholders’ and depositors’ funds had been mixed and could not 																																																													
73 This tendency is particularly prominent in the context of retention of title clauses: e.g. see Aluminium 
Industrie Vaassen BV v. Romalpa Aluminium Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 676 (bailment effectively identified as 
agency); Borden (UK) v. Scottish Timber Products [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 168 (bailment identified as a 
fiduciary relationship – reversed on appeal: [1981] Ch 25), Re BA Peters Plc (In Administration) [2008] 
EWHC 2205 (dealership agreement identified as an agency despite express provision to the contrary); 
Cf. Re Andrabell [1984] 3 All E.R. 407 (no fiduciary relationship arose in the absence of a duty on the 
subsequently insolvent buyer to account to the seller for any sale proceeds on goods which were the 
subject of a retention of title clause), Re Goldcorp Exchange [1995] 1 AC 74 (the customers of an 
insolvent gold trader, from whom they had purchased gold bullion and with whom the bullion was stored 
on the understanding that it could be claimed on demand, were not in a fiduciary relationship with the 
insolvent trader and therefore did not take priority over the holder of a fixed charge – a simple breach of 
contract did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship).	
74 [1981] 1 Ch 105. 
75 n.71. 
76 Ibid. 
77 n.74, 119. 
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therefore be identified or traced, so as to provide the evidential basis for their respective 
claims. Nonetheless, the majority went on to hold78 that the shareholders and depositors 
were entitled in equity to share in the mixed fund on a pari passu basis. Thus, on the 
one hand, the shareholders were entitled to assert a claim against the fund on the basis 
of their fiduciary relationship with the building society’s directors, who had 
misappropriated their assets in the ultra vires undertaking.  But on the other hand, the 
depositors were entitled to trace their money into the mixed fund on the basis that it had 
been obtained by the building society illegally – no pre-existing fiduciary relationship 
was necessary. 79  Specifically, their Lordships reasoned along the lines of unjust 
enrichment, in the sense that, as Lord Mansfield put it in Moses v. MacFerlan,80 ‘the 
defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, [was] obliged by the ties of natural 
justice and equity to refund the money’.81 On this basis, Viscount Haldane LC held that 
the depositors’ funds had been the subject of an ‘inactive’ resulting trust, which was 
sufficient to support the court’s exercise of its equitable jurisdiction to allow the 
depositors to trace their money into the mixed fund.82 The practical consequence of this 
ratio, however, was to ostensibly do away with the requirement for a pre-existing 
fiduciary relationship, before a claimant could seek a proprietary remedy claim against 
the defendant for breach of fiduciary duty.83  
When the House of Lords was faced again with the question of a mistaken payment in 
Re Diplock,84 they did not directly contradict this reasoning, for the facts in this case 
did support a fiduciary finding. Here, the executors of a large estate were challenged 
by the testator’s estranged next of kin, who emerged after the estate had mostly been 
distributed, albeit according to the wishes of the testator. Their Lordships held that the 
executors owed, and were in breach of, a fiduciary duty to both the estate and its 
																																																													
78 Lord Dunedin dissenting on the manner of risk apportionment being of the view that the parties should 
share in proportion to their respective contributions to the fund; Sinclair, n.71, 438. 
79 Ibid, 420, per Viscount Haldane LC. 
80 (1760) 2 Burr. 1005. 
81 Ibid, 1012. 
82 Sinclair, n.71, 421. 
83 Millet J applied the same rationale in El-Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings Plc (No.1) [1993] 3 All ER 717 
(approved on this point by the Court of Appeal: [1994] 2 All E.R. 685) where the claimant could trace 
its funds into the hands of the defendant company, on the basis of a resulting trust which arose 
immediately when the claimant’s fraudulent investment manager invested it into the defendant. The trust 
arose straightforwardly from the claimant’s relationship with the fraudulent agent. 
84 Re Diplock, n.71. 
	 209	
beneficiaries, who were therefore entitled to trace the wrongly distributed funds into 
the hands of the recipient charities. The analysis in Re Diplock was approved later in 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington LBC,85 where the House of Lords 
stoutly rejected the ratio in Sinclair to the extent that it supported a resulting trust arising 
automatically from a mistakenly or illegally obtained payment. Specifically, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson stressed that while a trust may well arise where a third party 
innocently acquires property which is subject to a claimant’s equitable interest, this will 
occur not at the time of the third party’s receipt of the property but at the time when the 
latter has become aware of the claimant’s interest. His Lordship emphasised that the 
key criterion giving rise to the trust, was the purported trustee’s knowledge of the fact 
that they are in possession of what is in effect trust property.86 This analysis, he argued, 
complied with the fundamental principle of trust law, namely that for the law to 
intervene  
‘the conscience of the trustee is affected. Unless and until the trustee is aware 
of the factors which give rise to the supposed trust, there is nothing which can 
affect his conscience’.87 
The effect of Westdeutsche Landesbank was to rein in the circumstances in which 
claimants could be awarded restitutionary remedies with respect to funds which have 
been mixed with those of a third party by mistake or fraud. It is important for the 
claimant to demonstrate a fiduciary relationship with the defendant, which may have 
been pre-existing or the consequence of an implied trust, arising as soon as the 
defendant becomes aware that they are in possession of what is in effect trust property.88  
The discussion of how the law on resulting trusts evolved to this point should illustrate 
the dangers inherent in the malleability of the fiduciary concept. Indeed, the state of the 
fiduciary doctrine perpetuates the paradox of courts both rejecting the doctrine, where 
the relationship is ostensibly an ‘arm’s length’ one, and openly resorting to it, where 
																																																													
85 [1996] AC 669, 707, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
86 Ibid, 709. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Where the funds have been acquired through deceit, then the court will be more permissive in its 
application of the tracing rules, e.g. potentially even allowing ‘backward tracing’, including tracing into 
overdrawn accounts (see Brazil v. Durant International Corp [2016] AC 297), while the remedies 
available to the claimant can be far more stringent, such as including an award of compound interest: 
Target Holdings Ltd. v. Redferns [1996] AC 421; AIB Group (UK) Plc. v. Mark Redler & Co 
Solicitors [2015] AC 1503).  
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they simply wish for claimants to recover property from unscrupulous defendants, 
regardless of whether key features of the fiduciary relation are missing. Thus, cases as 
disparate as English, Nocton and Chase Manhattan are a reminder that courts may well 
abuse the fiduciary doctrine to ensure that swindled claimants get a meaningful remedy, 
usually by being able to trace their property into new assets, products or mixed funds 
in the hands of the defendant or third parties. In other words, the slippery nature of the 
fiduciary doctrine allows courts to apply it as a one-off band-aid, rather than a 
coherently applied preventative measure regulating the conduct of those who are 
empowered to exercise discretion in relation to the legal and/or financial affairs of 
another. In the following sections I will show that my methodology provides a principle 
whereupon many of the aberrations in the commercial application of the fiduciary 
doctrine can be explained rationally.  
6.3 The fiduciary obligation as a response to the powerful freeloader: default 
duties, content, and extent. 
The problems associated with the fluidity of the fiduciary doctrine, as developed briefly 
above, are even more pronounced when considered in light of the fact that the fiduciary 
obligation not only represents the most demanding standard of conduct in private law, 
but it operates on a strict liability basis and, for a successful claimant, unlocks the most 
permissive remedial regime possible in common law. Therefore, given the state of the 
fiduciary doctrine, why would rational parties, who choose to cooperate through a 
contractual joint venture, voluntarily submit to an extra-contractual duty of good faith 
that carries all the weight and unpredictability of the fiduciary doctrine, as is the crux 
of this thesis? Put differently, how does choosing conduct-constraining defaults in the 
form of fiduciary duties reflect the highest utility strategy for constrained maximisers 
who have chosen to cooperate? The purpose of this section is to discuss how the 
fiduciary doctrine maps onto Gauthier’s conception of rational collaborative 
bargaining, as well as what this means in terms of the ensuing duties’ operation and 
extent. 
6.3.1 The fiduciary doctrine in light of rational bargaining 
I contend that there are significant parallels between the fiduciary doctrine in a 
commercial context and Gauthier’s contractarian morality. Identifying these parallels 
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will not only help rationalise the commercial fiduciary obligation, 89  but will also 
effectively address the gap in Gauthier’s conception of rational bargaining, namely the 
problem of the powerful freeloader. Thus, the parallels between the two frameworks 
are twofold. First, on a practical level, they both concern – what is ultimately self-
imposed – constraints on utility maximising conduct. Secondly, on a conceptual level, 
they are both the product of an overarching welfarist ideology, to the effect that the 
conduct constraints they articulate are fundamentally other-regarding, namely they 
consist of the duty to give effect to interests other than the rational agent’s self-interest. 
I will discuss each of these propositions in turn. 
As regards the first proposition, i.e. that both frameworks are concerned with self- 
imposed conduct constraints, I contend that this is directly so in the case of Gauthier’s 
methodology, whereas it is indirect with respect to the commercial fiduciary obligation. 
Thus, according to Gauthier, classically defined utility maximisers who have chosen to 
collaborate, must necessarily choose to constrain the pursuit of their interest in the 
short-term, so as to preserve and maximise their self-interest overall. The extent to 
which Gauthier’s constrained maximisers are to sacrifice their self-interest is then 
determined by the minimax relative concession. Correspondingly, the fiduciary 
doctrine is concerned with regulating the conduct of those, who have chosen to act in 
the interests of another and, in return, have been empowered by the latter to exercise 
discretion with respect to the conduct of the latter’s affairs. The fiduciary obligation, 
then, at least in the commercial context, may well be described as an exchange of linked 
undertakings – not just on the part of the fiduciary (see 6.2) but also on the part of the 
beneficiary, who must first empower the fiduciary to act for them (see, e.g., 6.2.2.1).  
In this light, I contend that it is imperative to imply an agreement into the exchange to 
the effect that the fiduciary will not act in a way that would adversely affect the interests 
of their charge. Why is this so? In the absence of the implied agreement, the beneficiary, 
presumed to be an agent equally rational to the fiduciary (and therefore presumed to 
																																																													
89 This qualification is important. Gauthier’s theory of morals operates only in the context of bargaining. 
Bargaining is the quintessence of commercial/economic activity and therefore the mechanics of 
Gauthier’s theory of bargaining are on all fours with standard commercial practice. However, Gauthier’s 
morality on its own tenets cannot operate outside of the bargain (see 1.3.2). Therefore, the justification 
of the fiduciary doctrine based on an implied agreement between fiduciary and beneficiary, which I 
develop below, cannot work with respect to individuals who do not have the capacity to bargain for 
themselves, e.g. minors or other legally incapacitated persons.  In other words, outside of the commercial 
realm, the fiduciary doctrine’s protection of those who cannot bargain cannot be justified through 
Gauthier’s methodology. 
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operate on the common knowledge of rationality), would not have granted such power 
to the fiduciary in the first place. This is because the risk to the beneficiary’s self-
interest, whether short or long-term, would be too high if it were left in the hands of 
another maximiser, who is not so constrained. In response to this agreement, the 
fiduciary doctrine may then be described as the institutional framework fleshing out 
and giving legal effect to its terms. I submit that, in light of this implied agreement, the 
fiduciary doctrine fits in seamlessly with Gauthier’s approach to rational bargaining.   
At this point, I should clarify that I am not concerned here with the question of whether 
the fiduciary obligation is philosophically autonomous 90  or simply an alternative 
iteration of a classic contractual duty91 or whether it is merely legal shorthand for a gap-
filling exercise by the courts, as they address the high transaction costs associated with 
apportioning liability for economic activity which adversely impacts social welfare.92 
My focus here is that the fiduciary doctrine, at least in the commercial sense, is 
inherently driven by the autonomous, parallel actions of both fiduciary and beneficiary, 
who must be presumed to be rational. To be sure, this vaguely contractarian view93 of 
the fiduciary doctrine is not supported in the case of a fiduciary identified as such in 
the wake of a resulting trust, as expressed in Westdeutche Landesbank (see 6.2.2.3). 
This type of trust is institutional (i.e. triggered by the court rather than the parties’ 																																																													
90 See, D.A. Demott ‘Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation’ (1988) Duke L.J. 879. 
91 As advocated in F.H. Easterbrook and D. Fischel ‘Contract and Fiduciary Duty’ (1993) 36 J. Law Econ 
425.    
92 A viewpoint first set out in R. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 J. Law Econ 1 and 
expanded upon in Easterbrook and Fischel, ibid, as well as R. Cooter and B.J. Freedman ‘The Fiduciary 
Relationship: its Economic Character and Legal Consequences’ (1991) 66 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1045.  
93  Briefly, my contention is that a purely contractual analysis of the fiduciary doctrine, as per the 
economic analysis of the authors cited in n.92, is plainly inappropriate. The benefit of a contractual 
analysis lies in its appreciation of the parties as autonomous agents and their intentions in the exchange 
of implied promises. However, this is where the buck stops. There is no quid pro quo in the fiduciary 
relation, which is the very essence of a contract. To be sure, a fiduciary is more likely to be a professional 
(almost invariably, an agent of some description) acting for the beneficiary for a fee, and in that respect 
the fiduciary is also in a contractual relationship with the beneficiary. However, the fiduciary’s capacity 
qua fiduciary lies in their power to exercise discretion over the affairs of the beneficiary, which 
automatically precludes the fiduciary relation from being a classically understood ‘contract’. It will be 
remembered that in contract law, a contract is defined as a bargain among equals; an exchange of 
promises, with the agreed consideration reflecting the value the parties have attributed to these promises. 
If one of the parties empowers the other to exercise discretion in their conduct of the yielding party’s 
affairs, the relationship by definition stops being equal – the power dynamic shifts automatically onto 
the party with power over the other – and no manner of consideration could reflect the value of the 
yielding party’s very autonomy. Thus, contractual analysis offers a familiar and well-worn path toward 
understanding the mechanics of the fiduciary relation but in no way should it be the last word in shaping 
the doctrine itself, because the nature of the fiduciary relation is simply alien to classical contract’s 
founding tenet: a rational agent will only ever yield part of their factor endowment in exchange for 
something (the law presumes) of equal value. 
	 213	
express or implied intentions) 94  and, following Westdeutche Landesbank, arises 
automatically once the person, who has received the claimant’s asset in error, becomes 
aware of holding the claimant’s property. Its purpose, in other words, is to correct a 
technicality, an error on the part of the claimant, where the circumstances so justify. 
This is not to say that the parties’ intention, or – more aptly – absence thereof, with 
respect to the claimant’s property is not conceptually relevant to the operation of the 
resulting trust and the fiduciary conception in that specific context. If anything, the 
resulting trust is conceptually the exact inverse of both express and constructive trusts, 
given that it operates on the absence of an intention for there to be a transfer of the legal 
title to (what is effectively) the trustee and in the absence of a relationship of any type 
(let alone the oft-cited ‘trust and confidence’) with the claimant. Therefore, putting the 
‘fiduciary’ under a resulting trust on par with the fiduciary in an express or constructive 
trust, would be both inaccurate and damaging to our understanding of the fiduciary 
concept. To my mind, the resulting trust is an easily digestible and effective judicial 
manoeuvre, which borrows the mechanism of title separation from classic trust 
jurisprudence so as to justify the use of a restitutionary remedy in cases of unjust 
enrichment. In this light, the resulting trust should be regarded as a standalone route to 
a restitutionary remedy, separate from general trusts jurisprudence, so as to avoid 
further compromising the operational integrity of the fiduciary concept. 
The second parallel between Gauthier’s contractarian morality and the fiduciary 
doctrine lies in the underlying ideology driving the conduct constraints. Thus, 
according to Gauthier, a rational economic agent must accept that actively constraining 
their pursuit of their short-term self-interest, so as to allow a similarly disposed agent 
to achieve their own ends under the bargain, is a necessary requirement for successful 
collaboration, which in turn is the only effective response to market externalities. 
Externalities, it will be remembered, are the perceived cause of our failure to develop a 
reliable compass for human interaction based on the market mechanism, which operates 
on a classic model of supply and demand, free from extraneous influences. It should go 
without saying that, in addition to being self-imposed, Gauthier’s conduct constraints 
are by definition other-regarding, and therefore they amount to moral duties. Thus, 
according to Gauthier, being moral is a rational agent’s ultimate utility maximising 
																																																													
94 Cf. W. Swadling ‘The Fiction of the Constructive Trust’ (2011) C.L.P. 399, who rejects any such 
distinction and argues that the constructive trust is merely a portmanteau for a certain type of money 
order. 
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response to an unpredictable world ruled by externalities, because it is conducive to 
creating a predilection for successful collaboration (most of the time).  
The ideological underpinnings of the fiduciary doctrine are strikingly similar to those 
which Gauthier sought to instil in his constrained maximisers. The common ground 
among Gauthier’s contractarian morality and the fiduciary doctrine is the realisation 
that maintaining the integrity of one’s relationships (be they social or professional) 
contributes to the maximisation of universal utility in the long run. This is because, if 
being moral is the objectively rational (long-term) strategy, then it should be what 
classically understood rational agents would choose to implement in the majority of 
cases. As demonstrated in the previous section, the fiduciary doctrine has not been 
articulated in so many words (hence the widespread debate as to the extent and even 
nature of its coverage), as it developed and evolved through case law, which on the one 
hand keeps the doctrine flexible but, on the other, renders it frequently unpredictable. 
Having said that, at least in the commercial context, the doctrine can be usefully 
rationalised by tracking Gauthier’s contractarian reasoning, given that the commercial 
fiduciary obligation itself can comfortably fit the contractarian mould. The exchange in 
both frameworks concludes with at least one party assuming other-regarding duties. I 
submit that the difference between the two frameworks is that under Gauthier’s 
reasoning the other-regarding duties are self-imposed directly, whereas under the 
fiduciary doctrine the other-regarding duties are self-imposed indirectly. This means 
that, in the absence of an express prior understanding between the parties, it is the courts 
that impose the fiduciary obligation, in effect, enforcing an implied agreement between 
two rational agents, where one (the beneficiary) empowers the other (the fiduciary) to 
exercise discretion in their conduct of the beneficiary’s affairs, in exchange for a 
promise to do so with utmost loyalty to and in the beneficiary’s best interests. 
This reasoning tracks the primary objective of English commercial law, which is to give 
effect to ‘the reasonable expectations of honest persons’, the idea being that in the 
absence of circumstances somehow negating the consent of those involved, the bargain 
among legally capable agents is sacrosanct. On this reasoning, the extraneous 
implication of other-regarding duties into such bargains would only be possible where 
it can be demonstrated that doing so gives effect to the reasonable expectations of the 
parties to the bargain. By applying Gauthier’s approach to rational bargaining in the 
context of collaboration, this thesis sought to demonstrate just that; i.e. that given the 
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economic drivers behind commercial collaboration – a set of circumstances that must 
be taken into account as relevant context in order to determine the perceived 
expectations of the parties at the time of contracting – the rational economic agents 
involved in contractual joint ventures would voluntarily assume other-regarding duties 
in order to ensure successful collaboration and maximise their self-interest overall. 
Thus, I submit that considering the commercial application of the fiduciary doctrine 
through the lens of Gauthier’s rational bargaining based on an implied agreement 
between the purported fiduciary and beneficiary, is a dependable means of effectively 
rationalising the law in this area, in the sense of rendering it consistent and replicable. 
This is because it reconciles the operation of the fiduciary doctrine, whose core tenet 
lies in the assumption of other-regarding duties, with the foremost consideration of 
English commercial law, namely the parties’ intentions (in terms of their individual and 
collective objectives under the bargain, and the obligations they agree to in pursuit of 
those objectives). 
6.3.2 Fiduciary defaults in contractual joint ventures: their extent 
A contractarian analysis appears to also shape the commercial fiduciary obligation once 
the relationship is underway. Accordingly, the character and extent of the duties, which 
make up the obligation are determined by the circumstances of the case, including any 
relevant agreement between the parties. The Privy Council addressed this point directly 
in Kelly v. Cooper,95 which concerned the extent of the obligation in the context of an 
estate agent hired by two competing principals to sell their respective houses, which 
were adjacent to each other. The plaintiff’s house was eventually sold to the same 
buyer, who had first purchased the adjacent house. Following completion of the sale, 
the plaintiff refused to pay the defendant their agreed commission on the sale and sued 
on the ground that the defendant had been in breach of fiduciary duty, not having 
disclosed the fact that they had been acting for a competing home-owner and having 
allowed their own interests to compete with those of the plaintiff. The Privy Council 
held that since it was the business of estate agents to act for multiple principals, a term 
was to be implied into the agency contract that such an agent was not only entitled to 
act for other principals selling similar properties, but also to maintain the confidentiality 
of information obtained from each principal. This ratio was later approved by the House 
																																																													
95 [1993] AC 205. 
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of Lords in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates, 96  where Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
famously observed that:  
‘The phrase “fiduciary duties” is a dangerous one, giving rise to a mistaken 
assumption that all fiduciaries owe the same duties in all circumstances. That is 
not the case. Although, … every fiduciary is under a duty not to make a profit 
from his position (unless such profit is authorised), the fiduciary duties owed, 
for example, by an express trustee are not the same as those owed by an agent. 
Moreover, and more relevantly, the extent and nature of the fiduciary duties 
owed in any particular case fall to be determined by reference to any underlying 
contractual relationship between the parties.’97 
In other words, the nature and extent of fiduciary duties being implied into the 
contractual joint venture by default must inevitably be subject to the joint venture 
agreement. Mason J expressed this point in Hospital Products v. United States Surgical 
Corporation98 thus: 
‘That contractual and fiduciary relationships may co-exist between the same 
parties has never been doubted. Indeed, the existence of a basic contractual 
relationship has in many situations provided a foundation for the erection of a 
fiduciary relationship. In these situations, it is the contractual foundation which 
is all important because it is the contract that regulates the basic rights and 
liabilities of the parties. The fiduciary relationship, if it is to exist at all, must 
accommodate itself to the terms of the contract so that it is consistent with, and 
conforms to, them. The fiduciary relationship cannot be superimposed upon the 
contract in such a way as to alter the operation, which the contract was intended 
to have, according to its true construction.’99 
This dictum has been applied rather enthusiastically by the Australian courts, with 
arguably unbalanced results. A case in point is John Alexander’s Club v. White City 
Tennis Club100 which concerned a joint venture between the appellant and respondent 
for the acquisition and development of land, on part of which the respondent conducted 
sports activities under a lease and licence. The legal issue arose from the discrepancy 
between a memorandum of understanding in which the terms of the joint venture were 
originally recorded and a subsequent agreement, which was to be read in conjunction 
with the memorandum but was to supersede the latter where the two conflicted. A 
number of obligations to be performed by the appellant (JAC) on behalf of the 																																																													
96 [1995] 2 AC 145. 
97 Ibid, 206. 
98 n.5. 
99 Ibid, [70]. 
100 [2010] 241 CLR 1. 
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respondent (WCT) were included in the memorandum but not the subsequent 
agreement. Under the memorandum JAC was to acquire two options to purchase the 
land, one to be exercised by JAC and the other to be exercised by WCT, only in the 
event that JAC failed to exercise the first. With respect to the first option, JAC was to 
exercise it on behalf of a newly incorporated company, whose membership was to be 
offered to existing members of the respondent club. That company was then to offer a 
ninety-nine-year lease over the land to a second company, with whom JAC was to enter 
an operating agreement. However, under the subsequent agreement, JAC was under no 
obligation to exercise the option on behalf of another company, grant a lease or enter 
into an operating agreement. In fact, under this agreement JAC was free to acquire the 
land for itself or a nominee, which is what it did, once relations with WTC deteriorated. 
WTC sued claiming inter alia that by exercising the option, JAC breached its Pallant 
v. Morgan-like fiduciary duty (see 4.2.3.2) so that JAC’s nominee held the land on 
constructive trust exclusively for the respondent. 
In a rather peculiar judgment,101 the High Court openly disparaged WTC for taking an 
all-or-nothing approach to its claim, pursuing only the fiduciary relationship and 
constructive trust angle and not considering in its strategy the interests of third parties 
(such as those of the entity that financed JAC’s acquisition of the land).102 Never mind 
that the nature of litigation is by definition adversarial and the parties are entitled, 
expected even, to take an entirely self-interested approach to their claims. Never mind, 
also, that a strategy based in contract would have left WTC with no meaningful remedy, 
for JAC had no assets against which to enforce an award of damages, apart from the 
land acquired for its nominee, in which, had the memorandum and, later, its spirit been 
upheld, WTC would have a significant proprietary interest (through a corporation).103 
Instead, the court held unanimously that not only had there been no breach of fiduciary 
duty on JAC’s part, but that there had been no fiduciary relationship between the parties 
at all. Applying Mason J’s dicta in Hospital Products, the Court held that the 																																																													
101 For comment see R. Flannigan ‘Collateral Contracting Implicitly may vary Fiduciary Relationship’ 
(2010) LQR 496; J. Knowler and C. Rickett ‘The Fiduciary Duties of Joint Venture Parties – When do 
they arise and what do they comprise?’ (2011) 41 V.U.W.L.R 117, 126ff. 
102 n.100, [75]-[76]. 
103 The Court also referred, apparently with approval, to JAC’s assertion that it did not act fraudulently, 
unconscionably or in breach of fiduciary duty, for its nominee offered a licence to WTC’s membership 
to continue using the grounds for sporting activities following its acquisition of the disputed land (namely 
the clubhouse and grounds, on which WTC previously held a lease and licences); n.100, [40]. As 
Flannigan points out, ibid, 498, this ex post event was irrelevant to the legal issue of whether the appellant 
was in breach of fiduciary duty when it exercised the option for, effectively, its sole benefit. 
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subsequent agreement superseded any fiduciary relationship established by the 
memorandum of understanding. 104  The court rejected WTC’s argument that their 
relationship with JAC, which started with the memorandum, had placed WTC in a 
vulnerable position for not only did it trust and rely on JAC to secure its future, it also 
gave up its valuable legal rights (namely its lease on the clubhouse, with 15 years 
remaining on it, and licences to use the grounds for sporting activities) to pursue the 
opportunity with JAC. On the facts, the court held, the only reliance was with respect 
to JAC’s performance of its contractual obligations and any vulnerability arose from 
the risk of JAC’s breach, which is the case with all contracts.105 The court held that 
WTC did not rely on any representations by JAC, was on an equal bargaining position 
with it and did not depend on JAC to carry out any dealings of which WTC was 
ignorant.106 Furthermore, WTC’s argument based on the Pallant v. Morgan equity was 
not applicable on the facts, for there was no firm arrangement between the parties and 
JAC had not induced WTC not to seek the purchase options which JAC obtained and 
exercised.107 
The effect of the High Court’s judgment is to suggest that a fiduciary relationship may 
be entirely displaced by a subsequent agreement between the parties. I contend that, on 
a contractarian analysis of the fiduciary doctrine’s commercial application, this is the 
correct conclusion, but only where the subsequent agreement actually reflects the 
relationship between the parties. It will be remembered that the commercial fiduciary 
obligation itself depends on the voluntary undertakings of both the fiduciary (to act in 
the beneficiary’s or the joint interests to the exclusion of their own several interests) 
and the beneficiary (to relinquish control of their own affairs to the discretion of the 
fiduciary). In the present case, the court refused to acknowledge the relevant context 
which informed the relationship between the parties at both times of contracting, which 
was plainly the original memorandum of understanding.108 Indeed, not only did the 
subsequent agreement not extinguish the memorandum but it expressly ensured that it 
remained relevant to the relationship, albeit with the agreement taking precedence in 
																																																													
104 n.100, [91]-[95]. 
105 Ibid, [81]. 
106 Ibid, [81]-[83]. 
107 Ibid, [68]-[69]. 
108 This approach was unanimously taken by the Court of Appeal in White City Tennis Club Ltd v. John 
Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 86, [53] and [61]-[65]. 
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the event of conflict. No doubt, both parties were represented by competent and 
experienced professionals. However, given the language of the two documents and the 
collaborative spirit in which the parties first approached the opportunity, it was also 
entirely reasonable for the respondent to read the subsequent agreement in light of the 
memorandum of understanding, so much so that it acted to its considerable detriment 
as a result.109 I submit that the latter point contradicts directly the Court’s reasoning 
with respect to the applicability of the Pallant v Morgan equity; there was a clear 
arrangement, which – on the facts – even went beyond the ‘advanced negotiations’ that 
gave rise to fiduciary obligations in Brian, according to which WTC acted to its 
detriment by both relinquishing its legal rights and refraining from pursuing the option 
to purchase the land (which would have put it in direct competition with JAC and would 
have defeated the point of the joint venture).  
To my mind, JAC’s conduct in John Alexander’s Clubs is a classic example of a 
freeloader taking the competition out of the equation in order to develop an opportunity 
to its sole advantage. It is also an example of the type of conduct, which the Pallant v. 
Morgan equity was meant to address, if rationalised in light of an implied agreement 
among self-interested agents who have opted to become constrained maximisers in the 
context of collaboration. WTC in John Alexander’s Clubs had not made a bad bargain, 
as the High Court appeared to suggest,110 for the bargain made reasonable sense in light 
of the collaborative arrangement with JAC. It was JAC’s reneging on the agreement in 
order to pursue the opportunity in its sole benefit that gave rise to the dispute and 
WTC’s ambitious claims. As I understand it, the Court’s uncharacteristically hostile 
attitude to WTC’s case was due to WTC insisting on the imposition of a constructive 
trust and the Court being eager to reign in the circumstances where the remedial 
constructive trust is imposed, particularly where parties unconnected to the dispute 
could be affected by it. In its own words: ‘A constructive trust ought not to be imposed 
if there are other orders capable of doing full justice’,111 such as equitable compensation 
																																																													
109 On this the Court, peculiarly, observed that the pressure on WTC to relinquish its legal interests did 
not come from JAC, but from third-party purchasers of the land from whom JAC and WTC would 
subsequently acquire the options to purchase; n.109, [62]; this however is immaterial – the respondent 
offloaded its interest not because it was required to do so by the memorandum, but in the spirit of the 
arrangement with JAC, on whose undertaking in the memorandum WTC had relied. 
110 n.100, [56]. 
111 Ibid, [128]. For a well-reasoned analysis of the circumstances where a proprietary remedy for breach 
of fiduciary duty is appropriate, see S. Worthington ‘Fiduciary Duties and Proprietary Remedies: 
Addressing the Failure of Equitable Formulae’ (2013) CLJ 720; on this analysis, the appropriate remedy 
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or an account of profits, neither of which WTC pursued. Having said that, I submit that 
the artifice of the High Court’s reasoning could have been avoided had the joint venture 
been subject to default fiduciary obligations, thus eliminating the gap created by the 
memorandum and the subsequent agreement. The default duties would have been 
justified on the basis that this is what the parties would have wanted, had they properly 
considered what their self-interest requires. On the matter of the appropriate remedy, it 
would have been open to the equitable jurisdiction of the court to either substitute the 
award of a constructive trust in favour of WTC for an account of profits112 or to declare 
a constructive trust for the joint benefit of both JAC’s nominee and WTC. I submit that 
the latter option would have accurately upheld the intentions of the parties at the time 
of contracting, both originally and with respect to the subsequent agreement. 
In summary, this section has demonstrated that the commercial application of the 
fiduciary doctrine is primarily informed by the contractual arrangements of the parties, 
whether implied or express. By the same token, a fiduciary relationship in the context 
of collaborative activity, such as the contractual joint venture, may well be terminated 
by contract. However, as the Australian High Court’s decision in John Alexander’s 
Clubs illustrates, the intention to terminate must be clear from the circumstances of the 
relationship and having regard to the conduct of all parties. Such assessment must 
include any circumstances on the basis of which the parties may become entitled to 
expect that the other party is to act in the joint interest to the exclusion of their several 
interest. Any ambiguity (as, I submit, was the issue in John Alexander’s Clubs) should 
be interpreted in favour of mutual fiduciary duties on the basis that this is what rational 
agents, who the law must presume are constrained maximisers given their agreement 
to collaborate, would have wanted so as to optimise their self-interest in the context of 
the particular agreement and maximise their self-interest overall. 
6.3.3 Fiduciary defaults in contractual joint ventures: their content 
The effect of the analysis above is that the conduct of contractual co-venturers, who 
have been identified as fiduciaries following Gauthier’s methodology of rational 
																																																													
against the appellant would have been personal, such as equitable compensation, rather than a 
constructive trust.  
112  The House of Lords did something similar in Nocton (6.2.2.2); See, also the discussion of the 
operation of equity in Australian courts in P. Finn ‘Common Law Divergences’ (2013) 37 Melbourne 
University Law Review 509. 
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bargaining, cannot be constrained beyond the scope of the joint venture agreement. At 
the same time, while the incidence and extent of the fiduciary obligation is determined 
by the parties’ intentions as manifest from their relationship or agreement, its content 
is not. In terms of content the fiduciary obligation is almost entirely independent from 
the intentions of the parties113 and comprises exclusively the duty of loyalty.114 It will 
be remembered that the commercial fiduciary obligation refers to the duty to act in the 
beneficiary’s and/or the joint interest to the exclusion of the fiduciary’s several interest. 
According to English law, however, the duty does not extend further than this.115 In 
other words, liability for breach of a fiduciary duty will arise only where the fiduciary 
has contravened their duty of loyalty – generally, by making an (unauthorised) personal 
gain, whether directly or indirectly, by virtue of their position as a fiduciary.  
There are two consequences of this narrow conception of fiduciary loyalty. First, as 
Millet LJ pointed out, ‘not every breach of duty by a fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary 
duty’.116 Consequently, a fiduciary acting negligently or recklessly in the conduct of 
the joint venture business would not of itself be a breach of fiduciary duty. Where this 
conduct is actionable,117 it will be the subject of an action in tort (e.g. negligence) or 
contract (e.g. for breach of a reasonable care and skill clause).118 Similarly, where the 
fiduciary divulges sensitive confidential information, such as trade secrets pertinent to 
the joint venture, the offending conduct would be addressed through the law of 
confidence or contract. 119 The fiduciary in this case would not be in breach of their 																																																													
113 While a fiduciary may breach the duty of loyalty, they may not be liable if the beneficiary has ratified 
the breach. In that sense, the parties’ intentions may impact on the effect of the duty, but not its content. 
114 Bristol and WBS, n.8, 18, per Millet LJ. 
115 The same holds for the other major common law jurisdictions, namely Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand: see, generally, R. Flannigan ‘The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability’ (2004) 83 
Can.B.Rev. 35. Cf. American jurisprudence; see below. 
116 Bristol and WBS, n.8, 16. 
117 Note the analysis of different types of opportunistic behaviour (‘production opportunism’, associated 
with the production process – contrasted with ‘exchange opportunism’, associated with the 
negotiation/bargaining process. The first is actionable while the latter is not, for it refers to what is 
essentially, competitive behaviour) in R. Flannigan ‘The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability’ (2007) 
32 Del.J.Corp.L. 393, 396. 
118 E.g. Bristol and WBS, n.8 (solicitor acting for both borrower and lender negligently advising lender); 
LAC Minerals, n.9; and see Chaudhry v. Prabhakar [1989] 1 WLR 29, (a gratuitous agency was the 
basis for establishing the duty of care in a negligence claim); see further the discussion in M. Conaglen, 
Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-Fiduciary Duties (Hart, 2010), who argues 
that the duty of loyalty is merely an amalgam of the various duties making up the fiduciary obligation 
(namely acting in good faith, avoiding conflicts of interest), its function being to ensure that the fiduciary 
will perform properly the non-fiduciary aspects of their undertaking. 
119 Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers [1990] 1 AC 190 (‘a duty of confidence arises when 
confidential information comes to the knowledge of a person (the confidant) in circumstances where he 
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duty of loyalty, unless they had made an unauthorised personal gain from their conduct, 
whether directly or indirectly.120 To be sure, it could be argued that in a broad sense the 
duty of loyalty includes a duty to act to one’s best abilities (that is, avoiding negligent 
or reckless acts with respect to the conduct of the beneficiary’s or the joint venture’s 
business), as well as a duty to adhere to the terms of the joint venture contract.121 
However, addressing conduct, which is actionable under other legal doctrines, as a 
breach of fiduciary duty would not only amount to abuse of the doctrine itself, but 
would also cause unnecessary and unwelcome duplication in both legal doctrine and 
practice. In turn, this would further cloud our understanding of the doctrine and its 
operation, while practically it would do away with important safeguards, such as the 
rules on loss mitigation or contributory negligence, which ensure a balanced 
adjudication process. 
The second consequence of the narrow conception of fiduciary loyalty is that it is 
generally understood to be merely proscriptive of disloyal conduct. Thus, while the 
fiduciary is required from the outset to act in an entirely other-regarding manner, that 
obligation does not involve actively promoting their beneficiary’s interests, nor does it 
prescribe the way the fiduciary exercises their discretion in connection with the 
beneficiary’s affairs (though the fiduciary will be exposed to liability in negligence, if 
they fail to exercise care). Rather, the fiduciary is required to refrain from acting in a 
way which would cause their own interests to conflict with those of the beneficiary’s. 
In Nolan’s words ‘fiduciary duties promote loyalty by prohibiting disloyalty, and 
activity which might lead to disloyalty’.122  
How does the duty of loyalty then, fit in with the conception of constrained 
maximisation understood as ‘good faith conduct’ (see 5.3.2), when implied into the 
joint venture contract? In Chapter 5, I argued that a duty of good faith mandated through 																																																													
has notice, or is held to have agreed, that the information is confidential’, ibid, 281, Per Lord Goff); in 
the commercial realm see: Arklow Investments Ltd v. Maclean [2000] 1 WLR 594 (bank was not liable 
for using for own purposes sensitive information it received when acting for a client in a property 
transaction); Vercoe v. Rutland Fund Management Ltd [2010] EWHC 424 (venture capital firm using 
confidential proposals to proceed with transaction excluding those who made the proposals was in breach 
of confidentiality agreement). 
120 E.g. Campbell v. Frisbee [2002] EWCA Civ. 1374 (duty of confidentiality was part of contract of 
former employee). 
121 This is the operative argument in American fiduciary jurisprudence. Indicatively, see R.R.W. Brooks 
‘Knowledge in Fiduciary Relations’ in A.S. Gold and P.B. Miller (eds), Philosophical Foundations of 
Fiduciary Law (OUP, 2014). 
122 R. Nolan ‘A Fiduciary Duty to Disclose?’ (1997) LQR 220, at 222. 
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the contract mechanism must reflect the values of honesty and fairness, which the 
parties (whom the law must presume are constrained maximisers) must have exhibited 
in order to successfully bargain in the first place. I argued that the post-contractual 
aspect of the duty must take both a positive and a negative form. Specifically, post-
contractual good-faith-as-fairness should comprise a duty to avoid conduct which 
would ultimately harm the joint strategy and good-faith-as-honesty should comprise a 
limited duty to disclose, its extent to be determined by the application of Gauthier’s 
minimax relative concession (see 5.3.2.1). 
Against this background, I contend that in the context of contractual joint ventures, the 
duty of good faith, understood as honesty and fairness, is conceptually compatible with 
the general understanding of the duty of loyalty described above. This is because the 
duty of loyalty may be understood as a duty to, if not actively promote, at least preserve 
the interests of the beneficiary. In the context of the contractual joint venture, the duty 
of loyalty is presumed to be mutual by definition, for the law’s presumption of 
rationality requires constrained maximisers to bargain only with similarly disposed 
agents. Therefore, all parties to the venture will be presumed to have submitted to the 
duty of loyalty. The mutual duty of loyalty must then be understood as an all-round 
obligation to refrain from harming the others’ interests, which are in turn presumed to 
identify with the joint strategy. Fidelity to the joint strategy is also presumed to be the 
core of good-faith-as-fairness and good-faith-as-honesty, articulated through the 
contract mechanism, making the duty of loyalty under fiduciary law conceptually and 
practically identical to a contractually mandated good faith standard. 
However, I submit that while the two duties (fiduciary loyalty and contractual good 
faith) have a common conceptual core, at least in the contractual joint venture context, 
it is their respective procedural mandates that set them apart, even where fiduciary 
loyalty is examined through a contractarian lens. Thus, I contend that Gauthier’s 
method of rational bargaining (namely one that presumes voluntary conduct constraints 
in agreements between rational agents) would be severely handicapped, if implemented 
through the contract mechanism. This is evident from the hypothetical scenario 
contemplated in 5.3.2.1(c), where the implementation of conduct constraints through 
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the contract mechanism ultimately allows Acorn’s freeloading to go unaddressed.123 In 
response to this, I contend that good-faith-as-honesty, at the post-contractual stage, may 
take the form of an unbounded duty to disclose. In the next section I will argue that in 
certain circumstances and in order to prevent and even address freeloading in 
contractual joint ventures, the duty of loyalty may be interpreted as comprising a duty 
to disclose, where this falls within the scope of the joint venture and the information is 
vital for its continuing success. However, this is only prudent where the long-term 
interests of the disclosing party are secured through the proprietary remedies afforded 
through the fiduciary mechanism. 
6.4 Level of utility achieved from basing good faith in fiduciary law: solving the 
freeloader problem 
Let us consider the effect of implementing Gauthier’s conduct constraints as a 
contractual duty of good faith in the hypothetical joint venture between Acorn and 
Brazilnut (see 5.3.2.1(c)). Whether approached as a negative or positive duty, the 
purpose of the contractually implied good faith requirement is to safeguard the joint 
strategy. At the outset, this is entirely compatible with Gauthier’s approach to rational 
bargaining in the context of cooperation. The difficulty arises with respect to how this 
requirement translates into action for both Acorn and Brazilnut when implementing the 
joint strategy. The technical calculation, it will be remembered, is determined by the 
parties’ respective minimax relative concessions. Gauthier’s methodology requires that 
every time the parties’ respective long-term self-interest is likely to be affected by the 
joint strategy, the parties have to calculate their minimax relative concession. Gauthier 
holds that if the parties remain faithful to the joint strategy the calculation will 
eventually become unnecessary. However, as illustrated from Acorn’s decision to 
withhold information on the effective solution to the glitch if and when it occurs, the 
minimax relative concession will not allow a rational agent to knowingly jeopardise 
their long-term interest for the benefit of the joint strategy. It goes without saying that 
Acorn’s decision amounts to freeloading. Apart from the additional expense caused by 
field operations stalling following a glitch, Acorn’s unique knowledge and 
understanding of the technology puts it in a position to theoretically hold the joint 
																																																													
123 Perhaps along the lines of ‘shirking’, although, here, I submit that the conduct is fairly more egregious; 
see the analysis on this in R. Flannigan ‘Fiduciary Obligation in the Supreme Court’ (1990) 54 
Sask.L.Rev 45, at 51. 
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venture hostage particularly at times when the reliability of the technology is under 
examination, for instance when the venture seeks additional financing. However, with 
Acorn not being technically in breach of its express obligations under the joint venture 
agreement, Brazilnut would have to rely on a default contractual duty of good faith, 
determined by what the parties (as constrained maximisers) would have agreed to had 
they properly reflected on what their self-interest requires. In the circumstances, the 
claim would fail. This is because its minimax relative concession would not allow 
Acorn to make further disclosures, thus becoming catastrophically exposed to the risk 
of Brazilnut’s own freeloading, so Acorn could not be held to be in breach of the duty. 
Furthermore, Acorn’s size and resources relative to Brazilnut’s will not exempt it from 
the freeloader label. It will be remembered that vulnerability in the context of an 
ongoing contractual relationship is not determined by the respective resources and clout 
of the parties (though these will certainly be relevant in the innocent party’s ability to 
deal with the fallout from the freeloader’s conduct) but is dynamic, as the power 
pendulum shifts back and forth depending on which party is relying on the other’s 
performance of its obligations under the joint strategy. The constant calculation of the 
minimax relative concession ensures that, where adherence to the joint strategy is likely 
to cause a party to lose out in the long-term, at least some freeloading will remain an 
option. 
Having said that, the outcome of the calculation would be different had there been a 
regulatory framework in place which would mitigate or even negate the risk to Acorn’s 
long-term self-interest. However, the contract mechanism simply cannot provide the 
necessary framework to safeguard the calculating agent’s long-term self-interest, every 
time (see 5.3.2.3). The remedial system under English contract law, even in its most 
permissive form (i.e. the exceptional Wrotham Park damages) is not sufficiently robust 
to actively discourage freeloading. This is because the freeloader may calculate the 
damages payable upon defection from the joint strategy and bear them willingly as the 
cost of defection – it will matter little if the overall profit from defection is greater than 
this cost. Therefore, conduct-constraining rules in the form of a contractually implied 
duty of good faith are not capable of effectively addressing freeloading.  
It is a different matter, however, where the duty of good faith is implied into the 
contractual joint venture as a fiduciary obligation compelling the parties to act with 
utmost loyalty toward each other and the joint strategy. The remedial framework in this 
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case is entirely gain-based, giving the innocent party access, both substantively and 
procedurally (in terms of asset tracing), to any benefit the freeloader has acquired in 
breach of their duty of loyalty. Indeed, in English law it is now established that where 
the fiduciary makes a gain either through the use of property or information acquired 
in their capacity as a fiduciary, they will be holding the benefit on constructive trust for 
the beneficiary.124 In the context of a contractual joint venture, therefore, the freeloader 
would be holding the benefit from their conduct on constructive trust for the co-
venturers.  
How does the operation of this gain-based remedial regime impact the calculation of 
the parties’ respective minimax relative concessions? I submit that the concession in 
each case would be far more extensive, given that the risk of loss to the innocent party 
would be significantly mitigated, if not negated outright. In Acorn and Brazilnut’s case, 
Acorn could be compelled to disclose its knowledge of the glitch on the ground that it 
would otherwise be contravening its duty of loyalty to the joint venture, by jeopardising 
the joint strategy. At the same time, Brazilnut is prohibited from using this knowledge 
for its own purposes to the exclusion of Acorn125 on pain of being compelled to hold 
whatever gain it has made for its collaborator, at least in part. Therefore, the operation 
of the gain-based remedies and the procedurally favourable tracing process, which go 
hand in hand with the enforcement of the fiduciary obligation, render straightforward 
the presumption that the parties – as constrained maximisers – have submitted to stricter 
other-regarding duties of mutual loyalty and good faith, having properly reflected on 
what their self-interest requires (i.e. having calculated their respective minimax relative 
concessions). On this basis, I conclude that implying an extra-contractual duty of good 
faith into the contractual joint venture through the mechanism of fiduciary law affords 
the co-venturers (who the law must presume to be constrained maximisers) the highest 
utility, understood as both risk mitigation and maximisation of long-term self-interest. 
																																																													
124 FHR European Ventures, n.28; the judgment overruled the position under Lister, n.28, and Sinclair 
v. Versailes [2011] EWCA Civ. 347 Notably, the Australian courts had reached this point sooner: 
Grimaldi v. Chameleon Mining NL (No2) (2012) 200 FCR 296, which expressly did not follow Sinclair. 
125 E.g. see Vercoe, n.119, where no fiduciary duty could be established. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I set out to demonstrate that the English law on contractual joint ventures 
is outdated and neither reflects nor accommodates the commercial realities, which make 
the contractual joint venture a popular vehicle for economic growth. I argued that to 
address this problem, English law must recognise a new legal model of commercial 
association to fit the contractual (project specific) joint venture. The new model should 
be governed by the joint venture agreement as interpreted in light of all of the relevant 
context, including the economic drivers behind the parties’ intention to cooperate – both 
from an individual and a collective perspective. To determine which parts of the context 
are relevant to the interpretation of the agreement, I argued for the implementation of 
David Gauthier’s ‘Morals by Agreement’, which provides a framework for discerning 
what rational (i.e. self-interested) agents would intend in the context of cooperation, 
when pursuing the maximisation of their long-term self-interest. By applying this 
theory of rational bargaining, I argued that such agents would expect certain duties to 
be implied extra-contractually into the agreement, so as to effectively deal with the 
problem of a co-venturer defecting from the joint strategy to pursue short-term gain. I 
then examined the two main jurisprudential avenues available for such exercise, namely 
the mechanisms of contract and fiduciary doctrine respectively. Having demonstrated 
that the fiduciary mechanism affords the highest utility option in terms of enforcement 
and remedies for implying legally effective duties into the joint venture relationship, I 
argued what these duties would consist of a general duty of loyalty to the joint strategy, 
comprising both negative duties of avoiding conflicts of interest and a positive duty of 
disclosure.  
My central premise can be expressed in terms of the principle of instrumental reason 
(i.e. the principle of hypothetical imperatives), whereby to pursue a goal is to pursue 
the necessary means of achieving that goal or to give up that goal.1 I have argued that 
the long-established goal of the law on contractual joint ventures is to give effect to the 
contracting intentions of prudent (utility maximising) commercial parties. I have also 
argued that the necessary means of achieving that goal is that the law takes into account 
both the inevitable limitations of attempts to contract for the future and the wider 
economic factors driving collaboration between frequently competing, economic 																																																													
1 M. Adcock and D. Beyleveld ‘Morality in intellectual property law: a concept-theoretic framework’ 
(2016) 4(1) Intellectual property rights 154, 155. 
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agents. Thus, the law’s ex post determination of the parties’ intentions must take proper 
account of those considerations or give up the goal of giving effect to the intentions of 
prudent commercial parties at the time of contracting. Specifically, the law on 
contractual joint ventures must first accept the following presumptions or give up the 
identified goal. Thus, the law must: 
a) presume that the parties to the joint venture are rational (i.e. self-interested) 
economic agents, who have chosen to cooperate with like-minded economic 
agents, so as to mitigate the cost (and overall risk) of dealing with externalities; 
b) presume that these agents have chosen, in this context, to become, what 
Gauthier terms, ‘constrained maximisers’ or ‘utility optimisers’, namely that 
they have chosen to constrain the pursuit of their short-term self-interest, so as 
to maximise their self-interest overall; 
c) presume that the constraints the parties have agreed to in the bargaining process 
are by definition other-regarding, for they must each concede the other party’s 
pursuit of its own interests (up to a point determined by Gauthier’s adaptation 
of the Lockean proviso, which he terms ‘minimax relative concession’ or 
‘maximin  relative benefit’ – namely, conceding just short of the point where 
the agent becomes worse off by reason of the bargain than they would have been 
had they never bargained at all); 
d) presume that the parties, as constrained maximisers, have agreed to those other-
regarding conduct constraints, which afford them the highest utility in the long 
run;  
e) presume that, as the law stands and given its historical evolution, the conduct 
constraints which afford the parties the highest utility are fiduciary in nature and 
effect; and 
f) presume that the parties must have accepted mutual fiduciary duties as part of 
the bargaining process. 
The collective effect of those presumptions can be expressed as follows: if a rational 
agent’s goal is to maximise their self-interest in a joint venture operating within the 
constraints of English law, then, since the necessary means of giving effect to that goal 
is to accept fiduciary duties, that agent must accept fiduciary duties or give up that goal. 
On this basis, in order to achieve its objective of giving effect to the expectations of 
rational commercial parties, the law on contractual joint ventures must imply by default 
mutually binding fiduciary duties into the joint venture relationship (on the basis that 
this is what the parties must have accepted), or give up this objective. 
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My contention is that while Gauthier’s reliance on self-interest alone cannot provide a 
complete justification for being a constrained maximiser, his theory of rational 
bargaining provides two crucial insights. First, when compared to the law’s current 
approach to determining the intentions of reasonable parties to a contract, it provides a 
more accurate and comprehensive understanding of what it means to reason from a 
contractual party’s self-interested perspective, which is, incidentally, how the law 
purports to apply in the context of commercial relations. Secondly, when implemented 
in the existing legal framework, it provides a coherent and replicable basis for the 
implication of other-regarding duties in commercial relations. From the outset this 
tracks the objective of commercial law to give effect to the intentions of rational 
commercial parties. But more importantly, it addresses the inconsistencies in the courts’ 
expectations of what constitutes acceptable conduct in the context of joint ventures (by 
reference to the parties’ own presumed intentions).  
Crucially, the incentive to act in an other-regarding manner (i.e. to act morally) every 
time, which is missing from Gauthier’s reasoning, is provided by the legal framework, 
in which Gauthier’s approach to rational bargaining is implemented. Specifically, this 
is achieved through the operation of strict other-regarding legal duties imposed through 
the fiduciary doctrine. On a superficial level, this point might appear circular. The 
criticism would hold that using Gauthier’s approach to rational bargaining as a 
justification for the imposition of extra-contractual defaults into joint venture 
relationships is question-begging, if those defaults are relied on to fill the gaps in 
Gauthier’s reasoning. However, it must be remembered that unlike the other-regarding 
duties which Gauthier’s contractarian morality seeks to justify on the basis of (long-
term) self-interest, the other-regarding legal duties imposed through the fiduciary (or 
contractual, for that matter) mechanism require no justification, for they operate by fiat. 
The purpose of implementing Gauthier’s methodology into existing law is to deliver a 
predictable and replicable regulatory framework for contractual joint ventures, which 
gives effect to the intentions of rational commercial parties.  As long as it is accepted 
that Gauthier’s methodology for rational bargaining is merely the means necessary to 
achieve the end of rationalising the existing law on contractual joint ventures, there is 
no circularity to the argument, for whereas Gauthier’s methodology is limited by its 
fundamental reliance on self-interest, the law is not. 
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Ultimately, English law already recognises that self-interest is not a sufficient 
foundation for the law as such. In fact, it is plain that many areas of English law 
recognise and impose duties, which expect the individual to not only act against their 
self-interest, but also to actively give effect to the interests of others. Examples range 
from the law for the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms, to the laws 
of property rights, family relations, civil wrongs, industrial relations and, to an extent, 
even company law. In every case, the law provides for substantive other-regarding 
duties, namely duties which do not rest, and apply irrespective of, the self-interest of 
the individual. A prime example of such duties is fiduciary duties. In fact, if it is 
accepted that the validity of such duties is not dependent on their recognition by positive 
law, then they are properly described as legally effective moral duties.  
By way of conclusion, I contend that English law’s reliance on constraints, which go 
beyond the individual self-interest, cannot be meaningfully restrained to one area of 
law, nor should it be. This however is an argument to be made in the context of a fully 
developed theory on the norms underlying the law as whole, which is beyond the remit 
of this thesis. However, as a final observation, it may be argued that in order for the law 
to be valid the values underlying the law as a whole must be reflected in all areas which 
ultimately regulate and/or affect human activity and relations.2 In other words, to be 
fully rational, in the sense of avoiding contradiction, the law must be normatively 
consistent. As a matter of normative consistency, therefore, the other-regarding values 
reflected in many other areas of English law must feed back into the law of commercial 
relations, whether this refers to joint ventures, corporations or spot contracts. I contend 
that this would rationalise the law of commercial relations as a whole (at the very least, 
with respect to the good-faith-in-contract debate) but there is another benefit to 
achieving such normative consistency. This is the acknowledgment that the law, 
particularly commercial law, is not in the business of protecting and/or regulating legal 
fictions (e.g. the limited company) in their various guises and interactions, but is 
ultimately concerned with regulating market relations, as a cornerstone of human life 
and activity.
																																																													
2 For an argument along these lines focusing on the interaction of human rights and intellectual property 
law, see Adcock and Beyleveld, ibid. 
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